OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, United States District Judge.

Roberta Croskey sues the Ford Motor Company-UAW Retirement Plan ("Ford-UAW") to recover survivor benefits allegedly due her as the lawful widow of C.B. Croskey. Although Ford-UAW admits that it is obligated to pay benefits to C.B.'s widow, it has expressed doubt as to whether Roberta is the lawful widow, or whether that status belongs to Carrie Croskey, who is listed as C.B.'s spouse on his application for pension benefits, and who married C.B. roughly 13 years after he married Roberta. Ford-UAW has interpleaded Carrie into this action and asked for a determination of the proper beneficiary, as well as a discharge in interpleader and an award of attorney's fees. Roberta and Carrie have both moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that each, respectively, is the lawful widow of C.B. Croskey. Roberta also seeks reimbursement from Ford-UAW for benefits already paid to Carrie. Because genuine questions of material fact remain, Carrie's and Roberta's motions for summary judgment are denied. Ford-UAW is discharged from the action, and no fees will be awarded.

I.

The following facts are drawn from the uncontested evidence submitted by the parties. On April 27, 1955, Roberta married C.B. Croskey in Montgomery, Alabama. (Fersch Affirm. Ex. A) Roberta and C.B. lived together in Alabama from 1955 to 1960/1961 and then in New York from 1960/1961 to 1968. (Compl. ¶ 3; Roberta Aff. ¶ 3) During this period, Roberta and C.B. had four children together — Ruthie (d.o.b. 3/21/53); Debbie (d.o.b. 3/17/56); Charles (d.o.b. 7/15/57) and Locaster (d.o.b. 8/22/58). (Compl. Ex. B)

In 1963, Carrie started a romantic relationship with C.B. in New York. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 3) Roberta says that she and C.B. were still living together at that time, and that they continued to live together until some time in 1968. (Compl. ¶ 3; Roberta Aff. ¶ 3) Presumably they were no longer living together on March 28, 1968, when C.B. and Carrie were married in Jamaica, New York. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 4; Carrie Mem. Ex. A) On his marriage certificate, C.B. swore that his marriage to Carrie was his first. (Id.) Carrie says she did not know about C.B.'s previous marriage at the time of the wedding. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 8)

Roberta avers that she never divorced C.B., nor was she ever made aware of any divorce proceeding that he initiated. (Roberta Aff. ¶ 5; Compl. ¶ 6) Roberta's search of the divorce records of several of the counties in which she or C.B. have lived supports her statement. The following searches failed to turn up any evidence of a divorce between Roberta and C.B.: 1) a search of the divorce records from Wayne County, Michigan (where Detroit is located) from January, 1940 to March 17, 2000 (Compl. Ex. D); 2) a search of the divorce records from the State of Michigan from 1955 to 1999 (id.); 3) a search of the divorce records from the New York State Department of Health from January 1, 1963 to December 31, 1999 (id.); and 4) a search of the divorce records from New York County from 1968 to 1973 (id.). The search is incomplete only to the extent that it excludes the divorce records of Alabama, where Roberta and C.B. lived together from 1955 until 1960/1961, and of New York State or County for the years 1960/1961 to 1963, during which time Roberta and C.B. lived together in New York City.

At the time of Carrie and C.B.'s March 1968 wedding, Roberta was seven months pregnant with her and C.B.'s fifth child, Celeane, who was born on June 4, 1968. (Compl. Exs. B, C) At about the time of Celeane's birth, Roberta filed a petition for child support in New York State Family Court stating that "since on or about April 1968," C.B. had "refused and neglected to provide fair and reasonable support for Petitioner and the other said dependent(s)." (Compl. Ex. B) In an order dated June 3, 1968, a family court judge declared Roberta to be the "wife of [C.B.]," stated that the two were now "living apart," and ordered C.B. to pay $35 per week, beginning on June 10, 1968. (Id.) Although the order was served on C.B., it is not clear whether he ever made such payments. (Id.) The order was suspended on September 7, 1971 and there is no evidence that the order was ever renewed. (Id.)

It is unclear where C.B. and Carrie lived for the first several months of their marriage, but the record shows that they had a child, Jeffrey Croskey, on February 1, 1969, and moved to Detroit, Michigan shortly thereafter. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 5) Upon moving to Detroit, Carrie and C.B. moved in with C.B.'s sister, and C.B. began working at Ford in September, 1969. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 5) During the next year., Carrie and C.B. purchased a home together. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 6) Carrie and C.B. lived together in Detroit for 32 years as husband and wife until C.B. died on January 6, 2000. (Id. ¶ 7; Johnson Aff.; Maull Aff.) During this time. Carrie and C.B. had three more children: Sabrina LaTanya (d.o.b. 2/16/75), and Darren and Darrel (twins) (d.o.b. 2/17/78). (Carrie Aff. ¶ 6) Carrie contributed to the household her salary as a teacher, took care of her four children, and cared for C.B. during his struggles with coronary artery disease and obstructive lung disease. (Carrie Aff. ¶¶ 12, 14) Carrie maintains that, to her knowledge, Roberta did nothing to contribute to the household and Roberta and C.B. "did not live together during [the thirty-two years of her marriage] and they did not have a conjugal relationship." (Carrie Aff. ¶¶ 7, 13)

The degree of knowledge that each woman had of the other's marriage to C.B. is not entirely clear. Carrie states that she had no knowledge of C.B.'s marriage to Roberta until after C.B.'s death. (Carrier Aff. ¶ 8) She does admit to having learned that C.B. had children with another woman, and she states that Roberta's three oldest children came to stay at her home in Detroit for extended visits in the early 1980s. (Id. ¶ 9) Carrie further states that when the children left, C.B. would occasionally travel back to New York with them, staying with the children in their homes, sometimes for as long as a week. (Id. ¶ 11) The extent of Roberta's knowledge of C.B.'s marriage to Carrie is similarly unclear. Carrie asserts that based on Roberta's children having visited her and C.B.'s home in Detroit, it is "reasonable to infer that Roberta was aware of [the] marriage years before C.B.'s death." (Carrie Mem. at 8; Carrie Aff. ¶ 10). Roberta disputes this interpretation of the evidence. (Roberta Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 4)

C.B. Croskey retired from Ford in 1986 as a vested participant in the Ford-UAW Retirement Plan. (Carrie Mem. Ex. B) On his pension form, C.B. listed Carrie as his spouse and survivor beneficiary. (Carrie Mem. Exs. B, C) Within a month after C.B.'s death on January 6, 2000, Ford-UAW began paying Carrie a monthly benefit of $359.09; the benefit continued until November 2000. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 15; Carrie Mem. Ex. E) However, in November 2000, Ford-UAW suspended benefit payments because Roberta submitted a copy of her marriage certificate to Ford-UAW and claimed that she was C.B.'s lawful spouse. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 16; Carrie Mem. Ex. E) In January 2001, when Carrie also submitted a marriage certificate, Ford-UAW payed retroactive benefits and resumed monthly payments to Carrie. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 17; Carrie Mem. Ex. E) Roberta then filed this lawsuit, and Ford-UAW suspended payments to Carrie effective April 1, 2001, pending the outcome of the litigation. (Id.).

Ford-UAW has interpleaded Carrie, and Carrie has crossclaimed against Ford-UAW for benefits due to her as the lawful spouse of C.B. Croskey. Both Roberta and Carrie have moved for summary judgment, each seeking a declaration that she is C.B. Croskey's lawful widow and therefore entitled to benefits. Carrie further claims that even if Roberta otherwise would be C.B.'s lawful widow, Roberta should be estopped by laches to challenge the validity of Carrie's marriage to C.B. (Carrie Mem. at 4-9) At the very least, Carrie argues that she should be entitled to some equitable share of C.B.'s survivor benefits. (Id. at 15-18) Roberta, should she prevail, seeks reimbursement from Ford-UAW for benefits already paid in error to Carrie. (Roberta Mem. in Opp'n to Ford-UAW at 2-3) Ford-UAW seeks a discharge from this action and an award of attorney's fees. (Ford Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Discharge)

II.

Although the parties have not produced a copy of the Ford-UAW Retirement Plan document ("the plan"), pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, as amended by the Retirement Equity Act ("REA"), Pub.L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984), C.B.'s pension benefits must be paid to his lawful widow, regardless of the plan's terms and definitions.

The parties agree that the plan is governed by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994 Supp. V. 1999). (Compl. ¶ 12; Ford Answer ¶ 12; Carrie Answer ¶ 2) Further, the parties do not contest that the plan is subject to ERISA § 205, which mandates that a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" be provided to the surviving spouse of a vested plan participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1). (Compl. ¶ 13) Essentially all pension plans fall within the coverage of § 205. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 842 (1997). The statute requires that a survivor annuity be granted automatically, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a); see Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991), and not waived or paid to a beneficiary other than the surviving spouse without that spouse's written, notarized consent, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2); Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843. In accordance with the statute, two plan documents, both entitled "Application for . . . Retirement Benefits" and dated May 17, 1988, make reference to the "automatic election of spouse's survivor benefits." (Carrie Mem. Exs. B, C)

Because the plan is covered by ERISA § 205, the plan, whatever its terms and provisions, must pay benefits to the lawful spouse of C.B. Croskey because neither Roberta nor Carrie has waived the right to survivor benefits under § 205(c)(2). The Second Circuit has held in Lefkowitz v. Arcadia Trading Co. Ltd. Benefit Pension Plan, 996 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1993), that compliance with the survivor annuity provisions of the REA is "mandatory, not optional," and such benefits are automatic "unless . . . specifically and effectively waived." Id. at 603-04 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gallagher v. Park West Bank and Trust Co, 921 F. Supp. 867, 876-77 (D. Mass. 1996) (collecting cases). Congress intended to "inject the required provisions [of ERISA § 205] into covered plans whether or not the provisions are ever actually adopted and incorporated into the plans." Id. at 604 (Mahoney, J., concurring). Thus, whatever the plan's language, and regardless of the fact that C.B. listed Carrie as his designated spouse, ERISA § 205 controls, and benefits must be paid to the lawful spouse. A pensioner's designation of a person other than a lawful spouse is ineffective when it is made without the lawful spouse's written permission. See In re Lefkowitz, 767 F. Supp. 501, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),aff'd, 996 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1993); Robbins v. Robbins, No. 1:99CV303-D-D, 2000 WL 33207648, at 2-3 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 26, 2000).

Carrie asks whether the plan "defines the beneficiary in clear terms as the legally recognized relict, or uses terms — like widow or widower, husband or wife — loosely in a way that might connote even a non-legal wife . . . whom the decedent nevertheless meant to treat as the surviving spouse." (Carrie Mem. at 8-9 (quoting Grabois v. Jones, 89 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under the above analysis, that question is moot because the benefits at issue must be paid to C.B.'s "spouse" as mandated under ERISA, and not to his "spouse" as the term might be defined under the language of the plan. See Lefkowitz, 996 F.2d at 603-04. Addressing the meaning of the term "spouse" as used in ERISA § 205, all federal courts to have considered the issue have determined that the statutory term "spouse" refers to the legal spouse.See Grabois v. Jones, No. 94 Civ. 2070, 1998 WL 158756, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) (concluding, on remand, that "under ERISA the term `spouse' is limited to that person to whom one is legally married, even if the two people no longer co-habitate, are not [sic] longer intimate, and are in the process of getting divorced."); Gallagher, 921 F. Supp. at 877; Davis v. College Suppliers Co., 813 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Kahn v. Kahn, 801 F. Supp. 1237, 1241, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 2 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 1993); Lefkowitz, 767 F. Supp. at 508 n. 12.

III.

Because the lawful widow of C.B. Croskey is entitled to the survivor benefits from his pension plan, it is necessary to determine whether Roberta or Carrie was C.B.'s lawful spouse at the time of his death. That determination is to be made in accordance with state law because there is no federal domestic relations law, and marriage and divorce are traditional subjects of state regulation. See Grabois, 89 F.3d at 101;Bond v. Trustees of STA-ILA Pension Fund, 902 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Md. 1995); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 896 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). However, the application of state law in this case is not a simple matter because there are three states whose laws are potentially applicable: Alabama (where C.B. and Roberta's marriage was solemnized); New York (where C.B. and Carrie's marriage was solemnized); and Michigan (where C.B. and Carrie lived for 32 years until C.B. death and where C.B.'s pension benefits accrued and vested).

Jurisdiction in this case is predicated on a federal question because the underlying claim is based on ERISA, and therefore federal common law determines the choice-of-law rule to be applied. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In federal question cases, we are directed to apply a federal common law choice of law rule to determine which jurisdiction's substantive law should apply."). But see Detroit Diesel Corp. v. Lane-Smith, 39 F. Supp.2d 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (applying Michigan's choice-of-law rule in an analogous ERISA dispute between two women claiming to be a decedent's lawful widow). In Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1977), an ERISA case in which a first and second husband both claimed to be entitled to life insurance proceeds as the lawful widower of one woman, the Second Circuit held that the determination of the lawful widower was to be made in accordance with "the law of her domicile at death." Id. at 926; see also Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203, 1205 (5th Cir. 1973) (drawing the same conclusion); Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1964) (same); Grove v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 918, 919 (4th Cir. 1959) (same); Jackson, 896 F. Supp. at 321 (same). The Court reasoned that "[t]he state of the insured's domicile is the state most interested in questions of the insured's marital status," and therefore concluded that "it is that state to whose law Congress intended that reference should be made in identifying the lawful spouse of the insured." Manning, 568 F.2d at 926. Thus, the determination of C.B. Croskey's lawful widow must be made in accordance with Michigan law because Michigan was C.B. Croskey's domicile at death.

"In Michigan, where the validity of a marriage is attacked on the ground that one of the parties was married to another, a very strong presumption exists in favor of the validity of the second marriage."Barnett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 94-CV-70627-DT, 1995 WL 871197, at 4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 1995) (citing Doertch v. Folwell Eng'g Co., 252 Mich. 76, 78, 233 N.W. 211, 212 (1930); Quinn v. Quinn, 4 Mich. App. 536, 539, 145 N.W.2d 252, 253-54 (1966)). "[T]his presumption is one of the strongest known to the law. It is founded, not only on a presumption of innocence of the crime of bigamy on the part of the contracting parties and on the regularity of the acts of licensing and officiating officers, but has a basis in the public policy to foster respectability and to protect offspring from the taint of illegitimacy."Doertch, 252 Mich. at 78, 233 N.W. at 212. "[The] presumption is particularly strong where there are children born of the later marriage."In re Estate of Pope, 205 Mich. App. 174, 175, 517 N.W.2d 281, 282 (1994) (citing In re Adams' Estate, 362 Mich. 624, 626-27, 107 N.W.2d 764, 766 (1961)). "`Clear and positive proof to the contrary' is required to overcome it." Barnett, 1995 WL 871197, at 4 (quoting Adams, 362 Mich. at 626, 107 N.W.2d at 766).

The presumption "may be rebutted by a showing of facts or circumstances which either may establish the validity or invalidity of the marriage conclusively or raise an issue to be determined upon preponderance of the evidence." Doertch, 252 Mich. at 78, 233 N.W. at 212. However,

[t]he presumption is not rebutted by testimony of the first spouse that, to the best of her knowledge, her husband never attempted to procure a divorce from her and that she had never received or been served with divorce papers In re Adams Estate, 362 Mich. 624, 626, 107 N.W.2d 764[, 765-66] (1961), or by testimony that a search was made in the county wherein decedent was known to have resided and no record of divorce was discovered, Doertch, [ 252 Mich. at 77] 233 N.W. at 211. The possibility exists that an absent spouse. could have obtained a divorce elsewhere. Mogk v. Stroecker, 243 Mich. 668, 220 N.W. 730 (1928).

Even following those legal principles, Michigan courts have sometimes found evidence to be sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of a subsequent marriage. In Beaudin v. Suarez, 365 Mich. 534, 113 N.W.2d 818 (1962), and Watts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 308 Mich. 499, 14 N.W.2d 68 (1944), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the presumption of validity of a second marriage can be overcome by proof of the existence of a prior common-law marriage that neither party asserted was dissolved. In addition, the Michigan courts have found an admission by the bigamous party that the first marriage was never dissolved to be sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the second marriage.See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 438 F.2d 1207, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that the presumption was rebutted based on statements made by both a deceased, bigamous husband and his first wife indicating that they never divorced); Braymer v. Overton Mach. Co., 324 Mich. 648, 653, 37 N.W.2d 659, 661-62 (1949) (holding that a bigamous wife's admission on cross-examination that she never received divorce papers and never saw a decree of divorce was sufficient to rebut the presumption). In addition, the testimony of a bigamist's sufficient where the decedent had claimed that she was the one who had initiated the divorce. See Williams, 164 Mich. App. at 608, 417 N.W.2d at 559. Strong circumstantial evidence that the parties were never divorced has also been found to be sufficient. In In re Estate of Pope, 205 Mich. App. 174, 517 N.W.2d 281 (1994), a court held that the fact that a bigamous husband had an uncompleted divorce action pending against his wife at the time of his death, and that he lived openly with her until his death, was sufficient to rebut the presumption that his later marriage to another woman was valid. Pope, 205 Mich. App. at 176-78, 517 N.W.2d at 282-83.

The above cases reveal no particular formula for determining what type of evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of a subsequent marriage under Michigan law. Neither a record search nor the testimony of a prior spouse that no divorce took place is sufficient to rebut the rebut the presumption. See Barnett, 1995 WL 871197, at 4. Yet, as the cases discussed above illustrate, neither is either type of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption, so long as there is sufficient other evidence suggesting that the marriage was never dissolved.

Based on the totality of the evidence available, and the strength of Michigan's presumption of validity of a second marriage, it appears that the presumption in this case is rebutted based on the overwhelming evidence that Roberta and C.B. were never divorced. While he was alive, C.B. never suggested or even hinted in any available statement or document that he divorced Roberta. This is consistent with Roberta's testimony that she and C.B. were never divorced. (Roberta Aff. ¶ 5) It is also consistent with Roberta's search of the divorce records of two of the three places where C.B. lived — New York City and Detroit. (Compl. Ex. D) Although no search was conducted in Alabama or in New York from 1960-1963, Roberta's unchallenged testimony states that she and C.B. were living together as husband and wife in Alabama from 1955 to 1960/1961, and in New York until 1968 — testimony supported by evidence that the couple had children in Alabama in 1953, 1956, 1957, and 1958, and in New York in 1968 (Roberta Aff. ¶ 3; Compl. Exs. B, C). It is also highly significant that C.B. lied on his second marriage certificate, stating that his 1968 marriage to Carrie was his first. (Carrie Aff. ¶ 4; Carrie Mem. Ex. A) Courts have held that this is a strong indication that a prior divorce was not obtained because, if the party were truly divorced, there would have been no incentive to lie. See Detroit Diesel Corp. v. Lane-Smith, 39 F. Supp.2d 852, 859 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Grabois v. Jones, No. 94 Civ. 2070, 1998 WL 158756, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) (treating such evidence as "conclusive" proof that the first marriage was never dissolved).

Finally, the conclusion that Roberta and C.B. were never divorced finds support in a child-support order that Roberta obtained from New York State Family Court and served on C.B. Croskey two months after his marriage to Carrie. (Compl. Ex. B) The order stated that Roberta was C.B.'s wife and that C.B. was therefore required to make child support payments. (Id.) There is no evidence that C.B. ever contested the order or challenged the Court's declaration that she was his wife.

Notwithstanding the presumption in favor of the validity of a subsequent marriage, it appears that Roberta Croskey is the lawful wife of C.B. Croskey, provided she is not equitably estopped to make such a claim — a subject addressed immediately below.

IV.

Carrie has asserted that even if Roberta otherwise would be the lawful wife of C.B. Croskey, Roberta should be estopped by laches to challenge the validity of C.B.'s second marriage. (Carrie Mem. at 4-9) According to Carrie, Roberta "had thirty-two years to assert that she was C.B.'s wife while he was alive, but did nothing in all that time to challenge the status of Carrie and C.B.'s marriage." (Id. at 5) During that time, Carrie and C.B. had four children and she contributed economically and emotionally to her and C.B.'s household during his years at Ford, expecting that her needs eventually would be provided for by C.B.'s pension. (Id. at 5, 7) As an equitable matter, Carrie asserts that Roberta "should not now be permitted to reap the bounty of C.B. and Carrie's years of labor together." (Id. at 9)

The doctrine of laches "is applicable in cases in which there is an unexcused or unexplained delay in commencing an action and a corresponding change of material condition that results in prejudice to a party." Pub. Health Dep't v. Rivergate Manor, 452 Mich. 495, 507, 550 N.W.2d 515, 520 (1996). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show a lack of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff, resulting in some prejudice to the defendant. Badon v. Gen. Motors Corp., 188 Mich. App. 430, 436, 470 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1991). In proving lack of diligence, the defendant must establish when the plaintiff first discovered the cause of action. Gallagher v. Keefe, 232 Mich. App. 363, 370, 591 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1998).

The Michigan courts have recognized estoppel by laches in a case similar to this one. In the Williams case, the Court held that a second wife was estopped to challenge her husband's later marriage to a fourth wife where the second wife had deserted her husband, had remarried without obtaining a divorce or attempting to discern whether she had been divorced, and had remained silent for ten years after he remarried, despite knowledge of the marriage and frequent social contact with the decedent. Williams, 164 Mich. at 609, 417 N.W.2d at 559. Michigan courts have generally undertaken an equitable analysis of whether the party challenging the subsequent marriage was duly diligent in asserting his or her rights, implicitly assuming that entering into and investing in a marriage that turns out to be invalid many years later is sufficient prejudice. See Pope, 205 Mich App. at 178, 517 N.W.2d at 283 (declining to find laches after such an equitable analysis); Detroit Diesel, 39 F. Supp.2d at 860 (same).

Summary judgment must be denied in the present case because genuine questions of material fact must be resolved before an equitable determination regarding laches can be made. Although the record is sparse, the evidence is consistent in suggesting that Roberta never remarried and she did not abandon C.B. Croskey. However, there is a genuine issue of fact on the question of when, if at all, Roberta became aware that C.B. was married to Carrie. Carrie surmises that Roberta must have been aware of her marriage to C.B., at least by the time Roberta's children started visiting her household in the early 1980's, but Roberta denies that any such conclusion can be drawn (Roberta Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 4). Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence concerning Roberta's relationship with C.B. during the 32 years of his subsequent marriage to Carrie. Carrie has testified that C.B. and Roberta had no significant contact during the years of her marriage (Carrie Aff. ¶ 7) and that Roberta did nothing to contribute to C.B.'s household or good health (Carrie Aff. ¶ 13-14). However, there is evidence, including evidence that Roberta obtained a child support order and that C.B. made periodic visits to New York (id. ¶ 11; Compl. Ex. B), from which a factfinder might conclude that Roberta maintained regular contact with C.B. consistent with an ongoing marital relationship. This factual conflict also must be addressed.

Whether laches is a bar to Roberta's challenge to Carrie and C.B.'s marriage is a question that remains to be resolved and, therefore, summary judgment will not be granted at this time in favor of either party. The court also declines at this time to address either Carrie's alternative request for equitable relief or Roberta's claim to retroactive benefits — these are claims that will have to be considered only if Roberta is determined to be C.B. Croskey's lawful widow.

V.

Ford-UAW has moved to be discharged from this interpleader action and awarded costs and attorney's fees payable out of the pension funds in dispute.

Neither party contests that interpleader is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994), the federal interpleader statute: the pension benefits in dispute are worth more than $500, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a); Carrie and Roberta are diverse parties (residents of New York and Michigan respectively) with adverse claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1); and Ford-UAW has posted a $70,000 bond as a surety conditioned upon compliance with whatever future order this court issues regarding the funds in dispute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2). Whether Roberta or Carrie is ultimately determined to be the proper beneficiary, the $70,000 bond is of sufficient present value to secure the stream of income payable to either party. Having met all of the requirements for interpleader, Ford-UAW is dismissed from this action and relieved of any further liability in connection with the claims asserted. See Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 853 F.2d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)) ("An interpleader action is normally conducted in two stages, the first to determine whether the stakeholder is entitled to bring an interpleader action, and the second to determine the rights of the competing claimants to the fund.")

Ford has also requested costs and attorney's fees. A court may award costs and attorney's fees to a stakeholder that has initiated an interpleader action, or asserted interpleader as a counterclaim, where the court finds that the stakeholder: 1) is disinterested; 2) has conceded liability; 3) has deposited the disputed funds into the court; and 4) has sought a discharge from liability. Septembertide Publ'g, B.V. v. Stein and Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675, 683 (2d Cir. 1989). Costs and fees are generally awarded against the interpleader fund itself, in the absence of misconduct on the part of one of the parties suggesting that they should bear such costs. Id. The ultimate decision whether to grant costs and attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the district court. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1965).

In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488, the Second Circuit cautioned against awarding costs and attorney's fees as a matter of course in interpleader actions because awarding such fees might improperly allow insurance companies to recover "a part of their ordinary cost of doing business" from the interpleader fund. Id. at 90. Expounding on Travelers, another court explained: "Conflicting claims to the proceeds of a policy are inevitable and normal risks of the insurance business. Interpleader relieves the insurance company of multiple suits and eventuates in its discharge. Accordingly [such actions are] brought primarily in the company's own self-interest." Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Schaffer, 442 F. Supp. 826, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Finding self-interest to be the motivating factor behind an insurance company's interpleader action, numerous courts have declined to award costs or attorney's fees.See, e.g., Travelers, 354 F.2d at 490; Commercial Union Life Ins. Co. v. Almonor, No. 98 Civ. 3649, 1999 WL 292562, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1999);Marvin E. Herman, Inc. v. White, No. 91 Civ. 5025, 1993 WL 362405, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1993); Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, 415 F. Supp. 615, 619 (N.D. Ill. 1976).

Several courts have applied the Travelers rationale beyond the classic insurance context to disputes over pension benefits similar to those at issue in this case. In Lewis v. Atl. Research Corp., No. Civ. A 98-0070-H, 1999 WL 701383 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 1999), the Court found that a pension fund's assertion of interpleader in a dispute over a pensioner's survivor benefits was "simply a ministerial act that was part of tithe Plan's] ordinary course of doing business." Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court found that the plan "benefitted itself" by filing its interpleader, and should not be entitled to an award of costs or attorney's fees. Id. Similarly, another court has held, with regard to employee welfare benefits, that "[c]onflicting claims to benefits owed to beneficiaries under an employee welfare benefit plan, such as a group life insurance policy, are inevitable" and that costs and attorney's fees were therefore not warranted in an interpleader action initiated by the life insurance company. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Thomas, 735 F. Supp. 730, 733 (W.D. Mich. 1990).

In this case, the court declines to award costs or attorney's fees to Ford-UAW because the resolution of conflicting claims to benefits is an activity that a pension fund frequently undertakes in its ordinary course of business. To avoid double liability, a pension fund must definitively resolve disputes between claimants, and an interpleader action is often the best way to accomplish this goal, consistent with the interests of the fund. Neither the record in this case, nor Ford-UAW's arguments based upon that record, suggest any extraordinary circumstances that make this dispute any different from the types of disputes typically encountered by pension funds, or from the types of insurance disputes addressed by the Second Circuit in Travelers. Given Ford-UAW's clear interest in a definitive resolution to the parties' conflict in this case, and given the simple and straightforward nature of Ford-UAW's role and pleadings, no costs or attorney's fees will be awarded.

Ford-UAW is discharged from the case and from any further liability associated with the claims asserted herein, but no fees will be awarded. On the merits of this action, Roberta and Carrie's motions for summary judgment are denied because genuine issues of material fact remain. Although the court finds that Roberta and C.B. Croskey were never divorced and that C.B.'s subsequent marriage to Carrie therefore was bigamous, unresolved factual conflicts prevent the court from determining whether Roberta Croskey should be estopped by laches to challenge the validity of that marriage. Before such a determination can be made, a factfinder must determine when, if at all, Roberta first learned of C.B.'s marriage to Carrie, and the nature of Roberta and C.B.'s contact during those years. Only after these factual conflicts are resolved, and the lawful spouse of C.B. Croskey determined, will the court consider Carrie's alternative plea for equitable relief and Roberta's request for an award of retroactive benefits.