Opinion
C. A. 3:21-1806-JFA-PJG
09-17-2021
William T. Coleman, Plaintiff, v. Columbia Police Department; Officer Beech; North Charleston Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff William T. Coleman, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that Defendants Columbia Police Department and North Charleston Police Department should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
In a contemporaneous order, the court authorized the issuance and service of process against Defendant Officer Beech.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff claims that the North Charleston Police Department obtained an unlawful warrant for Plaintiff's arrest, and Columbia Police officers, including Defendant Beech, came to Plaintiff's house and arrested him. Plaintiff claims he presented exculpatory evidence to Beech, and Beech agreed Plaintiff should not be arrested, but Beech sought to arrest him anyway. Plaintiff attempted to flee, was tased, and was knocked unconscious and apprehended. Plaintiff claims Beech's actions were motivated by race because Beech made comments about race during the arrest. The Columbia Police Department turned Plaintiff over to the North Charleston Police Department. Plaintiff was released on bond and the charges were later dismissed for lack of evidence to prosecute. Plaintiff claims his arrest was unlawful and he seeks damages for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious, ” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
In accordance with the court's duty to liberally construe pro se complaints, the court construes it as asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the Columbia Police Department and the North Charleston Police Department. A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Initially, the court notes that a “police department” is not a corporate or political body that is amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”); see, e.g., Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Brown v. City of N. Charleston Police Dep't, C/A No. 2:19-3180-RMG, 2020 WL 1169219 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020) (“But the City of North Charleston Police Department is not a ‘person' subject to suit under § 1983.”). Therefore, the defendant police departments are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for that reason alone.
But even if Plaintiff named the proper legal entity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under a theory of municipal liability. A plaintiff who seeks to assert a § 1983 claim against a municipality for acts done by a municipal official or employee must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff's injury. See Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)). “[M]unicipalities are not liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles for all constitutional violations of their employees simply because of the employment relationship.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94). “Instead, municipal liability results only ‘when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.' ” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Because municipal liability results only when the municipality itself can be directly charged with fault for a constitutional violation, it results only when policy or custom as above defined is (1) fairly attributable to the municipality as its own, and (2) the moving force behind the particular constitutional violation.” Id. at 1386-87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff provides no allegations that would plausibly show that his arrest-even if unlawful-was in any way attributable to the municipalities. Plaintiff's allegations concern only the facts surrounding his arrest, and he makes no reference to any policies or customs of the municipalities to show that they were the cause of his purportedly unlawful arrest. See, e.g., Est. of Jones by Jones v. City of Martinsburg, W. Virginia, 961 F.3d 661, 672 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that for a single incident to warrant the imposition of municipal liability, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the municipality failed to train its employees to “handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to make any allegations that could plausibly show that the defendant police departments could be held liable for Plaintiffs purportedly unlawful arrest.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants Columbia Police Department and North Charleston Police Department be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).