Opinion
2011-12-6
Richard DiSanza, Carmel, N.Y., appellant pro se. Thomas F. Wood, Town Attorney, Montrose, N.Y., for respondents.
Richard DiSanza, Carmel, N.Y., appellant pro se. Thomas F. Wood, Town Attorney, Montrose, N.Y., for respondents.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Town Board of the Town of Cortlandt dated January 12, 2010, which abolished the position of environmental analyst, and to reinstate the petitioner to that position with back pay, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cacace, J.), entered August 12, 2010, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
A public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency ( see Matter of Hritz–Seifts v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 22 A.D.3d 493, 803 N.Y.S.2d 656; Matter of Rose v. City of Newburgh, 239 A.D.2d 587, 658 N.Y.S.2d 986). One who challenges the validity of such an act has the burden of proving that the employer did not act in good faith in abolishing the position ( see Matter of Hritz–Seifts v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 22 A.D.3d at 493, 803 N.Y.S.2d 656; Matter of Rose v. City of Newburgh, 239 A.D.2d at 588, 658 N.Y.S.2d 986; Matter of Rosenthal v. Gilroy, 208 A.D.2d 748, 749, 617 N.Y.S.2d 509; see also Matter of Aldazabal v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 787, 788, 406 N.Y.S.2d 32, 377 N.E.2d 476). Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proving that the Town Board of the Town of Cortlandt did not act in good faith ( see Matter of Hritz–Seifts v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 22 A.D.3d at 493, 803 N.Y.S.2d 656; Matter of Rose v. City of Newburgh, 239 A.D.2d at 588, 658 N.Y.S.2d 986; see also Matter of Linney v. City of Plattsburgh, 49 A.D.3d 1020, 1021–1022, 853 N.Y.S.2d 227).
Moreover, the petitioner's contention that the Town Board of the Town of Cortlandt violated Civil Service Law § 75–b is without merit, as the record contains no evidence that the petitioner's position was eliminated in retaliation for whistle-blowing activities ( see Civil Service Law § 75–b[2] [a]; Suarez v. New York City Dept. of Probation, 268 A.D.2d 203, 700 N.Y.S.2d 682).
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, he failed to raise a triable issue of fact that would have necessitated a hearing ( see CPLR 7804[h]; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. Rockland County Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 39 A.D.3d 641, 643, 834 N.Y.S.2d 263; cf. Matter of Weber v. County of Nassau, 215 A.D.2d 567, 569, 627 N.Y.S.2d 64).
The petitioner's remaining contention is not properly before this Court, as it is raised for the first time on appeal ( see Dance Magic, Inc. v. Pike Realty, Inc., 85 A.D.3d 1083, 1089, 926 N.Y.S.2d 588).