ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO REMOVE PLAINTIFF LINDA BROWN AS GUARDIAN A.D. LITEM FOR PLAINTIFF NATSUE ELLIOTT [ECF No. 179]

         Hon. Cynthia Bashant, United States District Judge

          In the wake of the final pre-trial conference proceedings on October 15, 2018 (ECF No. 176) and the Court’s issuance of the Final Pretrial Order (ECF No. 178), the parties have filed a series of pre-trial motions. In relevant part, Defendants Versa CIC, L.P. ("Versa") and ConAm Management Corporation ("ConAm") (together, "Defendants") have filed a motion to remove Plaintiff Linda Brown as the guardian ad litem in this case for her mother, Plaintiff Natsue Brown, and to appoint an unrelated guardian ad litem. (ECF No. 179.) Plaintiffs oppose. (ECF No. 194.) For the reasons herein, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to remove Plaintiff Brown as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Elliott.

          BACKGROUND

         Simultaneously with the filing of the initial complaint on February 3, 2016, Plaintiff Linda Brown moved to be appointed as guardian ad litem for her mother. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Brown’s motion set forth five reasons: (1) she is the natural-born daughter of Natsue Elliott: (2) she is also a named plaintiff in the action: (3) Elliott is mentally incapacitated due to Alzheimer’s disease; (4) on or about July 1, 2015, Elliott executed a power of attorney appointing Brown as her agent; (5) and Brown "is competent and willing to act as guardian ad litem for her mother, Natsue Elliott, in this case." (Id. at 1-2.) The Court granted Plaintiff Brown’s motion in March 2016. (ECF No. 6.)

          Over two and half years after the Court’s appointment of Plaintiff Brown as guardian ad litem for her mother, Defendants seek her removal. (ECF No. 179.) Defendants argue that Brown does not have the "right to prosecute a [sic] claims or litigation on Ms. Elliott’s behalf." (Id. at 7.) They contend that the Court approved Brown’s guardian ad litem application at the commencement of the litigation based on "misleading information that Ms. Elliott had conferred Ms. Brown the right" to litigate on her behalf, but subsequent discovery has revealed that Brown has a "defective power of attorney document." (Id. at 2.) Defendants further contend that Plaintiff Brown can no longer serve as the guardian ad litem for her mother in this case because "Ms. Brown is conflicted" due to her lawyer’s alleged conduct in other cases involving incompetent plaintiffs. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants thus "request that the Court remove Plaintiff Linda Brown as the guardian ad litem for plaintiff Natsue Elliott and appoint an independent and unrelated guardian[.]" The Court denies this motion in its entirety.

          LEGAL STANDARD

         Rule 17(c) establishes certain rules regarding representation of minors and competent persons in federal court actions. First, for individuals "with a representative," the Rule provides that "[t]he following representatives may sue or defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a committee; (C) a conservator; or (D) a like fiduciary." Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)(1). Second, for individuals "without a representative," the Rule provides that "[a] minor or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem— or issue another appropriate order— to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)(2) (emphasis added).

          Pursuant to Rule 17(c)(2), the federal court thus has the power to appoint a special representative for a minor or incompetent plaintiff. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986). "The role of the guardian ad litem is to protect the incompetent person’s rights in the action, to control the litigation, to compromise or settle, to direct the procedural steps, and make stipulations." Golin v. Allenby, 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 644, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 762 (Cal. Ct.App. 2010). As a general matter, the decision whether to appoint a guardian ad litem is "normally left to the sound discretion of the trial court." United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 1986). Relatedly, in its discretion, the Court may remove a guardian ad litem if she acts contrary to the best interests of the minor or incompetent plaintiff, has a conflict of interest with the minor or incompetent plaintiff, or demonstrates an inability or refusal to act. See Garlick v. Cty. of Kern, No.1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22236, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2015) (citing Hull By Hull v. U.S., 53 F.3d 1125, 1127 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995) and M.K. v. Harter, 716 F.Supp. 1333, 1335-36 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ).

          ANALYSIS

         The distinctions drawn in Rule 17(c) are dispositive of Defendants’ motion. The Court’s appointment order expressly appointed Brown as the "guardian ad litem for her mother, Natsue Elliott" solely "for the purposes of this action" pursuant to Rule 17(c)(2). (ECF No. 6 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)(2).) By citing Rule 17(c)(2), the Court’s order makes clear that the Court appointed Brown to represent Elliott specifically for the purposes of this action and not on the ground that she is Elliott’s general representative. Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion that the Court appointed her "[b]ased upon Ms. Brown’s representation" about the power of attorney (ECF No. 179 at 3), the Court’s order did not identify the power of attorney— one of five reasons listed in the motion for appointment as guardian ad litem— as the basis for Brown’s appointment. (ECF No. 6.) Defendants do not argue that the other four reasons identified in Brown’s motion were false. The Court finds that those reasons were adequate to appoint Brown as Elliott’s guardian ad litem at the time of its appointment order and they remain adequate.

         Defendants further intimate that Brown is conflicted from acting as a guardian ad litem for Elliott and thus should be removed on this basis. Defendants initially contend that a conflict arises because Brown is also a plaintiff in this case and is related to Elliott. (ECF No. 179 at 7-8.) They argue that the denial of the plaintiff mother’s motion to be appointed guardian ad litem for her minor children in Hernandez v. Starlight Mgmt-17 LP, CV 17-3661 PA (FFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151115 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017), shows why this is so. Even accepting that Hernandez’s "concern" that the appointment of such a plaintiff as a guardian "may create a conflict of interest" that warrants denial of the motion in a particular case, this Court does not find that "concern" applicable to this case. Id. at *2. This case has been pending for nearly two and a half years. Defendants have not identified any concrete conflict of interest that has arisen during the pendency of this litigation due to the mere fact that Brown is also a plaintiff in this case and is related to Elliott.

         Defendants further claim that a conflict arises due to the purported conduct of Plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel of other unrelated plaintiffs in cases involving settlements with minors or incompetent persons. (ECF No. 179 at 10, 16-18.) Specifically, Defendants suggest that throughout the federal courts in California, competent plaintiff guardian ad litems conspire with their counsel to exact higher settlement awards and attorneys’ fees whereas minor and incompetent plaintiffs receive far less. (Id. at 9.) These issues are inapposite at the current stage of the proceedings. The case has not settled and the Court has not been presented with a motion to approve a settlement on behalf of Elliott.

         Even if this case settles, removal of Brown as a guardian ad litem is not the appropriate measure. Both sides recognize that any settlement of Elliott’s claims will require this Court’s approval. (ECF No. 179 at 12-13; ECF No.); S.D. Cal. L.R. 17.1(a) ("No action by or on behalf of a minor or incompetent, or in which a minor or incompetent has an interest, will be settled, compromised, voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated without court order or judgment. All settlements and compromises must be reviewed by a magistrate judge before any order of approval will issue."). To the extent Defendants are concerned that the Court would approve a settlement without full knowledge about what a competent plaintiff and the attorney have received, the Court may order disclosure of such information as a condition of approval. See Cortes v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance, No. 3:16-CV-1834-CAB-(MDD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184100 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2018).

          CONCLUSION & ORDER

          For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to remove Plaintiff Brown as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Elliott is DENIED. (ECF No. 179.)

          IT IS SO ORDERED.