Summary
In Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 724, the Court stated: "We do not think the motion requires a showing that demonstrates innocence or that makes it highly probable that the defendant is innocent; but, if the defendant did not understand the nature of the plea, or the facts pertinent thereto, and it appears from the showing made that a jury might reasonably return a verdict of not guilty, the plea should be set aside, unless it is manifest that the matter took the course it did for the purpose of delaying or defeating justice."
Summary of this case from Lambert v. StateOpinion
No. 30014.
April 11, 1932.
1. CRIMINAL LAW. Where defendant, charged with assault with intent to kill and murder, pleaded guilty in self-defense, court should have ascertained what was meant thereby.
It appeared that defendant desired to plead self-defense, but did not know how to do so, and that by her plea of guilty in self-defense she meant that she was guilty of the shooting, but that she shot in self-defense.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
Motion to set aside guilty plea held not to require showing of defendant's innocence or strong probability thereof.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
If defendant misunderstood nature of guilty plea or pertinent facts, and jury might reasonably acquit, plea should be set aside, in absence of wrongful intent.
APPEAL from circuit court of Marion county. HON. J.Q. LANGSTON, Judge.
B.J. Goss, of Columbia, for appellant.
On arraignment, where a defendant in a criminal case pleads guilty, it is within the discretion of the court to set aside, or to refuse to set aside, the plea; but it should only be set aside upon a showing that the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged, and a showing of the nature and facts of the defense in case it should be set aside.
Fortenberry v. State, 113 So. 193.
The right of a defendant to withdraw a plea and the power and duties of the court in connection therewith will be found fully described in 16 C.J., 396-7, pars. 728-29-30.
The defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty when unadvisedly given, when any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury. This is a matter within the discretion of the court, but a judicial discretion should always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty.
Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691; Gauldin v. Crawford, 30 Ga. 674.
Herbert Nunnery, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
It is well-settled law that it is entirely within the discretion of the court to set aside or refuse to set aside such plea, and unless the court abused this discretion, would be sustained. This is a case where a grown, prudent negro woman, being fully advised by the court of her situation, having the benefit of all knowledge, plead guilty. The facts in the testimony was fully gone into and heard by the court, and after its due consideration, the motion was overruled. After considering the testimony, I am of the opinion that the court did not abuse its discretion, and it was not shown that the defendant was not guilty of the crime charged.
In setting aside a plea of guilty and permitting the substitution of a plea of not guilty, the judge exercises a judicial discretion, and unless he is manifestly wrong, this court will not interfere with that discretion.
Haywood v. State, 151 Miss. 536.
On motion to set aside plea of guilty, there must be established probability that the trial would result in acquittal, or reasonably lead thereto.
McDonald v. State, 151 Miss. 566.
The appellant was indicted on a charge of assault with intent to kill and murder, was arraigned, and pleaded guilty in self-defense. The court thereupon told her that she could not enter a plea of guilty in self-defense, but that she would have to plead guilty or not guilty, and that, if she desired to plead self-defense, she would have to plead not guilty. The appellant then entered a plea of guilty. There was no effort, so far as the record shows, to clear up what she meant by guilty in self-defense. She was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary and sent to jail, and then, for the first time consulted an attorney. The attorney filed a motion to set aside the plea of guilty and to go to trial, stating, in said motion, that the defendant had a perfect defense to said charge; that she is an ignorant colored girl, and did not then know the meaning of said plea of guilty; and that, although she entered the plea of guilty, she thought she would have the right to show, by her witnesses, the manner in which the incident occurred. She asked that the testimony of three witnesses, who were then in court, be taken, and that the court hear these witnesses upon the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. The witnesses were introduced, and all testified that the alleged assaulted person was, at the time, advancing upon the defendant with a drawn knife, stating, as he advanced, that he was going to cut her throat, and that she thereupon fired a pistol at him, and he fled.
The defendant testified to like effect, and, further, that she did not understand that the plea of guilty would prevent her trying the cause, but thought her witnesses would be allowed to talk.
The state, in rebuttal, placed the person alleged to have been assaulted upon the stand, and he denied the story of the other witnesses; denied that he had threatened the defendant; and denied that he had a knife, at the time, or that he owned one. The state also introduced another man who kept a filling station at or about the place where the shooting occurred, who testified that he did not hear any threat or any profanity at the time; that he heard a shot and saw the negro man run, but that he did not see him at the time of the shooting, and could not say what he had in his hand, if anything.
The circuit court overruled the motion to set aside the plea of guilty, and it is contended here that the proof does not show clearly that the defendant was innocent.
We think it clear that the defendant, when arraigned, desired to plead self-defense, but did not know how to do so. In other words, she did not understand the effect of the plea which she did enter; and we think the circuit judge, when the defendant entered the plea of guilty in self-defense, should have ascertained what she meant. It is manifest that she meant that she was guilty of the shooting, but that she shot in self-defense.
There is no showing that the state's witnesses had been discharged and were not available; but it appears that the witnesses, as above stated, were present in court to testify.
We do not think the motion requires a showing that demonstrates innocence or that makes it highly probable that the defendant is innocent; but, if the defendant did not understand the nature of the plea, or the facts pertinent thereto, and it appears from the showing made that a jury might reasonably return a verdict of not guilty, the plea should be set aside, unless it is manifest that the matter took the course it did for the purpose of delaying or defeating justice.
Under the facts in the record, we think the circuit court should have set aside the plea of guilty and permitted a trial by jury.
The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.