OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

Claimant retired from his position as a paid uniformed firefighter for the City of Groton in December, 1981. On March 3, 1986 he filed by certified mail a Notice of Claim (Form 30-C) stating: "Notice is hereby given that the undersigned while in the employ of City of Groton. . . on. . . 29 April, 1983 sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of employment as follows: HEART ATTACK, HYPERTENSION; CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE BELIEVED TO BE CAUSED BY WORK AS A FIREFIGHTER. . ." The respondent city failed to file a Sec. 31-297 (b) disclaimer of liability within twenty days. Consequently claimant filed a Motion to Preclude defenses for such failure. The Commissioner at Large acting for the Second District denied claimants' motion. In his ruling the trial commissioner held that on its face, the Notice of Claim raised jurisdictional questions, i.e. did the Notice comply with the statutory one year and three year limitations period set forth in Sec. 31-294 and did the Sec. 7-433c injury and disease occur during the employment. Unless these jurisdictional facts were affirmatively established in further evidentiary hearings the commissioner ruled there was no basis to grant the Motion to Preclude.

We agree with the commissioner below. With respect to Sec. 7-433c claims "A fair reading of the statute. . . reveals that both the condition of hypertension or heart disease and the death or disability resulting. . . must be suffered while the individual was on or off duty as a regular member of a police or fire department." Gorman v. Waterbury, 4 Conn. App. 226, 231 (1985). Here the hypertension and heart attack occurred almost one and one half years after claimant ceased to be such a regular member. Thus the Sec. 7-433c claim cannot justify granting the Motion to Preclude.

However the Notice of Claim employs language which also seems to present a chapter 568 claim, "believed to be caused by work as a firefighter." In our law a heart attack has been treated in the language of our definition statute, Sec. 31-275 (8), as an injury "which may be definitely located as the time when and the place where the accident occurred" and not as an "injury. . . which. . . is the direct result of repetitive trauma" or "occupational disease as herein defined." See Stier v. Derby, 119 Conn. 44 (1934); Jones v. Hamden, 129 Conn. 532 (1942); McDonough v. Connecticut Bank Trust, 204 Conn. 104 (1987), Donato v. Pantry Pride, 37 Conn. Sup. 836 (1981). In that historical perspective a March, 1986 Notice of Claim for an April, 1983 heart attack fails to meet the Sec. 31-294 one year notice of limitation. Therefore as to the heart attack claim, Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc. 13 Conn. App. 276 (1988) mandates that a Motion to Preclude must fail as the commission lacks jurisdiction in the matter.

Other language in that March, 1986 notice suggests an occupational disease theory of recovery, i.e. "HYPERTENSION; CORONARY HEART DISEASE." Whereas the 1980 General Assembly retained the one year statute for accidental injury claims, it expanded the notice period to three years for occupational disease. A March, 1986 notice for an April 29, 1983 manifestation of an occupational disease may therefore arguably be considered within Sec. 31-294 limitations and arguably confer jurisdiction on the commission. But until there is an evidentiary hearing to establish those jurisdictional facts, the Motion to Preclude will still not lie.

Consequently, the decision of the trial commissioner denying claimant's Motion to Preclude is affirmed.

Commissioners Andrew P. Denuzze and James J. Metro concur.