Summary
In Cooper, the Delaware Superior Court held that when there is uncontradicted evidence that a plaintiff suffered injury from an accident, it is inappropriate for the jury to award zero damages, regardless of the extent of the injuries.
Summary of this case from Schneider v. ChickadelOpinion
C.A. No. 96C-11-149 RRC.
Submitted: September 10, 1999.
Decided: December 2, 1999.
Edward C. Ciconte, Esquire Ciconte, Roseman Wassermann 1300 King Street P.O. Box 1126 Wilmington, Delaware 19899 Attorney for Plaintiff.
Kristin A. Giakas, Esquire Swartz, Campbell Detweiler 919 Market Street, Suite 501 P.O. Box 330 Wilmington, Delaware 19899 Attorney for Defendant.
Dear Counsel:
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59, Plaintiff has filed this Motion for Additur or New Trial, claiming that the failure of the jury to award any amount of money damages was in violation of the Court's instructions. The sole issue to be resolved is whether a new trial should be granted when the jury found for Defendants, awarding Plaintiff zero damages after the trial court had "directed judgment as a matter of law" in favor of the Plaintiff on the issues of negligence and proximate causation and where the jury's sole function was to determine the extent of the Plaintiff's injuries caused by the automobile accident in question and the amount of damages that should be awarded. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial (limited to damages only) is GRANTED.
Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 59(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] new trial may be granted as to all or any of the parties and all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in the Superior Court."
Although captioned as a "Motion for Additur or New Trial," the motion and Plaintiff's reply address only Plaintiff's request for a new trial. The Court thus deems any request for additur to have been abandoned.
See Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 50.
Summary of Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff's claim stems from a January 19, 1995 automobile accident. It was tried before a jury on July 26 and 27, 1999. At trial, Plaintiff presented expert medical testimony from Craig D. Sternberg, M.D., Plaintiff's physician, and Defendants presented expert medical testimony via video-tape deposition from Peter B. Bandera, M.D. At the close of Defendants case, the Court granted a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. (Defendants had conceded negligence). The jury was instructed that the "Defendant's negligence in fact was the proximate cause of at least some injury to Plaintiff" and that Plaintiff "is entitled to recover for damages proximately caused by [the accident], [and that the jury] should consider the compensation to which [Plaintiff] is entitled." The jury nevertheless returned a verdict in favor of Defendants awarding zero damages to the Plaintiff. Pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 59, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Additur or New Trial, claiming that the failure of the jury to award any amount of money damage was in violation of the Court's instructions.
Jury instruction at 12.
Id. at 9.
Standard of Review
When considering a motion for a new trial, the jury's verdict is presumed to be correct. When considering a motion for a new trial, the Court must determine whether it is against the great weight of the evidence. A jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless it is manifest that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or that it was clearly in disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law.
Lacey v. Beck, Del. Super., 161 A.2d 579, 580 (1960).
James v. Glazer, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1150, 1156 (1990).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979).
Discussion
Plaintiff contends that the jury's failure to award any amount of money damages violated the Court's instructions. Plaintiff argues that the jury was required to return an award because of the uncontradicted medical testimony that Plaintiff sustained some injury as a result of the January 19, 1995 accident, and that its failure to return a monetary verdict was improper.Defendants advance two arguments in support of their position that the motion should be denied. First, Defendants argue that a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause should not have been granted. Defendants heavily rely on Gier v. Kanenen, a case where a jury award of zero damages was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Defendants contend that the case presently before this Court is factually similar to Gier and therefore a new trial should be denied. Second, Defendants argue that it was proper for the jury to have evaluated the Plaintiff's credibility in determining the nature of the alleged injuries and that it was therefore appropriate for the jury to have awarded zero damages. Defendants further contend that the jury had a reasonable basis to have questioned the accuracy of the Plaintiff's testimony and to have concluded that the alleged injuries were not caused by the motor vehicle accident at issue, or that they were not otherwise significant enough to warrant an award.
Del. Supr., No. 522, 1992, Horsey, J. (June 7, 1993) (ORDER).
The issue of a zero damages jury award where there had been a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation was addressed by Supreme Court of Delaware in Maier v. Santucci. In Maier, the zero damages verdict was reversed and remanded. The Maier Court found that the trial court's grant of a directed verdict on liability required the jury to decide only whether the Plaintiff had sustained an injury as a result of the accident and award the proper amount of damages. Although the seriousness of the Plaintiff's injuries in Maier had been contested at trial, the medical experts for both the Plaintiff and Defendant in that case agreed that the plaintiff had sustained a cervical sprain injury as a result of the accident. The Court then stated, "[i]n light of the uncontradicted medical testimony that Maier suffered an injury as a result of the accident, the jury's award of zero damages is inadequate and unacceptable as a matter of law." The Court further stated that "once the existence of an injury has been established as causally related to the accident, a jury is required to return a verdict of at least minimal damages." The Court then remanded the case to the Superior Court "for a new trial limited to damages."
Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 747 (1997).
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
The case before this Court is distinguishable from Gier (which was decided prior to Maier). In Gier, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the denial of a new trial following a zero damages jury award. Unlike Maier and the case presently before this Court, only two experts testified in Gier about the nature of the injuries. There was no evidence that a defense expert had determined that the Plaintiff sustained any injuries. In Gier, there was an absence of uncontradicted medical testimony relating to the injuries alleged. The Court stated
[w]e find the jury's refusal to award damages reasonable given the fact that the damage to Gier's car was minimal, Gier also sustained injuries in other various accidents, the doctor's testimony was based at least in part on Gier's subjective representations and Gier's credibility was questionable.
Gier at 3.
In the case presently before this Court, unlike Gier, there was testimony presented at trial from both the Plaintiff's and Defendants' experts establishing that Plaintiff had sustained an injury as a result of the January 19, 1995 automobile accident.
Although in this case there is disagreement to the extent of the Plaintiff's injuries, like Maier, this Court finds that there was sufficient evidence presented by Defendants that established some injury to Plaintiff as result of the January 19, 1995 automobile accident. The presence of uncontradicted medical evidence presented at trial distinguishes the present case from the decision in Gier. Specifically, Dr. Peter Bandera, Defendants medical expert, testified by video-tape deposition that Plaintiff had sustained some injury as a result of the accident. Specifically, Dr. Bandera testified that
relative to her car accident of January 19, 1995, I thought she received a neck and back strain and sprain pattern . . . [m]y diagnosis is one of cervical, thoracic, and lumbosacral strain and sprain. . . . It seems by the records that she had some neck and back spasm after that accident which resolved. And so she may have had some spasm during that time because of this accident of January 19th, 1995. I think she may have had more spasm in the neck and back, and she could get potentially six weeks of therapy. . . ."
Bandera tr. at 23.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 56.
A jury award of zero damages when both medical witnesses agreed that some injury has been sustained was also addressed in Cooper v. Russell, a case where the jury was not presented with the issue of damages because it found that the Defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. The Court noted that both medical witnesses agreed that some injury had been sustained and that no reference to the contrary had been made by either party. In that case, negligence was conceded and the only dispute was whether the injury was entirely caused by the accident or whether it was a pre-existing injury. The Court stated that "the jury's finding that the injuries were not proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendant was in fact `against the great weight of the evidence."" The Court also stated that "[t]he weight of the evidence, in other words, showed that the injuries were sustained during the accident, and a contrary jury finding can not be allowed to stand."
Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-08-196, Toliver, J. (Aug. 17, 1999) (ORDER).
Id. at 3, quoting Story v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979).
Id. at 3-4.
Although the extent of Plaintiff's injuries in this case is in dispute, both medical experts agreed that Plaintiff did exhibit some objective symptoms of injury from the accident. This court finds that the "directed judgment as a matter of law" was proper because of the medical evidence presented from both sides that Plaintiff had sustained an injury.
Conclusion
This Court finds that there was uncontradicted medical evidence that Plaintiff sustained some injury from the accident. The jury was instructed that Defendant's negligence was in fact the proximate cause of at least some injury to Plaintiff and that the only issue to be determined was the amount of damages. The jury's verdict of zero damages was against the great weight of evidence. Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is GRANTED as to damages only.
Decisions of Delaware courts on this issue are very fact sensitive and are thus not always easy to reconcile. See, e.g., Roberts v. Cisneros, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-07-074, Herlihy, J., (Aug. 14, 1998) (Mem. Op.) (granting Plaintiff's motion for a new trial because the award of no damages was against the great weight of the evidence); compare Joseph v. Truitt, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-07-003, Lee, J. (June 14, 1999) (Mem. Op.) (denying Plaintiffs motion for a new trial because it was within the discretion of the jury for it to reject the Plaintiff's complaints of pain and suffering and to conclude that the injuries were so minimal as to not be worthy of compensation).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
A scheduling conference will be set up in the near future to select a new trial date.