ROBERSON, E.C., Associate Judge.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Tonya B. Rainwater, Judge. Stephen Joseph Biggie, of Arcadier, Biggie and Wood, PLLC, Melbourne, for Appellant. James M. Talley, of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Orlando, for Appellee, Bachu C. Patel. No Appearance for Other Appellees. ROBERSON, E.C., Associate Judge.

Collection and Recovery of Assets, Inc. ("CRA") challenges the trial court's limitation of its judgment against Dr. Bachu Patel pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(5). Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Dr. Rajiv Chandra and Patel were involved in multiple business ventures, including the loan and, ultimately, the judgment at issue in this case. Zeta Medical, LLC, of which Chandra and Patel had membership interests through other corporations they owned, purchased a medical office building. Zeta Medical took out a revolving line of credit through a note that was secured, in part, by a mortgage on the medical building. Chandra and Patel both personally guaranteed the debt owed by Zeta Medical. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., ultimately acquired the note, mortgage, and guaranties.

When Zeta Medical defaulted on the loan, Wells Fargo obtained partial summary judgment against Chandra and Patel personally and jointly and severally on the guaranties. Wells Fargo's action for foreclosure remained pending as did cross-claims that Chandra and Patel filed against each other for fraud. Thereafter, Chandra formed CRA and was its sole owner. CRA then purchased the summary judgment and loan documents from Wells Fargo. After being substituted as the party plaintiff, CRA then began post-judgment collection efforts seeking to recover the entire amount from Patel.

Several years later, with the forced sale of his real property looming, Patel sought relief from the judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(5). Patel, relying on Weitzman v. F.I.F. Consultants, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), argued that CRA's purchase of the judgment was a change in circumstances that made it inequitable to enforce the entire amount of the judgment against him. The sale was stayed when Patel posted a bond, equaling nearly half of the judgment amount, into the court registry. A full evidentiary hearing on Patel's Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment was held several months later.

At the hearing, Patel argued that he and Chandra, as co-guarantors, were each liable to Wells Fargo for half of the total amount of the guaranteed loan. Thus, Patel claimed that it was inequitable to allow Chandra to shift that liability entirely to him through CRA's purchase of the judgment and loan documents.

CRA, on the other hand, argued that Patel had an adequate remedy at law by seeking contribution from Chandra's estate. However, CRA represented to the trial court (but not in its appellate briefing) that:

[t]he real reason [Patel] will not file a contribution action is because he is so overwhelmingly indebted to Dr. Chandra, now the estate of Dr. Chandra, . . . that any claim for contribution would be reduced to zero by setoff.

The trial court held that CRA's purchase of the summary judgment and loan documents was a change in circumstances that warranted the court invoking its equitable powers. The court, relying on Weitzman, found that it was no longer equitable that the summary judgment should have prospective application and limited Patel's liability to CRA to half of the judgment amount plus accrued interest. This timely appeal followed.

We review a trial court's decision pursuant to Rule 1.540(b) for an abuse of discretion. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Brogdon, 185 So. 3d 627, 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); see also LPP Mortg., Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 826 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ("[T]rial court's ruling [on Rule 1.540 relief] should not be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion."). Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review means the trial judge's ruling is due to be affirmed unless it is "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable." Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)). "[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.

Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allows relief from a judgment "upon such terms as are just" when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective action." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(5). The rule contains no time limitation when seeking relief on this ground, but the motion must allege significant new circumstances affecting the decision made by the trial judge. Gotham Ins. Co. v. Matthew, 179 So. 3d 437, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

Relevant to this case, Rule 1.540(b) authorizes the court to do what is "just" and "equitable." Equity is defined as "[t]he body of principles constituting what is fair and right." Equity, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). "An equity court will never be thwarted from fashioning a decree that will do right and justice between the parties." Demorizi v. Demorizi, 851 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

On appeal, CRA first suggests that a trial court should not invoke Rule 1.540(b)(5) unless there is a finding of fraud or wrongdoing. Here, the trial court did not make any such findings against Chandra or CRA. Moreover, while there was substantial litigation history between Chandra and Patel involving several claims of wrongdoing, none were adjudicated in favor of Patel. Thus, CRA argues that the trial court erred in relying on Weitzman, without such misconduct.

Weitzman presents one of the clearest examples of when a court should invoke its equitable powers. Weitzman obtained a New York judgment against Stein and others for "an outrageous stock fraud they had perpetrated upon him." Weitzman, 468 So. 2d at 1085. Stein's fraud also resulted in a Florida judgment against Weitzman and in favor of a stock brokerage firm. Id. Stein controlled F.I.F. Consultants, Inc., and that corporation purchased the Florida judgment against Weitzman. Id. When F.I.F. attempted to collect on the Florida judgment, Weitzman sought relief under Rule 1.540(b). His motion was denied, and he appealed.

The Third District Court of Appeal did not mince words, holding that "[s]uch a state of affairs cannot be countenanced." Weitzman, 468 So. 2d at 1086. Stein's conduct was "an archetypical example of the situation for which [Rule 1.540(b)(5)] was designed." Id. Allowing F.I.F. to pursue the Florida judgment would further two impermissible goals: rewarding the wrongdoer and penalizing Stein's victim. Id. For those reasons, the Florida judgment was cancelled in what the court described as a "happy event when justice under the law and poetic justice so nicely coincide." Id. at 1087. While Weitzman is a clear example of when it is appropriate to invoke equity; nothing in Weitzman, nor in Rule 1.540(b)(5) for that matter, limits a trial judge's discretion to grant equitable relief absent a finding of misconduct.

CRA's other argument is that it was inequitable and unfair to deprive CRA and Chandra's heirs of their "rights" by limiting the judgment. We disagree. Chandra formed CRA as an artifice to collect the entire amount of the judgment against Patel. There may have been many legitimate reasons for forming CRA, but at the end of the day, Patel would have been 100% liable for the judgment. CRA argues that equitable relief is unnecessary because Patel has a remedy at law; Patel had the right to seek contribution from Chandra's estate. CRA's own words, though, shows this is merely illusory, as any claim for contribution would allegedly be completely setoff. Such a right without a remedy is no right at all.

We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by ensuring that Patel would only be responsible for half of the total judgment—just as he was before Chandra formed CRA and purchased the judgment. See Schrank v. Pearlman, 683 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) ("Where, as here, there is no express agreement covering rights of contribution, Florida law recognizes a right of equitable contribution. 'The [equitable contribution] principle attempts to distribute equally among those who have a common obligation, the burden of performing that obligation.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Fletcher v. Anderson, 616 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993))). It would not be equitable for Chandra's heirs—as the current owners of CRA—to receive a windfall of the full amount of the purchased judgment when Chandra was liable for half of that amount. See Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 1956) ("The doctrine of equitable contribution is applied to prevent one of two, or more, joint obligors being required to pay more than his share of a common burden, or to prevent one obligor from being unjustly benefited or enriched at the expense of another.").

AFFIRMED. COHEN and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.