ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THELTON E. HENDERSON, United States District Judge

Issac Coronado, currently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed his complaint and found numerous deficiencies. The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend and identified the various pleading deficiencies that Coronado needed to cure in his amended complaint. Coronado then filed an "Amendment Complaint," which is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Coronado alleges that he was arrested for a domestic abuse charge on February 8, 1999 in Santa Cruz County by sheriff's deputies. Coronado alleges that detective Tom Gilbertson violated his constitutional rights in numerous ways, including by not listening to his side of the story before arresting him and by not taking alternative steps to effectuate the arrest. The pleading identifies no other defendants. The pleading discloses a statute of limitations problem: Coronado alleges that the wrongful actions took place on or about February 8, 1999, and that he was released on bail and thereafter was treated for his injuries on February 12, 1999. Coronado also alleges that all the felony charges were dismissed on his first appearance for lack of evidence.

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is that of the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Elliots v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Because California has multiple statutes of limitations for different torts, the court borrows the general or residual statute for personal injury actions to use for a § 1983 action. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). The general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the one year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code § 340(3) and is the applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See id. A claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802.

The court must give effect to a state's tolling provisions. See generally Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989). The relevant tolling provision here is California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1, which recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life." See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the disability of imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See id.1 Tolling under section 352.1 is triggered by the plaintiff's arrest and incarceration. See Elliot, 25 F.3d at 802-03. But if the statute of limitations starts to run again because the prisoner is released, tolling will not be reinstated by subsequent incarceration. See Boag v. Chief of Police, 669 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1982) (disability of imprisonment ceases upon release on parole), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982); Williams v. Coughlan, 244 F.2d 6, 8 (9th Cir. 1957) (statute of limitations not tolled after prisoner released).

Coronado's "Amendment Complaint" discloses that the relevant events occurred in early February 1999, and that he was released from custody on February 12, 1999. Because he was released from custody on bail within a week of the date on which his constitutional rights allegedly were violated, the tolling of the limitations period ended and the one-year limitations period began to run on February 12, 1999. Any subsequent reincarnation did not cause the limitations period to be tolled again. See Boag v. Chief of Police, 669 F.2d at 588. Coronado thus had to file his Section 1983 action within a year from February 12, 1999. He did not do so. He did not file this action until September 24, 2001, more than thirty months after the events occurred and the causes of action accrued.

Although the statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense, the court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint where the defense is complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations defense is complete and obvious from the Amendment Complaint.

This action is dismissed with prejudice because it was not timely filed.