Opinion
CV126030527.
12-18-2012
CORNER BLOCK DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BRIAN T. FISCHER, Judge.
I
FACTS
On June 20, 2012, the plaintiff, Corner Block Development, LLC, filed a two-count complaint appealing the actions of the defendants, the City of New Haven, the New Haven Tax Assessor, the Board of Tax Revenue of the City of New Haven and the City of New Haven Board of Assessment Appeals. The complaint alleges the following relevant facts. The plaintiff is the owner and successor in interest to the owner of record on October 1, 2011, of real property, including building improvements, located at 808 Chapel Street in New Haven, Connecticut. The Assessor for the City of New Haven (" Assessor") valued the land at $186, 340 and the building at $35, 700, for a total assessed value of $222, 040. The Assessor determined that all property should be liable for taxation at 70% of its true and actual valuation. Based upon 70% assessment, the 100% fair market value for the real property is $317, 200. The plaintiff alleges that this valuation is grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful. The plaintiff alleges that it appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (" BAA"), claiming to be aggrieved by the actions of the Assessor and offered to be sworn and answer all questions concerning the property, but the BAA refused to take any further action other than the determination of assessment, making no significant valuations and arriving at the valuations determined by the Assessor.
The plaintiff requests, inter alia, that the valuation of the property on October 1, 2011, and subsequent years occurring during the pendency of this appeal, be reduced to 70% of its true and actual value, and that the court order a reduction in the amount of the tax and assessment on which the tax was computed. Counts one and two of the plaintiff's complaint are brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119, respectively.
On September 17, 2012, the defendants filed the present motion to dismiss count one of the plaintiff's complaint along with a supporting memorandum of law, asserting that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff is not aggrieved as it was not the owner of the property obligated to pay taxes on October 1, 2011, the date of the assessment. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on September 21, 2012, followed by a supporting memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss on October 2, 2012. The matter was heard on the November 5, 2012 short calendar.
II
DISCUSSION
A
Motion to Dismiss Standard
" A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009). " The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10-31.
A motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle for challenging a plaintiff's standing to sue, and must be granted if the plaintiff does not have a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter of the challenged action. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 346-47, 780 A.2d 98 (2001). " [S]tanding ... implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any point in judicial proceedings." Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 656, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). " If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1016, 126 S.Ct. 659, 163 L.Ed.2d 526 (2005). " [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544-45, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., supra, 294 Conn. at 214.
B
Parties' Arguments
The defendants argue that the plaintiff is not aggrieved pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-111 and 12-117a as it was not the owner of the property obligated to pay taxes on October 1, 2011, the date of the assessment. Rather, according to the defendants, the owner of the property on October 1, 2011, was 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC. It was 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC, not the plaintiff, who appealed the assessment to the BAA on February 21, 2012. On March 12, 2012, a hearing was held by the BAA. On March 27, 2012, the plaintiff acquired title to the property. On April 17, 2012, the BAA voted to reduce the fair market value of the property, and a notice of the change was sent to 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC on April 25, 2012. On June 15, 2012, the plaintiff, not 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC, appealed the decision of the BAA to this court. Thus, according to the defendants, the plaintiff is neither classically nor statutorily aggrieved as it neither owned the property on October 1, 2011, nor is it bound to pay taxes pursuant to General Statutes § 12-111.
In contrast, the plaintiff asserts that the appeal to the BAA was still pending when it took title to the property, and, as the successor owner to the property, it is entitled to pursue the tax appeal. In support of its position, the plaintiff cites to Wallingford Center Associates v. Board of Tax Review, 68 Conn.App. 803, 793 A.2d 260 (2002) in which the Appellate Court determined that a subsequent property owner was entitled to intervene in a pending valuation appeal as a matter of right. According to the plaintiff, if 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC had appealed the BAA's decision to the Superior Court, the plaintiff would have been entitled to intervene in that action as a matter of right. Therefore, it would be incongruous to deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to appeal the decision directly. The plaintiff has a direct and substantial interest in the issue of whether the property was properly assessed on October 1, 2011, as subsequent assessments will be based on that valuation.
C
Analysis
" There is a pervasive statutory scheme that has been developed by the legislature for the assessment of real estate and the procedure for challenging that assessment is by a process which is carefully balanced by both procedural and substantive remedies ... To challenge a real estate assessment, our statutes provide that a taxpayer, who is aggrieved by the actions of the assessor, may appeal his or her decision to the board of assessment appeals pursuant to [General Statutes] § 12-111. If a taxpayer is aggrieved by the decision of the board of assessment appeals, the taxpayer may then proceed to appeal this decision to the Superior Court within two months from the date of notice of such action. General Statutes § 12-117a." (Citation omitted.) S & S Realty Co. v. Middletown, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown, Docket No. CV 98 0085530 (June 20, 2001, Aronson, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 136, 136-37).
Count one of the plaintiff's complaint is brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a which provides in relevant part that " [a]ny person ... claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom ... to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated ..."
" [General Statutes §§ ]12-117a and 12-119 clearly create causes of action for taxpayers who have been aggrieved by excessive and wrongful valuation of their property. Section 12-117a provides taxpayers with an opportunity to appeal to the Superior Court upon an allegation that their property tax assessment is excessive." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Megin v. New Milford, 125 Conn.App. 35, 37, 6 A.3d 1176 (2010). " [T]he general rule is that one party has no standing to raise another's rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 37-38. " In order to maintain an appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, the complainant must be a record owner of the subject property in order to claim aggrievement by the assessor's action." Fairfield Merrittview, LP v. Norwalk, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 094016844 (August 6, 2012, Aronson, J.T.R.), citing Megin v. New Milford, supra, 125 Conn.App. at 40.
In Megin v. New Milford, supra, 125 Conn.App. at 35, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's tax appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked the requisite aggrievement under General Statutes § 12-117a. See Megin v. New Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 05 4002510 (May 6, 2009, Pickard, J.). The appeal was brought in the name of someone who did not own the property. Megin v. New Milford, supra, 125 Conn.App. at 36. The record owner of the property was " Wilfred J. Megin, Trustee, " not the plaintiff, Wilfred J. Megin, in his individual capacity. Id. The plaintiff did not advance a claim that he had standing to pursue the appeal in his individual capacity, but rather argued that the defendant should be collaterally estopped from raising the issue of standing in light of a tax foreclosure proceeding between the parties that occurred several years prior concerning the same property. Id., at 38.
The issue that this court must resolve is whether the plaintiff, who was not the owner on the date of assessment and who did not appeal the assessment to the BAA, nonetheless has standing to appeal the actions of the BAA having become the subsequent owner of the property during the time the BAA appeal was pending.
In SG Stamford, LLC v. Stamford, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 08 4014088 (September 22, 2009, Tierney, J.T.R.) (48 Conn. L. Rptr. 499), the court denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's tax appeal, finding that the plaintiff, as the current owner of the subject property, had sufficiently alleged statutory aggrievement. On October 1, 2007, Southern Connecticut Newspapers, Inc. (" SCN"), was the owner of the subject property. Id., at 500. SCN appealed to the BAA claiming to be aggrieved by the assessor's action. Id. On March 24, 2008, the BAA elected not to conduct an appeal hearing and, thus, denied the relief requested by SCN. Id. Thereafter, on April 22, 2008, SG Stamford, LLC (" SG Stamford") purchased the subject property and commenced an appeal in the Superior Court on May 22, 2008. Id. The defendant argued that SG Stamford lacked standing to bring the appeal under General Statutes § 12-117a because it acquired the property after the appeal to the BAA. Id., at 501-02. The court concluded that SG Stamford " alleged sufficient statutory aggrievement based upon the plain ‘ any person’ language of ... General Statutes § 12-117a by reason of being the current owner of the real property at issue being obligated to pay the real estate taxes due upon the contested tax assessment." Id., at 503. The court also found that SG Stamford alleged sufficient taxpayer standing and classical aggrievement. Id. In reaching its decision, the court noted that " [t]he Supreme Court has liberally construed General Statutes § 12-117a." Id., at 502. The court explained that the phrase " any person" in General Statutes § 12-117a has been broadly construed in administrative appeals and was broader than the limitation contained in General Statutes § 12-119, which states that only an " owner" may take an appeal. Id., at 503. The court noted that " General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119 are not inconsistent and both allow subsequent purchasers who have acquired title after the action by a Board of Assessment Appeals to bring a Superior Court tax appeal." Id. Moreover, the court determined that denying standing to appeal to a subsequent owner, who has an obligation to pay the real estate taxes, would yield absurd results. Id.
Cf
Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the " any person" language contained in General Statutes § 12-117a was limited by General Statutes § 12-111. SG Stamford, LLC v. Stamford, supra, 48 Conn. L. Rptr. at 501-02. The court was unpersuaded by this argument, stating that General Statutes § 12-111 " is a separate and distinct proceeding, which does not include appeals to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 12-111 relates only to standing before the Board of Assessment Appeals. Therefore, General Statutes § 12-111 should not be used to read language and terms into General Statutes § 12-117a." Id., at 503.
General Statutes § 12-111(a) provides in relevant part that " [a]ny person, including ... any person to whom title to such property has been transferred since the assessment date, claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may appeal therefrom to the board of assessment appeals."
In reaching its various conclusions, the court in SG Stamford, LLC v. Stamford, supra, 48 Conn. L. Rptr. at 503, relied on, inter alia, the holding in Wallingford Center Associates v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 68 Conn.App. at 803. In Wallingford Center, the court was faced with the issue of whether a subsequent owner of property was entitled to intervene, as a matter of right, in a pending valuation appeal brought by the prior property owner. Id. The Appellate Court held that the subsequent owner, as the taxpayer, was entitled to intervene because when it " took title to the subject property, it gained a direct and substantial interest in the issue of whether the property had been properly revalued [prior to its ownership] because the property tax assessment for the next five years ... would be based on that valuation. That fact gave [the subsequent owner] a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation ..." Id., at 812. The court noted that " [i]n the future, when a person who takes title to property while a valuation appeal is pending is allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff to the appeal, that person will then be an ‘ applicant’ ... Although ... the word ‘ applicant’ as used in § 12-117a refers specifically to a person who has been aggrieved by a decision of the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals and who has then made application in the nature of an appeal therefrom to the Superior Court, we do not think that the legislature meant to preclude subsequent owners from intervening in a pending appeal to challenge assessments issued to the subsequent owner while the original owner's appeal is pending." Id., at 813 n. 4.
Finally, in Resnik v. New Haven, 12 Conn.Supp. 47, 48 (1943), the court addressed the issue of whether the right to appeal a property tax assessment to the Superior Court is limited " to one who on the date of the assessment was the owner of the property ..." On July 29, 1942, the plaintiff purchased property and " assumed and agreed to pay taxes assessed upon the premises on the list of 1942 payable in 1943. The assessment date for property in New Haven is June 1st ... Within the time provided by law the plaintiff appealed to the board of tax review for a reduction of the assessment made by the assessors ... [T]he plaintiff then appealed to [the Superior Court] ..." Id. The defendant claimed that " the plaintiff was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of the appeal statute" because he did not own the property on the assessment date. Id. The court held that the plaintiff was an aggrieved party by virtue of a showing that the plaintiff " had a sufficient financial interest in the matter ..." Id., at 50. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that " [i]t is not the named person against whom the assessment is made. A ‘ person assessed’ is a person whose property is assessed. It is not the party who is assessed but the property. When the [subsequent owner] became the owner of this property, it became, and the original owner ceased to be, a ‘ person assessed, ’ that is, a person whose property is assessed ... A person who is improperly assessed is aggrieved because he will be obliged to pay a tax on an improper assessment. Having become the owner of the proper [the subsequent owner] will have to pay the tax assessed under the assessment and, if the assessment is excessive, it is aggrieved and will be injured by being compelled to pay an excessive tax." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 49-50.
" Section 374c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes, as amended by section 164f of the 1941 Supplement to the General Statutes, under which the action is brought, provides: ‘ Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of relief ... may ... appeal.’ "
" When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros, Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 369, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). " Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved." Id. " Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SG Stamford, LLC v. Stamford, supra, 48 Conn. L. Rptr. at 501. " The test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest shared by the community as a whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Selectmen, 234 Conn. 513, 523, 662 A.2d 1281 (1995). " In determining whether a party is [classically] aggrieved, the test is whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest that he has ... has been adversely affected." Dept. of Income Maintenance v. Watts, 211 Conn. 323, 326, 558 A.2d 998 (1989).
In the present case, based on the plain " any person" language of General Statutes § 12-117a, the plaintiff, as the current owner of the property obligated to pay the real estate taxes due, has alleged sufficient statutory aggrievement. See SG Stamford, LLC v.. Stamford, supra, 48 Conn. L. Rptr. at 499. Moreover, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged classical aggrievement. Our Appellate Court has broadly interpreted the language of General Statutes § 12-117a, and determined that a subsequent owner of property has a specific personal and legal interest in the issue of whether property has been properly valued prior to its ownership because subsequent property tax assessments are based on that valuation. Consequently, a subsequent owner has a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the appeal. As our Supreme Court has noted, when engaging in statutory interpretation, courts must " construe a statute in a manner that will not thwart its intended purpose or lead to absurd results." Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 712, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). As the plaintiff noted, if 810 Chapel Bapaz, LLC had appealed the BAA's decision to the Superior Court, then the plaintiff would have been entitled to intervene in that action as a matter of right. Because the plaintiff has a direct and substantial interest in the issue of whether the property was properly assessed on October 1, 2011, it would lead to absurd results if the plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to appeal the BAA's decision directly.
Furthermore, the rationale applied by the court in Resnik v. New Haven, supra, 12 Conn.Supp. at 47, adds further support to the determination that the plaintiff is classically aggrieved based on its sufficient financial interest in the matter. When the plaintiff became the subsequent owner, it became the person whose property was assessed, and the person who will have to pay the tax assessed. Thus, if the assessment is excessive, the plaintiff will be injured by being compelled to pay an excessive tax.
Accordingly, the plaintiff is statutorily and classically aggrieved. As the plaintiff is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of this matter, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
Dabush v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 5015420 (December 8, 2011, Aronson, J.T.R.) where the court states, without analysis, that the plaintiffs were " not entitled to appeal the assessor's valuation on the subject property for the Grand Lists prior to October 1, 2011, having acquired ownership of the subject property on June 6, 2011."
Resnik v. New Haven, supra, 12 Conn.Supp. at 48.
SG Stamford, LLC v. Stamford, supra, 48 Conn. L. Rptr. at 502-03 provides a useful comparison of the language and purposes of General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119. The plain language of General Statutes § 12-119 limits an appeal to " owners, " whereas the plain language of General Statutes § 12-117a is broader. Id., at 503.