Opinion
No. CV02 039 60 10
December 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, University of Bridgeport, moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no issue of material fact in dispute regarding the claim of the plaintiff, Robert Cullen, for breach of contract for educational services. The defendant asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the defendant's program has not failed in any fundamental respect, nor has the defendant failed to fulfill a specific contractual promise. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant provides the court with: a supporting memorandum of law; an uncertified excerpt from the defendant's course catalog; a signed and sworn affidavit from Peter Martin, the current Dean of the University of Bridgeport's College of Naturopathic Medicine; and an uncertified transcript of the plaintiff's deposition.
On August 8, 2003, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff counters that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding whether the defendant's conduct constituted a failure to fulfill a contractual promise. The plaintiff did not file any evidence in support of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, but instead relies upon the deposition testimony in the transcript offered by the defendants.
"[D]eposition testimony . . . is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradictory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact. Practice Book § 17-45 provides in relevant part that [a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to . . . certified transcripts of testimony under oath . . . [W]here the parties on both sides of a motion for summary judgment rely on uncertified deposition transcripts, the court may take them into consideration." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0439693 (August 27, 2003, Skolnick, J.). In this case, because both parties rely on uncertified deposition testimony, the court will consider this evidence for purposes of deciding the motion for summary judgment.
Facts
On September 4, 2002, the plaintiff, Robert Cullen, served the defendant, University of Bridgeport, with a three-count complaint. The cause of action arises from the plaintiff's enrollment in the defendant's College of Naturopathic Medicine as a candidate for a degree in the Naturopathic Medicine Program (the program), a four-year, full-time post-graduate program. There were problems with a gynecology course offered by the program, from which the plaintiff withdrew. He was also unhappy with his clinical rotation, the credentials of the instructors, and a number of other classes which he dropped because the courses did not meet for the requisite number of hours. As a result of the lessened course load, the plaintiff could not finish the program in four years. He requested, and was granted, a leave of absence from the program. During the plaintiff's tenure at the University of Bridgeport, other students completed the naturopathic program in four years, and were qualified to sit for the CNME (credentialing) exam.
The first count of the plaintiff's complaint alleges a breach of contract for the defendant's failure to comply with specific representations made in the defendant's course catalog. The plaintiff alleges a number of deficiencies in the program in terms of the adequacy of the professors, administrators and course work. The second count of the complaint is based on promissory estoppel and alleges that the defendant made misrepresentations about the program to induce the plaintiff to enroll in the program, and as a result, the plaintiff has suffered a loss of time and money. The remaining count alleges a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.
On November 6, 2002, the defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint as well as four special defenses. On November 13, 2002, the plaintiff answered the defendant's special defenses and denied the allegations. Thereafter, on July 31, 2003, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there exists no disputed issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant filed a supporting memorandum of law as well as documentary evidence. On August 8, 2003, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion, citing to his own deposition in support of his objection. Oral argument was heard by this court on September 15, 2003.
Discussion
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 545, 830 A.2d 139 (2003). "[T]he party opposing . . . a motion [for summary judgment] must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).
Our courts have been reluctant to recognize claims of educational malpractice in the academic environment. The courts have held that "[i]n general, the basic legal relationship between a student and a private university or college is contractual in nature . . . The catalogs, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institution made available to the matriculant become a part of the contract . . . Questions of discipline, academic matters, and tuition and scholarship disputes have been addressed by courts and resolved on contract principles. At the same time, however, courts have been reluctant to apply strict contract law concepts to the unique relationship that exists between students and universities or colleges." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Soderbloom v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 910324553 (February 3, 1992, DeMayo, J.) ( 5 Conn. L. Rptr. 513, 7 C.S.C.R. 290, 291).
The Connecticut Supreme Court refrained from evaluating the academic policies and practices of a school by denying a claim based on educational malpractice in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996), and stated that questions about the reasonableness of an academic program "involve the judiciary in the awkward tasks of defining what constitutes a reasonable educational program and of deciding whether that standard has been breached." Id., 591. "In reality, a claim such as that advanced by the plaintiff raise[s] questions concerning the reasonableness of conduct by educational institutions in providing particular educational services to students — questions that must be answered by reference to principles of duty, standards of care, and reasonable conduct associated with the law of torts . . . Because these tort principles are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the academic environment, courts have almost universally held that claims of educational malpractice are not cognizable." Id. (Citations omitted.) The Gupta court noted, however, that a cause of action for institutional breach of contract for educational services exists in at least two situations. "The first would be exemplified by a showing that the educational program failed in some fundamental respect, as by not offering any of the courses necessary to obtain certification in a particular field . . . The second would arise if the educational institution failed to fulfill a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program." (Citations omitted.) Id., 592-93.
The documents filed in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment support its contention that it is undisputed that it has not breached its contract for educational services, and, therefore, the plaintiff's claim is not cognizable. First, the evidence submitted by the defendant does not establish that the program has failed in some fundamental respect as required under the first Gupta exception. In Gupta, the court cited two cases from other jurisdictions to support the first exception based on a "fundamental failure" of an educational program. In Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 452 n. 1, 725 P.2d 155 (1986), the court stated "[s]uch fundamentals would include the number of days/hours required to complete a prescribed course of study and other objective criteria in a course's presentation." (Emphasis in original.) In Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992), the court recognized a student's breach of contract claim against the defendant university for failure to perform five specific commitments it had made to the plaintiff. The court determined that "[t]o adjudicate such a claim, the court would not be required to determine whether [the defendant] had breached its contract with [the plaintiff] by providing deficient academic services . . . [but] [r]ather, its inquiry would be limited to whether the University had provided any real access to its academic curriculum at all." (Emphasis added.) Id. 417. Wickstrom and Ross demonstrate that for a breach of contract claim to fall within the first Gupta exception, the "alleged fundamental failure of the educational program must be objectively measurable. A claim that invites inquiry into subjective aspects of a program, such as quality or methodology implicates the policy considerations the court discussed in CT Page 14085 Gupta v. New Britain Hospital . . ." Tankoos v. Mead School for Human Development, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X05 CV 95 0145853 (June 4, 1999, Tierney, J.).
In contrast to Wickstrom and Ross, the plaintiff in the present case has failed to provide objective evidence that the defendant's program suffered a "fundamental failure." The plaintiff merely alleges in his complaint, and reiterates in his deposition, that he was unhappy with the quality of the courses, clinical experience, and professors to which he attributes his inability to obtain his degree in the anticipated four-year period. The plaintiff does not, however, substantiate his claims with any concrete evidence such as a failure to offer required courses or clinics, but only makes bare assertions that certain courses were not meeting for the minimum hours. The plaintiff has not shown that it was impossible to obtain a degree in naturopathic medicine; the plaintiff instead admits during his deposition that many of his classmates who enrolled the same year as the plaintiff completed the program and obtained their degree in four years. The plaintiff has done no more "than simply allege that the education was not good enough . . . [which] is insufficient to state a cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 593.
The evidence submitted by the plaintiff also does not establish that the defendant breached a specific contractual promise that would bring the plaintiff's claim within the second Gutpa exception. The plaintiff, in addition, fails to point to a specific contractual promise that the defendant allegedly breached. The plaintiff contends that a contract exists between himself and the defendant, the terms of which were outlined in the 1997-98 course catalog. In his deposition, the plaintiff admits that this course catalog provides his sole basis for arguing that the defendant failed to meet its contractual obligations to him. A copy of the course catalog was not provided by the plaintiff, however, for review by this court. The defendant provided two pages from this course catalog, one of which contains a specific clause reserving the defendant's right to make changes in the program. Moreover, this clause clearly states that the information contained in the catalog "does not constitute a contract."
In Soderbloom v. Yale University, supra, 7 C.S.C.R. 292, the court recognized that "universities must have the flexibility to make changes in furtherance of their educational responsibilities." "[I]n the period of time between a student's matriculation and graduation, an educational institution, which is a living, changing thing, may not reasonably be expected to remain static, and conversely, change may reasonably be expected. Hence, each statement in a publication of what now is true does not necessarily become a term in the contract between the school and the student." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In accordance with Soderbloom, the course catalog relied upon by the plaintiff did not constitute the terms of a final, binding contract with the defendant.
Although the bulletin relied upon by the plaintiff in Soderbloom contained a clause reserving the defendant's right to make modifications, courts in other jurisdictions have noted that "implicit in the university's general `contract' with its students is a right to change the university's academic degree requirements if such changes are not arbitrary or capricious." Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 577 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989).
The court in Gupta cited Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1994), to illustrate an application of the second exception. In Cencor, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a breach of contract action could be maintained against the defendant vocational school where there were allegations that the school had made specific promises to provide modern, functioning equipment, computer training, and qualified instructors, and did not do so. Id., 400. Unlike Cencor, the plaintiff in this case has not pointed to an identifiable written or oral promise (other than the course catalog which was not submitted) that the defendant failed to honor that would support a breach of contract claim under the rule set forth in Gupta. Instead, as the court found in Day v. Yale University School of Drama, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 97 0400876 (March 20, 2003, Munro, J.), "the evidence presented by [the plaintiff] does not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court for a breach of contract claim in the educational environment."
Conclusion
Based on the evidence offered by the parties, and viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether the defendant has breached a contractual promise with the plaintiff. There is no evidence that the program has failed in any fundamental respect, or that the defendant has breached a specific contractual promise. The plaintiff's claims, therefore, fail as a matter of law. For these reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
WOLVEN, JUDGE.