Opinion
Civil No. 00-1165-JO
February 7, 2001
Albert F. Christman Clackamas, OR., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Lynne Rennick, Eric J. Fjelstad DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Salem, OR., Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Albert Christman brings this civil rights action pro se against defendants State of Oregon, Judge Robert Morgan, Judge Robert Sealander, Judge Patrick Gilroy, Judge Deanne Darling, Chief Justice Wallace Carson, Carol Lofgrin, Marcy Cady, Asa Lewis, Joanne Lewis (together, the "state defendants"), two Court Appointed Special Advocates, Pat James and Barbara Johnson (the "CASA defendants"), and Clackamas County Mental Health, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985. In essence, plaintiff alleges that the various defendants have violated his constitutional rights by, among other things, conspiring to place his step-daughter in state custody. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief but no monetary relief.
Plaintiff's complaint is styled as a petition and motion for an injunction and was, therefore, docketed in part as a motion (# 1). That motion is denied.
All defendants, except Clackamas County Mental Health, now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (## 16, 20) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the state defendants' motion is granted and this action is dismissed as to them. The CASA defendants' motion is granted, but plaintiff is given 20 days to amend his complaint against them.
I note that defendant Clackamas County Mental Health was served with summons and complaint but has yet to enter an appearance.
STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove "no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1995). The court must treat all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Parks School of Business, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1484. All doubts are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Keams v. Tempe Technical Institute, 39 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994).
Pro se complaints are held to a less strict standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1988). Before dismissing a pro se complaint, the court must, in many circumstances, instruct the pro se litigant as to the deficiencies in the complaint and grant leave to amend. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the court may dismiss a pro se complaint outright where it is "absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
1. CASA Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Pat James and Barbara Johnson move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that he has failed to allege any specific wrongdoing on their part, much less the kind of deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities that is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As far as the court is able to decipher the complaint, plaintiff's allegation against James and Johnson is as follows:
Grow up and stop acting like a child, no one is impressed by a Cackle Party like CASA, a group of emotionally insecure woman who join a mutual admiration society so you can ride some pseudo ego trip of personal unimportance[.]
Your husbands and other male members of your family may have to put up with you and your personal problems and bigotry and prejudices, but I don[']t have to, if you lie, distort, fabricate, create, or commit any act or conspire with anyone or aid or abet any act so as to affect the life, liberty or property of the Plaintiff, you commit a crime under the laws of the United States.
Complaint, p. 23.
I agree with the CASA defendants that the complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim against them, and note also that plaintiff's response to the motions to dismiss, lengthy as it is, likewise fails to describe any specific wrongdoing on their part that is actionable under section 1983. Consequently, the CASA defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
Because, however, it is not "absolutely clear" that plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in his claim against the CASA defendants, the court will allow plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 20 days of the date of this opinion, with respect to the CASA defendants only. To state a section 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) he was deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by a federal law. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, because the complaint shows on its face that most of plaintiff's assertions and allegations fall well outside the two-year limitation period (see discussion below), plaintiff shall also allege, with specificity, the dates on which James or Johnson took any alleged wrongful actions.
2. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
The state defendants move to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including Eleventh Amendment immunity, failure to state a claim against the State, judicial immunity, issue and claim preclusion, and the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (holding federal statutory jurisdiction over direct appeals from state courts beyond the original jurisdiction of federal district courts); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983) (holding that claims "inextricably intertwined" with those a state court has already decided beyond the jurisdiction of lower federal courts).
The State of Oregon is absolutely immune from plaintiff's claim under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Likewise, because plaintiff does not allege or claim that defendants Carol Lofgrin, Marcy Cady, Asa Lewis, or Joanne Lewis, employees, case workers, and foster care providers of the State Office for Services to Children and Families ("SOSCF"), acted in any capacity other than their official capacities, these defendants also are absolutely immune. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School Host. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1983) (an unconsenting state and state employees acting in their official capacities are immune from suits brought in federal courts by the state's own citizens); see also Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1994) (the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from hearing claims by a citizen against dependent instrumentalities of the state).
I also note that in neither his complaint nor his response to defendants' motions does plaintiff specify any wrongdoing whatsoever by Asa or Joanne Lewis; rather, he describes them as "honorable people, who have been led by the lies of [SOSCF] they don't understand the depravity, sickness and degeneracy of these people[.]" Plaintiff's Response, p. 15; see also Complaint, pp. 26-27.
Further, section 1983 does not "abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit"; moreover, "a state is not [a] `person' within the meaning of § 1983," Hale v. State of Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993). State employees sued in their official capacities also are not "persons" under section 1983. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1991) (state officials sued in official capacities not "persons" for purposes of section 1983 claims).
With respect to the various defendant judges, I agree with the state defendants that to the extent plaintiff's complaint can be deciphered, he fails to allege that any of the judges acted in any capacity other than within his or her judicial role. Consequently, the individual judges are absolutely immune from liability. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).
In view of the above rulings, it is unnecessary to reach the state defendants' other arguments. I note, however, that as the state defendants propose, it is probable that most, if not all, of plaintiff's current complaint is barred by issue and claim preclusion, although the pleadings necessary to make that determination are not before me on this Rule 12 motion. Additionally, I note that most of plaintiff's allegations concern matters far outside the two-year limitations period applicable to actions under section 1983.
Section 1983 claims are governed by the general personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged injury occurred. See, e.g., Wilson v Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1984). In Oregon, where plaintiff's alleged injury occurred, the personal injury limitation period is two years. O.R.S. 12.110(1).
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff's complaint invites this court to review a state court judgment or to enjoin ongoing state court custody proceedings, I am compelled to decline the invitation. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890-91 (1986) (discussing Rooker/Feldman doctrine (see footnote 2); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971) (district court may not stay or enjoin state court proceedings except in special circumstances).
In summary, the state defendants' motion to dismiss is well-taken and is granted in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
The state defendants' motion to dismiss (# 16) is GRANTED and the state defendants are dismissed from this action. The CASA defendants' motion to dismiss (# 20) is GRANTED; plaintiff shall have 20 days from the date of this opinion to file an amended complaint against the CASA defendants. Plaintiff's motion for injunction (# 1) is DENIED.