GREG ABBOTT, Justice.

We grant the Flores family's motion for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion dated July 1, 1999, and substitute the following in its place.

This case concerns the exclusion of an expert witness's testimony for violating "the Rule" by discussing the case with a corporate representative. In addition, we clarify the proper procedure for applying settlement credits under Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code when all of the plaintiffs are seeking damages for injury to the same person. Based on our resolution of these issues, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment, as reformed, and remand this cause to the trial court to render judgment in accordance with this opinion.

I

Jorge Flores was employed as a roughneck/floorhand for Helmerick and Payne, a drilling contractor. Jorge's hand was severely injured during a well-drilling operation for Amoco Production Company. Jorge, his wife Maria, and their three children Gina, Jose, and Georgette, sued Amoco, Drilex Systems, Inc., MASX Energy Services Group, and MASCO Industries, Inc. for Jorge's injury.

Before trial, Amoco settled with all of the plaintiffs for a total of $774,675. The case proceeded to trial against Drilex, MASX, and MASCO ("Drilex"). On the first day of trial, Drilex invoked the Rule and asked that any witnesses present in the courtroom be sworn. The trial court swore in Jorge and Maria Flores and Tom Bailey, Drilex's corporate representative. The court noted that these individuals were parties, and instructed that "anybody else" who stayed in the courtroom for a considerable time would not be allowed to testify. Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267(d) requires the trial court to instruct witnesses placed under the Rule "that they are not to converse with each other or with any other person about the case other than the attorneys" and that "they are not to read any report of or comment upon the testimony in the case," Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(d), the trial court did not give such an admonishment at that time. Drilex did not attempt to have the trial court exempt its expert witnesses from the Rule.

Plaintiffs then called their first witness, Tom Bailey. During Bailey's testimony, one of Drilex's testifying expert witnesses, Randy Acock, remained present. On the second day of trial, counsel for the Flores family moved to strike Acock as a witness, arguing that Acock had violated the Rule by being present during part of Bailey's testimony. Drilex's counsel argued that Acock was exempt from the Rule because he was an expert. The trial court made no ruling at the time, and Acock left the courtroom.

When Drilex later called Acock to testify, counsel for the Flores family again objected to Acock's testimony on the basis that Acock was present for a portion of Bailey's testimony. After listening to counsel's arguments and discussing the substance of Acock's testimony, the court stated that it would allow Acock to testify. However, the court was then informed that Acock had also discussed the case with Bailey after Bailey had testified. Acock also admitted talking to another expert after hearing Bailey's testimony, but stated that they did not discuss Bailey's testimony. Based on this additional information, the trial court excluded Acock's testimony.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Drilex was sixty percent responsible, Amoco was thirty percent responsible, and Jorge Flores was ten percent responsible for causing Jorge's injuries, and awarded a total of $2,145,000 in damages. After applying a credit for the Flores family's settlement with Amoco, the trial court awarded Jorge $1,929,048, and ordered that all other plaintiffs take nothing.

Drilex appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly excluded Acock's testimony and failed to properly apply the settlement credit. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of Acock's testimony, but reformed the judgment after reallocating the settlement credit. Drilex petitioned for review in this Court. The Flores family filed a conditional petition for review solely on the settlement credit allocation issue.

II

Drilex argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Acock's testimony for violating the Rule, and that this error was harmful because Acock's testimony was necessary to the presentation of its defense. We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and in any event, the excluded testimony would have been cumulative.

A

Sequestration minimizes witnesses' tailoring their testimony in response to that of other witnesses and prevents collusion among witnesses testifying for the same side. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Hometown Real Estate Co., 890 S.W.2d 118, 130 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied); Gordon v. State, 796 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, pet. ref'd); 1 Goode et al., Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 614.1, at 656-57 (2d ed. 1993). The expediency of sequestration as a mechanism for preventing and detecting fabrication has been recognized for centuries. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1837, at 455-56 (Chadbourn rev., 1976). English courts incorporated sequestration long ago, and the practice came to the United States as part of our inheritance of the common law. Id. at 456; see also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976). Today, most jurisdictions have expressly provided for witness sequestration by statute or rule. See 6 Wigmore, supra § 1837, at 458.

In Texas, sequestration in civil litigation is governed by Texas Rule of Evidence 614 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267. These rules provide that, at the request of any party, the witnesses on both sides shall be removed from the courtroom to some place where they cannot hear the testimony delivered by any other witness in the cause. Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(a); Tex.R.Evid. 614. Certain classes of prospective witnesses, however, are exempt from exclusion from the courtroom, including: (1) a party who is a natural person or his or her spouse; (2) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person and who is designated as its representative by its attorney; or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the cause. Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(b); Tex.R.Evid. 614.

When the Rule is invoked, all parties should request the court to exempt any prospective witnesses whose presence is essential to the presentation of the cause. The burden rests with the party seeking to exempt an expert witness from the Rule's exclusion requirement to establish that the witness's presence is essential. See Burrhus v. MS Supply, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 635, 643 n. 7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Kelley v. State, 817 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cervantes, 584 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Witnesses found to be exempt by the trial court are not "placed under the Rule."

Once the Rule is invoked, all nonexempt witnesses must be placed under the Rule and excluded from the courtroom. Before being excluded, these witnesses must be sworn and admonished "that they are not to converse with each other or with any other person about the case other than the attorneys in the case, except by permission of the court, and that they are not to read any report of or comment upon the testimony in the case while under the rule." Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(a), (d). Thus, witnesses under the Rule generally may not discuss the case with anyone other than the attorneys in the case.

Witnesses exempt from exclusion under Rule 614 (and Rule 267) need not be sworn or admonished. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267(d) states that "[w]itnesses, when placed under Rule 614 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence, shall be instructed by the court that they are not to converse with each other or with any other person about the case other than the attorneys." Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(d) (emphasis added). The instruction requirement does not apply to exempt witnesses because they are not "placed under Rule 614."

A violation of the Rule occurs when a nonexempt prospective witness remains in the courtroom during the testimony of another witness, or when a nonexempt prospective witness learns about another's trial testimony through discussions with persons other than the attorneys in the case or by reading reports or comments about the testimony. When the Rule is violated, the trial court may, taking into consideration all of the circumstances, allow the testimony of the potential witness, exclude the testimony, or hold the violator in contempt. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(e); Triton Oil Gas Corp. v. E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We review the trial court's action for abuse of discretion. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Tex. 1965); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vanderburg, 581 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

B

Drilex asserts that there was no Rule violation because Acock was exempt from the Rule, he spoke only to another exempt witness, and neither witness was admonished not to discuss the case with others. Thus, contends Drilex, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Acock's testimony.

Drilex contends that the trial court "exempted" Acock from the Rule's requirement that witnesses be excluded when it ruled that Acock could testify despite the fact that he had remained in the courtroom during Bailey's testimony. Because witnesses exempt from exclusion are also exempt from Rule 267(d)'s admonishment not to discuss the case with others, Drilex argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it exempted Acock from the exclusion requirement but nevertheless excluded his testimony for discussing the case with Tom Bailey. The flaw in this argument is that Drilex never established — and the trial court never found — that Acock was in fact exempt. After being told that Acock had been present during Bailey's testimony, the trial court concluded that he would allow Acock to testify. As noted, a court may, subject to review for abuse of discretion, allow a witness to testify even though the witness has violated the Rule by remaining in the courtroom during another witness's testimony. See, e.g., Garza v. Cole, 753 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a video technician to testify despite his violating the Rule because he was not a fact witness and his testimony was cumulative). But a decision to allow a witness to testify despite his presence in the courtroom is not the same as a finding that the witness is exempt from the Rule. Thus, although Drilex is correct that a witness who is exempt from exclusion is also exempt from Rule 267(d)'s requirement not to discuss the case with others, the trial court did not actually exempt Acock from the exclusion requirement.

Drilex also argues that all expert witnesses are exempt from the Rule under the essential presence exception in Rules 614 and 267, and therefore Acock was exempt. See Tex.R.Evid. 614; Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(b) (both exempting from exclusion persons whose presence is shown to be essential to the presentation of the cause). Drilex is correct that this exception is often relied on to allow expert witnesses to be exempt from the Rule. See Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d 45, 52 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ dism'd); Triton Oil, 509 S.W.2d at 685. But nothing in Rules 614 or 267 suggests that all expert witnesses qualify for exemption. See Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 630 (6th Cir.) ("[H]ad the framers intended [an automatic exemption for experts], they would have said so, or added a fourth exception."), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). Although an expert witness may typically be found exempt under the essential presence exception, experts are not automatically exempt. Instead, Rules 614 and 267 vest in trial judges broad discretion to determine whether a witness is essential. See Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 629 (4th Cir. 1996); Polythane Sys., Inc. v. Marina Ventures Int'l, Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1116 (1994). But see Morvant, 570 F.2d at 630 ("[W]here a fair showing has been made that the [presence of the] expert witness is in fact required for the management of the case, and this is made clear to the trial court, we believe that the trial court is bound to accept any reasonable, substantiated representation to this effect by counsel.").

Drilex presented no evidence to the trial court to establish that Acock should have been exempt, other than its argument that experts are per se exempt. Drilex could have presented evidence that Acock needed to be present to form his opinions based on more accurate factual assumptions, see Tex.R.Evid. 703, but it did not do so. Moreover, Acock admitted in the bill of exceptions that he did not need to be present in the courtroom. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to exempt Acock from the Rule.

Drilex further contends that Rule 614 "did not apply to Tom Bailey and it could not serve as a predicate for preventing him from discussing the case with Mr. Acock." Tom Bailey, Drilex's designated corporate representative, was exempt from exclusion, and the trial court recognized that Bailey was exempt. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 267(b)(2) (exempting "an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person and who is designated as its representative by its attorney"); Fazzino v. Guido, 836 S.W.2d 271, 277 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). But the record indicates that the trial court based its decision to disqualify Acock partly on its belief that Bailey violated the Rule. The trial court stated that, although Bailey was exempt from the Rule for the purpose of exclusion from the courtroom, he was under the Rule for the purpose of discussing the case with other witnesses, and thus he violated the Rule by discussing the case with Acock. As stated previously, a witness such as Bailey who is exempt from exclusion is also exempt from the Rule for purposes of discussing the case with others. Bailey was not under the Rule for any purpose — only Acock was. Accordingly, this basis for the trial court's decision to exclude Acock was erroneous. We will nevertheless uphold the trial court's ruling if there is any legitimate basis for it in the record. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998) ("An appellate court must uphold the trial court's evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling.").

The trial court also stated that it would not allow Acock to testify because he discussed the case with another witness although he was under the Rule. The proper focus in determining whether Acock's testimony should have been excluded is whether Acock, not Bailey, was exempt from Rule 614. If Acock was not exempt, he was not free to discuss the case with Bailey, regardless of whether Bailey was exempt from the Rule. Because Acock was never exempted from Rule 614, he was not free to discuss the case with another witness, and his doing so violated the Rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.

We acknowledge that the court never expressly placed Acock under the Rule and never instructed him not to discuss the case with others. However, a court may, in its discretion, exclude the testimony of a prospective witness who technically violates the Rule even though the witness was never actually placed under the Rule. See Johnson, 389 S.W.2d at 647 ("[W]e disagree with the plaintiff's position that under no circumstances may the Court, in its discretion, refuse to allow testimony where the rule has been invoked and where the proffered witness has either violated the rule, or . . . has not been placed under the rule."); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vanderburg, 581 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 n. 5 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of a prospective witness who discussed the case with another witness, even though the disqualified witness was not present in the courtroom when the Rule was invoked and was never placed under the Rule); 3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 19:40[b], at 566-67 (George ed., 1992) (trial court may exclude witness who violated the Rule although he was not placed under it).

Drilex invoked the Rule and was obligated to ensure that its witnesses either complied with the Rule or were exempted from it. See Johnson, 389 S.W.2d at 648; see also 6 Wigmore, supra § 1842, at 477 ("[T]he burden of causing every witness to be notified, and thus of preventing inadvertent violation, may fairly be placed upon the party demanding sequestration."). Drilex did neither. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in disqualifying Acock even though the court never actually placed Acock under the Rule and failed to appropriately instruct him.

Additionally, we note that it may be an abuse of discretion in some circumstances to disqualify a witness even when the witness has violated the Rule. However, Drilex has not argued that excluding Acock's testimony was an abuse of discretion even if Acock was not exempt from the Rule, and therefore we do not decide that question.

Last, we agree with the court of appeals that the excluded testimony was largely cumulative, and thus Drilex was not harmed by Acock's disqualification. See Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 966 S.W.2d 467, 474 (Tex. 1998).

III

Drilex also complains that the court of appeals failed to properly credit the Amoco settlement. The agreed judgment between the Flores family and Amoco specified the settlement amounts distributed to each of the family members:

Jorge Maria $425,000

Jorge individually $266,730

Gina Flores $29,374

Jose Flores $27,286

Georgette Flores $26,285

$774,675

The jury awarded the Flores family $2,145,000 in damages, allocated as follows:

Jorge $2,000,000

Maria $100,000

Gina $15,000

Jose $15,000

Georgette $15,000

$2,145,000

In determining how to allocate the settlement money as a credit against the family members, the court of appeals noted that the agreed settlement with Amoco distributed the money in individual payments to individual claimants (Jorge, Gina, Jose, and Georgette) in addition to the lump sum of $425,000 awarded to multiple claimants (Jorge and Maria). 961 S.W.2d at 215. The court then applied two different methods of allocation, one for the individual payments, and one for the lump-sum payment.

For the lump-sum payment, the court of appeals used a percent-allocation method. Specifically, the court determined that Jorge's percent of the total jury award to Jorge and Maria was about ninety-five percent ($2,000,000/$2,100,000), and Maria's about five percent ($100,000/$2,100,000). The court of appeals allocated ninety-five percent of the $425,000 ($404,762) as a credit against Jorge's recovery, and five percent of the $425,000 ($20,238) as a credit against Maria's recovery.

Then, to allocate the credits for the individual settlement payments, the court of appeals credited each individual plaintiff's settlement payment against each individual plaintiff's jury award. Because the children had already received more in settlement money than they were awarded by the jury, the court rendered judgment that the children take nothing. After also deducting ten percent for Jorge's contributory negligence from Jorge's and Maria's recovery, the court of appeals awarded $1,128,508.10 to Jorge and $69,761.91 to Maria.

Justice Rickhoff dissented, arguing that the entire family should have been treated as one claimant rather than as individual claimants, and therefore the total of the settlement money paid to the Flores family should have been deducted from the total amount awarded to the family by the jury. After making the deduction, Justice Rickhoff would have allocated the remaining damages among the plaintiffs based on their respective percentages of the total jury verdict. 961 S.W.2d at 216 (Rickhoff, J., dissenting).

Drilex argues that the court of appeals majority erred because it did not deduct the full $774,675 paid by Amoco from the Flores family's recovery and therefore did not deduct "the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements" as mandated by section 33.012(b)(1) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Drilex further contends that the court of appeals erred by treating the family members as separate claimants for purposes of deducting the settlement credit, and urges that the dissent below reached the correct result. We agree.

Application of the settlement credit in this case is governed by Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 33.002(a); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 926 (Tex. 1998). Section 33.012 requires the trial court to reduce the judgment according to one of two methods — a dollar-for-dollar credit or a sliding scale — elected by the defendant. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code §§ 33.012, 33.014. Drilex elected the dollar-for-dollar credit in section 33.012 (b)(1), which provides:

If the claimant has settled with one or more persons, the court shall further reduce the amount of damages to be recovered by the claimant with respect to a cause of action by a credit equal to . . .

(1) the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements. . . .

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 33.012 (b) (emphasis added).

Section 33.011(1) defines "claimant" as a party seeking recovery of damages pursuant to the provisions of Section 33.001. . . . In an action in which a party seeks recovery of damages for injury to another person, damage to the property of another person, death of another person, or other harm to another person, `claimant' includes both that other person and the party seeking recovery of damages pursuant to the provisions of Section 33.001.

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 33.011(1) (emphasis added).

All of the Flores family members are seeking recovery of damages for injury to Jorge. Thus, under the plain language of section 33.011(1), the term "claimant" in section 33.012(b)(1) includes all of the family members. See J.D. Abrams, Inc. v. McIver, 966 S.W.2d 87, 96 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Tex. 1993) (construing the almost identical definition of "claimant" in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.001 and concluding that "when a party is seeking exemplary damages for the death of an individual, both the deceased and the persons seeking recovery are defined as a claimant").

If the Legislature had intended that each of the parties seeking recovery for damages for the same person be treated as individual claimants, it could easily have written the statute as follows: "In an action in which a party seeks recovery of damages for injury to another person . . . both that other person and the party seeking recovery of damages are claimants." Instead, the Legislature provided that "`claimant' includes both that other person and the party seeking recovery of damages." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 33.011(1). We are bound to apply the Legislature's chosen definition. See Tijerina v. City of Tyler, 846 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. 1992). Thus, the court of appeals erred in treating each of the Flores family members as individual claimants rather than as one claimant.

Because we must view the entire Flores family as one claimant for section 33.012 (b)(1) purposes, the total of all damages to be recovered by the family must be reduced by the total of all settlements received by the family. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 33.012 (b)(1) (requiring that the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements entered into by a claimant be deducted from the amount of damages to be recovered by that claimant). Accordingly, the $2,145,000 to be recovered by the family must be reduced by $774,675, the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements received by the family. See C H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 321 (Tex. 1994); McIver, 966 S.W.2d at 96. Then, to give effect to the jury verdict, the remaining damages should be allocated among the parties seeking recovery based on each party's percentage of the total verdict awarded to the claimant by the jury. See 961 S.W.2d at 216 (Rickhoff, J., dissenting); see also Gem Homes, Inc. v. Contreras, 861 S.W.2d 449, 460 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).

Applying these principles, the Flores family's damages are calculated as follows:

TOTAL JURY AWARD TO FAMILY CLAIMANT: $2,145,000

LESS 10% CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: $214,500

LESS TOTAL SETTLEMENT FROM AMOCO: $774,675

TOTAL AWARD (BEFORE ALLOCATION) $ 1,155,825

The remaining amount is then allocated among the family members according to their respective percentages of the total jury award, as follows:

(A) (B) (C) Jury Award % of Total Jury $1,155,825 Award (approx.) Allocated by % of Award ($1,155,825 x column (B))

Jorge $2,000,000 .9324 $1,077,692.31 Maria $100,000 .0466 $53,884.62 Gina $15,000 .00699 $8,082.69 Jose $15,000 .00699 $8,082.69 Georgette $15,000 .00699 $8,082.69 $2,145,000 100% $1,155,825.00

The family contends that this method of applying the settlement credit would result in "gross inequities" in some cases. For example, the family correctly points out that some plaintiffs may recover more than the amount awarded by the jury, and some plaintiffs' awards will be reduced by settlement amounts paid to other plaintiffs. Although such results may seem harsh, they are mandated by the statutory language and are consistent with legislative intent.

The Legislature is presumed to intend the plain language of its legislative enactments, and we must give effect to the legislative intent. See Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1994). As to each claimant, the Legislature provided that defendants would receive a credit equal to "the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements" paid to that claimant. In addition, the Legislature defined claimant to include both the injured party and the party or parties seeking recovery of damages for injury to that person. Deducting the aggregate of all settlement amounts received by a claimant from the aggregate judgment awarded that claimant ensures that defendants will receive the full settlement credit provided by the statute.

Moreover, this method of allocation, which is not affected by the actual disbursement of the settlement money among the plaintiffs, is necessary to protect defendants from plaintiffs who "would manipulate settlements among those `seek(ing) recovery of damages for injury to another person.'" McIver, 966 S.W.2d at 97. Because they generally have no control over how other defendants' settlements are structured, nonsettling defendants should not be penalized for the way in which the plaintiffs distribute the money among themselves. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d at 928 ("Nonsettling parties should not be penalized for events over which they have no control."); see also Gem Homes, 861 S.W.2d at 460 ("We find [that] . . . allocation of settlement credit upon the percentage of damages found by the jury, rather than a percentage decided by the plaintiffs themselves for reasons of their own, is a more equitable method of assessing credit."). Using a method of allocation that is not dependent on the distribution of the settlement money chosen by the plaintiffs is the best method of ensuring that nonsettling defendants are not penalized.

* * * * *

In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in applying the settlement credit and we therefore modify the court of appeals' judgment. Because we also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Acock's testimony for violating the Rule, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment, as reformed, and remand this cause to the trial court to render judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Justice OWEN, joined by Chief Justice PHILLIPS and Justice HECHT, dissenting.