DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

[Dkt. 16]

Presently before the court is Plaintiff Vinod Chhabra's Motion to Remand. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court denies the motion and adopts the following Order.

I. Background

This case is once again before this court, after having been dismissed, remanded, now removed from state court a second time. As described in this court's earlier Order ("First Order"), Plaintiff was employed by Defendants Devry University, Inc. and Devry, Inc. as an admissions advisor. (No. 14-cv-07663-DDP-FFM, Dkt. 19.) The Individual Defendants were Plaintiff's supervisors. Plaintiff alleged that all Defendants, including the Individual Defendants, "intended at all time to discriminate against plaintiff's employment (sic) due to his race natural origin and age (sic)." The Complaint further alleged that the Individual Defendants "intended to undermine, disrupt and terminate plaintiff as retaliation for his disclose, and divulging of conduct perpetrated by defendant Scott Sand." On October 22, the Individual Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment because of a "claimed prevarication."

Plaintiff brought suit in state court alleging one cause of action for discrimination, three causes of action for wrongful termination, and a cause of action for breach of contract. Defendants removed to this court and moved to dismiss. Plaintiff moved to remand. This court, noting that Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss solely discussed facts and theories regarding the Individual Defendants that appeared either totally unrelated to this case or were not alleged in the Complaint, denied Plaintiff's motion to remand for lack of diversity jurisdiction and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. (First Order at 4.) The court, although expressing skepticism that Plaintiff would be able to adequately allege any claims against the Individual Defendants, granted leave to amend. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), adding defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against the Individual Defendants. (No. 14-cv-07663-DDP-FFM, Dkt. 8.) Defendants acknowledged that is was no longer discernible from the face of the FAC whether the parties are completely diverse. (No. 14-cv-07663-DDP-FFM, Dkt. 23.) At the request of the parties, the court remanded to state court. (No. 14-cv-07663-DDP-FFM, Dkt. 27.)

After conducting some discovery in state court, and deposing Plaintiff himself, Defendants concluded that the Individual Defendants, who are California citizens, remain sham defendants, fraudulently joined by Plaintiff to defeat diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal at 6.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he has no facts to support any of the newly-alleged claims (defamation, infliction of emotional distress) against the Individual Defendants. (Notice of Removal at 7-18). This court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Individual Defendants are not fraudulently joined. (Dkt. 15.) In response, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand, as well as a "supplement" to the motion ostensibly responsive to the court's Order to Show Cause, but essentially comprised of a shortened version of the arguments raised in the instant motion.

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's counsel once again does not dispute that he made no attempt to meet and confer in accordance with Local Rule 7-3. See C.D. Cal. L. R. 7-3, 7-9. This is the second such failure, as Plaintiff's counsel violated Local Rule 7-3 in connection with his first motion to remand as well. As explained in this court's First Order, this alone would be reason to deny Plaintiff's motion to remand. C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12. Plaintiff's counsel is cautioned that the court expects full compliance with all Local Rules in the future.

In any event, the argument raised in the instant motion has no merit. Plaintiff contends, without authority, that Defendants may not remove the same case twice. Plaintiff is mistaken. See Reyes v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 781 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) ("A successive removal petition is permitted . . . when subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal." (internal quotations and emphases omitted)); See also S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The prohibition against removal on the same ground does not concern the theory on which federal jurisdiction exists . . ., but rather the pleading or event that made the case removable. . . . A defendant . . . can file a second removal petition when subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal . . . .").

Plaintiff then argues that Defendants "abandoned" their right to remove when they consented to remand of the FAC. (Motion at 6.) "A waiver of the right of removal must be clear and unequivocal." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, there has been no unambiguous relinquishment of the right. To the contrary, Defendants' notice that, on the face of the FAC, there was no "current" jurisdiction over the matter, and explicit pronouncement that they believed even the new allegations to be "improper and meritless" are consistent with their subsequent discovery efforts and second removal. (No. 14-cv-07663-DDP-FFM, Dkt. 27.) Although a defendant may waive the right to removal by taking "actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal forum," the taking of jurisdictional-type discovery in state court does not manifest any such intent. Resolution Trust, 43 F.3d at 1240.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: February 2, 2016

/s/

DEAN D. PREGERSON

United States District Judge