Summary
proceeding on remand from the Connecticut Supreme Court
Summary of this case from Deutsch v. Circa Bistro LLCOpinion
No. CV 98 0075654S
August 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before the court is the defendants' motion to strike counts three and five of the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state relief for which relief can be granted. The defendants assert that a person injured by someone who was sold alcoholic liquor "shall have no cause of action against such seller for negligence in the sale of alcoholic liquor to a person 21 years of age or older" as provided in Public Act 03-91 (the "Act") which amends the Dram Shop Act codified at Connecticut General Statutes § 30-102. The plaintiff claims that the Act is a substantive change in the law which can only apply prospectively.
The Act emanates from Substitute Senate Bill No. 1112 (January Session 2003) entitled: An Act Concerning The Dram Shop Act. The bill was raised by the Joint Committee on General Law on March 12, 2003 in response to the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312 (2003), which was released the previous month. The Senate passed it on May 15, 2003 and the House passed it on May 20, 2003. The bill was designated Public Act 03-91 on May 29, 2003 and signed by the governor and made effective on June 3, 2003.
The bill before both houses contained fiscal and legislative analyses.
The Office of Fiscal Analysis Fiscal Note incorporated into the bill states: "The workload of the Judicial Department's (sic) Civil Division would be reduced by eliminating the option to recover damages for negligence." The fiscal analysis clearly denotes that the bill amends and does not clarify the Dram Shop Act which it amends. If the bill clarified the law there would be no fiscal impact since the bill, if enacted, would have restored the status quo disturbed by Craig v. Driscoll, supra.
The Office of Legislature Analysis Bill Analysis of the Act states: "The bill eliminates the right of an injured person to sue a seller for negligence in selling alcohol to someone at least age 21. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently established a common law (judge-made) right for a person to file a negligence lawsuit against a seller." The analysis does not say the court misinterpreted the law. In fact the Office of Legislative Analysis acknowledges that the Dram Shop Act did not address the issue in that it further provided that:
In Craig v. Driscoll, the Connecticut Supreme Court (by a three to two vote considered the Dram Shop Act's history and its earlier ruling on whether the act preempted a negligence claim. The court found that the act does not occupy the field, and recognizing a common law negligence action did not conflict with or thwart the act's purposes. It found that the act provides recovery for plaintiffs whether or not they can prove causation subject to a damage limitation, and the court could use its common law authority to increase recovery opportunities when the bar owner's state of mind warrants it; this would supplement the Dram Shop Act. The court considered its rationale for rejecting a negligence claim in the past, its other rulings on negligence, policy considerations in using its common law authority, and the common law's adaptability to changing times ( 262 Conn. 312 (2003).
Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 313 (2003).
General Assembly File No. 606 Substitute Bill No. 1112, January Session 2003, May 1, 2003. The parties concede and the court confirmed that there is no legislative history. Had the General Assembly disagreed with the fiscal and legal analyses it surely would have been questioned or debated on the floor of the House of Representatives or the Senate. Thus, neither house of the General Assembly enacted Public Act 03-91 with the understanding that it was clarifying the legislative intent of the Dram Shop Act. Instead, they enacted it to interdict a new common-law cause of action.
Statutory laws are presumed to operate prospectively:
The principles that govern retroactive application of legislative enactments are well established. Except as to amending statutes that are procedural in their impact, there is a general presumption that legislation is intended to operate prospectively. General Statutes Section 55-3; East Village Associates, Inc. v. Monroe, 173 Conn. 328, 331-32 (1977); Edward Balf Co. v. East Granby, 152 Conn. 319, 322-23 (1965); E.M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 127 Conn. 415, 418 (1941); Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 220 (1892) (as cited in Enfield Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 571 (1981)).
The Act was expressly made "effective upon passage," evincing a legislative intent that it not have prospective effect.
Because the plaintiffs' cause of action arose prior to June 3, 2003 and Public Act 03-91 does not clarify existing law, but rather, substantively changes the existing law as of June 3, 2003, the Act does not bar the plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion To Strike is denied.
By the Court
Vanessa L. Bryant