STARGEL, Judge.

William D. Mueller, Elliot B. Kula, and W. Aaron Daniel, of Kula & Associates, P.A., Miami; and Andres Alonso of Alonso Legal, PLLC, Coral Gables, for Appellants.

Andrew A. Labbe of Groelle & Salmon, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

STARGEL, Judge.

Luz and Agustine Cintron (the Cintrons) challenge the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief (second amended complaint) against Edison Insurance Company (Edison). Because the trial court erred in its determination that the Cintrons’ second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for declaratory relief, we reverse.

The Cintrons’ home was insured with Edison when they made a claim for damage. The insurance policy included coverage for "sudden and accidental direct loss to property described in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a physical loss to covered property." The policy also provided exclusions to coverage, including, as pertinent here, "wear and tear," "marring," "deterioration".

While the policy was in effect, the Cintrons alleged that their property suffered direct physical loss from Hurricane Irma. The Cintrons reported the loss to Edison which, after inspecting the home, denied coverage for the damage, advising the Cintrons that the policy did not cover the direct physical loss suffered. Among the reasons offered for the denial of the Cintrons’ claim was that the physical loss reported was not caused by Hurricane Irma but rather by "wear and tear," "marring," or "deterioration" of the property and was thus excluded under the terms of the policy.

On August 7, 2020, the Cintrons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment which concerns the interpretation and construction of contractual rights, obligations, and exclusions contained in the Policy and the facts surrounding the claim, namely: whether there is coverage for the subject loss, which was caused by Hurricane Irma, along with compliance of relevant policy provisions concerning post-loss obligations.

In response, Edison filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Cintrons failed to meet the pleading requirements necessary to seek declaratory relief under Florida law. After hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion without prejudice, giving the Cintrons twenty days to amend the complaint.

The Cintrons then filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief (amended complaint). Edison again moved to dismiss based on the Cintrons’ failure to state a cause of action. After a hearing, the trial court granted Edison's motion to dismiss, finding that the allegations of the amended complaint did not raise any questions sufficient to require declaratory relief and that interpretation or construction by the court was not necessary for the parties to understand their rights. The trial court again provided the Cintrons twenty days to cure the pleading deficiencies.

On February 10, 2021, the Cintrons filed their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. In response, Edison moved to dismiss for a third time. The trial court dismissed the Cintrons’ second amended complaint with prejudice.

"[T]he purpose of a declaratory judgment is to afford parties relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations." Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles , 680 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Santa Rosa County v. Admin. Comm'n, Div. of Admin. Hearings , 661 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 1995) ). Thus, requests for declaratory relief should be liberally construed. See § 86.101, Fla. Stat. (2021) (explaining that chapter 86 is "substantive and remedial" and that due to its purpose, it "is to be liberally administered and construed").

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint for declaratory relief must allege:

[T]here is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration; that the declaration should deal with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts; that some immunity, power, privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon the facts or the law applicable to the facts; that there is some person or persons who have, or reasonably may have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in fact or law; that the antagonistic and adverse interest[s] are all before the court by proper process or class representation and that the relief sought is not merely giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity.

Chiles , 680 So. 2d at 404 (alterations in original) (quoting Santa Rosa County , 661 So. 2d at 1192–93 ). The trial court dismissed the Cintrons’ second amended complaint with prejudice on the bases that (a) the Cintrons’ second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action, (b) there was no ambiguous policy language requiring construction, and (c) the Cintrons had an adequate remedy at law.

The Cintrons satisfied the pleading requirements when they alleged that their residence had been damaged by Hurricane Irma; that they had submitted a claim to Edison for payment under an all-perils property insurance policy; that Edison had denied the claim on the ground that certain exclusions, such as those for "wear and tear" and "deterioration" barred recovery; that they had provided Edison with copies of invoices, estimates, photos, and other documents that related to purportedly necessary repairs, contending that these materials demonstrated the inapplicability of the cited exclusions; and that there is now a bona fide dispute between the parties as to the applicability of the exclusions in light of the facts of this case.

As to the second basis for the trial court's dismissal, the availability of declaratory relief is not contingent on the existence of purportedly ambiguous policy language. The supreme court made clear in Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 894 So. 2d 5, 12 (Fla. 2004), that although declaratory relief is available to resolve such ambiguity, it is not available only to resolve such ambiguity. See id. ("[A]lthough section 86.021 ... grants to the courts the power to determine any question of ‘construction or validity’ arising under a contract, section 86.051 states that the enumeration of powers in section 86.021 ‘does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in section 86.011.’ "). Rather, declaratory relief is available to resolve questions concerning the application of unambiguous policy provisions to a disputed set of facts. "Put another way, ‘the courts have the general power to issue declaratory judgments ... in suits solely seeking a determination of any fact affecting the applicability of an "immunity, power, privilege, or right." ’ " Heritage Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romanach , 224 So. 3d 262, 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Higgins , 894 So. 2d at 12 ).

As the trial court observed, refusing to limit declaratory actions to those cases involving some ambiguity or some question of interpretation may result in substantial overlap with otherwise-available actions at law. But that is what the legislature has provided. As the supreme court stated when discussing a prior but similarly worded version of the pertinent statutory sections:

It is difficult to find broader words or express a broader scope of jurisdiction. Unless we are to deny the power of the Legislature to enact the statute we must give full force to its language, subject only to the constitutional limitations upon the functions of the judicial department of government. ... With these [pleading] requirements met there is almost no limit to the number and type of cases that may be heard under this statute.

May v. Holley , 59 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952).

While the trial court was correct that the Cintrons had an adequate remedy at law, the plain language of section 86.111, Florida Statutes (2021), unequivocally dispatches the final basis, providing, "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief." See also Michael A. Marks, P.A. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. , 332 So. 3d 11, 11-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (agreeing that pursuant to section 86.111, the trial court erred in dismissing a declaratory judgment action merely because the plaintiff could have brought an action for breach of contract instead).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to allow the Cintrons to proceed with their claim for declaratory relief.

Reversed and remanded.

LaROSE and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.