MEMORANDUM OPINION

ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.

Uri Cohen appeals the portions of a judgment that favor Delores Hawkins. Hawkins sued Cohen and Brian Culwell seeking, among other things, return of her real property, which Culwell sold to Cohen. Hawkins had signed a power of attorney authorizing Culwell to handle certain of her affairs including real estate transactions. Under color of this document, Culwell sold Hawkins' property to Cohen in exchange for credit on an antecedent debt Culwell owed to Cohen. In his response to Hawkins' lawsuit, Cohen raised claims for reimbursement of property taxes paid and indemnification among other things. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment setting aside the conveyance deed from Culwell to Cohen and holding that the power of attorney from Hawkins to Culwell was void. The court further found that Culwell committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duty to Hawkins. The court also denied all of Cohen's requests for relief, finding that he did not have clean hands in the underlying transaction. The court awarded the property to Hawkins and found Culwell liable for monetary damages.

On appeal, Cohen raises nine issues, contending: (1) Culwell was vested as Hawkins' agent with authority to convey the property and accept the proceeds; (2) the power of attorney was not rendered invalid as to Cohen simply because it may have resulted from fraud between Culwell and Hawkins; (3) Hawkins is estopped from denying the validity of the power of attorney; (4) the conveyance deed, conveying the property to Cohen, is not void; (5) the second corrected warranty deed, purporting to correct an error in the conveyance from a prior owner to Hawkins, is not void; (6) Cohen was a bona fide purchaser who took the property for value and without notice of another's claim of interest in the property; (7) Cohen is entitled to reimbursement for taxes he paid on the property; (8) Cohen is entitled to indemnification for costs he has incurred in defending title; and (9) Hawkins' negligence was more than 50% responsible for the damages incurred by all parties. We affirm.

I. Background

Hawkins testified that in late 2002, she was having trouble buying a car because of her credit record. Culwell offered to help, drafted a document, and arranged for Hawkins to sign the document in front of a notary. The record contains a power of attorney apparently signed by Hawkins, granting Culwell the power to: "act in [her] name, place and stead in any way which [she herself] could do . . . with respect to the following matters . . . Real estate transactions . . . Claims and litigation . . . Records, reports and statements . . . [and granting authority] to delegate his powers to any other person." The document also required Culwell to act in Hawkins' "best interest." Sometime after signing the document, Hawkins began receiving mail from the City of Houston indicating that a piece of property she owned was now owned by Cohen. She went to see Culwell, who told her "that's no good, " that he didn't do it, and that he would try to get her some money. She told him that she didn't want money, she wanted her property back. She testified that she knew nothing about the sale of the property until she received notice from the City. Subsequently, Hawkins and Culwell met again, and Culwell told Hawkins that someone wanted to give her $27,000. She said that was the last meeting she had with Culwell. Thereafter, a notice to vacate was stapled to the house located on the property. Hawkins was given the notice by Flora Binkley, the tenant who lived at the property. Hawkins denied that she ever gave Culwell written or oral authority to transfer her property for his benefit.

Cohen testified that he is in the business of buying and selling diamonds. He met Culwell sometime around 2002 when Culwell began buying diamonds from him. Eventually, Culwell came to owe Cohen about $190,000 for diamonds Cohen had given him. Cohen made repeated but unsuccessful requests for payment. Finally, Culwell offered Cohen several pieces of property against the amount owed. Apparently, two of the properties were in Culwell's name and the third was owned by Hawkins. Cohen said that he investigated the properties and chose the one owned by Hawkins. At the back of the property was what Cohen described as a "[s]hack, little small building in the back where the big building in front had been taken down." Cohen said that Culwell told him that he (Culwell) owned the property. Cohen further said that he believed Culwell owned the property because of the power of attorney signed by Hawkins.

In November, 2002, Culwell conveyed Hawkins' property to Cohen in exchange for a $55,000 credit against the outstanding debt and an extension of time to pay the remaining balance. In an effort to clear title, Cohen's attorney, Lana Dieringer, obtained a Second Corrected Warranty Deed from George Raft Washington, who had previously deeded the property to Hawkins. Cohen listed the property for sale approximately three months later.

In March 2004, Dieringer received a letter from an attorney representing Hawkins and claiming that Hawkins' property had been stolen. Several months later, Cohen received a letter from the Harris County District Attorney's office informing him that Hawkins had filed criminal charges against Culwell. The district attorney's office told Cohen that the property should be removed from the market until the issue was resolved. Cohen complied with the district attorney's request.

In her lawsuit against Culwell, Hawkins alleged fraudulent inducement, fraudulent transfer, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraud in a real estate transaction, theft, and conspiracy to commit theft. Hawkins also alleged that Cohen conspired to commit theft and claimed that Cohen was a joint tortfeasor in Culwell's breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, real estate fraud, and theft. In response, Cohen filed a general denial and raised claims against Hawkins for proportionate responsibility, quasi-equitable estoppel, indemnification, conspiracy to defraud, recovery of rents collected, and reimbursement for taxes paid. Cohen further alleged that he was a bona fide purchaser.

After a bench trial, the trial court entered 45 findings of fact and 18 conclusions of law, giving multiple reasons for each of two core holdings: (1) Hawkins was entitled to get her property back because it was obtained by fraud, and (2) Cohen was not entitled to any requested relief because he had unclean hands in the transaction. Among the courts' specific findings of fact are the following:

• Hawkins came into possession of the property on April 14, 1979.

• Hawkins transferred the property to George Raft Washington on August 21, 1989, and he transferred it to the George and Dorothy Washington Family Partnership, Ltd. on August 23, 1995.

• On January 11, 1996, the property was transferred by warranty deed from George R. Washington to Hawkins. A Corrected Warranty Deed then issued on July 22, 1998, to correct the description of the property transferred.

• On October 18, 2007, a General Power of Attorney was signed in the name of "DM Hawkins" but not by Hawkins. This power of attorney was presented to Cohen or his attorney by Culwell and was subsequently produced by Cohen in discovery.

• Hawkins executed a power of attorney on November 8, 2002, authorizing Culwell to act for her in regard to real estate transactions and other matters. Hawkins signed based on Culwell's false representation that he would use it to clean up her credit. The power of attorney did not specifically authorize Culwell to use Hawkins' property for his own benefit.

• On November 14, 2002, Culwell transferred the property by deed to Cohen in exchange for a $55,000 credit against an antecedent debt totaling $192,712.65. Hawkins received no consideration for the transfer.

• Cohen knew that Culwell did not own the property, Cohen did not visit or inspect the property, and he did not acquire title insurance prior to the transfer.

• Culwell had given Cohen over $17,000 in bad checks prior to the property transfer.

• Flora Binkley lived at the property from February 2002 through the time of trial.

• On September 9, 2003, George Raft Washington executed a Second Corrected Warranty Deed to correct the name of the transferor. The draft deed was presented by Cohen's attorney, Lana Dieringer, to Washington's attorney, Alice Bonner, without Dieringer disclosing that she represented Cohen instead of Hawkins. Hawkins did not receive the corrected deed.

• Lana Dieringer knew that the property never belonged to Culwell.

• Culwell had a fiduciary duty to Hawkins that required him to place her interests above his own at any time when his self-interest may conflict with his duty to her.

• Cohen and agents acting on his behalf participated in Culwell's breach of his fiduciary duty.

• Culwell committed fraud and statutory fraud against Hawkins. Culwell was also convicted in criminal court of stealing Hawkins' property.

• Cohen did not obtain legal title to the property in good faith and did not rely on the power of attorney in good faith.

• Cohen had actual and constructive notice of Hawkins' interest in the property prior to the transfer.

• Cohen did not give consideration to Washington for the Second Corrected Warranty Deed.

• Cohen was not a bona fide purchaser.

• Cohen paid all the taxes on the property since the conveyance; however, he failed to establish that he had clean hands and thus is not entitled to an equitable lien for such taxes.

• Based on Culwell's actions, Hawkins sustained $48,400 in damages, but Hawkins failed to establish that Cohen's actions caused her to sustain any damages.

In its conclusions of law, the court specifically held, among other things:

• Cohen failed to establish that he was a bona fide purchaser.

• The transfer of the property to Cohen was invalid because (1) an agent cannot use a principal's property to pay an antecedent debt of the agent absent specific authority, (2) Cohen knew the consideration paid was not for Hawkins' benefit, (3) Hawkins did not have clear title because the Second Corrected Warranty Deed did not clear errors in the title, (4) the deed transfers an impermissibly ambiguous "undivided interest" in the property, and (5) the power of attorney was not filed in the county clerk's office separately from the deed.

• Culwell owed a fiduciary duty to Hawkins, and Cohen knowingly participated in the violation of that duty.

• The power of attorney is invalid because it was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Cohen conspired with Culwell to defraud Hawkins.

• The Second Corrected Warranty Deed is invalid because (1) Washington received no consideration for signing it, (2) it was not delivered to Hawkins, (3) Washington did not intend to deliver it to Cohen, and (4) it does not relate back to the prior warranty deed.

• A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that (1) Cohen is entitled to indemnity from Hawkins, (2) Hawkins is equitably estopped from denying the power of attorney, or (3) Cohen is entitled to an equitable lien for the taxes he paid.

In its final judgment, the trial court set aside the deed from Culwell to Cohen and held that the power of attorney signed by Hawkins was invalid. The court further ordered Culwell to pay Hawkins $48,400 in actual damages, $100,000 in exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Lastly, the court ordered that Hawkins take nothing from Cohen and denied all additional relief not expressly granted in the judgment.

II. Bona Fide Purchaser

We begin by addressing Cohen's sixth issue, in which he contends that the trial court erred in holding (as a finding of fact and as a conclusion of law) that he was not a bona fide purchaser of the property. Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); Fletcher v. Minton, 217 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). In an appeal following a bench trial, the trial court's findings of fact have the same weight as a jury verdict; we thus review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence as we would following a verdict. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); In re K.R.P., 80 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding of fact, we will overrule a legal sufficiency challenge. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence and set aside a finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo, independently evaluating them to determine their correctness. In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We will uphold conclusions of law on appeal if they can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

Generally, a person who acquires property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest is a bona fide purchaser. Madison, 39 S.W.3d at 606. Cohen contends that he acquired Hawkins' property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest. The trial court found that Cohen did not acquire the property in good faith, did not give Hawkins consideration, and was on notice of a third-party claim or interest (namely Hawkins' own interest). We will focus our analysis on the element of good faith because it is also implicated in other issues raised by Cohen.

Texas law does not provide a definitive explanation for what constitutes "good faith" sufficient to make one a bona fide purchaser. Good faith can be defined generally as "[a] state of mind consisting of (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." Black's Law Dictionary 307 (2d pocket ed.). Also instructive is the case of Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., wherein the Texas Supreme Court sought to define "good faith" as used in a surety agreement. 964 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. 1998). After reviewing definitions for the phrase from various contexts, the court stated: "[w]e hold that 'good faith' in the surety agreement before us refers to conduct which is honest in fact, free of improper motive or wilful ignorance of the facts at hand." Id. With these general definitions in mind, we will review the trial court's relevant factual findings and legal conclusions.

In addition to its general findings that Cohen was not a bona fide purchaser and did not acquire title to Hawkins' property in good faith, the trial court made several more specific findings of fact relevant to the good faith issue. These include that Cohen: (1) obtained the property from Culwell knowing that Culwell did not own the property; (2) took the property knowing that the transaction was benefitting Culwell and not Hawkins; (3) did not act in good faith in relying on the power of attorney, which did not authorize Culwell to sell Hawkins' property for his own benefit; (4) failed to contact Hawkins to verify whether she authorized the transfer of her property for Culwell's benefit; (5) relied on Culwell's representations despite the fact Culwell had given Cohen bad checks in the past; (6) knowingly participating in Culwell's breach of his fiduciary duty to Hawkins; (7) misled others in regard to the purpose of the corrected warranty deed (representing essentially that it was for Hawkins); (8) failed to obtain title insurance; and (9) had actual and constructive notice of Hawkins' interest in the property prior to the transfer.

In his brief, Cohen attacks the sufficiency of the evidence on many of these findings; however, we need not address the evidence regarding each and every finding in order to sustain the ultimate finding and conclusion that Cohen did not act in good faith in obtaining the property. We thus address only the most relevant of Cohen's arguments. We note in general that Cohen attacks the trial court's findings as being based on inferences and circumstantial evidence and as being contrary to Cohen's own testimony in several regards. However, since "good faith" is essentially a mental state, it is not normally susceptible to direct proof and must usually be proven by circumstantial evidence. See generally Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986); DR Partners v. Floyd, 228 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet. h.). Furthermore, conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the fact finder, in this case the trial court. Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

First, we address Cohen's contention that the power of attorney authorized Culwell to use Hawkins' property for his own benefit such that Cohen's reliance on that document was reasonable and in good faith. Generally, a person with a fiduciary duty to another (such as an agent under a power of attorney) may not use that position to benefit him or herself at the others expense (i.e., "self-dealing"). See Tex. Bank Trust v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 507, 510 (Tex. 1980); Mims v. Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ). In support of his argument that this particular power of attorney authorized Culwell to benefit himself, Cohen relies primarily on the case of Neill v. Kleiber, 112 S.W. 694 (Tex.Civ.App. 1908). That case dealt with a power of attorney in which the agent was given "full power by this to do with the said land as if the same was his own property." Id. at 695. Based on this language, the court upheld the agent's disbursement of sale proceeds to himself. Cohen contends that this broad language is substantially similar to language in the power of attorney from Hawkins to Culwell, authorizing Culwell to handle Hawkins' "real estate transactions . . . including powers to pledge, sell, or otherwise dispose of . . . in my name, place and stead in any way which I myself could do." Specifically, Cohen contends that the "in any way which I myself could do" phrase is the functional equivalent of the "as if the same was his own property" language in Neill.

The key distinction between the two phrases is the statement in the Neill document that the agent could treat the property in question as his own property. Such language (as in Neill) would clearly inform a prospective purchaser that the agent could sell the principle's property and receive the benefit therefrom as though it were his own property. The power of attorney between Hawkins and Culwell, however, contains no such language. It appears to permit Culwell to sell property but does not indicate that Culwell was authorized to benefit directly from the transaction. Indeed, the document specifically provides that Culwell is to act in Hawkins' "best interests." Furthermore, Cohen would have been aware that Culwell was applying the proceeds of the sale to his own benefit because the "proceeds of the sale" reduced Culwell's debt to Cohen and permitted an extension of time to pay the remaining balance of the debt. The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that the power of attorney did not authorize Culwell to sell Hawkins' property for his own benefit.

Next, we address Cohen's argument that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Cohen knew the property did not belong to Culwell. Cohen asserts that he thought Culwell owned the property because of the power of attorney. However, nothing in the power of attorney would support the conclusion that Culwell owned the property. Furthermore, as just discussed, the document did not authorize Culwell to sell the property for his own benefit. Additionally, the deed Cohen received from Culwell lists Hawkins as grantor. Lastly, Cohen acknowledges that his attorney, Dieringer, knew that Culwell did not own the property (as evidenced by her review of the power of attorney, her procurement of a second corrected warranty deed from Washington, and her signature as notary on the deed to Cohen). It is well-settled that knowledge acquired by an attorney during the existence of an attorney-client relationship, and while acting in the scope of his or her authority, is imputed to the client. E.g., Burke v. Ins. Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 777-78 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 480-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude, contrary to Cohen's testimony, that he knew Culwell did not own the property at the time of the conveyance.

Cohen additionally argues that evidence he knew the property was owned by someone other than Culwell does not necessarily support the claim that he acted in bad faith. While taken alone, this evidence may not demonstrate bad faith, it is an integral part of a chain of findings that the trial court could have properly concluded amounted to bad faith. The court found that Cohen knew that (1) Culwell did not own the property that he (Culwell) was attempting to convey, (2) Culwell did not have specific authority to convey such property for his own benefit, and (3) knew the only benefit was going to Culwell and not the true owner of the property. Further, Cohen made no attempt to find out whether Culwell indeed had such authority. The evidence supporting the first three findings is discussed above. Regarding the failure to make further inquiries, we need look no further than Cohen's own testimony in which he admitted not checking with Hawkins regarding Culwell's authority or further investigating ownership of the property before the conveyance. Furthermore, Hawkins testified that she was not aware of the transfer until she received notice from the city that the property belonged to Cohen. In addition to this chain of findings and evidence, there were additional findings and evidence that Cohen wilfully disregarded the facts, acted without honesty in belief or purpose, acted with improper motive, or sought an unconscionable advantage, including that Cohen knew Culwell had previously passed bad checks and had a criminal record and that Dieringer obtained the Second Corrected Warranty Deed from Washington without revealing that she represented Cohen instead of Hawkins.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the record supports the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that Cohen did not act in good faith in obtaining Hawkins' property and thus was not a bona fide purchaser. Because of our holding in regard to the good faith element of this defense, we need not address Cohen's arguments regarding the value and notice elements of the defense. We overrule Cohen's sixth issue.

III. Remaining Issues

Next, we briefly discuss Cohen's remaining issues. In his first issue, Cohen contends that the trial court erred in holding that the power of attorney did not authorize Culwell to use Hawkins' property for his own benefit. Because we have held that the court did not in fact err in making this finding, we overrule Cohen's first issue. In his second issue, Cohen contends that the power of attorney was not void as to him because (1) even assuming it was procured by fraud as found by the trial court, it was not automatically void but only voidable at the election of the defrauded party (Hawkins), and (2) the defrauded party cannot assert the fraud against a bona fide purchaser, citing Pure Oil Co. v. Swindle, 58 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved), et al. However because we held, in response to Cohen's sixth issue, that the trial court did not err in holding he was not a bona fide purchaser, this issue is rendered moot and hence is overruled.

In his third issue, Cohen contends the trial court erred in finding that Hawkins was not estopped from denying the validity of the power of attorney. Estoppel arises when, by the fault of one party, another has been induced to change his position for the worse. Vessels v. Anschutz Corp., 823 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied). Estoppel generally requires a showing of reasonable and detrimental reliance by the party asserting the theory. See id. Cohen maintains that he reasonably relied on Hawkins' statements in the power of attorney authorizing Culwell to sell her property. However, the fact that the power of attorney did not authorize Culwell to sell Hawkins' property for his own benefit coupled with the fact that Culwell was selling the property for his own benefit was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that Cohen's alleged reliance was not, in fact, reasonable. Accordingly, we overrule Cohen's third issue.

In his fourth issue, Cohen contends the trial court erred in concluding that the conveyance deed was invalid because it contained the ambiguous phrase "undivided interest" and thus impermissibly conveyed a real property interest that was indeterminable. In his fifth issue, Cohen contends the trial court erred in finding that the second corrected warranty deed signed by Washington was invalid for various reasons. As discussed above, the trial court made several findings of fact and conclusions of law, any one of which would have resulted in return of the property to Hawkins. Because we uphold return of the property to Hawkins because of the fraud that was committed against her and the finding that Cohen was not a bona fide purchaser, we need not address Cohen's arguments regarding validity of the deed that conveyed the property to him or the validity of the corrected warranty deed. Consequently, we overrule Cohen's fourth and fifth issues.

In his seventh issue, Cohen contends that the trial court erred in declining to award him reimbursement for the taxes he paid on Hawkins' property. Generally, if a person in good faith and under a color of title, who claims to be the owner of real estate, pays taxes assessed thereon, he or she is entitled to reimbursement if the title is thereafter defeated. Parker v. McGinnes, 842 S.W.2d 357, 363 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). The trial court denied reimbursement because it found appellant did not have clean hands and did not act in good faith. As explained above in the section discussing Cohen's alleged bona fide purchase, the trial court did not err in finding that Cohen was not acting in good faith in purchasing the property. Consequently, we overrule Cohen's seventh issue.

In his eighth issue, Cohen contends that the trial court erred in refusing to impose an indemnity obligation on Hawkins. Cohen bases his argument on a clause contained in the power of attorney, which basically states that Hawkins agreed to indemnify and hold harmless any third party who acted in reliance on the provisions therein. Cohen contends Hawkins should be required to indemnify him for any losses he sustained in the present action because he acted in reliance on the power of attorney. Cohen, however, premises his argument on the assertion that he acted in good faith. As explained above in the section discussing Cohen's alleged bona fide purchase, the trial court did not err in finding that Cohen did not act in good faith. Consequently, we overrule Cohen's eighth issue.

In his ninth issue, Cohen challenges the trial court's refusal to find that appellant's own negligence was more than 50% responsible for the damages she incurred in this case. Cohen, however, did not adequately brief this issue because he failed to cite any relevant authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Accordingly, we overrule Cohen's ninth issue.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.