MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WESLEY E. BROWN, Senior District Judge

Plaintiff Jeffrey Dunn claims that on February 28, 2001, he was subjected to excessive force by officers of the City of Newton Police Department. Count One of his complaint alleges that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it prays for an award of damages against the City of Newton and the individual defendants. Counts Two and Three of the complaint, based on Kansas tort law, additionally allege that the City of Newton is liable for damages because it was negligent in its supervision and retention of the officers and in its failure to train the officers.

As indicated in the caption, plaintiff has asserted claims against the above-named officers in their individual and their official capacities. The defendants now move to dismiss the claims against the officers in their official capacities, arguing that such claims are redundant of plaintiff's claims against the City of Newton. The court concludes the motion should be granted in the interests of judicial economy and clarity. The Supreme Court has held that a suit against an individual in his official capacity is really just "another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. at 166. This means that the real party in interest in an official capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official. Where, as here, the plaintiff has named the City as a defendant on the § 1983 claim, asserting the same claim against the City's officers in their official capacities is considered redundant, and the latter allegations are typically dismissed for the sake of clarity. See e.g., Smith v. Bd. of County Com'rs. of County of Lyon, 216 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1219-20 (D.Kan. 2002); Sims v. Unified Gov't. of Wyandotte County, Ks., 120 F. Supp.2d 939, 945 (D.Kan. 2000). See also Booker v. Bd. of Educ. Baldwinsville Central, 238 F. Supp.2d 469, 475 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (D.Colo. 1996) ("[A] § 1983 claim is properly pled against a municipality either by naming the municipality itself or by naming a municipal official in his or her official capacity. . . . Naming either is sufficient. Naming both is redundant.").

As indicated above, there is no prejudice to the plaintiff from the granting of this motion because naming the City of Newton as a defendant is merely another way of naming the city's officers in their official capacities. Contrary to some of the arguments in plaintiff's brief, there is no distinction between the two. Plaintiff's argument that the dismissal of these allegations will somehow alter the City's potential liability under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) is misguided. Regardless of whether the § 1983 claim is characterized as one against the municipality or one against the municipality's officers in their official capacities, this portion of the claim is really against the municipality, and its potential liability under § 1983 is subject to the rule of Monell.

Conclusion.

IT IS SO ORDERED