Summary
concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of prior conviction where each exhibit contained certified copy of judgment and where fingerprint expert testified that fingerprints in exhibits and defendant's known fingerprints were same
Summary of this case from Montiel v. StateOpinion
No. 05-02-01809-CR
Opinion Filed January 9, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-15408-Rh. Affirm.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and RICHTER.
OPINION
Pursuant to a guilty plea, a jury convicted Glenntorence Djon Cooks of the third degree felony offense of evading arrest "using a vehicle." See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2)(A) (Vernon 2003). The jury assessed punishment at five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. In two points of error, appellant complains about the admission of the videotape of the events constituting the offense and the admission of evidence of prior convictions. We affirm. We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, and will reverse only if the ruling falls outside the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). In his first point of error, appellant asserts the court erred in overruling his objection to the videotape because the State failed to show the tape accurately depicted the events constituting the offense. Under Rule 901(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a videotape is admissible if there is evidence showing it accurately represents the scene or event it purports to portray. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(a); Hooker v. State , 932 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no pet.). In this case, the record reflects the State offered the videotape during the arresting officer's testimony. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the officer testified he reviewed the tape and it showed "exactly what happened" the day of the arrest. This testimony came after the officer recounted the events leading to appellant's arrest and explained that a camera mounted in his squad car recorded the events. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's objection to the tape. See Hooker, 932 S.W.2d at 716. Appellant's first point of error is without merit. In his second point of error, appellant complains the court erred in overruling his objection to the State's exhibits three through twelve, certified copies of various court documents evidencing ten prior misdemeanor convictions. Appellant asserts the court erred because the State failed to show he was the same person as the one convicted of those offenses. We disagree. During the punishment phase of trial, a court may admit evidence of prior criminal convictions. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Certified copies of a judgment and sentence are admissible but, standing alone, are insufficient to prove a prior conviction. Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(7); Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The State must also present independent evidence showing the defendant is the same person named in the previous conviction. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. One of the most common ways is for fingerprint experts to link known fingerprints of a defendant with those of the person named in the judgment evidencing the prior convictions. Id. In this case, each complained-of exhibit contained a certified copy of the judgment as well as a fingerprint of the person named in that judgment. Prior to offering the exhibits into evidence, the State called a fingerprint expert who testified he fingerprinted appellant and compared appellant's prints with those contained in each exhibit. In each case, the fingerprints matched. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's objection to State's exhibits three through twelve. Appellant's second point also is without merit. We affirm the trial court's judgment.