Opinion
No. CV 03-0829600
August 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Facts
The plaintiff State of Connecticut commissioner of labor, Shaun Cashman, brings the present action for the collection of unpaid wages against the defendant, Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72. The action was commenced by service of process upon the defendant on October 27, 2003. The plaintiff alleges the following.
The defendant was the general contractor on the project known as Oliver Wolcott Regional Vocational Technical School additions and renovations. The plaintiff performed an audit of the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 31-76a, which revealed that the defendant failed to pay specified employees the required prevailing wage rate prescribed by the commissioner of labor under General Statutes § 31-53. The plaintiff made demand upon the defendant to tender payment in accordance with its findings. The defendant failed to make such payment in violation of General Statutes § 31-71b. The plaintiff seeks double damages from the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72 and civil penalties pursuant to General Statutes § 31-69a.
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of its first special defense, that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant's motion is supported by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff objects to the motion on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-596 does not apply to the commissioner of labor when he brings a lawsuit for unpaid wages because it does not apply to the state by its express terms. Additionally, because one of the persons specified in this action filed a complaint for unpaid wages with the commissioner of labor, the statute of limitations is tolled as to that person and all others similarly situated. CT Page 11996-ah
The defendant also filed a reply brief and affidavits in response to the plaintiff's objection. It is unnecessary to consider the content of the affidavits because the defendant's position is not supported by the applicable statutory or case law.
Because the court finds that this statute of limitations does not apply to the state the court does not reach this argument.
DISCUSSION
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitation grounds when the "material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute . . ." Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).
The statute of limitations applicable to this case is set forth in General Statutes § 52-596. "No action for the payment of remuneration for employment payable periodically shall be brought but within two years after the right of action accrues, except that this limitation shall be tolled upon the filing with the Labor Commissioner of a complaint of failure to pay wages pursuant to the provisions of chapter 558." General Statutes § 52-596.
"It may be stated we think as a universal rule in the construction of statutes limiting rights, that they are not to be construed to embrace the government or sovereignty unless by express terms or necessary implication such appears to have been the clear intention of the legislature, and the rights of the government are not to be impaired by a statute unless its terms are clear and explicit, and admit of no other construction . . . The State holds the immunities in this respect belonging by the English common law to the King." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 320, 323-24, 278 A.2d 818 (1971); see Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 516-17 (1893); see Joyell v. Commissioner of Education, 45 Conn.App. 476, 485-86, 696 A.2d 1039, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 910, 701 A.2d 330 (1997) (the plaintiff's claim of violation of the statute of limitations was unavailing because there was not an applicable statute of limitations and because the board was an agency of the state not subject to a statute of limitations unless expressly declared by the legislature); Towbin v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 71 Conn.App. 153, 177, 801 A.2d 851, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 908, 810 A.2d 277 (2002) (reiterating, in dicta, the rule set forth in Joyell v. Commissioner of Education, supra, 486, in the context of a constitutional claim founded on a delay in bringing an action).
In State v. Goldfarb, the issue before the court was whether General Statutes § 45-205 (now General Statutes § 45a-395), the statute limiting the time in which claims can be brought against a decedent's estate, was CT Page 11996-ai applicable to the state. There the court, while acknowledging the inapplicability of statutes of limitation to the state generally, found that the statute at issue there did apply to the state because it imposed "a condition precedent to a legal recovery against a solvent estate." State v. Goldfarb, supra, 160 Conn. 325. Nevertheless, the language of State v. Goldfarb, on the issue of whether statutes of limitations apply to actions brought by the state, has been relied upon in numerous subsequent decisions where the question was considered. See, e.g., Department of Transportation v. Canevari, 37 Conn.Sup. 899, 442 A.2d 1358 (App. Sess. 1982) (affirming the trial court's decision to strike a special defense of the statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-584 where the plaintiff was the Department of Transportation); King v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket Nos. CV 910287324 and CV 910287123 (January 26, 1995, Rush, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 321) (third-party action brought by state not barred by General Statutes § 52-584 because sovereign is not impliedly bound by statute of limitations); Rocque v. Xtra Lease, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 000598293 (June 8, 2001, Beach, J.) (state not bound by statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-577c); Commissioner v. Kapadwala, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 990590472 (Feb. 13, 2001, Rittenband, J.T.R.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 210) (motion to strike special defense of statutes of limitations pursuant to General Statutes § 52-577c, 52-577 or 52-584 granted based on holding in Joyell v. Commissioner of Education, supra, 45 Conn.App. 476).
The defendant attempts to factually distinguish the present case from those cited by the plaintiff but disregards the principle upon which these cases were decided: that the rights of the sovereign cannot be impaired by statute unless the legislature has done so explicitly. State v. Goldfarb, supra, 160 Conn. 323-24. Here, the statute is silent as to whether the state is bound by the limitation set forth therein. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
BY THE COURT
Kevin B. Booth, J.