Opinion
No. 4:20-cv-00166-JEG-SBJ
2021-07-30
Jared CLINTON, Plaintiff, v. Ryan GARRETT, Brian Minnehan, and Ryan Steinkamp, Individually and in Their Official Capacity as a Law Enforcement Officers for the Des Moines, Iowa Police Department; Dana Wingert, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police for the Des Moines, Iowa Police Department; and City of Des Moines, Iowa, Defendants.
Gina Messamer, Jessica Donels, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff. Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders, Des Moines City Attorney Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Ryan Garrett, Brian Minnehan, Ryan Steinkamp, City of Des Moines, Iowa.
Gina Messamer, Jessica Donels, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders, Des Moines City Attorney Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Ryan Garrett, Brian Minnehan, Ryan Steinkamp, City of Des Moines, Iowa.
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JAMES E. GRITZNER, Senior Judge
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, requesting that the Court find Defendants liable on each Count in his Petition, which Defendants resist. Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 35, seeking dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims, which Plaintiff resists. Plaintiff requested a hearing on his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 6, ECF No. 26. The Court has considered Plaintiff's request and, upon review of the record and ample briefing, finds oral argument is unnecessary. The cross-motions for summary judgment are fully submitted and ready for disposition.
Also, before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Exclude two affidavits filed by Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 56, which Plaintiff resists.
I. BACKGROUND
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Michael v. Trevena, 899 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 2018). "Where a court confronts cross motions for summary judgment, the court views the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff when considering defendant's motion, and the court views the record in the light most favorable to defendant when considering plaintiff's motion." Thompson-Harbach v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 359 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614 (N.D. Iowa 2019) (citation omitted). The facts set forth in this section are either undisputed by the parties or, where genuinely disputed, appropriately attributed to the party advancing the allegation.
On October 3, 2019, Plaintiff Jared Clinton was driving eastbound on University Avenue near the intersection of 17th Street in Des Moines, Iowa. Des Moines Police Department (DMPD) officers Ryan Garrett, Brian Minnehan, and Ryan Steinkamp were on patrol nearby, riding together in Garrett's marked police vehicle. At their depositions, Defendants Garrett and Minnehan testified that as Clinton's vehicle passed the patrol car, a passenger in the front seat sat up quickly from a reclined position and looked at the officers in a manner that appeared nervous. Both officers testified that this movement caught their attention. They began to follow Clinton.
In addition to their observations of his passenger's movements, the officers noted Clinton's vehicle was not affixed with permanent license plates. Iowa law generally requires motorists to display front and rear license plates. See Iowa Code § 321.37. However, an exception exists for newly purchased vehicles:
A vehicle may be operated upon the highways of [Iowa] without registration plates for a period of forty-five days after the date of delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser from a dealer if a card bearing the words "registration applied for" is attached on the rear of the vehicle. The card shall have plainly stamped or stenciled the registration number of the dealer from whom the vehicle was purchased and the date of delivery of the vehicle.
Id. § 321.25(1). Operating a vehicle without valid registration plates or a temporary paper registration tag is a simple misdemeanor. Id. § 321.98(2). Falsification of a temporary tag is likewise unlawful. See id. §§ 321.100, 714.8(11).
A properly completed temporary registration tag was taped in Clinton's rear window. However, the officers were unable to read any information on the tag from their position behind Clinton's vehicle. According to Officer Minnehan, "mostly it [was] the angle of the back wind-shield and then the glare from the sun" that made the tag unreadable. Minnehan Dep. 17–Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 59, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Garrett similarly testified that "there was no way to tell" whether the piece of paper in Clinton's window was blank or not blank. Garrett Dep. 35–Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 47, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Steinkamp testified about his previous experiences with drivers placing counterfeit or blank documents in the windows of unregistered vehicles to mimic temporary registration tags. A traffic stop was initiated "to verify that the paper tag was legitimate." Minnehan Case Summ. Report 1–Defs.’ App. 11, ECF No. 35-1.
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Minnehan was able to read Clinton's temporary tag and verify that it was not expired. Officer Garrett went to Clinton's window and asked whether the car was titled in Clinton's name. Clinton asked Officer Garrett to explain why he had been stopped, and Garrett answered, "I'm pulling you over because I was just checking up on your ID tag, OK?" Garrett Body Cam. at 2:50–3:00. Officer Steinkamp explained to Clinton that the DMPD "get[s] a lot of [temporary registration tags] that are fraudulent. We don't know that until we verify it. That's why we pulled you over." Steinkamp Body Cam. at 5:20–5:50. Officer Minnehan told Clinton that he had been stopped because the officers couldn't "read [his] paper tag" and added that Clinton had first attracted their attention when his passenger "looked at [them] real hard, like [he was] super nervous." Minnehan Body Cam. at 22:00–22:30.
According to Defendants, Officer Garrett recognized the smell of marijuana emanating from somewhere inside Clinton's vehicle during the traffic stop and noticed what he believed to be evidence of marijuana on Clinton's person. Clinton told the officers he had been smoking marijuana in the same clothing earlier that day. The officers searched the car and its occupants and discovered a vape pen alleged to contain THC. Clinton was arrested and charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(5). After his arrest, Clinton spent roughly four hours in jail. The criminal case was dismissed without prejudice after Clinton filed a Motion to Suppress and the State filed a Notice of Intent Not to Prosecute.
On May 18, 2020, Clinton filed a Petition in the Iowa District Court for Polk County against Officers Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp, alleging violations of his state and federal constitutional rights, and against the City and Chief Wingert on theories of vicarious liability. His Petition also pleads claims against the officers for conspiracy to violate his state and federal rights. Defendants removed the case based on federal question jurisdiction and subsequently filed their answer. Defendants contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Clinton contends the Court should grant him summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability on his claims and set this matter for trial on the issue of damages.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ " Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). To overcome such a showing, the nonmovant must "set out ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). A genuine issue for trial requires more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). Instead, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court views the facts presented on summary judgment in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
A. Count I - Clinton's Fourth Amendment Claim
Count I of Clinton's Petition seeks to hold Officers Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp individually liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Clinton's Fourth Amendment rights by stopping his vehicle without reasonable suspicion. Clinton's Petition also asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by "extending the stop beyond what was reasonably necessary to resolve the basis of the stop" and by "searching [Clinton] and his vehicle without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to do so." Petition ¶ 47, ECF No. 1-1. However, Clinton does not pursue those theories in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or in his resistance to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. He focuses exclusively on the constitutionality of the initial stop.
Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity from Clinton's § 1983 claim. "Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit under § 1983 if his ‘conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). To determine whether an officer is shielded by qualified immunity, courts ask two questions: whether "the official violated a statutory or constitutional right," and whether that "right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ). "Unless both of these questions are answered affirmatively, an appellant is entitled to qualified immunity." Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 738–39 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). "[C]ourts are ‘permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.’ " Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). "The plaintiff has the burden to show that his or her right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Kuessner v. Wooten, 987 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) ).
1. Traffic Stop
"A traffic stop is a seizure and must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause." United States v. Martin, 999 F.3d 636, 639 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is determined by "look[ing] at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing [based on his] own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). Even when the factual observations giving rise to an officer's suspicion are mistaken, reasonable suspicion will still be found so long as the officers’ error is objectively reasonable. See United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he validity of a stop depends on whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an objectively reasonable one."). Moreover, so long as the objective facts support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, "any ulterior motivation on the officer's part is irrelevant." United States v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2011) ).
To stop a driver for a suspected registration violation, police must have "articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Several Eighth Circuit decisions have found reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop where the officer's observations provided a particularized basis for believing a motor vehicle was unregistered or a temporary registration tag was falsified. See United States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987, 991 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding reasonable suspicion where an officer "could not determine whether the paper affixed to the rear window of [the] vehicle was in fact a temporary registration card," which was inconsistent with the officer's experience with other tags); United States v. Mendoza, 691 F.3d 954, 956–57 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of suppression based on a temporary tag stop where the officer "credibly testified that she could not read the state of origin of the temporary tag and that she genuinely believed based on her experience that the tag's simple color scheme made it appear like something that could be forged"); United States v. Sanchez, 572 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop where the officer observed a temporary tag on a vehicle without license plates but could not detect the name of an issuing jurisdiction, such that the officer "reasonably suspected that the paper was not an official document"). On the other hand, reasonable suspicion does not exist where police lack particularized reasons to believe a vehicle's registration tag violates the law. The Fourth Amendment does not "permit police officers to randomly stop any car with a temporary tag." United States v. McLemore, 887 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2018).
Upon the requisite analysis of unique facts and circumstances, and resultant evolving legal standards, the foregoing precedent does not authorize police to stop a vehicle for the sole purpose of verifying the authenticity of a temporary registration tag. McLemore, which both Clinton and Defendants discuss at length, is instructive on this point. There, an officer stopped a vehicle with dealer plates due to the officer's inability to read the temporary tag taped inside the rear window. Id. at 863–64. She testified that she did not examine the tag for non-compliance or indicia of falsification because "[she] already had the probable cause, which was a temporary tag." Id. at 864. The district court disagreed, suppressing the evidence discovered during the stop. In affirming suppression, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Givens, Sanchez, and Mendoza, noting that the officer failed to "identify what information she could not see that gave her ... reasonable suspicion of a violation" or even specify what legal requirement she believed the driver had transgressed. Id. at 865–66.
The parties dispute whether McLemore is controlling here. Clinton argues that reasonable suspicion is similarly lacking in this case because the defendant officers testified—consistent with their statements on the scene and in the incident report—that they stopped Clinton's vehicle to verify the illegible information on his temporary registration tag, not because they had a particular reason to think the tag was fraudulent. Clinton stresses that, at his deposition, Officer Garrett testified he would not make the same stop today based on his current knowledge of the law. Garrett Dep. 43–Pl.’s Resist. App. 48, ECF No. 44-3. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that McLemore is distinguishable because Officers Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp "could not make out if [Clinton's] tag in the back window was a registration or a blank piece of paper." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 14, ECF No. 39. They contend the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Givens, Sanchez, and Mendoza are more closely aligned with the facts of this case.
When Clinton asked Officer Garrett to explain why he had been stopped, Garrett answered, "I'm pulling you over because I was just checking up on your ID tag, okay?" Garrett Body Cam. at 2:50–3:00. When Clinton asked again, Officer Garrett stated, "the reason I'm pulling you over is because you have just a tag, OK? So, I have the right to pull you over to make sure that everything matches up, everything's good to go, okay?" Id. at 3:15–3:30. Officers Steinkamp and Minnehan made similar statements at the scene, explaining to Clinton that the officers often encountered fraudulent tags and that they pulled Clinton over to "verify" the registration information. Steinkamp Body Cam. at 5:20–5:50; Minnehan Body Cam. at 22:00–22:30.
Defendants also argue McLemore is distinguishable because "the officers in this case looked at the tag for signs of authenticity within 15 seconds of the stop." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 14, ECF No. 39. However, it is unclear how this conduct occurring after the initiation of the stop bears upon the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion.
Clinton's emphasis on the officers’ own explanations regarding the legal basis for the stop is misplaced. It is well established that an officer's subjective opinion about the constitutionality of a seizure is immaterial to the objective Fourth Amendment analysis. See Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 97–98 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding an "objective basis for [the defendant officer's] reasonable suspicion" regardless of the officer's subjective opinions regarding the basis of detention); United States v. Jones, 990 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e decide whether reasonable suspicion justifies a detention based on all the objective facts, we are not limited by the detaining officer's subjective opinions."). In determining whether a constitutional violation occurred in this case, the Court must assess whether the officers were "aware of particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] suspicion." Givens, 763 F.3d at 989.
Even when viewed through this objective lens, however, the summary judgment record leaves no room for dispute that the officers failed to establish reasonable suspicion of a registration violation before initiating the traffic stop. From their patrol car, the officers could see that Clinton's vehicle lacked permanent license plates and that there was a paper tag in the rear window, although they couldn't make out what, if anything, was written on it. Images from Officer Garrett's dash-mounted camera lend support to Defendants’ assertion that the contents of the tag were not readily apparent from driving distance, but those same images also confirm the document was visible and unmistakably affixed to the rear window of the vehicle, in compliance with Iowa law. Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 16–22, ECF No. 35-1. As Officer Garrett testified, based on previous patrol experience, his suspicion was not that Clinton's vehicle lacked a temporary tag but rather that the tag in the window might be a fake. Garrett Dep. 33–34–Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 45–46, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Garrett further testified "there was no way to tell" what, if anything, was written on the page. Id. at 47. However, he conceded that there was nothing specific about Clinton's tag which led him to believe it was more likely than not to be blank:
Iowa Code § 321.25 requires that a temporary registration tag be "attached on the rear of the vehicle." Iowa Code § 321.25(1). Officer Steinkamp testified to the frequent placement of temporary tags in vehicles’ rear windows. Steinkamp Dep. 8, 18–Defs.’ App. 64, 67, ECF No. 35-1.
Q: In any event, going to this stop, though, you didn't think there was just a blank sheet up in Jared Clinton's page [sic], you just figured there was just a glare there and you couldn't see it?
A: At that time, yes, it was strictly that we couldn't see it. I have been in—not with this case, but I have been in contact where there have been just blank tags there and you would have never known it until you approached.
Id. at 45–46. Officer Garrett admitted to initiating the stop "strictly" because the officers "couldn't see" what was on Clinton's temporary tag and not because of a mistaken, affirmative belief that the tag was blank or fraudulent. It is undeniable and pivotal that the stop in this case was based on the absence of information and not based on a particularized suspicion. See McLemore, 887 F.3d at 866 (finding no reasonable suspicion where the officer "did not identify what information she could not see"). When examined in this fundamental approach, the guidance from McLemore is not so narrow a departure from earlier cases as it may first appear.
The officers’ lack of any particular basis to suspect Clinton's tag was fraudulent distinguishes this case from those in which police have noted something abnormal about a driver's paper registration card. In Givens, for example, an officer stopped a driver after observing his vehicle did not have license plates. Givens, 763 F.3d at 988. The officer had noticed what appeared to be a temporary registration tag in the driver's rear window, but he could not read it "due to the angle of the window and the darkness of the night." Id. After exiting his patrol car and approaching the driver's rear windshield, the officer determined the registration tag was valid. Id. at 988–89. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that in his experience, under those same circumstances, temporary tags were typically legible. Id. at 988. The district court denied the driver's motion to suppress. Id. at 989. In affirming on appeal, the Eighth Circuit held the officer was objectively reasonable "to expect that a properly displayed valid registration card would be readable from his location" and that "[b]ecause he could not decipher any information on the paper affixed to the rear window," he reasonably suspected that the vehicle lacked valid registration. Id. at 990.
The record in this case does not indicate that the officers made any correlation between the legibility of Clinton's temporary tag and its authenticity. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that the officer in Givens acted reasonably when stopping a car with an illegible temporary tag because the officer believed a valid registration tag could be read from a squad car in similar conditions. By contrast, Officer Minnehan testified that, in his experience, whether a temporary tag can be read from a squad car "depends on the situation," like "the tag, ... the vehicle it's affixed to[,] and how it's affixed." Minnehan Dep. 17–18–Defs.’ App. 59–60, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Steinkamp likewise explained that he sees temporary registration tags on a daily basis and that whether they are scrutable from a distance "depends on lighting of the vehicle, tint, [and the] angle of the window .... Every situation is different with these paper tags and how they're placed." Steinkamp Dep. 7–8–Defs.’ App. 63–64, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Steinkamp admitted "it's more of we didn't read it, so [we] [did]n't know what's on it," and when asked "[s]o there's no evidence that's telling you this is forged, right?," he answered, "Correct." Id. at 74. Based on this testimony, Givens is not controlling. Nor can Defendants identify irregularities to the appearance of Clinton's tag that would bring this case under the control of the other temporary tag cases Defendants cite. Cf. Mendoza, 691 F.3d at 957 (finding reasonable suspicion for tag stop where the officer could not detect a jurisdiction of origin and where the tag's color scheme appeared unusual); Sanchez, 572 F.3d at 479 (finding reasonable suspicion where the officer mistakenly but reasonably perceived no issuing jurisdiction on tag).
Defendants argue that additional factors push the totality of the circumstances past the reasonable suspicion threshold. First, they point out that the officers consider the 17th Street and University neighborhood to be a high-crime area due to their knowledge of previous shootings and weapon recoveries at nearby Good Park. "An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime," although it may be a "relevant contextual consideration[ ] in a Terry analysis." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (internal citations omitted) (finding reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention considering suspect's "headlong flight" from officers in an area of heavy narcotics activity). In McLemore, the Eighth Circuit was not swayed by the fact that the stop at issue occurred in "a high crime neighborhood." McLemore, 887 F.3d at 863. Here, too, the Court gives this fact minimal weight in its reasonable suspicion analysis. The record does not suggest the officers believed Clinton was traveling from Good Park or anywhere else in the immediate vicinity. Nor do Defendants contend Clinton was stopped on suspicion of a weapons offense. As such, the officers’ awareness of prior violence in the neighborhood would appear to have no logical connection to the reasonableness of their belief that Clinton was engaged in a violation of Iowa's vehicle registration laws.
Defendants also contend that the body language of Clinton's passenger factors into the reasonable suspicion analysis. According to Officer Steinkamp, DMPD officers are trained to watch people and see how they react to officers. Steinkamp Dep. 53–Defs.’ App. 73, ECF No. 35-1. He described that "in this case, or in other cases for me," he sees people "get real rigid, it's like a deer in the headlights look." Id. Officer Garrett similarly described the reaction of Clinton's passenger as a "deer in the headlights." Garrett Dep. 14–Defs.’ App. 39, ECF No. 35-1. "[N]ervousness combined with several other more revealing facts can generate reasonable suspicion" and "extreme and unusually nervous behavior observed in conjunction with only one or two other facts can generate reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 928 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted) (finding suspect's cracking voice, shaking thumb, and lack of eye contact during traffic stop was insufficient for reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Davison, 808 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding reasonable suspicion for stop where suspect and his companion avoided eye contact with police while walking in a high-crime neighborhood, but also matched the description of persons who had recently operated a stolen truck). Yet, a nervous reaction to police presence, without more, is insufficient to generate reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998) ("It certainly cannot be deemed unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer."). A lone look cannot support a stop in this case and receives de minimis weight in the Court's cumulative reasonable suspicion assessment.
The record before the Court contains no facts to support a finding that the officers had a particularized suspicion that the paper affixed to Clinton's window was fake or fraudulent or that Clinton's vehicle was otherwise in violation of Iowa's registration requirements. Nor are the other facts argued by Defendants of material weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis. As the officers told Clinton at the scene, they stopped him because they suspected a closer look at his tag might reveal a violation, not because they reasonably believed his vehicle was unregistered or the tag was invalid. Conducting an investigatory stop on a mere hunch violates the Fourth Amendment. See Kansas v. Glover, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020) (reasoning that although the reasonable suspicion standard requires less proof of wrongdoing than the probable cause standard, "a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion" (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) )).
Defendants invoke Iowa Administrative Code r. 761-400.19 as further support for the reasonableness of the officers’ stop. In relevant part, that regulation requires vehicle owners to present a certificate of title, registration receipt, or bill of sale to a peace officer upon request. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-400.19(3). It is unclear how Defendants allege Clinton violated this rule prior to being stopped, and so it is immaterial to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
The foregoing disciplined legal analysis compels the conclusion that a constitutional violation has occurred. Thus, the Court proceeds to the next step in the qualified immunity inquiry.
2. Clearly Established Right
Having found a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers performed the stop on Clinton, the Court must turn to the other prong of the qualified immunity test: whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. "A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ). To meet this standard, the constitutional rule in question must be "dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority." District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42, 131 S.Ct. 2074 ). "It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent"—rather, the "precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply." Id. at 590 (citing Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664, 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088 ).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (collecting cases). Rather, "the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case. Otherwise, ‘[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.’ " White v. Pauly, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). Determining whether a right is clearly established requires "identify[ing] a case where [the official] acting under similar circumstances ... was held to have violated [a Constitutional right]." Id. Here, Defendants argue that the officers are immune because "the constitutional right to drive with an indiscernible piece of paper in the window, combined with displayed nervousness of a passenger in a high-crime neighborhood is not clearly established." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 16–17, ECF No. 39. While Clinton contends such specificity "borders on absurd," Pl.’s Resist. Br. 26, ECF No. 53, Defendants’ formulation honors the requirement that discussion of Clinton's Fourth Amendment right be carefully tethered to the facts of his stop. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. 305 (noting for purposes of qualified immunity that defining the violated right with "specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts" (internal quotation and alteration omitted)).
Even when construed at the level of specificity Defendants advocate, Clinton's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable temporary tag stop was clearly established at the time of this incident. Prior to October 3, 2019, the Eighth Circuit had unambiguously held that police may not stop a vehicle on suspicion of an Iowa Code § 321.25 violation just because an officer is "unable to see the letters or numbers on the paper plate from [her] vehicle," despite being observed in a "high-crime" neighborhood. McLemore, 887 F.3d at 863, 866. The only factor advanced by Defendants that is not addressed in McLemore is the nervous body language of Clinton's passenger, and perceived nervousness has been deemed inadequate to support suspicion absent "several other more revealing facts." Jones, 269 F.3d at 928 ; see also Beck, 140 F.3d at 1139. Defendants themselves acknowledge that "nervousness alone may not be the basis of reasonable suspicion." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 15, ECF No. 39. While the Court is mindful that the reasonable suspicion standard looks to the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable officer would expect unrelated, innocuous facts to total more than the sum of their parts—especially in this case, where Defendants offer no explanation as to why the officers’ faulty suspicion of a registration violation would have been bolstered by the perceived nervous expression of Clinton's passenger. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1137 ("[I]t is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation." (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997) )).
In their brief in support of summary judgment, Defendants contend that McLemore’s applicability to the facts of Clinton's stop was not clearly established because officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan—unlike the officer in McLemore—"could not make out if the tag in the back window was a registration or a blank piece of paper." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 14, ECF No. 39. However, this argument is flatly contradicted by Officer Garrett's deposition testimony, which concedes the officers did not conduct the stop because they thought it "was just a blank sheet" in the window but did so "strictly" because they "couldn't see it." See Garrett Dep. 33–Defs.’ App. 45, ECF No. 35-1. Additionally, Officer Minnehan's narrative report from the incident recounts, "[w]e initiated a traffic stop in the 1300 block of Keo to verify that the paper tag was legitimate. " Minnehan Case Summ. Report 1–Defs.’ App. 11, ECF No. 35-1 (emphasis added). Defendants’ argument is further undermined by DMPD internal communication to officers regarding the impact of the McLemore decision. See infra § II(A)(3).
To be sure, Officer Steinkamp testified that in his training and experience, a suspect's nervous expression at the sight of police could indicate "anything from a suspended driver ... [to] illegal narcotics warrants." Steinkamp Dep. 53–Defs.’ App. 73, ECF No. 35-1. However, nowhere do Defendants argue that Clinton was stopped for any reason other than a suspected registration violation, and nowhere do they suggest that the apparent nervousness of Clinton's passenger intensified the officers’ belief that Clinton was engaged in a violation of Iowa's temporary registration rules. McLemore is again instructive. There, police had a hunch the car they stopped was involved in criminal activity unrelated to its temporary registration card, having previously tied it to a known gang member and more recently seen the car depart a residence affiliated with gang activity. See McLemore, 887 F.3d at 863. These extra observations did not factor into the Court of Appeals’ reasonable suspicion analysis. See id. at 865–67. As such, a reasonable officer would not interpret McLemore to suggest reasonable suspicion for a temporary tag stop could be achieved through an observation of unrelated suspicious behavior.
Pointing to authority outside the Eighth Circuit, Defendants contend that whether reasonable suspicion existed under the circumstances of Clinton's stop is unsettled among federal courts. This contention is without merit. McLemore is binding precedent in this circuit that preceded Clinton's stop by eighteen months. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (explaining that a plaintiff attacking qualified immunity may cite to "controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident" to show a clearly established rule). In any event, the cases Defendants cite do not show that the officers were operating against a "hazy legal back-drop" when they conducted the stop. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 14, 136 S.Ct. 305. Each of the out-of-circuit cases cited by Defendants features an articulable fact about the way a driver's temporary tag was displayed, which led police to believe they had witnessed a registration violation under applicable state law. See, e.g., United States v. Crooks, 337 F. App'x 159, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (finding reasonable suspicion where, prior to making a traffic stop, the officer ran the suspect's temporary tag through the Criminal Justice Information System, which reported a different, lapsed expiration date); United States v. Daniels, 265 F. App'x 219, 220–22 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam) (finding reasonable suspicion where the temporary tag was obscured from view in violation of Texas law); United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion where state trooper "initiated the stop because he was not even able to determine whether the defendant's car had a temporary tag"); United States v. Poke, 81 F. App'x 712, 713–715 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer "testified at the suppression hearing that he was not able to see even an outline of the temporary tag" until he approached the vehicle with a flashlight"); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding reasonable suspicion where "van did not comply with [state law] because its tinted windows obscured the temporary registration tag"). Contrary to Defendants’ contention, in each of these cases the courts held that police had particularized suspicion that the driver failed to adhere to temporary registration laws.
Defendants also argue that the lack of reasonable suspicion for Clinton's stop was not clearly established because Iowa's temporary registration statute leaves room for police to interpret whether an illegible tag displays "plainly stamped or stenciled" vehicle information. Defs.’ Summ J. Reply 1, ECF No. 57-1 (quoting Iowa Code § 321.25 ) (emphasis in briefing). This contention, raised for the first time in Defendants’ Reply, fails. The Eighth Circuit addressed the same issue in McLemore, holding it "is not reasonable to construe the requirement of ‘plainly stamped or stenciled’ information in § 321.25 as meaning information that can be read from a pursuing officer's police cruiser." McLemore, 887 F.3d at 867 (citing State v. Carmo dy, No. 13-0237, 2013 WL 5949621, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished table decision)). The officers were therefore on notice that their inability to read a temporary tag from driving distance could not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion for a violation of Iowa Code § 321.25. Under the unique and pivotal facts of this case, the Court must conclude Clinton's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was clearly established by controlling authority.
3. Errant Training
Defendants next contend that the officers must be excused from liability under § 1983 because their conduct was consistent with the legal guidance they received from a county prosecutor during a law enforcement training session several months prior to Clinton's stop. Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan assert that in early 2019, they attended a Summer Enforcement Team training at which they recall Assistant Polk County Attorney Jordan Roling leading a discussion on temporary tag stops. Apparently, the officers left this training with the impression that they could lawfully stop a motorist to investigate an illegible registration tag. Officer Steinkamp testified:
The way I was explained is when stopping a vehicle for a paper tag you have to basically – when you stop a car for
paper tag you go up, verify the tag's good. If it's good, and you verify it with the VIN, the stop is ended.
....
So, essentially, if you can't read a paper tag and you can't see any part of it, you can stop it, verify it's legitimate, confirm it.
Steinkamp Dep. 7–Defs.’ App. 63, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Minnehan testified that it was his understanding if "you could observe a piece of paper but couldn't read it on the back window, you had probable cause to stop the vehicle." Minnehan Dep. 9–Defs.’ App. 52–53, ECF No. 35-1. Officer Garrett testified that "if you observed a tag you could ... stop the vehicle, verify VIN, dates, and all that information with the paperwork." Garrett Dep. 9–Defs.’ App. 37, ECF No. 35-1. Mr. Roling, who is not a party but was deposed by Clinton in connection with this case, recalled participating in an informal training session with the officers’ DMPD patrol unit, but he could not remember whether temporary tag stops were even discussed. Clinton denies the accuracy of the officer's recollections, although he ultimately argues it is immaterial whether they were misinformed about the relevant law because the officers did not seek out specific legal advice regarding the application of Fourth Amendment principles in Clinton's case.
Whether a right is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity is an objective inquiry that does not generally look to the official's personal familiarity with the law. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19, 102 S.Ct. 2727. "Nevertheless, if the official ... claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained." Id. at 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727. "[O]ne possible extraordinary circumstance may be where the defendant seeks the advice of counsel before acting." Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see also Nord, 757 F.3d at 747 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) ("[R]eliance on counsel's advice may be a factor in the qualified immunity analysis ...." (citing Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 399 (8th Cir. 1995) )). However, "the advice of counsel alone will not satisfy an official's burden of acting reasonably." Watertown, 830 F.2d at 1495 (citing Wentz v. Klecker, 721 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1983) ). "[A]n attorney's advice cannot transform ... patently unlawful activity into objectively reasonable conduct." Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App'x 523, 532 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (finding qualified immunity applied where officers consulted and received approval from prosecutor to make arrest during traffic stop).
Here, extraordinary circumstances do not excuse the officers’ failure to follow clearly established law. Even assuming the officers had been provided incorrect training on the law regarding illegible registration tags, it was not objectively reasonable for them to assume this general instruction would be applicable in every case. The officers knew probable cause and reasonable suspicion are fact-intensive standards that depend upon the cumulative observations of police in any given encounter. See, e.g., Minnehan Dep. 55–Defs.’ App. 74, ECF No. 35-1 (acknowledging cause for a stop is dependent upon multiple "contributing factor[s]"); Garrett Dep. 42–Pl.’s Reply App. 5, ECF No. 55 (discussing reasonable suspicion factors for Clinton's stop as cumulative in nature). They are not entitled to avoid the case-by-case application of clearly established Fourth Amendment principles by relying on a convenient rule of thumb. Furthermore, the Court does not agree that Mr. Roling's instruction constitutes "advice of counsel." Unlike the decisions cited by Defendants, this is not a situation where the officers sought Mr. Roling's input about the specific facts to which they were confronted prior to acting. Cf. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 742 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding a deputy was entitled to qualified immunity where, among other factors, the deputy had consulted an assistant district attorney prior to removing children from the plaintiff's custody pursuant to a court order); Wentz, 721 F.2d at 247–48 (considering as a factor in granting qualified immunity that, before denying a due process hearing to a terminated employee, a supervisor consulted with an attorney as to whether a hearing was required).
The most glaring failure of Defendants’ extraordinary circumstances argument is that the record reveals the officers received on-point legal advice specifically denouncing the precise conduct at issue in this case. On May 4, 2018, the DMPD's legal advisor issued a training bulletin discussing the impact and required response to the Eighth Circuit's McLemore decision and attaching a copy of the case. May 4, 2018 DMPD Training Bulletin No. 18-1–Defs.’ App. 87–94; ECF No. 35-1. The first sentence of the two-page bulletin instructed that officers "have no reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for violation of Iowa Code § 321.25 (temporary registration card requirements) if your only basis for the stop is that you can't read the temporary card from your patrol vehicle." Id. It is undisputed that this bulletin was issued to all Des Moines police officers. Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Stmt. Add'l Facts ¶ 8, ECF No. 57-2. Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan each recall receiving the DMPD legal advisor's periodic training bulletins, although none of them could recall specifically reading the bulletin on McLemore. Minnehan Dep. 10–Defs.’ App. 54, Steinkamp Dep. 45–Defs.’ App. 68–69, ECF No. 35-1; Garrett Dep. 27–28–Pl.’s Resist. App. 44–45, ECF No. 44-3. The officers cannot reasonably assert that they "neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard" for temporary tag stops when a more careful review of the training materials they received may well have averted their misunderstanding. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727. Because there was no extraordinary circumstance excusing the officers’ violation of Clinton's clearly established Fourth Amendment right, qualified immunity must be denied.
4. Individual Liability
For the reasons set forth above, the record presents no genuine dispute of material fact bearing on Clinton's entitlement to relief on his § 1983 claim. Whether each of the three officers named by Clinton is liable for this violation presents a separate question. "[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity requires an individualized analysis of each officer's alleged conduct." S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 2014) ). "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Triplett v. Azordegan, 570 F.2d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 1978) ("A defendant will not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he was personally involved in causing the deprivation of a constitutional right.").
Defendants raise no argument that the involvement of Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan in Clinton's stop is distinguishable when it comes to evaluating their liability for the constitutional violation that occurred, and the record offers no facts persuading the Court that the unique actions of one or more of these officers limits his liability toward Clinton. Although Officer Garrett was the one to signal Clinton to pull over and to first speak with Clinton at his window, Officers Steinkamp and Minnehan also participated in the stop by exiting the patrol car, approaching Clinton's vehicle, and keeping post near Clinton's passenger doors in a manner clearly telegraphing that the car's occupants were not free to leave. As the stop progressed, Officers Steinkamp and Minnehan also assisted in the restraint and search of Clinton, his passengers, and their car. Furthermore, according to Officer Minnehan's deposition testimony, the three officers expressly discussed their inability to read Clinton's temporary tag as they followed Clinton's vehicle. See Pl.’s Summ. J. App. 53, ECF No. 58. Officer Minnehan did not indicate that he or either of his partners voiced dissent to the basis for the proposed traffic stop. See id. For these reasons, there is no genuine dispute as to each of the defendant officers’ personal participation in the violation of Clinton's Fourth Amendment rights. Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan are each individually liable on Clinton's § 1983 claim.
B. Count II - Clinton's State Constitution Claim
1. Constitutional Violation
Count II of Clinton's Petition alleges Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan violated his rights under Article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution based on the same factual circumstances as his § 1983 claim. Like the Fourth Amendment, Article I, § 8 prohibits "unreasonable seizures and searches" of persons, houses, papers and effects. Iowa plaintiffs may pursue a direct cause of action against state officials for violations of state constitutional rights, provided the applicable constitutional provision is self-executing and no adequate statutory remedy is available. See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017). Godfrey acknowledged "the thoroughly well settled principle that violation of article I, section 8 gives rise to a cause of action." Id. at 862 ; see also Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin II), 915 N.W.2d 259, 275–78 (Iowa 2018) (collecting pre- Godfrey cases recognizing a right of action under Article I, § 8 and discussing the limits of liability for such claims).
Despite its nearly identical language, the Iowa Supreme Court has occasionally read Article I, § 8 to confer distinct and more expansive rights than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2015) ; State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 782 & n.10 (Iowa 2011) ; State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 284–85 (Iowa 2010). With respect to the requirement that police develop objective reasonable suspicion of a law violation prior to making a traffic stop, Article I, § 8 is, at the very least, "coextensive with the Fourth Amendment." State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 854 (Iowa 2019) (aligning with federal precedent to find an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant to reasonableness of a traffic stop under Article I, § 8 ); see also State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 2013) (resolving to "apply the general standards as outlined by the United States Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge under the Iowa Constitution" in finding officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for its tinted license plate cover).
Iowa's appellate courts have on many occasions considered the circumstances in which police have conducted traffic stops for suspected violations of Iowa's temporary tag provision § 321.25. Like the Eighth Circuit, the Iowa Court of Appeals has also held that such seizures must be based on particularized suspicion that a vehicle's temporary registration tag is altered, missing, or otherwise in violation of Chapter 321.25. See State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 681–82 (Iowa 2005) (per curiam) (finding reasonable suspicion supported stop where deputy failed to detect any registration tag on the defendant's vehicle and reasoning that, but for deputy's reasonable mistake of fact, "he undoubtedly would have had probable cause to stop Lloyd's car" for a registration violation); State v. Andrews, 705 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 2005) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where the record presented "no evidence suggesting that a reasonable police officer observing the card in the [defendant's] window would conclude the ‘in transit’ sign complied with the requirements of section 321.25"); State v. Knight, 853 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (finding reasonable suspicion for stop where officer errantly believed the vehicle lacked a temporary tag, only to find one displayed in the darkly tinted rear window after initiating the stop and pointing a spotlight toward the vehicle (citing Lloyd, 701 N.W. 2d at 681–82 ; and Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 297 )); State v. Hollie, 854 N.W.2d 695, 696, 699 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (finding "officer had no specific and articulable facts upon which to reasonably believe criminal activity was afoot" where she explained her sole reason for stopping vehicle with temporary tag was because drivers "alter those all the time so we pull them over just to make sure"); Carmody, 2013 WL 5949621, at *2 (finding suppression warranted due to a lack of reasonable suspicion where an officer stopped a car due to the illegibility of its temporary tag but did not "assert the card was irregular," "articulated no mistake of fact," and conceded it was not unusual for a temporary tag to be illegible at driving distance); State v. Corry, No. 08-0858, 2009 WL 141201, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2009) (finding reasonable suspicion based on objectively reasonable mistake of fact where officer "had not observed the temporary paper plates in the windows of the defendant's vehicle prior to initiating the traffic stop").
Defendants acknowledge Hollie and Carmody as adverse authority but discount them as non-precedential. However, both Iowa Court of Appeals decisions concern traffic stops identical to Clinton's in all relevant respects and rely upon the reasonable suspicion jurisprudence of the Iowa Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court. See Hollie, 854 N.W.2d at 699 (quoting Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 292 (quoting in turn Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391 )); Carmody, 2013 WL 5949621, at *2 (same). Hollie and Carmody are highly persuasive, and Defendants’ attempts to distinguish the facts of these cases fare no better than they do with Clinton's § 1983 claim. The Court finds no reason to believe Article I, § 8 confers less protection than the Fourth Amendment when it comes to the demands of reasonable suspicion. A temporary tag stop must be based on "specific and articulable facts" that a violation of Iowa Code § 321.25 is afoot. Hollie, 854 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) ).
Defendants inaccurately refer to Hollie as an unreported case. Although Hollie was originally listed as a table decision, See State v. Hollie, No. 12-0727, 2013 WL 3291861 (Iowa Ct. App. June 26, 2013), it was later published in full at 854 N.W.2d 695.
Defendants cite Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983), in support of the proposition that "Iowa does not apply the same onus of probable cause or reasonable suspicion in civil actions as it would in a suppression case." Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 21, ECF No. 39. Burton was a tort case discussing the standard for an officer's affirmative defense to a claim of false arrest. Defendants have raised no case suggesting the Iowa Supreme Court would depart from its established reasonable suspicion standards in determining for purposes of a Godfrey action whether a violation of Article I, § 8 has occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no genuine factual dispute that the officers’ stop also violated Clinton's state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
2. Due Care Immunity
As with Clinton's § 1983 claim, Defendants assert they are entitled to immunity even if they violated Clinton's state constitutional rights. The Iowa Supreme Court held that qualified immunity could apply to a direct constitutional claim under Godfrey, but that the standard differs from the federal qualified immunity standard. See Baldwin II, 915 N.W.2d at 279 ; see also Wendt v. Iowa, 971 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that in Baldwin II, the Iowa Supreme Court "held that the qualified immunity defense applies to Iowa constitutional claims, but that the standard for it differs from the federal standard"). Baldwin II expressly deviated from Harlow and its successors, reasoning federal qualified immunity doctrine "gives undue weight to[ ] one factor: how clear the underlying constitutional law was." Baldwin II, 915 N.W.2d at 279. Instead, the court described a more "nuanced" approach by which "[f]actual good faith may compensate for a legal error, and factual bad faith may override some lack of clarity in the law." Id. It resolved to set "due care as the benchmark" and concluded that an Iowa official who is sued on a direct constitutional claim "will not be subject to damages liability if she or he pleads and proves as an affirmative defense that she or he exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the law." Id. at 280–81 ; see also Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Baldwin II ).
Iowa's appellate courts have yet to define the precise contours of the "all due care" standard. "When a state's highest court has not decided an issue, it is up to [federal courts] to predict how the state's highest court would resolve that issue." Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay Ctr. Christian Church, 746 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 2014). Studying the Iowa Supreme Court's answers to the questions certified in Baldwin II, then-U.S. District Court Judge Mark W. Bennett discerned that all due care is likely breached when an official acts with "negligence," "bad faith," "malice and lack of probable cause," or a "lack of ‘reasonable ground’ for the conduct in question." Baldwin v. Estherville (Baldwin III), 333 F. Supp. 3d 817, 842–45 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Judge Bennett further predicted that the all due care standard requires an official to take affirmative steps to meet the requirements of the law:
This Court has previously adopted the factors discussed by Judge Bennett in Baldwin III in evaluating the all due care defense. See Davis v. Dawson, No. 19-cv-00382, 2021 WL 2665458, at *9, *24 (S.D. Iowa June 17, 2021) ; Ackerman v. Iowa Workforce Dev., No. 18-cv-363, 2020 WL 9607096, at *29 (S.D. Iowa May 19, 2020).
The distinction [between Baldwin II and Harlow ] appears to me to be between taking reasonable action to ‘conform’ to the requirements of the law, under the Iowa ‘all due care’ qualified immunity standard, and avoiding action one should reasonably know would violate the law, under the Harlow federal qualified immunity standard.
Id. at 843. Another judge in the Northern District of Iowa has similarly interpreted all due care immunity as a more stringent standard than federal qualified immunity. See Ohlson-Townsend v. Wolf, No. 18-CV-4093, 2019 WL 6609695, at *8–9 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 5, 2019) (finding "at a minimum, ... an officer who acted negligently is not entitled to qualified immunity against claims under the Iowa Constitution," whereas under federal law, "a state actor who is merely negligent ... is entitled to qualified immunity" (citing Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1993) )).
For the same reasons they must be denied federal qualified immunity on Clinton's § 1983 claim, Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan must also be denied immunity under state law. The officers stopped Clinton on a theory of reasonable suspicion, which had already been definitively rejected by both state and federal courts. While Baldwin II made clear that all due care is not solely determined by whether the underlying constitutional law was clearly established, this is not a case in which "[f]actual good faith may compensate for a legal error." Baldwin II, 915 N.W.2d at 279. The officers had reason to know that they could not stop a vehicle just for a closer look at a temporary tag because a training bulletin had previously been issued to them admonishing against precisely that kind of stop. They cannot assert they committed a reasonable mistake due to a faulty training session while at the same time admit they declined to review written bulletins provided by their department's own legal advisor. This is "a sloppy study of the laws the officers were duty-bound to enforce" and indicative of negligence, not good faith. Baldwin III, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 845 (declining to resolve whether defendant officers were entitled to all due care immunity but suggesting their mistake of law would not be excused when the officers "had more authoritative resources available to them than each other or other officers or some [h]andbook that purportedly summarized the applicable law statewide").
In arguing that officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan acted with all due care, Defendants put forward email exchanges from early 2020 in which Officer Garrett and other DMPD officers sought clarification from a different county prosecutor regarding the lawfulness of investigatory registration tag stops. They contend these emails show a good faith effort by the officers to correct their understanding of the law. This post-hoc correspondence is of little relevance in evaluating whether Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan were acting with all due care in stopping Clinton. As of October 3, 2019, the officers had failed to take reasonable steps to keep apprised of current case law. They are not entitled to all due care immunity.
Defendants’ argument based on Iowa Administrative Code rule 761–400.19 is likewise unpersuasive to show the officers’ good faith. That regulatory language does not expand the temporary tag requirements of Iowa Code § 321.25 or create any additional ambiguity regarding when police may stop a vehicle for failing to display a registration tag. Rather, the rule requires that a motorist produce evidence of vehicle ownership at an officer's request during an otherwise lawful police encounter. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761–400.19. In any event, Defendants cite to no record evidence suggesting that, at the time of the stop in this case, the officers were under a misimpression that stopping Clinton was authorize by this administrative rule.
C. Counts III and IV - Clinton's Conspiracy Claims
Count III of Clinton's Petition alleges civil conspiracy claims against the individual officers under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Count IV asserts a parallel conspiracy claim under state law. Clinton argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on these claims because he has put forward undisputed evidence that the officers reached an agreement to pull him over due to his illegible registration tag, and because they acted in concert in approaching his car and questioning its occupants. Defendants respond that summary judgment must enter in their favor on Counts III and IV because, among other reasons, there is no evidence the officers were intent upon violating Clinton's state or federal rights when they decided to stop his vehicle.
To make out a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) that the defendants conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt act injured him." Holmes v. Slay, 895 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep't, 810 F.3d 1103, 1109 (8th Cir. 2016) ). Federal district courts have routinely observed that the first element of this claim requires a showing of specific intent. See, e.g., Wooten v. Roach, 431 F. Supp. 3d 875, 902 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (requiring that a § 1983 conspiracy plaintiff show the defendants acted in concert "with the specific intent to violate the [plaintiff's] right"); Dennis v. DeJong, 867 F. Supp. 2d 588, 650 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting a § 1983 conspiracy claim requires a showing of "actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate the right protected"); Crist v. Phelps, 810 F. Supp. 2d 703, 711 (D. Del. 2011) (explaining that in a § 1983 conspiracy case, "there must be evidence of actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate [the plaintiff's] right"); Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 137 F. Supp. 2d 670, 680 (W.D. Va. 2001) ("To make a conspiracy claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show ... actions taken in concert by the defendants with the specific intent to violate the [plaintiff's] right."). Thus, Clinton's § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment unless there is "a possibility the jury could infer from the circumstances a ‘meeting of the minds’ or understanding among the conspirators to achieve the conspiracy's aims"—namely, a violation of Clinton's rights. Bonenberger, 810 F.3d at 1109 (alterations omitted) (quoting White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 816 (8th Cir. 2008) ).
As factual support for his conspiracy claim, Clinton relies exclusively on Officer Minnehan's testimony that the officers discussed their inability to read Clinton's tag and agreed that this would be the basis for their stop. See Pl.’s Summ. J. Br. 26, ECF No. 27-1; Pl.’s App. 53, ECF No. 58. This is far from an admission that the officers agreed specifically to infringe Clinton's constitutional rights. See White, 519 F.3d at 816 (holding that to prevail on their conspiracy claim, plaintiffs "must show evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendants reached an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally guaranteed rights" (citing Larson by Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1458 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc))). To the contrary, Officer Minnehan's testimony indicates the officers’ intent to act constitutionally by discussing their inability to read Clinton's temporary tag and concluding this fact established a law violation. See Minnehan Dep. 23–Pl.’s App. 53, ECF No. 58.
The same is true for Clinton's claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In order to prove the existence of a civil rights conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must show that the defendants conspired "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 684 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Larson, 76 F.3d at 1454 ). The "purpose" element requires "that some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators’ action." Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267–68, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) ); see also Davis, 685 F.3d at 684–85. Clinton's conspiracy theory under § 1985 suffers from the same deficiency as his § 1983 claim. He has cited no facts in the summary judgment record indicative of a racial animus or specific intent by the officers to deprive Clinton of equal protection. A mere consensus by the officers to stop Clinton is not enough, even if that decision violated Clinton's constitutional rights as a matter of law.
Finally, with respect to Count IV, Clinton appears to allege one or more conspiracy claims based upon the officers’ concerted violation of his rights under Article I, §§ 6 and 8 of the Iowa Constitution. However, he has not identified any state authority supporting a direct cause of action against the officers for conspiracy to violate his state constitutional rights, and the Court finds no clear support in Godfrey or its successors. Defendants suggest Clinton's Count IV be construed as a civil conspiracy claim under Iowa tort law. The Iowa Supreme Court defines a civil conspiracy as "a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose not in itself unlawful." Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 171 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 232 (Iowa 1977) ). "The principal element of conspiracy is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons to effect a wrong against or injury upon another." Basic Chems., 251 N.W.2d at 233. Here too, Clinton has put forward no evidence that the officers intended to effect a wrong against him. Their constitutional violation was a result of inattention toward the law. Clinton has failed to show a genuine issue of fact requiring trial for any of his conspiracy theories.
Article I, § 6 is the Iowa analogue to the federal constitution's Equal Protection clause. It provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." Iowa Const. art. I, § 6
D. Counts V and VI – Claims against the City and Chief Wingert
In the final two Counts of his Petition, Clinton asserts claims against the City of Des Moines and Chief Wingert, individually, for "deliberately indifferent policies, practices, customs, training and supervision," invoking § 1983 and various federal and state constitutional provisions. Petition ¶¶ 76-97. In his briefing, Clinton hones Counts V and VI to a theory of vicarious liability under Monell and Iowa Code chapter 670. He argues Chief Wingert and the City must be held liable for his unconstitutional seizure because they encouraged (or at least failed to address) a pattern of similar traffic stops by DMPD officers and because they failed to ensure officers were properly trained with regard to temporary tag stops.
1. Vicarious Liability under Federal Law
"Local governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; see also Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2021). Instead, "[a] municipality may only be liable for a constitutional violation resulting from (1) an official municipal policy; (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) failure to train or supervise." Robbins, 984 F.3d at 681–82.
Government officials are also immune from respondeat superior liability under § 1983 and may be held personally liable only for their own misconduct. S.M., 808 F.3d at 340 (citing Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) ). To establish a claim against an official for failing to train or supervise subordinates, a plaintiff must show the supervisor "1) Received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; 2) Demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the offensive acts; 3) Failed to take sufficient remedial action; and 4) That such failure proximately caused injury to [the plaintiff]." McGuire v. Cooper, 952 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Parrish, 594 F.3d at 1002 ). "Allegations of generalized notice are insufficient." S.M., 808 F.3d at 340.
Clinton seeks to establish liability on the part of the City and Chief Wingert under two different theories. First, he alleges that the City and police chief encouraged a "deliberately indifferent policy practice, and/or custom" by which DMPD officers regularly and unlawfully stopped vehicles with temporary registration tags. Pl.’s Summ. J. Br. 26–27, ECF No. 32. He points to several other DMPD stops, contending they show a pattern of constitutional violations comparable to his case. All but one of these police encounters took place between June 6 and July 22, 2018. Clinton has included in the summary judgment record various material related to these incidents, including video footage, court filings, and, in one instance, deposition testimony taken in connection with another civil rights action. Defendants deny Clinton's characterizations of these stops and variously object to the evidence upon which he relies.
"Policy and custom are not the same thing." Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699–700 (8th Cir. 2016). "[A] ‘policy’ is an official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) ). Clinton articulates no official policy, principle, or procedure which he believes to be at work in this case, other than perfunctorily alleging that "DMPD officers at large had a policy or practice" of making unlawful traffic stops. Pl.’s Reply 9, ECF No. 54. Instead, his argument appears to be that DMPD entertained an unofficial custom of unconstitutional stops amongst its officers. To prevail on this theory, he must demonstrate:
(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to
the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700 (quoting Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014) ).
Clinton's evidence of an unconstitutional custom is anecdotal at best and fails to create a triable issue of fact as to the vicarious liability of the City or Chief Wingert. Even assuming in a light most favorable to Clinton that the traffic stops he presents indicate a widespread and persistent pattern of Fourth Amendment violations, Clinton presents no viable support for his assertion that Chief Wingert or other City officials were aware of this pattern. Citing an online news article, Clinton asks the Court to take judicial notice of the City's settlement of another lawsuit arising from a December 6, 2016 temporary tag stop. However, absent any other details, the fact of this lawsuit is hardly enough for a reasonable jury to find that Chief Wingert or any other City policymakers knew of an unconstitutional trend amidst the DMPD's police encounters. Additionally, although Clinton has put forward six suppression motions filed by various defendants involved in traffic stops due to temporary tags, Officer Minnehan testified that DMPD officers themselves are not always informed of the outcomes of criminal cases that arise from their traffic stops, even when evidence is suppressed due to a Fourth Amendment violation. DMPD leadership cannot reasonably be presumed to know about constitutional challenges that frontline officers do not. In any event, only one of the motions Clinton cites appears to have been judicially resolved. "[A] single incident cannot serve as notice for a pattern of misconduct." Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989) ). This record offers no indication whatsoever that Chief Wingert or the City were aware of a pattern of faulty traffic stops in the DMPD.
The Court declines Clinton's invitation to evaluate the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct in the stops he discusses. That inquiry is immaterial because Clinton's claim against the City and Chief Wingert fails on other grounds.
Clinton's second argument for vicarious liability is that Chief Wingert and the City improperly trained DMPD officers that they could stop vehicles to inspect a temporary registration tag, or, alternatively, that they failed to teach officers that such stops are invalid under McLemore. "In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city could have done to prevent the unfortunate incident." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). "Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality ... can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983." Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ; see also Mendoza v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 849 F.3d 408, 420 (8th Cir. 2017). "Deliberate indifference requires proof the municipality disregarded a known or obvious consequence of its action or inaction." Robbins, 984 F.3d at 682 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) ); see also Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1217 (8th Cir. 2013) ("Absent some form of notice, [a] city cannot be deliberately indifferent to the risk [of] its training or supervision ....").
Just as he has failed to show any evidence that Chief Wingert or the City were on notice of the unconstitutional custom he alleges, Clinton has provided no more than speculation that these parties acted with deliberate indifference toward a known deficiency in the training DMPD provided to its officers. The parties dispute whether the DMPD's sponsorship of the errant 2019 Summer Enforcement Team training session can establish deliberate indifference when Mr. Roling is not under the City's employ, see Pl.’s Resist. Br. 39–40, ECF No. 53, but this question is inconsequential because there is no evidence that Chief Wingert or any other City official was aware of Mr. Roling's training session or the misguided instruction that the officers recall. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350 ("Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights."). Contrary to Clinton's argument, the summary judgment record suggests only that DMPD took reasonable steps to train its officers and keep them apprised of constitutional developments. Indeed, an accurate and timely training bulletin squarely addressing the legal rule at issue in this case was disseminated to officers in May 2018, shortly after the McLemore decision was handed down. Clinton's assertion that his constitutional injury was the product of a deliberately indifferent training deficit finds no genuine factual support. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Clinton's federal vicarious liability claims.
2. Chapter 670
For his final Count, Clinton claims vicarious liability against Chief Wingert and the City for the defendant officers’ violation of his state constitutional rights. Clinton identifies no supporting authority in his own summary judgment briefing, although he appears to settle upon Iowa Code chapter 670 in resisting Defendants’ motion. Chapter 670 is the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). Under the IMTCA, "every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Iowa Code § 670.2(1). The statute defines "tort" to include the "denial or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision, statute or rule of law." Id. § 670.1(4). Thus, "the IMTCA applies to ... Iowa constitutional tort causes of action." Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin IV), 929 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Iowa 2019) ; see also Venckus, 930 N.W.2d at 808 ("Claims arising under the state constitution are subject to the IMTCA."). Clinton is correct, as a matter of law, that the City of Des Moines is vicariously liable for its officers’ violation of Clinton's rights under Article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Clinton's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted to this extent. The Court makes no finding of liability on Clinton's Monell-like claim of deliberate indifference against the City, which he has failed to elaborate in his briefing.
The IMTCA does not attribute vicarious liability to supervisory officials. See Iowa Code § 670.1(2) (defining "municipality" for purposes of § 670.2 as a "city, county, township, school district, ... [or] any other unit of local government"). Clinton argues that Godfrey does not foreclose the possibility that Chief Wingert could be individually liable for Clinton's state constitutional tort claim on a respondeat superior theory, although he cites no affirmative support. The Court does not address this hypothetical argument. Clinton has failed to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Chief Wingert. E. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude
The final matter before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Exclude two affidavits filed by Clinton in resistance to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Citing Rule 37(c)(1), Defendants contend that these affidavits, which are the sworn statements of Clinton and his mother, must be stricken from the record because they were not disclosed in written discovery. Clinton responds that the affidavits were intended to meet the requirements of Local Rule 56(e) and that they could not be produced in discovery because they were not prepared until after Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.
Rule 56 explicitly allows a party resisting summary judgment to produce affidavits or declarations showing a genuinely disputed fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). That said, it is also "black letter summary judgment law that a conclusory, self-serving affidavit will not defeat an otherwise meritorious summary judgment motion." Smith v. Golden China of Red Wing, Inc., 987 F.3d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Keiran v. Home Cap., Inc., 858 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2017) ). Rather than excise disputed affidavits from the record, the Court may simply "consider and dispose of any unsupported facts when considering the summary judgment motion." Clay v. Lafarge N. Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1021 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (citing Dotson v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 251 F.3d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 2001) ). Here, the Court did not rely on the contested affidavits in its analysis of the merits above, as they were immaterial to disposition of the parties’ motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Exclude is denied as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability, ECF No. 26, must be granted in part and denied in part . Plaintiff's Motion is granted as to liability on Counts I and II and denied as to Counts III through V. On Count VI, Plaintiff's Motion is granted as to the City, which is vicariously liable under Iowa Code § 670.2, and denied as to Chief Wingert.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 35, must be granted in part and denied in part . Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to Plaintiff's Counts I and II and granted as to Counts III through V. On Count VI, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to the City and granted as to Chief Wingert. Finally, Defendants’ Motion to Exclude, ECF No. 56, must be denied as moot .