PER CURIAM

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Susan Davis-Grimplin ("Davis") appeals the District Court's judgment affirming the Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income ("SSI"), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

Davis, now at age sixty, seeks DIB and SSI for the period of November 30, 1994, to March 19, 2003. She has at least a high school education and engaged in the following past relevant work: cashier, sales clerk, receiving clerk, hostess, waitress, and prep cook. The ALJ found that Davis had several severe impairments— among them a bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome—during that November 30, 1994, to March 19, 2003, period, but nevertheless denied relief. The Appeals Council denied review, and Davis brought this action in the District Court.

In the District Court, Davis argued that the ALJ erred in a number of ways, by:

(1) failing to follow the Court's Remand Order; (2) posing an improper hypothetical [to the Vocational Expert (VE)], especially when the proper hypothetical posed, a finding of disability is mandated; (3) failing to find Plaintiff disabled under Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-14; (4) improperly analyzing Plaintiff's obesity; (5) failing to recognize all of Plaintiff's impairments; (6) failing to afford proper weight to Plaintiff's treating physicians; (7) failing to properly consider Plaintiff's fibromyalgia; and (8) failing to properly apply Eleventh Circuit's pain standard.

The Magistrate Judge considered these points and, in his R & R to the District Court, concluded that the ALJ had applied the correct legal standards and that the ALJ's decision denying Davis's applications was supported by substantial evidence. Id.

Davis objected to the Magistrate's Judge's R & R on three grounds:

(1) [T]he ALJ failed to identify the functional limitations resulting from Plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and consequently the ALJ failed to incorporate any findings as to Plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome into a hypothetical posed to the vocational expert ("VE"). [Referring to the Remand Order,] Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why he did not afford the worker's compensation disability determination great weight. (2) [T]here should be an immediate finding that Plaintiff lacked bilateral manual dexterity, and such a finding in combination with Plaintiff's other impairments would warrant the conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled as a matter of law." (3) [T]he Magistrate Judge did not properly address the ALJ"s failure to properly apply the Eleventh Circuit's pain standard. . . . [T]he Magistrate Judge improperly reasoned that there must be an objective basis for headaches, . . . that headaches are a non-exertional impairment and objective evidence is not required to establish them as a basis for disabling pain. In addition, . . . the Magistrate Judge erred by using daily activities as a method of refuting Plaintiff's pain testimony. Her testimony regarding her pain has not been properly refuted and, as such, must be accepted as true. Thus, . . . she has satisfied the Eleventh Circuit's pain standard such that her level of pain in combination with all impairments proven and not refuted should result in a finding that she is disabled.

The District Court rejected Davis's second ground, concluding that the Magistrate Judge did not err in finding the ALJ's treatment of the issue well-founded. The record supported the ALJ's declination to find that Davis "lacked the good use of both her hands." Id. Her "medical history indicated that [she] consistently demonstrated good range of motion and good grip strength of her wrists and normal fine and gross manipulation." Id.

As for Davis's third ground, the District Court found no error in the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the ALJ properly applied this circuit's pain standard in considering Davis's subjective pain testimony regarding her headaches and her other impairments. "[S]ubstantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that [Davis's] impairments did not correlate with [her] subjective complaints." Id. at 8.

In prosecuting this appeal, Davis argues that "the hypothetical [question] used as a basis for [the ALJ's] decision was incomplete since no limitation from an impairment which was deemed to be severe, that of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, was given in [the] hypothetical [question] to the VE." Appellant's Br. at 8. According to Davis, the ALJ should have included a functional limitation of her hands in the hypothetical question—because he had already been determined that the syndrome was a severe impairment—and that had he done so, he would have granted her DIB and SSA applications. Davis also says that the ALJ would have granted the applications had she supported her argument that the hypothetical question was incomplete with a statement that the ALJ should have given "great weight" to the state worker's compensation determination.

We review the Commissioner's legal conclusions de novo and determine whether his final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. See id. at 1211, 1213.

Eligibility for disability insurance benefits requires that the claimant is under a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Administration applies a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment and meets the duration requirements; (4) is unable to perform her past relevant work, in light of her residual functional capacity; and (5) cannot make an adjustment to other work, in light of her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). A "severe" impairment does not necessarily indicate that a person has a disability qualifying her for benefits because it is possible that, even with the severe impairment, that person could still perform the work pertaining to her job after taking into consideration other vocational factors. See McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that "the 'severity' of a medically ascertained disability must be measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality").

Generally, "[t]he findings of disability by another agency, although not binding on the [Commissioner], are entitled to great weight." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 1983). Even when an agency's definition of disability differs from that of social security law, if the agency's disability definition is construed in a similar manner as the definition of disability under social security law, it is error for the ALJ to not give that agency's finding of disability great weight. Falcon v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 827, 831 (11th Cir. 1984).

When a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, she must show evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (1) "objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain" stemming from that condition, or (2) "that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). The ALJ must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for choosing to discredit subjective testimony. Id. If the ALJ fails to articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective testimony, then, as a matter of law, the testimony must be accepted as true. Id.

The ALJ may consider the claimant's daily activities when evaluating her subjective symptoms, but a claimant's admission that she participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify her from a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); see Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that the claimant's successful completion of a six-minute treadmill exercise was not necessarily indicative of his ability to work, and that the fact that he did housework and went fishing was not inconsistent with the limitations recommended by his treating physicians).

Under step five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is able to perform other work that exists in the national economy. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is able to perform other work, he "must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and this finding must be supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture." Id. One way in which the ALJ may determine that the claimant is able to perform other jobs is by posing a hypothetical question to a VE that comprises all of the claimant's impairments. Id. The hypothetical does not need to include any symptom alleged by the claimant that is not supported by medical evidence. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The hypothetical need only include 'the claimant's impairments,' not each and every symptom of the claimant." (citation omitted)).

After considering the parties' briefs and the record before the ALJ, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ' denial of Davis's DIB and SSA applications. First, the ALJ complied with the Remand Order. The ALJ had ample evidence on which to conclude that Davis did not have functional limitations of her hands notwithstanding that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is a severe impairment. He therefore was not required to include a hand limitation in the hypothetical posed to the VE. Moreover, as the Remand Order required, he thoroughly explained his reasons for not including a functional limitation of the hands in his question to the VE.

Second, the ALJ was plainly justified in giving little weight to the State of Florida's disability determination because all that Davis introduced was a one-page, conclusory document acknowledging that she was receiving worker's compensation benefits.

In sum, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE's answer regarding the existence of jobs in the economy that Davis could perform in reaching his decision to deny Davis's applications.

AFFIRMED.