ORDER

SUSAN BOLTON, District Judge

This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on November 24, 2008. (Doc.# 10.) Plaintiff Danny James Cohea, who is confined in the California State Prison in Corcoran, California, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.# 1.) The Court will order Defendants Torres and Scribner to respond Plaintiff's claim in his Complaint for violation of his due process rights in connection with the confiscation of property pursuant to regulations and policies and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

II. Complaint

Plaintiff ostensibly alleges four counts. Each concerns the confiscation of allowable personal property, accumulated by Plaintiff while housed at "New Folsom Prison" (NSP), following his transfer to CSP. Plaintiff sues the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDC); L.E. Scribner, the Warden of California State Prison at Corcoran (CSP); Jonathan Buckley, Appeals Co-ordinator; and CSP Corrections Officer Torres. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and compensatory relief.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Between March 21, 1994 and October 27, 2004, Plaintiff was confined in NFP in Sacramento. (Doc.# 1 at 4.) While confined in NFP, Plaintiff accumulated personal property, which was allowable at NFP, from sanctioned sources, e.g., approved vendors. (Id.) On October 26, 2004, NFP officers packed all of Plaintiff's property, including legal materials, preparatory to Plaintiff's transfer to CSP the next day. (Id. at 5, 10.) At the time, CDC policies provided that "'the sending institution shall administer the inmate's disposition of property not allowed at the receiving institution.'" (Id., quoting California Code of Regulations (CCR), title 15, § 3190(c) (italics added)). NSP officers packed up all of Plaintiff's property without identifying any of the property as not allowable at CSP. On October 27, 2004, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP.

Plaintiff's property did not arrive at CSP until December 6, 2004. On December 12, 2004, Plaintiff was escorted to Receiving Release (R R) to claim his transferred property. (Id. at 5-6.) On arrival at R R, Plaintiff found Officer Torres unpacking his property and separating out items that were allegedly not allowed at CSP and therefore considered contraband. (Id. at 6.) Torres listed some but not all of the confiscated property on a "Property Transfer Receipt," but refused to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the receipt. (Id. at 7.) Officer Peck issued Plaintiff an "R R Mail-Out Disposal Notice," giving him 30 days, or until January 12, 2005, to pay $23.31 to have his excess property mailed out from the prison, although Plaintiff was indigent. (Id. at 8.) Prison officials thereafter disposed of Plaintiff's excess personal property as provided under prison regulations.

On February 9, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria). (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff's property was not transferred there until March 2, 2006, and Plaintiff's only set of tennis shoes was confiscated as contraband, although the shoes had apparently been allowed property at CSP and had not been designated as not allowed by CSP, i.e., the sending institution, at the receiving institution, Calipatria. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff was again limited to one cubic foot of legal materials in his cell. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff alleges that because NFP, as the sending institution, did not designate any of his property as not allowed at CSP, the receiving institution, all of his property should have been allowed at CSP. He contends that under Scribner's policies regarding transferred inmate property, Torres was able to confiscate his property at CSP, and unidentified staff was able to confiscate his shoes at Calipatria in violation of his due process and equal protection rights. Plaintiff also alleges that the confiscation of his personal property constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff contends that he was denied access to the courts based on the denial of access to his stored legal materials. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances was violated.

III. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, a "'plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot assert the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Negligence by a defendant acting under color of state law is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (plaintiff must plead more than mere negligence in a § 1983 action); see Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2002). To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that any Defendant acted negligently, he fails to state a claim.

A. CDC

Plaintiff sues the CDC. The CDC is not, however, a proper Defendant under § 1983. Under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state or its agencies may not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). "In the absence of waiver by the state or a valid congressional override, '[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.'" Dittman v. State of California, 191 F.3d 120, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985), and the United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity,Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 17 (1985). The State of California and its arms, such as the CDC, also are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); see also Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) ( en banc); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the CDC will be dismissed.

B. Buckley

Plaintiff sues grievance Appeals Co-ordinator Jonathon Buckley. Plaintiff alleges that Buckley failed to respond to his grievance appeals concerning the confiscation of his property by Torres. An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures because there is no free-standing constitutional right to a grievance process. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 493 (8th Cir. 1993) ( per curiam); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Buckley and he will be dismissed as a Defendant.

C. Petition for Redress of Grievances

Plaintiff asserts a violation of his right to petition for redress of grievances. Inmates have the right to petition for redress of grievances and to file suit without being subjected to retaliation. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, an inmate may state a constitutional violation where he alleges that a grievance was denied in retaliation for exercising a constitutionally-protected right, see Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), or in retaliation for filing a grievance, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). As noted above, however, an inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures.Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430; Adams, 40 F.3d at 75; Buckley, 997 F.2d at 493; Mann, 855 F.2d at 640.

Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that any Defendant retaliated against him for filing a grievance. At most, he only alleges that he was denied an adequate grievance procedure. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a constitutional claim for violation of his right to petition for redress of grievances.

D. Equal Protection

Plaintiff also asserts that his equal protection rights have been violated. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A state practice that interferes with a fundamental right or that discriminates against a suspect class of individuals is subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 700 (9th Cir. 2006). Absent allegations that he is a member of a suspect class, or that a fundamental right has been violated, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that he has been intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly situated without a reasonable basis therefor. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).

Plaintiff appears to contend that his equal protection rights were violated under the regulations and policies concerning transferred inmate property because his excess legal materials were placed in storage and he was denied access to those materials, which he contends was discriminatory. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that he has been treated differently, for intentional and arbitrary treatment, than similarly-situated individuals or that he is a member of a suspect class. Inmates do not constitute suspect class. See Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1998). For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his Equal Protection rights.

E. Access to the Courts

Although not so denominated, Plaintiff also appears to contend that the lack of access to his stored legal materials violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively interfering with an inmate's attempt to prepare or to file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). That right, however, only encompasses the right to bring a petition or complaint to federal court and not to discover or even effectively litigate claims once filed with a court. Id. at 354; see Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The right of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil rights complaint of a person in state custody will reach a court for consideration.") The right "guarantees no particular methodology but rather, the conferral of a capability — the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Further, the denial of access to a paralegal or use of a law library is not actionable if there is no claim of prejudice to an existing or future legal action. Id. at 351-53. That is, an inmate must establish that he suffered an "actual injury" when he alleges that he was denied access to a paralegal or a law library. See Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994). An "actual injury" is "actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant's conduct prevented him from bringing to court a non-frivolous claim that he wished to present. Id. at 351-53.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to stored legal materials while he was at CSP when he had a deadline to file a response to a dispositive motion in Cohea v. Pliler, No. CV 00-2799-FCD (EFB). Review of the docket for that case reflects that the dispositive motion was denied based on Plaintiff's assertions that prison officials denied him access to his legal materials. (See doc.# 61 in CV 00-2799-FCD (EFB)). Plaintiff did not, therefore, suffer any actual injury. Plaintiff otherwise fails to allege facts to support that the lack of access to his legal materials as CSP or Calipatria prevented him from filing any contemplated challenge in state or federal court or that he otherwise suffered an actual injury, i.e., actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation. For these reasons, he fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.

F. Takings Claim

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. "In order to state a claim under the Takings Clause, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he possesses a 'property interest' that is constitutionally protected." Schneider v. California Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, a prisoner must allege facts to support that property was taken for public use. Allen v. Wood, 970 F.Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Wash. 1997). For example, a law that requires interest earned on inmate accounts to be diverted to a general fund that benefits all inmates may constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1201. Thus, a prisoner property claim implicates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause only where the prisoner alleges that prison officials took his personal property and converted it for public use. It is only then that a person is entitled to just compensation. Allen, 970 F.Supp. at 831.

Although Plaintiff adequately alleges that he had a property interest in his confiscated property, he fails to allege facts to support that his property was taken for any public use. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a Fifth Amendment Takings claim.

IV. Claim for Which an Answer Will be Required

Plaintiff alleges that his property was confiscated and disposed of pursuant to prison regulations and official policies of Warden Scribner without affording Plaintiff pre-deprivation due process. He alleges that he was afforded only 30 days in which to pay to have his excess property mailed out, although that was far less than the period to fully grieve official action, such as the confiscation of his property, pursuant to Chapter 5, Article 43 of DOM § 54100.12. Defendants Scribner and Torres will be required to respond to this claim.

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83-182(f) and 83-183(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5-133(d)(2). Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Buckley and all of Plaintiff's claims, except his claim for deprivation of property without due process, and are dismissed without prejudice. (Doc.# 1.)

(2) Defendants Scribner and Torres must answer Plaintiff's claim for deprivation of property without due process. (Doc.# 1.)

(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the Complaint (doc.# 1), this Order, a Notice of Submission of Documents form, an instruction sheet, and copies of summons and USM-285 forms for Defendants Scribner and Torres.

(4) Within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order, Plaintiff must complete and return to the Clerk of Court the Notice of Submission of Documents. Plaintiff must submit with the Notice of Submission of Documents: a copy of the Complaint for each Defendant, a copy of this Order for each Defendant, a completed summons for each Defendant, and a completed USM-285 for each Defendant.

(5) Plaintiff must not attempt service on Defendants and must not request waiver of service. Once the Clerk of Court has received the Notice of Submission of Documents and the required documents, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to seek waiver of service from each Defendant or serve each Defendant.

(6) If Plaintiff fails to return the Notice of Submission of Documents and the required documents within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

SUSAN BOLTON, District Judge

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT COMPLAINT 42 U.S.C. § 1983 I. JURISDICTION

(1) PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS ACT COMPLAINT ARISES UNDER TITLE 42 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE ("U.S.C.") SECTION 1983 AND JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED PURSUANT TO TITLE 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

(2) THE CLAIMS ASSERTED HEREIN ARISES FROM INCIDENTS AT THE CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON "CORCORAN", WHICH CORCORAN IS LOCATED IN THE KING COUNTY, IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND ALL OF THESE EVENTS AND OMISSIONS HEREIN GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OCCURRED IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN (FRESNO) JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) AND THE COURT'S GENERAL ORDERS.

(3) PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

PLAINTIFF SEEKS MONETARY AND DECLARATORY RELIEF FROM DEFENDANT(S) NAMED WITHIN THIS CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH, FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS RIGHT TO "PROPERTY", AND VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES, MORE OVER, THIS COMPLAINT ASSERTS A "TAKING" CLAIM, "STANDING" CLAIM, AND A CLAIM OF "VAGUE AND OVERBROAD" REGARDING POLICIES OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATIONS ("CDCR") AS NOTED HEREIN.

(4) PARTIES: PLAINTIFF

PLAINTIFF DANNY JAMES COHEA IS CURRENTY AND AT ALL TIMES MENTIONED HEREIN, A PRISONER OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN CUSTODY OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION ("CDCR"). INCIDENTS NAMED IN THIS COMPLAINT ALL OCCURRED AT CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON — "CORCORAN" IN CORCORAN CALIFORNIA, IN THE COUNTY OF KING.

(5) DEFENDANTS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION ("CDCR" OR "DEPARTMENT") IS THE STATE AGENCY OVER ALL PRISON OPERATIONS, AND RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF AND THE WELFARE OF ALL THE INMATES/PRISONERS WITHIN THE CALIFORNIA PRISON SYSTEM THROUGH-OUT THE STATE'S NUMBREOUS PRISONS.

(6) L.E. SCRIBNER WAS/IS THE WARDEN OF CORCORAN STATE PRISON. HE WAS/IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION OF CORCORAN AND FOR THE WELFARE OF ALL THE INMATES/PRISONERS OF THE PRISON.

(7) JONATHAN BUCKLEY IS THE APPEALS COORDINATOR AT CORCORAN, AND WAS SO AT ALL TIMES AS ALLEGED.

(8) TORRES IS A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ("C/O") AT CORCORAN'S PROPERTY ROOM AND WAS SO AT ALL TIMES.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION DUE PROCESS "TAKING" CLAUSE CLAIM

(A) PLAINTIFF WAS RECEIVED IN THE COCR ON MARCH 21, 1994, AND WAS PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE WARDEN OF CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON-SACRAMENTO ("NEW FOLSOM") IN JULY 1994, WHERE PLAINTIFF REMAINED UNTIL OCTOBER 27, 2004 (OVER TEN (10) YEARS) WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED TO CORCORAN STATE PRISON.

(B) DURING THE TEN YEARS HOUSED AT NEW FOLSOM, THE CDCR (DEFENDANT) ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO ACCUMULATE PERSONAL PROPERTY THROUGH PRIRCHASES FROM AUTHORIZED VENDORS, CANTEEN, PACKAGES AND ETC . . . AS ALLOWABLE PROPERTY.

(C) ON OCTOBER 26, 2004, ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL AND PERSONAL "PROPERTY" THAT PLAINTIFF HAD ACCUMULATED AND HAD IN HIS HOUSING UNIT AT NEW FOLSOM WAS PACKED BY CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AT NEW FOLSOM FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 27, 2004.

(D) AT THE TIME PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON (OCTOBER 26, 2004), DEFENDANT CDCR'S POLICY REGARDING INMATES' TRANSFERRED PROPERTY STATED IN PERTINENT PART:

ALL INSTITUTIONS HOUSING MALE INMATES SHALL PROVIDE ALL OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIRECTOR WITH NO LESS THAN TWO COPIES OF THE INSTITUTION'S CURRENT LIST OF ALLOWABLE INMATE PERSONAL PROPERTY. UPON AN INMATE'S TRANSFER BETWEEN INSTITUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE SENDING INSTITUTION SHALL ADMINISTER THE INMATE'S DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY NOT ALLOWED AT THE RECEIVING INSTITUTION. (UNDERSCORES ADDED.) (CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS ("CCR") RULE § 3190(c).)

(E) THOUGH PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED (i.e., "TRANSPAKED") FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 26, 2004, AND PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED TO CORCORAN FROM NEW FOLSOM ON OCTOBER 27, 2004, THE PROPERTY DIDN'T ARRIVE WITH PLAINTIFF ON OCTOBER 27, 2004 (ITWASN'T PLACED ON THAT BUS).

DANNY JAMES COHEA (J13647), CALIPATRIA STATE PRISON, CALIPATRIA, CA., IN PRO PER.

I. JURISDICTION

(1) PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS ACT COMPLAINT ARISES UNDER TITLE 42 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE ("U.S.C.") SECTION 1983 AND JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED PURSUANT TO TITLE 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

(2) THE CLAIMS ASSERTED HEREIN ARISES FROM INCIDENTS AT THE CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON "CORCORAN", WHICH CORCORAN IS LOCATED IN THE KING COUNTY, IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND ALL OF THESE EVENTS AND OMISSIONS HEREIN GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OCCURRED IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN (FRESNO) JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) AND THE COURT'S GENERAL ORDERS.

(3) PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

PLAINTIFF SEEKS MONETARY AND DECLARATORY RELIEF FROM DEFENDANT(S) NAMED WITHIN THIS CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH, FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS RIGHT TO "PROPERTY", AND VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES, MORE OVER, THIS COMPLAINT ASSERTS A "TAKING" CLAIM, "STANDING" CLAIM, AND A CLAIM OF "VAGUE AND OVERBROAD" REGARDING POLICIES OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATIONS ("CDCR") AS NOTED HEREIN.

(4) PARTIES: PLAINTIFF

PLAINTIFF DANNY JAMES COHEA IS CURRENTY AND AT ALL TIMES MENTIONED HEREIN, A PRISONER OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN CUSTODY OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION ("CDCR"). INCIDENTS NAMED IN THIS COMPLAINT ALL OCCURRED AT CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON — "CORCORAN" IN CORCORAN CALIFORNIA, IN THE COUNTY OF KING.

(5) DEFENDANTS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION ("CDCR" OR "DEPARTMENT") IS THE STATE AGENCY OVER ALL PRISON OPERATIONS, AND RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF AND THE WELFARE OF ALL THE INMATES/PRISONERS WITHIN THE CALIFORNIA PRISON SYSTEM THROUGH-OUT THE STATE'S NUMBREOUS PRISONS.

(6) L.E. SCRIBNER WAS/IS THE WARDEN OF CORCORAN STATE PRISON. HE WAS/IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION OF CORCORAN AND FOR THE WELFARE OF ALL THE INMATES/PRISONERS OF THE PRISON.

(7) JONATHAN BUCKLEY IS THE APPEALS COORDINATOR AT CORCORAN, AND WAS SO AT ALL TIMES AS ALLEGED.

(8) TORRES IS A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ("C/O") AT CORCORAN'S PROPERTY ROOM AND WAS SO AT ALL TIMES.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION DUE PROCESS "TAKING" CLAUSE CLAIM

(A) PLAINTIFF WAS RECEIVED IN THE COCR ON MARCH 21, 1994, AND WAS PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE WARDEN OF CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON-SACRAMENTO ("NEW FOLSOM") IN JULY 1994, WHERE PLAINTIFF REMAINED UNTIL OCTOBER 27, 2004 (OVER TEN (10) YEARS) WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED TO CORCORAN STATE PRISON.

(B) DURING THE TEN YEARS HOUSED AT NEW FOLSOM, THE CDCR (DEFENDANT) ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO ACCUMULATE PERSONAL PROPERTY THROUGH PRIRCHASES FROM AUTHORIZED VENDORS, CANTEEN, PACKAGES AND ETC . . . AS ALLOWABLE PROPERTY.

(C) ON OCTOBER 26, 2004, ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL AND PERSONAL "PROPERTY" THAT PLAINTIFF HAD ACCUMULATED AND HAD IN HIS HOUSING UNIT AT NEW FOLSOM WAS PACKED BY CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AT NEW FOLSOM FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 27, 2004.

(D) AT THE TIME PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON (OCTOBER 26, 2004), DEFENDANT CDCR'S POLICY REGARDING INMATES' TRANSFERRED PROPERTY STATED IN PERTINENT PART:

ALL INSTITUTIONS HOUSING MALE INMATES SHALL PROVIDE ALL OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIRECTOR WITH NO LESS THAN TWO COPIES OF THE INSTITUTION'S CURRENT LIST OF ALLOWABLE INMATE PERSONAL PROPERTY. UPON AN INMATE'S TRANSFER BETWEEN INSTITUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE SENDING INSTITUTION SHALL ADMINISTER THE INMATE'S DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY NOT ALLOWED AT THE RECEIVING INSTITUTION. (UNDERSCORES ADDED.) (CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS ("CCR") RULE § 3190(c).)

(E) THOUGH PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED (i.e., "TRANSPAKED") FOR TRANSFER TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 26, 2004, AND PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED TO CORCORAN FROM NEW FOLSOM ON OCTOBER 27, 2004, THE PROPERTY DIDN'T ARRIVE WITH PLAINTIFF ON OCTOBER 27, 2004 (ITWASN'T PLACED ON THAT BUS).

(F) ON DECEMBER 06, 2004, PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ARRIVED AT CORCORAN FROM NEW FOLSOM. ON DECEMBER 12, 2004, PLAINTIFF WAS ESCORTED TO RECEIVING AND RELEASE ("R R") PROPERTY ROOM TO BE ISSUED PLAINTIFF'S TRANSFERRED PROPERTY.

(G) UPON ARRIVAL AT CORRORAN'S R R PROPERTY ROOM, DEFENDANT TORRES AS HE WAS UNPACKING THE BOXES OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY BEGAN PUTTING CERTAIN ITEMS OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY ASIDE INFORMING PLAINTIFF THAT THOSE ITEMS WERE CONSIDERED AS "CONTRABAND, AND MUST BE CONFISCATED".

(H) AS DEFENDANT TORRES WAS CONFISCATING THE ITEMS OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT HE WAS LABELLING AS "CONTRABAND", PLAINTIFF WAS INFORMING DEFENDANT TORRES THE ITEMS HE WAS CONFISCATING AS CONTRABAND WERE ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD PURCHASED AT "NEW FOLSOM" AS ALLOWABLE PROPERTY, AND ALL OF THE ITEMS WERE EITHER PURCHASED FROM AUTHORIZED VENDOR(S); AS PURCHASE THROUGH QUARTERLY PACKAGES OR FROM INSTITUTION CANTEEN, AND ETC . . ., NEVERTHELESS, THESE ITEMS WERE "CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND".

(I) PLAINTIFF NOTES THE ITEMS THAT DEFENDANT TORRES HAD CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND WERE ALL LISTED ON NEW FOLSOM'S "PROPERTY INVENTORY WORKSHEET" AS PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY TRANSFERRED, AND ALL THE PROPERTY CONFISCATED BY DEFENDANT TORRES AS "CONTRABAND", PLAINTIFF HAD SOME FORM OF RECEIPTS TO SHOW TO TORRES AS ALLOWABLE PURCHASED PROPERTY AT NEW FOLSOM, TO NO AVAIL. . . .

(J) THOUGH DEFENDANT TORRES LISTED MANY OF THE ITEMSCONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND ON THE DEPARTMENT'S "PROPERTY TRANSFERRECEIPT (COC-143)", MANY OF THE ITEMS WERE NOT LISTED DESPITE PLAINTIFF REQUESTING TORRES TO BE SURE TO ITEMIZE THE ITEMS CONFISCATED. MOREOVER, DEFENDANT TORRES REFUSED TO SUPPLY PLAINTIFF WITH A COPY OF THE "RECEIPT", PLAINTIFF NEVER SEEN ANY OF HIS CONFISCATED PROPERTY AGAIN.

(K) DEFENDANT TORRES ALSO HAD R R CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ("C/O") R. PECK ISSUE PLAINTIFF A "R R MAIL-OUT DISPOSAL NOTICE" DATED JANUARY 12, 2005 AS THE EXPIRATION DATE TO PRODUCE "$23.31" THE REQUIRED AMOUNT FOR POSTAGE TO SEND PLAINTIFF PROPERTY (CONFISCATED) OUT OF THE INSTITUTION (PLAINTIFF'S STATUS WAS/IS "INDIGENT").

(L) THE DECEMBER 12, 2004, "R R MAIL-OUT DISPOSAL NOTICE" (WITH THE EXPIRATION DATE OF JANUARY 12, 2005) REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S TRANSFERRED LISTED CONTRABAND CONFISCATED PROPERTY WAS ISSUED PER DEPARTMENTAL RULE SECTION 3191(C) OF CCR, PER DEFENDANT L.E. SCRIBNER'S CORCORAN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE #806, DESPITE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO FILE AN ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE REGARDING "ANY DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, ACTION, CONDITION, OR POLICY, WHICH [PLAINTIFF] CAN DEMONSTRATE AS HAVING AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON [HIS] WELFARE." PURSUANT TO CCR RULE § 3084.1(a), WHICH THE INSTITUTION APPEALS PROCESS TAKES AT THE LEAST ONE-HUNDRED FIFTY (150) DAYS TO COMPLETE (DOM 54100.12), FAR GREATER THAN THE THIRTY (30) DAYS REQUIREMENT SET BY THE POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT (DEFENDANT) AND DEFENDANT SCRIBNER.

(M) THE OCTOBER 26, 2004 PACKED FOR TRANSFER PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF BY NEW FOLSOM CORRECTIONAL STAFF (AS ALLOWABLE PROPERTY AT "CORCORAN" — PER CCR RULE § 3190(c)), THAT WAS CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 BY DEFENDANT TORRES (DESPITE BEING AUTHORIZED APPROVED PURCHASES BY CDCR) ILLUSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT CDCR AND DEFENDANT SCRIBNER'S POLICY ON TRANSFERRED INMATES PROPERTY IS CLEARLY BEING FRAUDULENTLY ADMINISTERED TO ALLOW() R R PERSONNEL (SUCH AS IN PLAINTIFF'S CASE — C/O TORRES) TO STEAL INMATES PROPERTY AT WILL.

(N) SINCE PLAINTIFF HAD NEVER BEEN TRANSFERRED (DURING HIS TEN(10) YEARS OF INCARCERATION — AT THAT TIME), PLAINTIFF HAD NEVER BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ( ETC . . .) ACTS OF FRAUDULENTLY STEALLING INMATES (AS PLAINTIFF'S) LEGALLY PURCHASED PROPERTY WHEN TRANSFERRED, WHEN DOING SO THROUGH THE TRANSFER POLICY (AS DEFENDANT TORRES WAS CLEARLY ALLOWED TO STEAL PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 — BY SIMPLY APPLYING THE TRANSFER POLICIES OF DEFENDANTS CDCR AND SCRIBNER.).

(O) THOUGH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT MY NOT HALE GUARATEED PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO THE "PROPERTY" FROM ONE INSTITUTION TO THE OTHER INSTITUTION, THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS GUARATEES PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO "JUST COMPENSATION" BY THE DEFENDANTS WHEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS CONFISCATED BY DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, DEFENDANT SCRIBNER AND DEFENDANT TORRES ON DECEMBER 12, 2004.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION "STANDING" VIOLATION CLAIM

(A) ON OCTOBER 05, 2004, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (IN SACRAMENTO) HAD GRANTED PLAINTIFF A SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME (OF THIRTY (30) DAYS) TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, THEREIN THAT ORDER THE COURT INFORMED PLAINTIFF THAT "NO FURTHER EXTENSION WOULD BE GRANTED ABSENT A 'MANIFEST INJUSTICE'." (COHEA V. PLILER, WARDEN, CV-00-2799 FCD (EFB), CD 52.)

(B) WHEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED FOR TRANSFER FROM NEW FOLSOM TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 26, 2004 (CONTAINING ALL PLAINTIFF CASE "LEGAL MATERIALS"), PLAINTIFF WAS STILL UNDER FEDERAL COURT ORDER (FROM OCTOBER 05, 2004 UNTIL NOVEMBER 08, 2004). BUT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED ON OCTOBER 27, 2004, NONE OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL MATERIALS WERE TRANSFERRED ON OCTOBER 27, 2004.

(C) PLAINTIFF FILED AN "OBSTRUCTION OF THE COURT'S OCTOBER 05, 2004 ORDER" MOTION INFORMING THE SACRAMENTO UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT THAT DEFENDANTS (OF THAT CASE, AND THEIR AGENTS) WAS OBSTRUCTING PLAINTIFF FROM COMPLYING WITH THE COURT'S ORDER BY CONFISCATING PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ON OCTOBER 26, 2004 AND AS OF NOVEMBER 19, 2004 REFUSED TO RELEASE PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL MATERIALS BACK TO PLAINTIFF.

(D) ON DECEMBER 06, 2004, CORCORAN RECEIVED PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY FROM NEW FOLSOM, AND ISSUED PLAINTIFF ONLY SOME OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL MATERIALS.

(E) ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 WHEN DEFENDANT TORRES ISSUED PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY, PLAINTIFF WAS ONLY ALLOW "SIX CUBIT FEET" (AND ONE BOX OF LEGAL MATERIAL) OF PROPERTY, AND DEFENDANT TORRES INFORMAND PLAINTIFF THAT THE "SIX CUBIT FEET" REQUIREMENT WAS DEPARTMENTAL AND WARDEN SCRIBNER'S POLICY. THESE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY C/O TORRES ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 IN MANDATED BY COCR POLICIES. (CCR RULE §§ 3161, 3190(b)).

(F) WHEN PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL MATERIAL FOR HIS PENDING CASE(S) WAS PLACED IN INSTITUTIONAL "STORAGE" BY DEFENDANT TORRES ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S COCR POLICY (SEE DOM 54030.9 AND 54030.9.1), PLAINTIFF HAD NO FURTHER ACCESS TO HIS PENDING CASE(S) LEGAL MATERIALS THE REMAINING TIME PLAINTIFF WAS AT CORCORAN, DESPITE PLAINTIFF SUBMITTING SEVERAL REQUEST TO ACCESS HIS LEGAL MATERIALS TO C/O TORRES AND CORCORAN'S R R FOR OVER A YEAR. PLAINTIFF REMAINED AT CORCORAN FROM OCTOBER 27, 2004 UNTIC FEBRUARY 09, 2006, WHEN PLAINTIFF TRANSFERRED (ON NON-ADVERSE) TO "CALIPATRIA" STATE PRISON, WHICH PLAINTIFF'S WAS KEPT FROM PLAINTIFF'S ACCESS FOR OVER A YEAR (WHILE PLAINTIFF HAD CASE(S) PENDING REQUIRING ACCESS TO THOSE LEGAL MATERIALS.

(G) AGAIN WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED FROM CORCORAN TO CALIPATRIA PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WASN'T TRANSFERRED, AND WHEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ARRIVED AT CALIPATRIA A MONTH LATER (ACCORDING TO CALIPATRIA OFFICIALS — ON MARCH 02, 2006) PLAINTIFF AGAIN HAS NOT HAD FULLY ACCESS TO HIS PENDING CASES LEGAL MATORIALS, AND CALIPATRIA IS ALSO IMPOSING THE "ONE COBIL FEET" OF PENDING CASE(S) LEGAL MATERIALS, WHICH IS OBSTRUCTING PLAINTIFF'S LITIGATION OF HIS PENDING (AND PURSUED CASES).

(H) ALSO AGAIN WHEN PLAINTIFF ARRIVED AT CALIPATRIA FROM BEING TRANSFERRED FROM CORCORAN, CALIPATRIA CONFISCATED PLAINTIFF ONLY SET OF TENNIS SHOES (LEFT BY CORCORAN CONFISCATION AS CONTRABAND), HERETOO CALIPATRIA CONFISCATION OF THE TENNIS SHOES IS CLAIMED TO BE "CONTRABAND", CLEARLY ILLUSTRATING THAT CDCRTRANSFER POLICY REGARDING "PROPERTY" IS A SYSTEMATIC AND WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION OF THE INMATE POPULATION THATS "BEINGTRANSFERRED" TO BE SUBJECTED TO R R CORRECTIONAL STAFF USING COCR'S TRANSFER PROPERTY POLICIES TO FRAUDULENTLY STEAL PROPERTY.

(I) ALSO ILLUSTRATES THAT CDCR'S POLICY ON TRANSFER PROPERTY IS SUBJECTING PRISONERS WITH PENDING LITIGATION (AND THAT IS PURSUING LITIGATION) TO SYSTEMATIC AND WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION. WHEN REFUSING LITIGANTS WITH "PENDING CASES" THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS TO ALL THEIR PENDING CASES "LEGAL CASE DOCUMENTS" AND MATERIALS AT ONE TIME:

(J) HERE CDCR HAS ILLUSTRATED THAT IT IS A REPEATED OBSTRUCTION AND THEFT OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL AND LEGAL MATERIALS BECAUSE IT HAS HAPPENED TO PLAINTIFF TWICE NOW, WHEN TRANSFERRED FROM NEW FOLSOM TO CORCORAN, THEN AGAIN WHEN TRANSFERRING PLAINTIFF FROM CORCORAN TO CALIPATRIA, THUS, CLEARLY CONSTITUTING A "STANDING" CLAIM IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND ITSNO DOUBT THAT THIS OBSTRUCTION OF "LITIGATION" AND "THEFT" OF PERSONAL PROPERTY THROUGH THE CDCR'S TRANSFER POLICIES IS SYSTEMATIC AND WIDESPREAD, BECAUSE ITS HAPPENING TO "TRANSFERRED" PRISONERS ALL OVER THE STATE.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION DUE PROCESS CLAUSE "VAGUE AND OVERBROAD" CLAIM

(A) WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED FROM NEW FOLSOM TO CORCORAN ON OCTOBER 27, 2004, THE DEFENDANTS POLICIES REGARDING TRANSFERRING INMATES' "PROPERTY" STATED THAT ". . . THE SENDING INSTITUTION SHALL ADMINISTER THE INMATE'S DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY NOT ALLOWED AT THE RECEIVING INSTITUTION." (SEE CCR RULE § 3190(c).)

AND THE DEPARTMENTAL OPERATION MANUAL ("DOM") SECTION 54030.10POLICY AND CORCORAN'S OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE #806. VII. B(9)POLICY STATED AT THE TIME PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED ON OCTOBER 27, 2004 THAT, "NO PROPERTY SHALL BE PACKED WHICH IS UNAUTHORIZED AT THE RECEIVING INSTITUTION".

(B) THEREFORE, WHEN DEFENDANT CDCR'S CORRECTIONAL STAFF AT NEW FOLSOM PACKED PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ON OCTOBER 26, 2004 FORTRANSFER TO CORCORAN, ANY PROPERTY THAT WAS "UNAUTHORIZED" AT CORCORAN WHEN THE "PROPERTY" ARRIVED AT CORCORAN ON DECEMBER 06, 2004 (SENT BY THE "SENDING INSTITUTION", i.e., NEW FOLSOM), CDCR BECAME LIABLE FOR ALL PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY LOSS (AS "UNAUTHORIZED" AT CORCORAN) DUE TO THE "EMPLOYEE NEGLIGENCE" OF NEW FOLSOM'S CORRECTIONAL STAFF "PACKING" AND "SHIPPING" ITUNAUTHORIZED.

(C) WHEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WAS PACKED FOR TRANSFER ON OCTOBER 26, 2004 FROM NEW FOLSOM TO CORCORAN, AND PLAINTIFF WAS TRANSFERRED ON OCTOBER 27, 2004, AND WHEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY ARRIVED AT CORCORAN ON DECEMBER 06, 2004 (FROM NEW FOLSOM), THE DEFENDANT CDCR'S "PROPERTY"POLICY CCR RULE SECTION 3193(b) ("LIABILITY") EXPLICITLY STATED IN PERTINENT PART THAT, "THE DEPARTMENT SHALL ACCEPT LIABILITY FOR THE LOSS DR DESTRUCTION OF INMATE PERSONAL PROPERTY WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT SUCH LOSS OR DESTRUCTION RESULTS FROM EMPLOYEE ACTION. . . . (SEE CCR RULE § 3193(b).)

(D) WHEN DEFENDANT TORRES BEGAN UNPACKING PLAINTIFF'S TRANSFERRED PROPERTY ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 AND BEGAN CONFISCATION PERSONAL PROPERTY ITEMS OF PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CLOAK OF "CONTRABAND" (i.e., AS "UNAUTHORIZED AT 'CORCORAN'"), DEFENDANTS CDCR AND WARDEN L.E. SCRIBNER POLICIES ON "PROPERTY" REGARDING "TRANSFERRED" INMATES MADE THEM LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY "LOSS OR DESTRUCTION" BECAUSE OF NEW FOLSOM'S CORRECTIONAL STAFF "EMPLOYEE ACTION".

(E) THESE EMPLOYEE ACTION(S) OF "PACKING" THE "UNAUTHORIZED" PROPERTY FOR TRANSFER, AND THESE EMPLOYEE ACTION(S) FOR LABELLING PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY AS "CONTRABAND" THEN "CONFISCATING" IT (WITHOUT GIVING PLAINTIFF A "RECEIPT" OF THE "CONFISCATED" "CONTRABAND") IS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION THAT DEFENDANTS CDCR AND WARDEN SCRIBNER IS ALLOWING THE "TRANSFER" AND "PROPERTY" POLICIES TO BE USED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUE AND OVERBROAD MANNER BY "SENDING INSTITUTION(s)" CORRECTIONAL STAFF WHEN APPLYING THEIR OWN DISCRETIONARY ACTION(s) WHEN TRANSFERRING "UNAUTHORIZED" PROPERTY (FROM "SENDING INSTITUTIONS" INTO "RECEIVING INSTITUTION"), THUS CLEARLY PURSUING THEIR PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS, AND BY "RECEIVING INSTITUTION(s)" CORRECTIONAL STAFF WHEN APPLYING THEIR OWN DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS WHEN LABELLING PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY AS "CONTRABAND" AND "CONFISCATING" IT, THUS ALSO CLEARLY PURSUING THEIR PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS.

(F) AND THESE EMPLOYEE ACTION(s) (i.e., c/o DEFENDANT TORRES, AND CORCORAN'S R R PROPERTY ROOM CORRECTIONAL STAFF) WHEN "CONFISCATING" PLAINTIFF'S (PENDING AND PURSUING CASE(S) "LEGAL MATERIAL") AND PLACING IT IN "INSTITUTIONAL 'STORAGE (i.e., 'HOT ROOM')'" (WHERE IT STAYED FOR OVER SIXTEEN (16) MONTHS WITHOUT PLAINTIFF HAVING ACCESS TO IT, DESPITE PLAINTIFF CONSTANT REQUESTS TO HAVE "ACCESS" TO NEEDED MATERIALS), ALSO IS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION BY DEFENDANTS CDCR AND WARDEN L.E. SCRIBNER ALLOWING THE "TRANSFER" AND "PROPERTY" POLICIES (SEE CCR RULE §§ 3161, 3164; AND DOM 54030.9, 54030.9.1) TO BE USED IN AN CLEAR UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUE AND OVERBROAD MANNER BY "RECEIVING INSTITUTION(s)" CORRECTIONAL STAFF WHEN APPLYING THEIR OWN DISCRETIONARY ACTION(S) UNDER THE CLOAK OF "IN EXCESS OF PROPERTY LIMITATIONS/TO EXCEED THE ALLOWABLE AMOUNT, IN THE LIVING AREA" WHEN PLACING PLAINTIFF'S "LEGAL MATERIALS" FOR HIS PENDING AND PURSUED CASE(S) IN INSTITUTIONAL "STORAGE (i.e., 'HOT ROOM')" WITHOUT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF "ACCESS" FOR OVER 16 MONTHS, THUS ALSO ILLUSTRATING THAT "RECEIVING INSTITUTION(S)" CORRECTIONAL STAFF CLEARLY PURSUING THEIR OWN PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS.

(G) DEFENDANTS CDCR AND WARDEN L.E. SCRIBNER POLICY ON "TRANSFER(s)" AND "PROPERTY" ILLUSTRATES THERES NO UNIFORMITY RELATING TO "SENDING INSTITUTION(S)" EMPLOYEE ACTION REGARDING WHICH ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS "UNAUTHORIZED" (STATEWIDE) AT THE POINT OF BEING "TRANSFERRED" NOT AT THE TIME OF BEING "RECEIVED" AT THE TRANSFERRED TO INSTITUTION (THUS ALLOWING INMATES TRANSFERRED PROPERTY TO BE " STOLEN"). AND ALSO ILLUSTRATES THERES NO UNIFORMITY RELATING TO "RECEIVING INSTITUTION(S)" EMPLOYEE ACTION REGARDING "RECEIVING" INMATES TRANSFERRED "LEGAL MATERIALS" AND PLACING IN INSTITUTIONAL "STORAGE".

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCE DUE PROCESS CLAIM AND "VAGUE AND OVERBROAD" DUE PROCESS CLAIM

(A) WHEN PLAINTIFF'S OCTOBER 26, 2004 PACKED (BY NEW FOLSOM CORRECTIONAL STAFF) PERSONAL AND LEGAL MATERIAL "PROPERTY" ARRIVED AT CORCORAN'S R R PROPERTY ROOM ON DECEMBER 06, 2004, AND C/O DEFENDANT TORRES ON DECEMBER 12, 2006 BEGAN "CONFISCATING" AS "CONTRABAND" SEVERAL ITEMS OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY DURING THE ISSUING OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY.

(B) DEFENDANT CDCR'S POLICY REGARDING THE "LOSS AND DESTRUCTION" OF INMATE PERSONAL PROPERTY ON DECEMBER 12, 2004 EXPLICITLY STATED IN PERTINENT PART THAT, ". . . INMATES SHALL UTILIZE THE INMATE APPEAL PROCESS IF UNABLE TO RESOLVE A PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIM PURSUANT TO SECTION 3084.1," (SEE CCR RULE § 3084.1.) . . . (SEE CCR RULE § 3193(b).)

DEFENDANT CDCR'S POLICY CDCR CCR RULE § 3084.1 STATES IN PERTINENT PART THAT, "ANY INMATE OR PAROLEE UNDER THE DEPARTMENT'S JURISDICTION MAY APPEAL ANY DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, ACTION, CONDITION, OR POLICY, WHICH THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE AS HAVING AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THEIR WEL FARE. . . ."

(C) ON (OR SOON THEREAFTER) DECEMBER 12, 2004 FOLLOWING DEFENDANT C10 TORRES "CONFISCATIONS" OF PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY AS "CONTRABAND", PLAINTIFF WAS ISSUED A "R R MAIL-OUTDISPOSAL NOTICE" BY C10 R. PECK CORCORAN'S R R MAIC-OUT ROOM INFORMING PLAINTIFF THAT HIS INMATE TRUST ACCOUNT REFLECKS NON-SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO COVER THE "$23.31" NECESSARY TO "MAIL-OUT" THE "CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND" PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD "THIRTY (30) DAYS (i.e., UNTIL JANUARY 12, 2005)" TO PRODUCE "$23.31" ON PLAINTIFF'S PRISON "TRUST ACCOUNT"TO "MAIL-OUT" THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY, AND THIS "THIRTY (30) DAY" REQUIREMENT WAS PURSUANT TO DEFENDANTS CDCR AND WARDEAL L.E. SCRIBNER'S POLICIES CCR RULE § 3191(c) AND CORCORAN'S OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE #806.

(D) PLAINTIFF'S CONFISCATED PERSONAL PROPERTY WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT CDCR'S POLICY CCR RULE § 3191(c) WHEN LABELLED AS "CONTRABAND" BECAUSE PLAINTIFF COULD ACCOUNT FOR OF HIS REGISTERED PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED, NOR WAS PLAINTIFF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "UNAUTHORIZED" TRANSFERRED PERSONAL PROPERTY (TROUGH ITS PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT NONE OF THIS PERSONAL PROPERTY WAS CONTRABAND FORE ONE REASON OR ANOTHER).

(E) IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEFENDANTS CDCR AND L.E. SCRIBNER'SPOLICIES ON APPEAL OF "LOSS OR DESTRUCTION" OF "PROPERTY" (i.e., CDC CCR RULE § 3193(b) AND CORCORAN'S OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE #806), PLAINTIFF IN FACT FILED DAY DECEMBER 21, 2004 (DATED DECEMBER 20, 2004) AN ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE (i.e., A CDC 602 FORM "APPEAL") ASSERTING EACH OF THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS REGARDING BOTH PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY AND LEGAL MATERIALS CONFISCATED.

(F) WHEN PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED HIS APPEAL DATED DECEMBER 20, 2004 REGARDING HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS, PLAINTIFF FILED A COPY WITH THE APPEALS COORDINATOR'S OFFICE (DEFENDANT JONATHAN BUCKLEY) AND A COPY WITH DEFENDANT L.E. SCRIBNER'S OFFICE OF THE WARDEN. ATTACHED THERETO, PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED A CDC FORM GA-22 "INMATEREQUEST FOR INTERVIEW" EXPLICITLY REQUESTING THAT THE PROPERTY "APPEAL" BE PROCESSED PURSUANT TO CDCR CCR RULE § 3084.3(a) BECAUSE INSTITUTIONAL. "CORRECTIONAL STAFF IS APPLYING THEIR OWN DISCRETION WHEN AND WHEN NOT TO PROCESS INMATES ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCES."

(G) ON DECEMBER 29, 2004, DEFENDANT JONATHAN BUCKLEY (CORCORAN'S APPEALS COORDINATOR'S OFFICE) SIMPLY RETURNED PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL UN-PROCESS, UN-ADDRESSED, OR UN-RESPONDED TO PLAINTIFF GA-22 REQUEST.

(H) ON DECEMBER 29, 2004, PLAINTIFF THEN SENT (INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MAIL) COPIES OF THE APPEAL (i.e., THE ORIGINAL APPEAL (RETURNED) AND A COPY) TO BOTH THE APPEALS COORDINATOR'S OFFICE (DEFENDANT JONATHAN BUCKLEY), AND DEFENDANT L.E. SCRIBNER'S WARDEN OFFICE, AND A COPY WAS SENT TO DEFENDANT C10 TORRES IN R R PROPERTY ROOM.

(I) FOLLOWING PLAINTIFF SUBMITTING THE DECEMBER 20, 2004 DATED APPEAL REGARDING THE PERSONAL PROPERTY "CONFISCATED" AND LEGAL MATERIAL PROPERTY BEING "CONFISCATED" AND PLACED IN INSTITUTIONAL "STORAGE" (AS PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY APPEAL WARNED THAT THE NOTICE OF PROPERTY "DISPOSAL" WAS SET FOR "JANUARY 12, 2008"), THATNEITHER DEFENDANT BUCKLEY OR DEFENDANT SCRIBNER ELECTED TO RESPOND TO (WHEN DEFENDANT BUCKLEY'S OFFICE DECIDED TO SIMPLY RETURN THE APPEAL WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIVING). PLAINTIFF HAVE NOT RECEIVE ANY RESPOND FROM PLAINTIFF'S SUBMITTED FOR FILING "APPEAL" CONCERNING HIS CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND OR LEGAL MATERIALS PUT IN "STORAGE".

(J) ON JANUARY 12, 2005, PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED AS CONTRABAND WAS "DISPOSED" OF, AND PLAINTIFF HAVE NEVER SEEN HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY AGAIN, NOR HAS PLAINTIFF EVER COMPENSATED FOR HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED BY DEFENDANT C10 TORRES ON DECEMBER 12, 2004.

(K) PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS HAS BEEN VIOLATED BY DEFENDANTS CDCR, L.E. SCRIBNER, JONATHAN BUCKLEY AND C10 TORRES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE DECEMBER 12, 2004 DATED "R R MAIL-OUTDISPOSAL NOTICE" ALLOWED PLAINTIFF ONLY THIRTY (30) DAYS TO PRODUCE "$23.31" WHICH IS FAR LESS THAN THE POLICIES TO "APPEAL" THE DECEMBER 12, 2004 PROPERTY SITUTION. AS THE CONTRASINGPOLICIES CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE, CDCR CCR RULE §§ 3084.1(a) 3084.6 et seq., 3193(b), DOM 54100.12 AND CORCORAN'S OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE #806. VII. (18) (CONFISCATED PROPERTY APPEALED BY INMATES WILL NOT BE "MAILED-OUT" UNTIL THE APPEAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED, REVIEWED AND/OR A SUPERVISOR DETERMINES THE PROPERTY BEING APPEALED CLEARLY VIOLATES THIS PROCEDURE (UNAUTHORITED, EXCESSIVE, OR IS CONTRABAND)).

(L) PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY THE "VAGUE AND OVERBROAD" POLICY IN THE "R R MAIL-OUT DISPOSAL NOTICE" BECAUSE THIS POLICY CREATES NO STANDARD TO GUIDE THE DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS REGARDING DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY ESPECIALLY WHEN APPEALED, SO AS TO PREVENT ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY LAW ENFOREMENT BY DEPARTMENTAL PEACE OFFICE STAFF MEMBERS.

RELIEF SOUGHT

(A) A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTS, POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONDUCT DESCRIBED HEREIN VIOLATES PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION(S).

(B) A PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION WHICH:

(1) REQUIRES DEFENDANT(S) TO "CEASE AND DESIST" ITS/THEIR VIOLATIONS OF "ACCESS TO THE COURTS";

(2) REQUIRES DEFENDANT(S) TO "CEASE AND DESIST" ITS/THEIR VIOLATIONS OF STEALING INMATES PROPERTY;

(3) REQUIRES DEFENDANT(S) TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COURT TO ANSWER THE CHARGES ALLEGED HEREIN;

(4) PROHIBIT DEFENDANT(S), THEIR AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, SUCCESSORS IN INTERESTS AND ALL OTHER PERSONS IN CONCERT OR PARTICIPATION WITH THEM, FROM HARASSING, THREATENING, INTIMIDATING, PUNISHING OR RETALIATING IN ANY WAY AGAINST PLAINTIFF BECAUSE HE FILED THIS ACTION OR AGAINST ANY OTHER PRISONERS AND/OR NON-PRISONERS BECAUSE THEY SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS IN THIS CASE ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF;

(5) REQUIRES DEFENDANT(S) AND EACH OF THEM, TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF AND OTHERS, INCLUDING PRISONERS TO:

A) ENGAGE IN ANY ORAL OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION WHICH IS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF THIS SUIT, INCLUDING THE PRE-PARATION OF AFFIDAVITS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF; AND;

B) TO CONFER WITH JAILHOUSE LAWYERS AND PREPARE LEGAL PAPERS, AND TO DO ANYTHING ELSE, CONSISTENT WITH PRISON SECURITY, WHICH IS REASONABLY CONNECTED WITH THE CONDUCT OF THIS SUIT;

(C) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF THREE-HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS FROM EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS.

(D) PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF FIVE-HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS.

(E) ORDER THAT A SPECIAL MASTER BE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF BOTH "ACCESS TO THE COURTS" AND "STEALIONG INMATES 'PROPERTY'" THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER POLICIES, AND THE OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.

(F) TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUE TRIABLE BY JURY.

(G) THAT AN ATTORNEY BE APPOINTED TO HANDLE THIS MATTER IN PLAINTIFF'S BEHALF.

(H) PLAINTIFF'S COURT COST OF THIS SUIT.

(I) SUCH OTHER AND FURTHER RELIEF AS THIS COURT MAY DEEM JUST, PROPER AND EQUITABLE.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL

[C.C.P. SEC. 446 § 201.5; 28 U.S.C. SEC. 1746]

I, DANNY JAMES COHEA DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT: I AM THE PLAINTIFF IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION: I HAVE READ THE FOREGOING DOCUMENTS AND KNOW THE CONTENTS THEREOF AND THE SAME IS TRUE OF MY OWN KNOWLEDGE, EXCEPT AS TO MATTERS STATED THEREIN UPON INFORMATION, AND BELIEF, AND AS TO THOSE MATTERS, I BELIEVE THEM TO BE TRUE.

EXECUTED THIS 21ST DAY OF: MARCH 2007 AT CALIPATRIA STATE PRISON, CALIPATRIA, CALIFORNIA #92233-5002 SIGNATURE Danny James Cokea

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL [C.C.P. SEC. 1013(a) 2015.5; 28 U.S.C. SEC. 1746]

ON MARCH 24 2007 I SERVED THE FOREGOING: COHEA N. COCR, et seq., CIVIL RIGHTS ACT COMPLAINT 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(SET FORTH EXACT TITLE OF DOCUMENTS SERVED)

OFFICE OF THE CLERK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1130 "O" STREET, #5000 FRESNO, CA. 93721

THERE IS DELIVERY SERVICE BY UNITED STATES MAIL AT THE PLACE SO ADDRESSED, AND THERE IS REGULAR COMMUNICATION BY MAIL BETWEEN THE PLACE OF MAILING AND THE PLACE SO ADDRESSED.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.MARCH 24 2007 DANNY JAMES COHEA DECLARANTIPRISONER

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING FORM USM-285

an answer to the complaint which is served on you with this summons, within 20 days after service of this summons on you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. Any answer that you serve on the parties to this action must be filed with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of time after service. RETURN OF SERVICE (PRINT) Check one box below to indicate appropriate method of service STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES DECLARATION OF SERVER