Opinion
2:22-cv-02435-SAL-MGB
01-17-2023
Devon Roy-Devantrez' Bernard Crawford, Plaintiff, v. Marion County Detention Center and Mullins Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Devon Roy-Devantrez' Bernard Crawford (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the Marion County Detention Center (“MCDC”) and Mullins Police Department (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant action is premised on an incident that apparently occurred while Plaintiff “was in custody of Mullins Police Department and/or Marion County Detention Center” in December 2021. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) More specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was “detained and transported” to MCDC “for outstanding legal obligations” and “sustained fatal injuries.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the Mullins Police Department then altered the police report, the location of which is “unknown.” (Id.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights and appears to seek $25 million in damages. (Id. at 3, 6.) Plaintiff also asks for the release of all video evidence involving his arrest and detainment, and “[e]mployment termination and independent investigation of those who voluntarily betrayed the trust and authority bestowed upon them by the citizens of South Carolina.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
Upon reviewing the Complaint in this case, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 7.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the time prescribed by the order would result in summary dismissal. (Id. at 3.) The order also warned Plaintiff that it was his responsibility to promptly notify the Clerk of Court regarding any changes to his address, and that his case would be dismissed if he missed a filing deadline set by the Court because he failed to do so. (Id. at 4.)
Despite the undersigned's warnings, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the time prescribed by the order. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the undersigned issued a second order granting Plaintiff another opportunity to file an amended pleading. (Dkt. No. 11.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading, and the time to comply with the undersigned's orders has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The instant Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a claim to relief under § 1983 for several reasons.
First, while the Complaint references the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the bare, cursory nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it very difficult for this Court to ascertain the facts underlying his constitutional claims. Indeed, while Plaintiff alludes to “injuries” he sustained while in custody, he does not provide any further context regarding the type of injuries suffered or how he came to sustain them. Without more, the undersigned simply cannot surmise a constitutional violation from the Complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that while the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278 (stating that “district judges are not mind readers” and need not “construct full-blown claims” from “sentence fragments” on the Pro se plaintiff's behalf).
Next, MCDC and the Mullins Police Department do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020) (explaining that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not ‘persons' and do not act under color of state law”); see also, e.g., Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011); Coleman v. Columbia Police Dep't, No. 3:21-cv-1806-JFA-PJG, 2021 WL 4778515, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 4777305 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2021); Madison v. Shell, No. 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA, 2022 WL 17156885, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 17128451 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2022); Freeman v. Anderson City Police Dep't, No. 8:21-cv-3872-JMC-JDA, 2022 WL 507610, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 507424 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2022). Consequently, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 7 at 2), any such claims against these Defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Finally, the Complaint appears to request that the Court terminate the employment of certain unidentified individuals associated with the Mullins Police Department and/or MCDC. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) “[T]he federal courts are not personnel directors for state offices or officials.” See Hoffman v. Smart-Gittings, No. 9:18-cv-1146-RMG-BM, 2019 WL 8759417, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2019) (explaining that a federal district court lacks the inherent power to remove or otherwise discipline state officials not within the executive control of that federal district court). Thus, any such relief is unattainable in this action. Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to initiate a criminal investigation into Defendants' actions, a private citizen cannot obtain criminal charges against defendants or demand a criminal investigation through a civil action. See Id. (noting that a private citizen “has no constitutional, statutory, or common law right to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime”) (internal citations omitted); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). (See also Dkt. No. 7 at 2-3.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint without further leave to amend, as he has already had several opportunities to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).