OPINION

DONALD R. ROSS, Justice

Rita Ann Ehrhardt was charged by indictment with recklessly causing bodily injury to Timbre Reid, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by biting Reid, a family member, on the arm. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04 (Vernon 2003) (injury to a child). The indicted offense was a state jail felony. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04(f). Ehrhardt waived a jury trial and submitted the matter to the trial court. The trial court found Ehrhardt guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed punishment at one year's confinement in the Wood County jail, probated for a period of two years, and a $500.00 fine. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.44 (Vernon 2003) (reduction of state jail felony punishment to misdemeanor punishment). The trial court did not enter an affirmative finding of family violence. On appeal, Ehrhardt challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. She contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to overcome her claim of self-defense. A person commits the offense of injury to a child if he or she recklessly causes bodily injury to a person fourteen years of age or younger. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04. A person acts recklessly if, "with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 2003). Our law also recognizes the doctrine of self-defense, which excuses from criminal sanction the defendant's use of force against an attacker when certain circumstances are proven at trial. "[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.31(a) (Vernon 2003). "The use of force against another is not justified: . . . if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force," unless the actor abandoned the encounter and the other continued or attempted to use unlawful force against the actor. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.31(b) (Vernon 2003). The defendant has the burden to come forward with evidence of self-defense. Clifton v. State, 21 S.W.3d 906, 907 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). Once a defendant brings forth evidence to support a theory of self-defense, the state bears the burden of persuasion to disprove this defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The state may satisfy this burden of persuasion by meeting its simultaneous burden of proving its case-in-chief beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Boget v. State, 40 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2001), aff'd, 74 S.W.3d 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). This is because "[t]he burden of persuasion is not one that requires the production of evidence, rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 (citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913-14). When the fact-finder finds a defendant guilty, there is an implied finding against the defensive theory. Id. To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must admit some affirmative physical conduct toward the other party-usually admitting the charged offense-and then offer self-defense as a justification. Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (cited favorably in Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App. Texarkana 2002), aff'd, 106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)); see Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d 307, 314-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Withers v. State, 994 S.W.2d 742, 745-46 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref'd); Holloman v. State, 948 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.). Nicole Marie Russell testified that, on September 9, 2001, Ehrhardt came to her home in an intoxicated condition. She said Ehrhardt sat on an ant mound while in the back yard. When Russell and Reid tried to get Ehrhardt out of the ants, Ehrhardt struck Russell in the face. Russell testified Ehrhardt continued shoving, pushing, slapping, and hitting her and Reid. Russell also saw Ehrhardt biting Reid. Reid testified she is fourteen years old and was trying to help Ehrhardt get to a vehicle so someone could take her home. Ehrhardt then fell on Reid as she was trying to stand up. Ehrhardt then bit Reid and would not release the bite until Russell forced Ehrhardt to stop biting. Reid denied striking or assaulting Ehrhardt before she was bitten. Ehrhardt admitted she bit Reid. Ehrhardt testified she did so because she wanted to be allowed to move away from the ants without assistance. According to Ehrhardt's testimony, when Reid and Russell continued to pull on Ehrhardt's arms, despite her protests, Ehrhardt bit Reid to get Reid to release her arm. When reviewing legal sufficiency, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and affirm if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Simmons v. State, No. 1840-02, 2003 Tex.Crim. App. LEXIS 161, at *5-6 (July 2, 2003). Whether the evidence satisfies the legal sufficiency test is a question of law. Collins v. State, 969 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.App. Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd). If we find the evidence legally insufficient, we must reverse the conviction and order an acquittal. Id. In conducting our review, we must also remember that the fact-finder is the exclusive arbiter of witness credibility and the weight to be given any or all of the witness testimony. Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 60 (Tex.App. Dallas 1999, no pet.). When faced with conflicting testimony, we must defer to the trial court's resolution of facts when the record supports such a resolution. The trial court's judgment in this case suggests it found the more credible testimony to be that of Reid. Such a finding is supported by Ehrhardt's admission that she was consuming alcohol on that day and Reid's testimony that Ehrhardt was intoxicated at the time she bit Reid. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the testimony established Ehrhardt acted at least recklessly when she bit the arm of Reid, a child fourteen years of age or younger, without justification. Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the judgment. We overrule Ehrhardt's first point of error and turn to whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's judgment.

[W]hen a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.