Opinion
1:22-CV-0983 (GTS/ML)
04-13-2023
SAMUEL CLAY, Plaintiff, v. STACEY BISHOP, An Individual; RANDY HALL, As Commissioner Of Rensselaer Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.; and THOMAS GORDON, As Support Magistrate For Rensselaer Cnty. Family Ct., Defendants.
SAMUEL CLAY Pro se.
SAMUEL CLAY Pro se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The Clerk has sent this Pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an in forma pauperis application to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, and recommend that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirety (1) in part with leave to amend, and (2) in part without leave to amend. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)
I. BACKGROUND
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his civil rights were violated by defendants Stacey Bishop, Randy Hall, and Thomas Gordon (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 1998, Defendant Bishop filed paternity petition against Plaintiff in the Rensselaer County Family Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 26, 1998, the Rensselaer County Family Court deemed him the father of Defendant Bishop's child despite there being no DNA test. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that at some point in time, he began to contest the paternity finding and requested that a DNA test be administered. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Gordon refused to advise [P]lainitff of his rights, including his right to an attorney, refused to order a DNA test and refused to vacate any and all previous orders entered.” (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 14, 1998, Defendant Hall began to enforce an order of support against Plaintiff in favor of Defendant Bishop. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
The court must interpret Pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bishop and Gordon are related and thus, there was a conflict of interest and that Defendant Gordon failed to protect Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard before the imposition of the Order of Support. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that to date, he has been “deprived of over $80,000.00, has incurred expenses for alternate previous court filings, and has suffered extreme embarrassment, defamation of character, shame, anxiety, and mental distress.” (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff appears to assert the following six causes of action: (1) a claim of unreasonable seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a claim that his rights pursuant to the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated; (3) a claim that his rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated; (4) a claim that his rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated; (5) a claim that his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated; and (6) a claim that Defendants breached the peace in violation of Article 1, §§ 6, 14 of the New York State Constitution. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks an order “directing the termination of any and all child support orders and order of affiliation [sic],” and $1,000,000.00 in damages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
“When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING INTIAL REVIEW OF A COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc., 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.'').
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's Pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint, and construing the allegations liberally, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
A. Claims Seeking Injunctive Relief Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
I recommend that Plaintiff's claims seeking an order “directing the termination of any and all child support orders and order of affiliation [sic],” be dismissed as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal claims “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). There are four “requirements” that must be satisfied before Rooker- Feldman applies: (1) the “federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court,” (2) the plaintiff “must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment,” (3) the plaintiff “must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment,” and (4) the state-court judgment “must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Green, 585 F.3d at 101 (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The underlying principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that, “within the federal judicial system, only the Supreme Court may review state-court decisions.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85.
Plaintiff's Complaint, to the extent it seeks injunctive relief, satisfies all four factors for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) Plaintiff lost the filiation claim in state court and, thus, was directed to provide financial support; (2) he complains of the injury caused by the state court order; (3) the state court determinations in question were rendered before this action was commenced; and (4) Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the state court's judgment is unconstitutional and void. See Edem v. Spitzer, 204 Fed.Appx. 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (dismissing pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the plaintiff's claims alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by a state court order of filiation and child support).
According to the Complaint, the Rensselaer County Family Court issued an order of filiation on or about August 26, 1998, and an order of support began being enforced on or about October 14, 1998. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.)
B. Claims Seeking Monetary Damages Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks entitlement to relief beyond a nullification of the child support order and order of filiation, and that the Court has jurisdiction over such claims, I find that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail for the following four reasons.
It is unclear whether Plaintiff's claims seeking monetary damages based on allegations that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during the state court proceeding should also be dismissed because they are “inextricably intertwined with the substantive decisions of the state court.” Compare Edem, 204 Fed.Appx. at 97 (citing Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d at 86-87 (“Rooker-Feldman bars a federal claim, whether or not raised in state court, that asserts injury based on a state judgment and seeks review and reversal of that judgment; such a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined' with the state judgment.”)), with Hansen v. Miller, 52 F.4th 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014)) (holding that Rooker-Feldman “generally does not affect a federal court's jurisdiction over claims for damages against third parties for alleged misconduct occurring in the course of a state court proceeding, because the adjudication of such claims would ‘not require the federal court to sit in review of the state court judgment.'”), and McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F.Supp.2d 507, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing McNamara v. Kaye, 08-CV-4561, 2009 WL 3377914, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2009); Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009)) (“Thus, the Court reads McNamara and Green to suggest that a plaintiff's claims seeking only monetary damages or prospective-only relief against court procedures rather than modification of a family court's temporary custody or other orders would not run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). A claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment if “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987). “[A] plaintiff cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by recasting her claims as federal civil rights violations.” Kramer v. Dane, 17-CV-5253, 2018 WL 5077164, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018) (citing Davidson v. Garry, 956 F.Supp. 265, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)), report and recommendation adopted by, 2018 WL 4489284 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2018). As a result, Plaintiff's constitutional claims seeking monetary damages may also be subject to dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Johnston v. Queens Admin. For Children's Servs., 197 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (“to the extent [the plaintiff] was asserting claims regarding the adequacy of the Family Court proceedings, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); Watley v. Dep't of Children and Families, 13-CV-1858, 2019 WL 7067043, at *18 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2019) (dismissing the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims arising from the termination of parental rights pursuant to Rooker-Feldman).
First, Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 against Defendant Gordon, who acted as the support magistrate judge, are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are absolutely immune from suit for claims for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209. Moreover, courts have routinely recognized that allegations that a judge improperly failed to recuse himself are insufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Jiggetts v. Rubin, 22-CV-1238, 2022 WL 17834268, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citing Parent v. New York, 786 F.Supp.2d 516, 534 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (Hurd, J.), aff'd, 485 Fed.Appx. 500 (2d Cir. 2012); Bobrowsky v. Yonkers Courthouse, 777 F.Supp.2d 692, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Further, as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes action outside his or her judicial capacity, or when a judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). However, “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). “District courts within this Circuit have applied this immunity doctrine to New York Family Court Support Magistrates,” like Defendant Gordon. Roger of the Family Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, 18-CV-10866, 2019 WL 4194332, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff asserts claims arising from the efforts of Defendant Gordon, in his capacity as a New York Family Court Support Magistrate, to assess and collect child support that Plaintiff owes pursuant to Family Court orders and judgments. Defendant Gordon is therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Gordon be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are untimely. The Supreme Court has held that, “[b]ecause § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions . . . a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied in all § 1983 claims.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989). The Supreme Court found in particular that New York's general or residual statute related to personal injury actions should be applied, which sets a three-year statute of limitations. Owens, 488 U.S. at 249-50; accord, Phillips v. City of New York, 304 F.Supp.3d 305, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). Such statute of limitations begins “when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief,” or, in other words, “when the wrongful act or omission results in damages, . . . and once the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” McDonough v. Smith, 898 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2018) rev'd on other grounds McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019).
In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint is clear that his alleged constitutional harms occurred as a result of the order of filiation and child support proceedings against him in 1998. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) It is therefore reasonable to find that Plaintiff knew or should have known of the proceedings against him and the child support order at the time those events occurred in 1998. “Of note, Plaintiff does not allege that he was never informed of either the proceedings against him or of the child support order itself until a later time.” Hall v. Clinton Cnty., 18-CV-1405, 2020 WL 1923236, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (Suddaby, C.J.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in this action until September 19, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) As a result, I find that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
I also find that tolling is not warranted under the circumstances alleged. “Although the Second Circuit recognizes the continuing violation doctrine, it has qualified that the doctrine applies only to claims ‘composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful practice,' or ‘claims that by their nature accrue only after the plaintiff has been subjected to some threshold amount of mistreatment.'” Hall, 2020 WL 1923236, at *6 (quoting Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015)). The mere fact that Plaintiff “continues to suffer an ongoing injury does not bring his claim under the auspices of the continuing violation doctrine. In other words, each payment Plaintiff is required to make under the child support order is not a new and separate act and injury, but merely a consequence of the initial act, namely, the proceedings and the issuance of the child support order in [1998].” Id. Plaintiff had a fully formed claim upon the occurrence of the relevant proceedings and the issuance of the child support order. I therefore recommend that the Court decline to find the continuing violation doctrine applicable to Plaintiff's claims, and instead find that there is no other apparent basis for tolling the statute of limitations. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed as time-barred.
Third, in the alternative, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to Defendant Bishop because she is not a state actor. A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Generally, private parties are not state actors, and are not liable under § 1983. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties ....”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state action.'” United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 941 F.2d 1292, 129596 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Blum v. Yartsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). A private defendant may be held liable only as “a willing participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Claims under § 1983 can be brought against private entities by “showing that a person acting under color of state law . . . collaborated with a private person . . . to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.” Fries v. Barns, 618 F.2d 988, 990 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144).
Here, the Complaints fail to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Bishop was a “state actor” or was “collaborating” with state actors. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2 [alleging that Defendant Bishop “instituted an action in the Rensselaer County Family Court entitled Paternity Petition.”]); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980) (“merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or joint actor with the judge”); Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 18-CV-11889, 2019 WL 1958107, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019) (finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that his ex-spouse was a state actor or conspired with state actors and thus, failed to state a claim for civil violations against her); Kashelkar v. Rubin & Rothman, 97 F.Supp.2d 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Plaintiff's attempt to allege state action via the lawyer Defendants' interactions with [a state judge] is insufficient as a matter of law”); Gangemi v. Johnson, 98-CV-8470, 1999 WL 777861, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (“Whether [a judge] made rulings based on information supplied by [an attorney] that was false or misleading is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis and cannot support a finding of cooperation between [the attorney] and the state jurist. Clearly, a judge does not conspire with an attorney merely by ruling in an attorney's favor.”).
Fourth, in the alternative, based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, I find that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Hall are subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. During the time in question Defendant Hall was acting as Commissioner of the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services, which oversees the child support collection unit. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) I find that Defendant Hall is “not entitled to judicial immunity because [his] responsibilities are not closely associated with the judicial process nor is [his] agency a quasi-judicial body. However, [he is] entitled to qualified immunity.” Parent, 786 F.Supp.2d at 537; but see Ramos v. Putnam Family Court, 15-CV-1443, 2017 WL 3083727, at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2017) (quoting Lomtevas v. Cardozo, 05-CV-2779, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2006)) (finding that “[o]fficials involved with . . . the enforcement of [a] child support order are entitled to ‘absolute quasi-judicial immunity.'”). Plaintiff does not allege any acts by Defendant Hall except that he “enforce[d] an Order of Support against [P]laintiff in favor of [D]efendant Bishop” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 14), which he had authority to do, pursuant to the New York State Family Court Act. His conduct in “enforcing the petition did not violate any clearly established right. There is no right to refuse to pay child support. Moreover, even if there was such a right and it was clearly established, it was objectively reasonable for [Defendant Hall] to believe that carrying out [his] duties and enforcing the petition did not violate [P]laintiff's rights.” Parent, 786 F.Supp.2d at 537. As a result, I recommend that all claims against Defendant Hall in his individual capacity be dismissed based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. See also Chris H. v. New York, 16-CV-6807, 2017 WL 2880848, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff's claims against the New York City Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services Commissioner were subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity).
Moreover, I recommend that any claims against Defendant Hall in his official capacity also be dismissed. Official capacity suits are merely an alternative way to plead a claim against an entity of which an officer is an employee. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a ‘moving force' behind the deprivation.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). In an official capacity suit against a municipal employee, a plaintiff must show that the acts were performed pursuant to a policy or custom. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, the suit against Defendant Hall in his official capacity is essentially an action against Rensselaer County. Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Hall performed any acts pursuant to a policy or custom. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Hall in his official capacity be dismissed.
C. State Law Claims
Having found that all of Plaintiff's federal claims are subject to dismissal, I recommend that, to the extent that he has asserted any state law claims, the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [pendent state law claims] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1974)) (holding that “federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, should abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction when federal claims in a case can be disposed of by summary judgment”).
In the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's state law claims be dismissed. “The New York State Constitution provides a private right of action where remedies are otherwise unavailable at common law or under § 1983.” Allen v. Antal, 665 Fed.Appx. 9, 13 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order). The private right of action under the New York State Constitution “is a ‘narrow remedy' available only when ‘necessary to effectuate the purposes of the State constitutional protections that the plaintiff invokes' or ‘appropriate to ensure full realization of the plaintiff's rights.'” Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 504, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alterations omitted) (quoting Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 84 (N.Y. 2001)). Accordingly, a private cause of action under the New York State Constitution “is usually available only in cases in which a plaintiff[ ] . . . has no alternative remedy.” Biswas, 973 F.Supp.2d at 522.
Plaintiff has asserted claims for damages under section 1983 related to his experiences in Rensselaer Family Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Those claims relate to the same conduct that Plaintiff says also violated his rights under the New York State Constitution. (See id.) “In light of those alternative remedies for the conduct challenged in this case, [I recommend that] this Court decline[] to break new ground in state constitutional law and fashion a cause of action directly under the New York State Constitution.” Orens v. Amherst Police Dep't, 20-CV-0778, 2022 WL 4485292, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022) (citing Biswas, 973 F.Supp.2d at 522 (“Actions for damages at common law and under § 1983 are both considered adequate alternative remedies that preclude the assertion of a claim for damages under the state Constitution.”); see also Wahad v. F.B.I., 994 F.Supp. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Section 1983 need not provide the exact same standard of relief in order to provide an adequate remedy.”)); see Donovan v. Norwich City Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 623904, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2022) (McAvoy, J.) (citing Wahad, 994 F.Supp. at 240) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim under the New York State Constitution and noting that “[t]he availability of Section 1983 claims precludes recognition of state constitutional tort claims, even if the Section 1983 claims are ultimately unsuccessful.”). As a result, I recommend that, in the alternative, Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the New York State Constitution be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, “[a] Pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the court granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Nielson v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(A)(2) (“THE COURT SHOULD FREELY GIVE LEAVE WHEN JUSTICE SO REQUIRES.”). LEAVE TO AMEND IS NOT REQUIRED WHERE “THE PROBLEM WITH [THE PLAINTIFF'S] CAUSES OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIVE” SUCH THAT “BETTER PLEADING WILL NOT CURE IT.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can amend to assert actionable claims I recommend that he be granted leave to amend the Complaint to the extent that it asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 seeking monetary damages against (1) Defendant Bishop, and (2) Defendant Hall in his official capacity. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007)) (“The pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, do not compel a litigant to anticipate potential affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of such defenses.”).
However, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims (1) seeking an order “directing the termination of any and all child support orders and order of affiliation [sic],” (2) against Defendant Gordon, and (3) against Defendant Hall in his individual capacity be dismissed without leave to amend because a better pleading will not cure the defects associated with those claims. See Dickson v. Schenectady Family Court, 22-CV-0499, 2022 WL 16966549, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2022) (Hummel, M.J.) (citing Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] complaint must be dismissed without prejudice where the dismissal is due to the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]”); Johnson v. Bieling, 20-CV-1124, 2021 WL 1841470, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2021) (Lovric, M.J.) (collecting cases dismissing with prejudice and without leave to amend on judicial immunity grounds), report and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 1840591 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021); see also Edwardsen v. Aloi, 17-CV-0202, 2017 WL 1283496, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2017) (Dancks, M.J.)) (“dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are dismissed without prejudice . . . however, because the Schenectady County Family Court and Judge Polk are immune from suit, the undersigned recommends dismissing the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 16961389 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2022) (Hurd, J.); Kramer v. Dane, 17-CV-5253, 2018 WL 4489284, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2018) (denying leave to amend where “the defects in the Amended Complaint are jurisdictional and substantive and cannot be cured through better pleading”); Chris H., 2017 WL 2880848, at *10 (holding that “amending the Complaint would be futile as to the claims that are . . . barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, judicial immunity or qualified immunity.”).
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED only for purposes of filing and any appeal unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent that it asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages against (1) Defendant Bishop, and (2) Defendant Hall in his official capacity, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent that it asserts claims against (1) Defendant Gordon, and (2) Defendant Hall in his individual capacity because it seeks monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent that it asserts claims seeking an order “directing the termination of any and all child support orders and order of affiliation [sic],” because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's New York State Constitutional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Order and ReportRecommendation on the parties, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(A), 6(D), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding Pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(D). IF THE LAST DAY OF THAT PRESCRIBED PERIOD FALLS ON A SATURDAY, SUNDAY, OR LEGAL HOLIDAY, THEN THE DEADLINE IS EXTENDED UNTIL THE END OF THE NEXT DAY THAT IS NOT A SATURDAY, SUNDAY, OR LEGAL HOLIDAY. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(A)(1)(C).