Opinion
C. A. 9:21-03875-RMG-MHC
02-03-2022
Craig Latwain Chestnut, Plaintiff, v. Kirstin Sutton, Trident Nurse; Christina Oh, CEO of Trident Medical Center, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, Craig Latwain Chestnut, an inmate at the Broad River Correctional Institution (BRCI) of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. In an Order dated December 21, 2021, Plaintiff was advised of pleading deficiencies and given an opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 7. On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff was housed at the Manning Correctional Institution of SCDC at the time he filed this action. See ECF No. 1 at 2. In the Order dated December 21, 2021, Plaintiff was specifically ordered to always keep the Clerk of Court advised in writing if his address changed, and he was warned that his case may be dismissed for failure to comply. Plaintiff has not updated his address in this case, but he filed a change of address in another one of his cases (Chestnut v. Smith, No. 9:21-02018-RMG-MHC (D.S.C.)) indicating he is now housed at BRCI. SCDC records also show that Plaintiff is now housed at BRCI, and Plaintiff listed a return address at BRCI on the envelope containing his Amended Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kirstin Sutton (Sutton), a nurse at Trident Medical Center, failed to provide him with adequate medical care for his serious illness or injury and that she made a discriminatory racial comment on September 22, 2021. He asserts he had very bad pain around his PEG (percutaneous endoscopic gastronomy) tube that was leaking after placement by a gastroenterologist. He claims Sutton stated that she did not like black people and jail inmates. Thereafter, SCDC and hospital staff allegedly “reported” Sutton and asked her to exit Plaintiff's room. Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth Amendment (failure to provide medical treatment) and Fourteenth Amendment (discrimination) rights were violated. He claims he suffered from emotional distress as a result of the alleged incident. ECF No. 12 at 4-6. Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 6.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants are Not State Actors
Defendants Sutton and Trident Medical Center CEO Christina Oh (Oh) are subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate that they are “state actors” under § 1983. To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In other words, a plaintiff suing under § 1983 must establish that his constitutional rights were violated through conduct that constitutes “state action.” See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982). Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, does not constitute state action under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (explaining that to qualify as state action, the conduct in question “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible, ” and “the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor”); Wright v. James, No. 0:20-CV-4477-TMC, 2021 WL 1232645 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2021) (summarily dismissing the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim because the named defendant, a physician at the Medical University of South Carolina, was not a state actor under § 1983).
In some instances, a private entity that jointly participates in constitutional wrongdoing with a state official may be said to have engaged in state action under § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). However, Plaintiff has alleged no facts of any joint participation. He has made no allegation that Defendants had a sufficiently close relationship with a state actor such that it cannot be concluded that they are engaged in governmental action. Additionally, Plaintiff has not named any state actor as a Defendant and has alleged no facts to indicate that Defendants conspired with any state actor.
Even if, liberally construed, Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Plaintiff has not mentioned § 1981 in his Amended Complaint), he fails to state a claim. Section 1981 guarantees equal rights to all persons in the United States “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” regardless of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must show the defendant's purposeful, racially discriminatory actions affected a contractual relationship. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982)). Therefore, a § 1981 claim must “initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship' under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff has not identified any contractual relationship with Defendants.
B. Plaintiff has not Alleged Any Claim Against Defendant Sutton
Defendant Oh is additionally subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her. Although Plaintiff lists Oh's name in the caption and in “The Defendants” section of his Amended Complaint, he fails to state any claim against her. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Further, although Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated, he provides no facts in support of any alleged violation against Defendant Oh. Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
C. Malpractice and Negligence are not Actionable under § 1983
Even if Plaintiff could show that Defendants are state actors, any claims for malpractice and/or negligence are subject to summary dismissal. A claim that Defendants were negligent or committed malpractice as to Plaintiff's medical care does not state a claim actionable under § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 (1986) (explaining a claim of negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
D. State Law Claims
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges claims, such as negligence or malpractice, under South Carolina law, this court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. As Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only the state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). Here, Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 12 at 2-3. Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without issuance and service of process.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, where the district court has already afforded a litigant with an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to either afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order.” Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).