In a prior criminal action, the defendant Joseph Crocitto pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree (see, Penal Law § 120.00). This judgment of conviction arose out of the same incident as that upon which the present civil action for damages is based. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiffs on the basis of collateral estoppel. We affirm.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, in general, precludes the subsequent relitigation of issues which were necessarily decided in a prior action. Collateral estoppel effect will be given to issues necessarily decided in prior criminal actions, including those which terminate in judgments based on pleas of guilty (see, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 78 N.Y.2d 41; D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659; Sun Ins. Co. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, 195 A.D.2d 24). We have previously held that a person who has been convicted of assault in the third degree, based on the intentional infliction of injury, may not relitigate the question of his potential civil liability for assault and battery (see, Read v. Sacco, 49 A.D.2d 471). In accordance with the holding of Read v. Sacco (supra), the order appealed from should be affirmed (see also, Hooks v. Middlebrooks, 99 A.D.2d 663). Bracken, J.P., Altman, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.