OPINION OF THE COURT

G.B. SMITH, J.

The primary issue on this appeal is whether Civil Rights Law § 52, which bans audiovisual coverage of most courtroom proceedings, violates the Federal or State Constitution. We agree with the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division that there is no First Amendment or New York Constitution, article I, § 8 right to televise a trial.

On September 5, 2001, Courtroom Television Network LLC (Court TV) filed a complaint against the State and Robert Morgenthau in his official capacity as District Attorney of New York County seeking a declaratory judgment that Civil Rights Law § 52 is unconstitutional and enjoining the prosecutor's office from enforcing it. On July 15, 2003, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to defendants stating:

"the court declines to establish a constitutional rule in New York granting the media a right to televise court proceedings. The record is consistent with the traditional approach of New York courts to public access questions, giving great weight to fair trial concerns. The record also is consistent with New York's statutory scheme which guarantees public trials, but gives primacy to fair trial rights. Moreover, to the extent any changes to the statutory scheme have been put into experimental use, these were initiated and reviewed by the Legislature. A state constitutional rule expanding the rights of the media in New York to include the right to photograph and broadcast court proceedings would derail what is, and always has been, a legislative process." ( 1 Misc 3d 328, 375 [2003].)

The Appellate Division affirmed. Court TV appeals as of right on constitutional grounds pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1).

Court TV asserts that section 52 denies it the right of access to trials guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution. Court TV argues further that most states permit televised trials, that New York stands alone in having an "absolute ban" on televised trials and that the evidence supporting access to information for the general public far outweighs any attendant problems of having cameras in the courtroom. New York State counters that there is no First Amendment right to televised trials, and that the concerns of Court TV are more appropriately directed to the Legislature than to the courts. The State additionally argues that allowing cameras in the courtroom is a discretionary policy determination that may be made by the Legislature.

I. First Amendment

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the press and the public a right of access to trial proceedings. Without the right to attend trials, "which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated'" ( Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US 555, 580; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk, 457 US 596, 605; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 US 501, 510 [ Press Enterprise I]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 US 1, 9 [ Press Enterprise II]).

Though the public acquires information about trials chiefly through the press and electronic media, the press is not imbued with any special right of access. Rather, the media possesses "the same right of access as the public . . . so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard" ( Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 573). Thus, the press has "no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public" ( Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 609), nor any right to information greater than the public ( see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 US 1, 15).

Civil Rights Law § 52 does not prevent the press, including television journalists, from attending trials and reporting on the proceedings. What they cannot do under the statute is bring cameras into the courtroom. This is not a restriction on the openness of court proceedings but rather on what means can be used in order to gather news. The media's access is thus guaranteed. But it does not extend to a right to televise those proceedings ( Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F2d 16, 23 [2d Cir 1984]). "There is a long leap . . . between a public right under the First Amendment to attend trials and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised" ( id.). Estes v. Texas ( 381 US 532) is the seminal case on televising a trial. Five Justices concurred in the Court's holding that the petitioner had been denied due process because of the televising and broadcasting of his trial and held there was no constitutional right of the press to have access to the courtroom during a trial. The Court listed a number of concerns about the presence of cameras at the trial, including the prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity on the jurors, the impact on the truthfulness of the witnesses, responsibilities placed on the trial judge to assure a fair trial and the impact on the petitioner. The Court wrote, "A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena" ( 381 US at 549; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333, 355). The Court did acknowledge that "the ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of criminal trials" ( 381 US at 551-552).

Today, television has become a "commonplace . . . affair in the daily life of the average person" ( id. at 595 [Harlan, J., concurring]). While the Supreme Court has revisited the effects of televised coverage of trials, concluding that such broadcasts are not a per se violation of fair trial rights, it has never deviated from its holding that "'there is no constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast'" ( Chandler v. Florida, 449 US 560, 569, quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 610).

Thus, it is clear that the Federal Constitution does not require courtrooms to be open to televise court proceedings.

II. The New York State Constitution

The New York State Constitution, similarly, does not provide a right to televise trials. Article I, § 8 states, "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Court TV argues that Civil Rights Law § 52 is an unlawful "restraint on the press." It concedes, however, that this Court has not "explicitly" recognized "a state constitutional right to public and press access to trial court proceedings." While we have in certain circumstances interpreted article I, § 8 more broadly than its federal counterpart ( see O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., 71 NY2d 521, 530-532 [then Judge Kaye concurring]), we decline to do so here.

In New York, the press, like the public, has a right of access to criminal proceedings ( see Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 NY2d 430, 437-438; Matter of Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 NY2d 370, 376; Matter of Associated Press v. Bell, 70 NY2d 32, 38). This includes access to pretrial hearings ( id. ["We conclude, therefore, that the public and the press may have a First Amendment right of access to pretrial suppression hearings"]). Any exception to a public trial should be narrowly construed ( Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 NY2d at 443; People v. Hinton, 31 NY2d 71, 75-76 ["While we reaffirm today the inherent discretionary power of the trial court to close the courtroom, we need only point out that the discretion be sparingly exercised and then, only when unusual circumstances necessitate it" (citation omitted)]).

Court TV relies on courtroom closure cases to suggest that New York has granted the press broader rights than those provided under the First Amendment. But even if the right to access was the equivalent of a right to televise courtroom proceedings, which it is not, our cases do not support appellant's assertions.

Even prior to Estes, New York did not recognize any independent right of the press beyond that of the public to have access to the court. In Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente

( 308 NY 71, 84-85), this Court held that the press had no independent right to request that the courtroom remain open separate from defendant's right to make either a request for the court to remain open or closed. In fact, our approach to courtroom closure has been comparable to the federal analysis. In imposing such a restraint on the press, the government must show that there is a legitimate governmental interest which outweighs any constitutional right of access by the press and public ( see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US 713, 715 [Black, J., concurring] [government has the burden of proving that governmental interest outweighs the constitutional right]).

The primary governmental interest, both state and federal, is guaranteeing that the defendant receives a fair trial ( see Estes v. Texas, supra; Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, supra). Consistent with that interest, the court must be concerned with the defendant, jurors, witnesses, attorneys and the public at large ( see Waller v. Georgia, 467 US 39, 45-46; People v. Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 497-498).

In Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, this Court stated, "All court proceedings are presumptively open to the public, but when this would jeopardize the right of the accused to a fair trial, the competing interests must be balanced and reconciled as far as possible" ( 48 NY2d 430, 438, supra). The governmental interests of the right of a defendant to have a fair trial and for the trial court to maintain the integrity of the courtroom outweigh any absolute First Amendment or article I, § 8 right of the press or the public to have access to trials.

This Court has clearly and unequivocally held that the state constitutional right of the press to attend a trial is the same as that of any citizen. "The fact that petitioners are in the business of disseminating news gives them no special right or privilege, not possessed by other members of the public. Since the only rights they assert are those supposedly given 'every citizen' to attend court sessions (Judiciary Law, § 4), they are in no position to claim any right or privilege not common to 'every [other] citizen'" ( see Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 NY 71, 85). The Valente court held that the press had no independent right to request that the courtroom remain open separate from defendant's right to make either a request for the court to remain open or closed. Thus, under New York State law the press has no right separate from the public to challenge the judge's order to close the courtroom.

In Matter of Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino ( 77 NY2d 1, 8), this Court held that there is no broader protection for the press under State Constitution, article I, § 8, than under the United States Constitution with respect to right of access to judicial proceedings. Even though Johnson specifically addressed disciplinary proceedings which are traditionally closed, and Court TV petitions this Court for a ruling on trials which are presumptively open, Johnson does guide this Court in that it addressed whether or not article I, § 8 gives greater rights than the First Amendment. Johnson also refused to find that there was a greater protection for the press than for the public to have access to the court.

Together, Valente and Johnson hold that there is no additional or broader protection under State Constitution, article I, § 8, than under the First Amendment insofar as access to court proceedings is concerned. Thus, we conclude that Civil Rights Law § 52 withstands state constitutional challenge.

III. The Legislative Prerogative

In New York State, the decision whether or not to permit cameras in the courtroom is a legislative prerogative. The Legislature may and has, under our State Constitution, experimented with rules regarding audiovisual broadcasts of trial proceedings.

Beginning in 1987 with the enactment of Judiciary Law § 218, the Legislature has on four occasions temporarily permitted certain courtroom broadcasts. Specifically, Judiciary Law § 218 (1) permitted the Chief Judge of the State to "authorize an experimental program in which presiding trial judges, in their discretion, may permit audio-visual coverage of civil and criminal court proceedings, including trials" subject to certain conditions and restrictions. Judiciary Law § 218 contained sunset provisions upon which the statute, if not extended, would automatically expire. It also required a committee to review audiovisual coverage to hold public hearings on audiovisual coverage and to issue reports "evaluating the efficacy of the program [of audiovisual coverage] and whether any public benefits accrue from the program, [and] any abuses that occurred during the program," with recommendations for future legislation (Judiciary Law § 218 [c], as amended by L 1995, ch 8). After each experiment, lasting approximately two to three years, the Legislature reviewed the findings and reports on audiovisual equipment in the courtroom, all of which recommended cameras in the courtroom, and, after each review, rejected the recommendation. On June 30, 1997, the Legislature and Governor allowed Judiciary Law § 218 to sunset. Thus, the ban on televised trials contained in Civil Rights Law § 52 resumed as of July 1, 1997, a ban which continues to the present. Despite the technological improvements to audiovisual equipment, which renders its presence in courtrooms less obtrusive, the Legislature has not seen fit since 1997 to amend section 52 or reenact section 218.

We will not circumscribe the authority constitutionally delegated to the Legislature to determine whether audiovisual coverage of courtroom proceedings is in the best interest of the citizens of this state. "A state constitutional rule expanding the rights of the media in New York to include the right to photograph and broadcast court proceedings would derail what is, and always has been, a legislative process" ( 1 Misc 3d 328, 375, supra).

For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that Civil Rights Law § 52 is constitutional under both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Order affirmed, with costs.