Summary
denying motions to sever and bifurcate as premature because discovery had barely begun
Summary of this case from Tarin v. RWI Constr., Inc.Opinion
01-CV-0757E(Sr)
July 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Plaintiffs Paula and Bruce Cramer commenced this action on October 25, 2001 alleging that defendant Fedco Automotive Components Co., Inc. ("Fedco") had created a hostile work environment and engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) and New York's Executive Law §§ 290 et seq. On May 3, 2002 defendant moved to bifurcate plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"), so that the individual claims of Paula and Bruce would be tried separately. In the alternative, Fedco seeks respective severance of these claims under FRCvP 21. Defendant's motion is premature and will therefore be denied without prejudice.
Paula and Bruce Cramer are married and were employed by Fedco. Paula avers that, to her detriment, Fedco treated her differently from other similarly-situated male employees. Paula first complained about this disparate treatment to her supervisor and to Fedco's president in September 1997, two months after being demoted. She alleges that no remedial action was taken in response to her complaint. She further alleges that defendant's agents harassed her in retaliation for her complaints. Paula subsequently complained about these working conditions to the General Manager of Operations on June 11, 1999. She brought these complaints to the New York State Division of Human Rights ("DHR") on June 17, 1999. On June 18, 1999 Paula was terminated along with two other female employees.
Plaintiff Bruce Cramer alleges that he was retaliated against as a result of his wife's complaints and because he assisted his wife in filing her complaint with the DHR. Pls.' Mem., at 6. After several reassignments to positions he characterized as "monotonous," Bruce was terminated on March 3, 2000. Pls.' Mem., at 8.
FRCvP 42(b) provides:
"The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States."
FRCvP 21 further states that "[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately." The decision to sever claims under either FRCvP 42 or FRCvP 21 is left to the broad discretion of the trial court. See New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1082 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). When ruling on such motions, courts may consider "(1) whether the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different from one another; (2) whether the severable issues require the testimony of different witnesses and different documentary proof; (3) whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted; and (4) whether the party requesting the severance will be prejudiced if it is not granted." Lewis v. Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., No. 97 Civ. 0607, 2000 WL 423517, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000). As a rule, it is presumed that all claims will be adjudicated in a single trial, and "it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials." Miller v. Am. Bonding Co., 257 U.S. 304, 307 (1921). In this regard, separate trials are the exception rather than the rule and defendant in the instant case has the burden of showing that bifurcation is necessary. Thrower v. Pozzi, No. 99 Civ. 5871, 2002 WL 91612, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2002); see also Martinez v. Robinson, No. 99 Civ.11911 (DAB), 2002 WL 424680, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2002) (denying severance motion as premature).
Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 827 F. Supp. 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
This case is still in its early stages. Indeed, discovery does not mandatorily close until June 27, 2003. Accordingly, this Court declines to grant defendant's motion before discovery is completed. The Court sees no need to bifurcate discovery and defendant may renew its motion after the close of discovery.
The Southern District of New York employed the same rationale when it denied a similar FRCvP 42(b) motion in Martinez, where defendants sought to bifurcate claims that, while stemming from the same tortious incident, were asserted against different defendants and based on different theories of liability. In Martinez, as here, "[defendants'] motion is premature. Discovery has barely begun, and, as a consequence, information necessary to evaluate the relevant factors is not yet available." Martinez, at *2. Thus, because this Court is unable to develop its knowledge as to the merits and sustainability of plaintiffs' case beyond what is represented in the pleadings, granting a motion for separate trials at this time would be premature. Moreover, "[t]he Court's determination as to whether it should sever the claims of the plaintiffs under Rule 21 or whether it should order separate trials under Rule 42 requires the same considerations." Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp.2d 556, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Consequently, defendant's request for severance of plaintiffs' claims under Rule 21 is premature.
Defendant cites Moore's Manual of Federal Practice and Procedure for the proposition that "[t]he question of whether to order separate trials for specific claims, affirmative defenses, or issues for hearing or trial should be raised and considered early in the pretrial stages of litigation, preferably before discovery is commenced." Vol. 2, § 20.03(5)(b) (emphasis supplied). However, this commentator's note, on its face, merely counsels parties to raise severance requests early so that the trial court may consider the issue of severance at a point where it may manage the case in an efficient manner, which may involve discovery bifurcation or other case management decisions. Herein, such has been raised and considered.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion for severance is denied, without prejudice.