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rejecting the petitioner's argument that a sentence of life imprisonment for second-degree murder in Pennsylvania violates the Eighth Amendment
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CIVIL NO. 99-504
March 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the Court as a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The underlying conviction giving rise to the custody of Thomas Craig (hereinafter "petitioner") occurred on March 24, 1980, when the petitioner pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania to charges of murder in the second degree, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, criminal mischief and conspiracy. Petitioner was sentenced on April 3, 1980 to life imprisonment on the murder charge and to a concurrent sentence of ten to twenty years imprisonment on the remaining charges. Craig did not appeal his sentence. Petitioner then sought collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541, et seq., seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. His request for post-conviction relief was denied after a hearing on January 13, 1984. Thereafter, Craig filed a petition for state habeas corpus relief, attacking the validity of his sentence on constitutional grounds, which was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court without opinion on July 14, 1998.
On February 11, 1999, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, seeking relief on the grounds that: (1) denial of a minimum term and inherent parole ineligibility required by a sentence of "life imprisonment" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) denial of a specific minimum term and inherent parole ineligibility without "fair warning" denies both substantive and procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the state's failure to annex a specific discretionary minimum term and parole eligibility to the sentence of "life imprisonment" imposed on the petitioner denies equal protection of law to the class of state prisoners serving a sentence of "life imprisonment" in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport on February 9, 1999. On June 6, 1999, Magistrate Judge Rapoport filed a report and recommendation which recommended that the petition be denied. For the reasons that follow, Magistrate Judge Rapoport's report and recommendation will be approved and adopted.
Petitioner sought to certify a class action which was denied by this Court on March 8, 1999.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Right to Parole Eligibility
The underlying issue in Craig's habeas petition is whether his sentence of "life imprisonment," pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1102(b), precludes parole eligibility under Pennsylvania law. Petitioner contends that, pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9756 (enacted after section 1102(b)), the sentencing court should have imposed a specific minimum sentence, the expiration of which would make petitioner eligible for parole. See Marshall v. Pennsylvania, 638 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa.Commw. 1994) (noting "the prisoner's right to apply for parole once his minimum term has expired"); see also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.21 (West 1999) (permitting the parole of a prisoner at any time after the expiration of his or her minimum term or sentence). Section 9756 states, in pertinent part:
(b) minimum sentence. — the court shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.
(c) prohibition of parole for summary offenses. — the court may impose a sentence to imprisonment without the right to parole under this subsection only when:
Because the petitioner's constitutional arguments (discussed below) rely heavily upon the petitioner's interpretation of Pennsylvania statutory law on this issue, the court first will determine the contours of the petitioner's rights under state law before resolving the petitioner's constitutional claims.
(1) a summary offense is charged;
(2) sentence is imposed for nonpayment of fines or costs, or both, in which case the sentence shall specify the number of days to be served; and
(3) the maximum term or terms of imprisonment imposed on one or more indictments to run consecutively or concurrently total less than 30 days.42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9756 (West 1998). Pennsylvania courts, however, have addressed the perceived inconsistency between section 1102(b) (which mandates life imprisonment for a second degree murder conviction) and section 9756(c) (which limits the imposition of sentences without parole to certain enumerated offenses), the precise issue raised by petitioner. Those courts have recognized that a sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder is in itself a mandatory minimum sentence, and therefore prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment are ineligible for parole. See Castle Bd. of Probation and Parole, 554 A.2d 625. 627-29 (Pa.Commw. 1989), appeal denied, 567 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 718 A.2d 1262 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal denied, 737 A.2d 1224 (Pa. 1999). In other words, Pennsylvania state courts have rejected the very argument raised by petitioner that section 9756 (originally enacted in 1974) impliedly repealed the mandatory minimum sentence of "life imprisonment" for second degree murder in section 1102(b), which was enacted earlier. See Castle, 554 A.2d at 627 n. 3, 629. Furthermore, petitioner's argument that he is entitled, under Pennsylvania statutory law, to parole eligibility is undermined by section 331.21 of the Pennsylvania Probation and Parole Act itself, which permits the Parole Board to release on parole, all persons, "except convicts condemned to death or serving life imprisonment." § 331.21(a). The court concludes, therefore, that petitioner's claim of a statutory right to parole eligibility fails as a matter of state law.
In reaching this conclusion, the court has taken into consideration the materials submitted in petitioner's motion to amend his habeas petition.
B. Constitutional Claims
The remaining claim made by petitioner is that the state court's imposition of the sentence "life imprisonment" without a specified minimum sentence (and, hence without the possibility of parole) is a violation of his right against cruel and unusual punishment and his rights to due process and equal protection.
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation addressed only petitioner's due process claim, overlooking the merits of petitioner's equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims. Since the Magistrate Judge did not address the latter claims, petitioner had no occasion to address those claims in his objections. In this procedural conundrum, the court could remand the case to the Magistrate Judge for consideration of these claims, see Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72.1.I(b), or could address the claims directly. Under the circumstances of this case and given that petitioner has had a full opportunity to argue his position on these claims, the court will address petitioner's equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims and will not remand.
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Petitioner makes a convoluted argument that the state court's construction of his sentence of "life imprisonment" as a mandatory minimum sentence of life without the possibility of parole violates his constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment because, under his interpretation of Pennsylvania's sentencing statutes, Pennsylvania law only authorizes the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without parole for conviction for "arson-murder," or in cases in which the current offense is the defendant's "third-strike." See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3302(a)(2) (West 2000)("[A] person convicted of murder of the second degree [for arson-murder] shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the right to parole."); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9714(a)(2) (West 1998) ("[U]pon a conviction for a third or subsequent crime of violence the court may . . . sentence the offender to life imprisonment without parole."). In other words, petitioner argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the state court has sentenced him more harshly than the legislature intended.
This argument is without merit and is essentially a rehashing of the petitioner's disagreement with Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of section 1102(b). Although section 1102(b) does not specifically state that the sentence for second-degree murder — life imprisonment — is without the possibility of parole, as stated above, Pennsylvania courts have held that the sentence of life imprisonment is a mandatory minimum sentence. See Castle, 554 A.2d at 627 (concluding that "by enacting section 1102(b), the legislature intended to remove a trial court's discretion to impose a lesser sentence in the case of a defendant convicted of second degree murder"). Because a prisoner cannot be eligible for parole prior to the expiration of his minimum sentence, a prisoner sentenced to life in prison is, therefore, de facto not eligible for parole. See § 331.21(a).
Petitioner is essentially asking this court to reconsider a question of statutory interpretation that has already been addressed by the Pennsylvania courts. This Court, however, is bound by the state court's interpretation of the statutes at issue. See Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 244 (1953)("The construction given to a state statute by the state courts is binding upon federal courts."); Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432, 436 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[I]n a federal habeas proceeding, `state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law . . . and [federal courts] are bound by their constructions except in rare circumstances.'") (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)). Therefore, absent any constitutional impediments to sentencing petitioner to life imprisonment without parole for second degree murder, petitioner has no constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment.
This statutory construction argument was specifically made to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in petitioner's state habeas corpus petition which was denied without opinion. See Exh. "C-l" to Federal Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner has not argued that his sentence of "life imprisonment" without the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to the crime to which he plead guilty — second degree murder. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)). Petitioner has failed to put forth any circumstances under which his life imprisonment sentence, even without the possibility of parole could be viewed as "grossly disproportionate" to his criminal conduct, conduct which resulted in the taking of a life. See United States v. Mack, No. 02-2203, 2003 WL 22326510, *9 (3d Cir. September 19, 2003) (finding that under no standard of review could the petitioner show that the imposition of his life sentence was grossly disproportionate to his criminal conduct — conspiring to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine).
2. Due Process
A claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires deprivation of a "protected liberty interest." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). Under certain circumstances, a state may confer enforceable liberty interests on behalf of prisoners that are protected by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 483-34; McCrery v. Mark, 823 F. Supp. 288, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing state court decisions recognizing state-created liberty interests). As Magistrate Judge Rapoport found, however, "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, a prisoner has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of being released from confinement prior to the expiration of the maximum term of the imposed sentence." Reider v. Board od Probation and Parole, 514 A.2d 967, 971 ( Pa. Commw. 1986).
Similarly, "there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7; see also Bd. of Pardons v. Alien, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that, in some cases, a state may construct its parole system such that it creates a reasonable expectation of parole. See Greenholtz 442 U.S. at 12. In that situation, the prospect of release on parole becomes a liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. Id.
As the Magistrate Judge concluded, however, under Pennsylvania's parole system, inmates like petitioner who are sentence to "life imprisonment" have no expectation of parole, since the grant of parole is discretionary under the Probation and Parole Act, see § 331.21, and most importantly because the Parole Board is specifically prohibited under section 331.21(a) from granting parole to a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment. See McCrery, 823 F. Supp. at 293. Thus, because neither the United States Constitution nor Pennsylvania state law give the petitioner a constitutionally protected interest in parole (or parole eligibility), petitioner's claim that his right to due process has been infringed cannot be sustained.
In his objections, petitioner argues that the issue before the court is whether he has a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in "parole eligibility" rather than whether he has a protected interest in "parole." Craig contends that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly focused on the latter issue. This argument is without merit. No matter how phrased, petitioner has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in being released prior to the expiration of his minimum sentence, which in this case is at the expiration of his life.
Because petitioner has no protected liberty interest in parole (or parole eligibility), the court need not discuss whether Pennsylvania law provides "fair warning" that imposition of a life sentence means that the defendant will not be eligible for parole.
3. Equal Protection
Petitioner argues that he is a member of cognizable class of persons, i.e. prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to section 1102(a) or (b) (as amended) who are ineligible for parole. Essentially, he claims that, as a member of that class, he has been denied equal protection under the law, in that he has been unlawfully treated differently than other prisoners, i.e. prisoners sentenced under section 1103 (which applies to sentences for felonies not covered by section 1102), because his life sentence is treated as a mandatory maximum and a mandatory minimum. By contrast, a trial court has discretion when setting the minimum and maximum sentence for prisoners sentenced for felonies under section 1103.
Despite petitioner's arguments to the contrary, the difference between the discretion given to the trial court in setting the minimum and maximum sentence under section 1103 and the rigid sentencing requirements under 1102(a) and (b) is that the latter represents a legislative choice to tie the hands of the trial court in cases in which the defendant is convicted of first or second degree murder. See Castle, 554 A.2d at 627-28. The difference in treatment is a product of the fact that defendants sentenced under 1103 have been convicted of offenses other than murder in the first or second degree, and are therefore not "similarly situated" to petitioner. Because petitioner is not "similarly situated" to the class of persons to which he claims is treated differently under Pennsylvania law, his equal protection claim must fail. See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)("To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that s/he has been treated differently from persons who are similarly situated.").
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation will be approved and adopted.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this __ day of March, 2004, upon
consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. no. 1) and review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport (doc. no. 19), petitioner's objections (doc. no. 20) and all responses and replies thereto, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;
3. Petitioner's motions for appointment of counsel (docs no. 8 and 28) are DENIED; and
4. No certificate of appealability is granted.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.