CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Victor Edward Rauch, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Appellant.

Daniel Peter Casullo III, Esq., Lawrence Jonathan Goode, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR This appeal concerns the application of the statutory compulsory joinder rules, which generally require a prosecutor to pursue, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district, subject to enumerated exceptions. The exception in issue pertains when a court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant or the offense.

In June of 2015, as a result of a traffic stop, Appellant was arrested and charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver heroin ("PWID"), and knowing and intentional possession of heroin ("K&I"). Before the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, he was found guilty, in absentia , of the summary traffic offense. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121(c)(3) (delineating the Traffic Division's jurisdiction for the relevant time period).

The Municipal Court's jurisdiction is capped at criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years. See id. § 1123(a)(2). Accordingly, and since that court lacked jurisdiction over PWID, see 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(1) (prescribing a maximum penalty of fifteen years' imprisonment for this crime), the Commonwealth pursued the drug offenses in the common pleas court, which, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, has "unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law." PA. CONST., art. V, § 5 (b). Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the prosecution was required to try all of the offenses simultaneously, per the compulsory joinder requirements of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. As noted, Section 110 generally requires the government to bring all known charges against a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district in a single proceeding. See id. § 110(1). The county court, however, denied the motion.

On interlocutory appeal, the Commonwealth acknowledged the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto , 652 Pa. 101, 207 A.3d 812 (2019), holding that Section 110 generally prohibits the government from proceeding with a prosecution subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, after a summary offense arising from the same criminal episode had been adjudicated in the Traffic Division of that court. See id. at 104, 207 A.3d at 813. Based on Perfetto , the Commonwealth conceded that it was foreclosed from pursuing the K&I charge, because that crime, like the traffic offense, fell within the Municipal Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argued that PWID remained viable, since the Municipal Court had lacked jurisdiction over that offense. In this regard, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code, which serves as an exception to Section 110's general prohibition by providing, in relevant part:

A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of [inter alia , Section 110 ] under any of the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). It was the Commonwealth's position that "the offense," in Section 112(1), doesn't mean the offense that was the subject of the prior prosecution, but rather, concerns the crime or crimes for which the government is seeking subsequent convictions.

The Superior Court credited this argument and affirmed with respect to PWID. See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 221 A.3d 217, 220-21 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Appellant lodged an application for reargument, contending that "the offense," in Section 112(1), means the crime that was the subject of the previous prosecution. Thus, according to Appellant, the exception applies only to situations where the prior conviction or acquittal was rendered by a court without jurisdiction or authority to render a judgment in the first instance. He stressed that this was not the circumstance in his case, because the Traffic Division unquestionably had jurisdiction to convict him of the summary traffic offense. The Superior Court denied Appellant's application.

As concerns the serial prosecutions of single-criminal-episode summary offenses (triable at the magisterial district court level) and greater crimes (over which magisterial district courts lack jurisdiction), the history of Section 110 provides some illumination. In 1973, this Court mandated compulsory joinder under its supervisory powers. See Commonwealth v. Campana , 455 Pa. 622, 626, 314 A.2d 854, 856 (1974) (per curiam ). By that time, the General Assembly had already enacted Section 110 of the Crimes Code, legislation which the Court deemed to be "entirely in harmony" with its supervisory mandate. Id. at 626, 314 A.2d at 856. Significantly, as well, both this Court in Campana , and the General Assembly, in its statutory scheme of compulsory joinder, derived governing principles from the Model Penal Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 110, Editor's Notes (citing the 1967 Joint State Government Commission Comment to the effect that, "[t]his section is derived from Section 1.09 of the Model Penal Code"); Campana , 452 Pa. at 248-250 & nn.31, 32 & 37, 304 A.2d at 438-40 & nn.31, 32 & 37. In the Campana line of decisions, a plurality of Justices made it clear that their intent was generally to require summary and greater offenses arising out of single criminal episodes to be consolidated in the common pleas courts. See Campana , 452 Pa. at 253-54, 304 A.2d at 441-42. This approach would seem to be consonant with the plain language of the Model Penal Code and Section 110, which barred subsequent prosecutions that were "within the jurisdiction of a single court" -- facially signifying any single court where jurisdiction might lie, including the courts of common pleas -- and not only the particular court in which an initial prosecution may have been conducted.

Nevertheless, in a series of subsequent decisions, and in a departure from the policy judgment of the Campana plurality, this Court construed the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso to permit serial prosecutions for summary and greater offenses, respectively, at the magisterial district and common pleas tiers. See Commonwealth v. Taylor , 513 Pa. 547, 552-53, 522 A.2d 37, 39-40 (1987) ; Commonwealth v. Breitegan , 500 Pa. 384, 385-86, 456 A.2d 1340, 1341 (1983) ; Commonwealth v. Beatty , 500 Pa. 284, 290-91, 455 A.2d 1194, 1198 (1983). In explaining this decision, the Court did not focus on substance of the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" language or its history or derivation, but rather, relied on the following policy pronouncement:

We are aware that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(b) appears to recognize concurrent jurisdiction in such cases of the Court of Common Pleas. Nevertheless, we will not construe the phrase "and was within the jurisdiction of a single court" in such a manner as to ignore the traditional division of labor in our court system. The traditional role of the Court of Common Pleas in the disposition of summary motor vehicle offenses is the role of the reviewing tribunal as opposed to the court of original jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 932.

* * *

Our interpretation of Section 110(1)(ii) as excluding traffic violations under the Motor Vehicle Code is further bolstered by a consideration of the purposes sought to be achieved by the legislative enactment as well as our promulgation of the compulsory joinder rule. The disposition of a summary offense in a traffic matter prior to the trial of a misdemeanor or felony does not present the type of governmental harassment of a defendant that would offend double jeopardy concerns. Additionally, judicial economy is not served by requiring our Courts of Common Pleas to dispose of these matters which are regularly entrusted to the district justices for disposition.

Id. at 290-91 & n.3, 455 A.2d at 1198 & n.3. Under this line of authority, the present prosecution for PWID would be permissible. However, in 2002, the Legislature modified Section 110(1)(ii) to remove the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso upon which these decisions were premised. See Act of June 28, 2002, P.L. 481, No. 81, § 1. It seems that the displacement of the Beatty line of decisions may have been an unintended consequence, since the General Assembly's clear intention was to override the effect of Commonwealth v. McPhail , 547 Pa. 519, 692 A.2d 139 (1997) (plurality), which had led to the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso of Section 110(1)(ii) being met even where multi-jurisdictional criminal episodes were involved. See id. at 530, 692 A.2d at 144-45. Disapproving this state of affairs, the General Assembly amended Section 110(1)(ii) to reflect its current language by replacing the phrase "was within the jurisdiction of a single court" with "occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution." See Act of June 28, 2002, P.L. 481, No. 81, § 1.

Again, the intended effect of the 2002 amendment was to limit mandatory joinder only to those offenses occurring in a single judicial district. See Commonwealth v. Fithian , 599 Pa. 180, 199, 961 A.2d 66, 77 (2008). But another impact -- which may not have been intended -- was to displace the Beatty line of decisions, which had approved of the serial litigation of summary offenses at the magisterial district court level and greater offenses in the county courts. See Perfetto , 652 Pa. at 121–23, 207 A.3d at 824.

So far, our discussion has centered on Section 110 ; whereas, the present case concerns the exception set forth in Section 112 of the Crimes Code, pertaining to instances in which, "[t]he former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense." 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). Both parties agree that the term "the offense," as employed in Section 112(1), is ambiguous. Accordingly, they maintain their competing positions regarding whether "the offense" relates to the crime that was the subject of the previous prosecution or the ones that are the subject of subsequent prosecution.

Significantly, the Commonwealth invites us to return to the roots of compulsory joinder policy by revisiting the Model Penal Code. In this regard, the Commonwealth explains that Section 112 is derived from Section 1.11 of the Model Penal Code. See Brief for Appellee at 18 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 112, Comment). Further, it highlights that the commentaries associated with the Model Penal Code recognize that, " ‘[a] number of jurisdictions have held’ that ‘a conviction for a lesser included offense in a court that lacked jurisdiction over the greater offense is not a bar to successive prosecutions.’ " Id. at 18 (quoting MPC & Commentaries, art. I, § 1.11, cmt. 2 n.6, at 179-180).

The relevant passage, however, proceeds to explain that, "[l]ower courts have held in several recent decisions that consecutive prosecutions of greater and lesser included offenses would violate double jeopardy, even where the first court lacked jurisdiction over the greater offense." MPC & Commentaries, art. I, § 1.11, cmt. 2, at 179-181 (citations omitted). Notably, the latter commentary is more in keeping with textual discussion at large.

And more importantly, Section 1.11(1) of the Model Penal Code is explicitly premised on the concept of a "jurisdictional error," which occurs "when a court, although it assumes power to dispose of a case, has no power to do so." Id. at 181. According to the commentaries, a judgment by a court committing such an error will not bar a subsequent prosecution, since "[a]ll courts agree that a former trial is not a bar unless the court had jurisdiction, the rationale being that since the judgment of or any action taken by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy if the court did not have jurisdiction." Id. at 179-180 (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at n.6 (citing Grafton v. United States , 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S. Ct. 749, 751, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907) ("We assume as indisputable, on principle and authority, that before a person can be said to have been put in jeopardy of life or limb the court in which he was acquitted or convicted must have had jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged." (emphasis added))). In this fashion, the commentaries decisively undercut the Commonwealth's position.

There is another difficulty with the Commonwealth's arguments, which is reflected in the historical development of compulsory joinder, as discussed above. The way in which this Court's decisions had evolved -- rightly or wrongly as relating to the original intentions of the Model Penal Code drafters -- the Beatty line of cases had construed Section 110 as inapplicable to the scenario in which the court presiding over the initial prosecution lacked jurisdiction over other offenses. See Beatty , 500 Pa. at 290-91 & n.3, 455 A.2d at 1198 & n.3. Thus, if the Commonwealth's construction of Section 112(1) were to be adopted, the statutory provision would have been superfluous at the time it was enacted (notwithstanding that the Commonwealth's construction would have garnered import after the Legislature amended Section 110(1)(ii) in 2002 to remove the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso). This understanding also militates weightily against the Commonwealth's position. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (prescribing for the presumption that the Legislature intends for the entirety of statutes to be effective and certain).

We recognize that several Justices, including this author, have previously favored a construction of Section 112(1) grounded on the Beatty Court's policy assessment that the Legislature would have apprehended and supported the traditional division of labor in the judicial system. See Perfetto , 652 Pa. at 123–26, 207 A.3d at 825-26 (Saylor, C.J., dissenting). On reflection, however, and upon review of the Model Penal Code provision and associated commentaries underlying Section 112(1), we decline to impose a policy-based construction upon the statute that disregards the explanation of its meaning, taken from the source from which it was derived, that was available to the Legislature at the time of the statute's enactment. See supra note 6. While this approach would seem to be the opposite of that which was applied in the Beatty line of decisions, in our considered judgment, some of the complexity and disharmony that has arisen in the compulsory joinder arena stems from the elevation of policy judgments over clearer indications of legislative design and intention. Of course, the General Assembly remains free to amend the joinder requirements to align with its current intentions, subject to constitutional limitations.

We hold that "the offense," in Section 112(1), means the offense that was the subject of an initial prosecution resulting in a conviction or acquittal. The ultimate purport, with respect to the summary-and-greater-offenses paradigm, is that the Commonwealth must generally assure that known offenses are consolidated at the common pleas level, when they arise out of a single criminal episode and occur in the same judicial district. See Failor , 564 Pa. at 649, 770 A.2d at 314. Perhaps ironically, this is consistent with the Campana plurality's policy perspective, also derived from the Model Penal Code, where this all began. See Campana , 452 Pa. at 253-54, 304 A.2d at 441-42.

The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for dismissal of the PWID charge.

Justices Todd, Donohue and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in which Justices Dougherty and Mundy join.

JUSTICE BAER, dissenting

As observed by the Majority, Appellant was charged with, inter alia , driving with a suspended license and possession with intent to deliver heroin ("PWID") for conduct that occurred during one criminal episode. He initially was found guilty solely of the summary traffic offense in the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. Subsequently, the Commonwealth sought to prosecute Appellant on the PWID charge in the court of common pleas. The trial court concluded that the Commonwealth was permitted to pursue this second prosecution, and the Superior Court agreed. In reversing the Superior Court's order, the Majority now holds that Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1), quoted below, precludes the Commonwealth from prosecuting Appellant for the PWID charge. I respectfully dissent, as I conclude that the lower courts correctly determined that the Crimes Code allows the Commonwealth to prosecute Appellant for PWID in a proceeding separate from Appellant's summary traffic offense.

As noted above, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with, inter alia , a summary traffic offense and a felony PWID offense based on one criminal incident. Appellant was found guilty before the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia of the summary traffic offense. Subsequently, the Commonwealth sought to prosecute Appellant on the PWID charge in the court of common pleas. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that pursuant to the compulsory joinder provisions in 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, the Commonwealth was required to try all of the offenses charged against him simultaneously. The trial court denied Appellant's motion.

On interlocutory appeal before the Superior Court, Appellant maintained that his prosecution for PWID was barred under Section 110. The Commonwealth responded that even if Section 110 barred the PWID prosecution, that prosecution nonetheless was permissible pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1), which allows a subsequent prosecution to go forward, even if ostensibly barred by Section 110, if the "former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense." The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth, holding that for purposes of Section 112(1), "the offense" referred to Appellant's PWID charge. The court noted that the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to try the PWID charge, and thus, the traffic offense conviction "was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over ... the [PWID] offense." 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). Accordingly, the Superior Court concluded that, pursuant to Section 112(1), the PWID prosecution could go forward.

We granted allowance of appeal to review the Superior Court's interpretation of Section 112(1). In performing this task, the Majority accurately opines that 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, if read in isolation, would bar prosecution of Appellant's PWID charge. The Majority also correctly notes that Section 112(1), which bars prosecution for an offense where the "former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense," 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1), is ambiguous because "the offense" can refer to the previously prosecuted offense or the offense sought to be tried in a later proceeding. However, based upon the historical development of the statute under consideration, the Majority ultimately holds that, in using the term "the offense" in Section 112(1), the Legislature was referring to the former offense - here, Appellant's traffic offense - and not to the offense that the Commonwealth subsequently seeks to prosecute - here, Appellant's PWID offense.

I respectfully disagree with the Majority's interpretation of "the offense." Although I recognize the Majority's analysis of the historical development of the relevant statute, in my view, resolving the ambiguity in Section 112(1) requires greater consideration of the consequences of our interpretation. One of the consequences of the Majority's interpretation of Section 112(1) is that a defendant who is charged in Philadelphia with a summary traffic offense and a more serious crime that is punishable by at least five years of imprisonment can avoid prosecution for the more serious offense, even murder, if he or she is tried for the traffic offense first. In my view, it is unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to allow Section 112(1) to function as a means to nullify a charge of murder for a killing that occurred during a criminal episode in which the defendant also committed a summary traffic violation, and the traffic offense was resolved first. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the General Assembly would countenance this outcome or the outcome of the Majority's reasoning, which admittedly concerns the less serious charge of PWID.

Another problematic result of adopting the Majority's position is that the Philadelphia Municipal Court will no longer be able to try summary traffic offenses and lighten the workload of the court of common pleas when defendants are charged with a traffic offense and a crime carrying a maximum sentence of at least five years of imprisonment arising from the same criminal episode. Viewing the ambiguous phrase, "the offense," as applying to the offense that the Commonwealth subsequently seeks to prosecute, here, Appellant's PWID charge, better aligns with the statutorily-created division of labor in the Philadelphia court system.

Lastly, viewing "the offense" as referring to a subsequent offense sought to be prosecuted by the Commonwealth better comports with fundamental double jeopardy principles. See MPC 1.11 Explanatory Notes (noting that the compulsory joinder statutes at issue "involve different aspects of double jeopardy protection"). At their most basic, the federal and Pennsylvania Double Jeopardy Clauses prevent the government from imposing multiple prosecutions or punishments on a criminal defendant for a single offense. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ; see also Commonwealth v. Kareem Johnson , ––– Pa. ––––, 231 A.3d 807, 819 (2020) (citations omitted). The Majority's position is difficult to reconcile with the Double Jeopardy Clauses' basic purpose of preventing multiple prosecutions or punishments for a single offense. Indeed, it is clear that Appellant has not been prosecuted or punished for his PWID charge, as he was only tried for the summary traffic offense, and that proceeding occurred before a court that lacked jurisdiction over the PWID charge. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123(a)(2).

In light of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.

Justices Dougherty and Mundy join this dissenting opinion.