Opinion
Darryl Scott Chatman, Petitioner, Pro se, Vacaville, CA.
For Edward Arnold, Acting Warden, Respondent: Alene M Games, CAAG - Office of Attorney General, California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FREDERICK F. MUMM, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, Darryl Chatman (" Petitioner"), a state prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (" Petition") on July 29, 2014. On January 27, 2015, respondent filed an answer to the Petition, and, thereafter, Petitioner filed a reply. The parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct all proceedings in this case, including the resolution of all dispositive matters. The matter, thus, stands submitted and ready for decision.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Los Angeles County Court jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of carjacking. (Lodged Doc. No. 2.) Petitioner was also found to have suffered a prior conviction. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years in state prison. (Id. )
Petitioner then appealed his conviction. On September 3, 2013, the California Court of Appeal filed an unpublished opinion in which it affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition on November 13, 2013.
Petitioner then initiated this action.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts were taken verbatim from the California Court of Appeal's opinion affirming Petitioner's conviction:
The Court has inserted headings in the following fact section to delineate between the facts underlying the crime and the facts underlying Petitioner's claim for relief.
A. Facts Underlying Charged Crime
Sometime shortly before 5:00 on the morning of November 23, 2010, three individuals called 911 and reported a car accident involving a black Chevy Silverado truck in the vicinity of 7th Street and Atlantic Boulevard in the City of Long Beach. The individuals reported the sound of tires " burning" rubber, and of the truck hitting several parked cars. Police officers were dispatched to the scene.
Esther Gale lived near the site of the accident and awoke to the sound of screeching tires. She stepped outside, smelled the distinct odor of burning rubber, and saw a black truck careening down the street, hitting parked cars, a fence, at least one tree and ultimately coming to a stop near an alley. She saw an individual get out of the truck, wearing a plaid shirt. He had a cell phone to his ear, and he looked right at her as he walked past and turned the corner.
James Richardson, a patrol officer with the Long Beach Police Department, reported to the scene in response to the dispatch call. He saw a black truck crashed on the sidewalk of 7th Street, near Lime Street. Several bystanders told him they saw individuals running down Lime Street. As Officer Richardson drove down Lime Street, he saw a Hispanic male waving his arms at him " frantically" and trying to get his attention.
Mario Reyes was the man who flagged down Officer Richardson. Mr. Reyes had been driving his truck near 8th Street on his way to his job loading fruit. While stopped at an intersection, a man he did not know (but later identified as [Petitioner]) walked up to the passenger side of his truck. The window was rolled down and [Petitioner] asked if Mr. Reyes had any change. He said no, at which point [Petitioner] tried to yank open the passenger door, yelling at Mr. Reyes to give him the keys to the truck and leave. [Petitioner] also pointed to some sort of identification badge on his shirt and claimed to be a police officer.
[Petitioner] opened the passenger side door, climbed into the truck and tried to position himself between Mr. Reyes and the steering wheel. The two fought to control the steering wheel. Mr. Reyes pressed his foot on the brake pedal, but [Petitioner] stepped on the gas, causing the tires to burn rubber. [Petitioner] eventually was able to commandeer the truck down the street a short way toward 7th Street, veering onto the sidewalk, hitting three parked cars and eventually crashing to a stop. The air bag deployed, hitting Mr. Reyes. [Petitioner] fled the vehicle and ran down an alley.
Mr. Reyes followed [Petitioner] and then saw Officer Richardson's patrol car and flagged him down. Mr. Reyes pointed out [Petitioner], who was still in the alleyway. Officer Richardson told [Petitioner] to stand by the front of the patrol car. He noticed [Petitioner] was breathing heavily and smelled of alcohol. He performed a patdown search of [Petitioner] and found several items in his front pants pocket, including three cell phones. Officer Richardson showed the phones to Mr. Reyes, and Mr. Reyes identified two of the phones as his. Both of his phones had been set to Spanish and had been in his truck before the incident.
Ms. Gale identified [Petitioner] in a field identification as the man she saw get out of the truck and walk past her on the sidewalk. B. Facts Underlying Petitioner's Claim for Relief [After being charged with carjacking, ] [Petitioner] made his first Marsden motion on February 24, 2011. [Petitioner] advised the court he felt his court-appointed attorney, Mr. Russ, was not keeping in touch with him, had not tried to present a defense at the preliminary hearing, and was not following through on inconsistencies in the statements made by the victim, Mr. Reyes. [Petitioner] contended there had been no carjacking and that his version of the incident would have been bolstered by showing that Mr. Reyes had given testimony at the preliminary hearing that differed from his statements to the police as reflected in the police report.
People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-25, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 (1970) (footnote not in original).
The court explained the purpose of a preliminary hearing and that the defense often chooses not to " show [its] hand" to the prosecution, and that it is unlikely for a case to be dismissed at that stage in the proceedings. The court allowed [Petitioner] to clarify and be more specific about his concerns and then offered Mr. Russ an opportunity to respond. Mr. Russ explained he had spoken with [Petitioner] numerous times and was taking his claimed defense seriously. He was attempting to investigate [Petitioner's] assertion that Mr. Reyes was in fact not a victim but part of a drug-selling operation, and that there had been no carjacking, but only a drug sale that went badly. Mr. Russ said time waivers were necessary to perform a complete investigation because individuals were hesitant to speak honestly about something that could incriminate them.
At the conclusion of the lengthy discussion with the court and counsel, [Petitioner] said he would continue with Mr. Russ as his lawyer. The motion was denied. Thereafter, [Petitioner] waived time for several months to allow Mr. Russ the opportunity to investigate and prepare his defense.
On the eve of trial, [Petitioner] made a second Marsden motion. [Petitioner] complained he had been expected to waive time for trial for some 10 months and yet Mr. Russ had apparently not completed the investigation into [Petitioner's] defense. He expressed his concern that Mr. Russ did not believe or understand the importance of the three cell phones found on him by the police and what the records for those phones could reveal about the parties' relationship in drug dealing. [Petitioner] claimed Mr. Russ was defending the credibility of Mr. Reyes and he was very uncomfortable with him. The court again allowed Mr. Russ to respond and allowed [Petitioner] to reply and clarify his concerns.
Mr. Russ said he told [Petitioner] he had reservations about presenting a defense that relied solely on claiming the victim was lying about the incident, particularly when he felt Mr. Reyes did not appear to lack credibility during his testimony at the preliminary hearing. He said he never told [Petitioner] he would not present that defense, or attempt to highlight the inconsistencies in Mr. Reyes's statements. He merely explained his concern about hinging the entire defense on showing Mr. Reyes to be a liar. Mr. Russ explained that phone records he had subpoenaed for the three cell phones had not shown the call activity [Petitioner] had hoped they would. His attempt to speak with possible witnesses had not been successful either, which he indicated was not surprising " given that we're trying to say that they were involved in drug selling." Mr. Russ sought to assure [Petitioner] that he was diligently working on the defense and that he would present his defense to the jury as best he could under the circumstances.
After a discussion off the record with Mr. Russ, [Petitioner] advised the court that he'll " keep him on." The motion was denied.
Trial by jury started on September 26, 2011. [Petitioner] made a third Marsden motion on the morning of the first day of trial. [Petitioner] informed the court he was frustrated, that Mr. Russ failed to properly appreciate his defense, and had failed to timely and thoroughly investigate the defense to uncover supporting evidence to bolster his version of events. [Petitioner] asserted in particular that, despite claiming to do so, Mr. Russ had not obtained all of the relevant records for the three cell phones. He also asserted the victim of the alleged carjacking, Mr. Reyes, was not a victim, but an intermediary for a drug dealer, " Maria, " and that he was supposed to deliver drugs to [Petitioner] for sale. [Petitioner] explained the phone records were crucial because they would show Mr. Reyes had had telephone contact with Maria or " Greg" (another individual involved in the sales), supporting [Petitioner's] claim that Mr. Reyes was part of the drug sale operation and that he fabricated the carjacking story to protect himself from criminal liability.
The court sought to clarify [Petitioner's] position. " The Court: Okay. [¶ ] So you're hoping that getting the phone records of number X, that number X is going to show a call to number Y, and number Y belongs to the victim? [¶ ] [Petitioner]: Yes, sir."
Mr. Russ then explained he had indeed subpoenaed the records for all three cell phones, but had not received a return as to one of the phones. He said the records received for two of the phones did not show the call activity [Petitioner] had hoped. He described pursuing the missing records for the third phone as a " moot" point " because I was able to get the records of the two other parties that [Petitioner] was hoping we would be able to show were called by the alleged victim in this case, and one of those parties, in particular . . . Maria -- she is the one who is allegedly a drug dealer. I have all her phone records. I have gone through them carefully, and she has no phone calls during that period of time to . . . the victim in this case, which is what [[Petitioner]] was saying was happening. And that was quite an exhaustive effort to get those phone records." Mr. Russ also indicated there were no relevant calls for Greg.
When asked by the court if he had any other concerns with Mr. Russ's representation, [Petitioner] said Mr. Russ had threatened him that he " better watch it" because " there is a fine line between attorney/client privilege." The court expressed its confusion about what [Petitioner] was trying to relate, and [Petitioner] said he understood Mr. Russ to be threatening to tell the prosecutor about their privileged communications or " something to that effect." Mr. Russ said he was not certain what [Petitioner] could possibly be referencing and that he would never threaten a client, and did not threaten [Petitioner] in any way.
The court then said: " Mr. Chatman, my sense is that you're frustrated with the case, and Mr. Russ is a good target for that frustration. Perhaps, also, you know what's going to happen at trial and you're trying to avoid that. So that's my suspicion, sir, that this is all intended to delay things. [¶ ] I want to make sure you get a fair trial, and Mr. Russ is a great lawyer. You're lucky to have him. There is no basis to excuse him. So I find that there is no violation here and Mr. Russ is doing an excellent job of defending Mr. Chatman." The court denied [Petitioner's] motion.
[Petitioner] then exercised his right to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The court questioned [Petitioner] on the record about his request to represent himself at trial, and found [Petitioner] to have made a knowing and voluntary decision to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. Mr. Russ was relieved of his appointment.
During trial, [Petitioner] presented his defense that Mr. Reyes had fabricated the carjacking story and was part of a drug-selling operation, making reference to that theory in both his opening statement and closing argument, and attempting to develop it during his cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses. Mr. Reyes denied being a drug dealer and of knowing [Petitioner], Maria[, ] or Greg. Mr. Reyes identified two of the cell phones recovered from [Petitioner] as belonging to him, and that he had set both to the Spanish language. He said his cell phone was a Samsung with a phone number ending in 7719, and that the other phone did not work.
Officer James Craig testified about his review of the electronic contents of the three phones recovered from [Petitioner]. He explained that two of the phones were Samsung models, and the other was a Motorola. One of the Samsung models had the phone number ending in 7719. There was no call activity at all on that phone on November 23, 2010, the date of [Petitioner's] arrest on the carjacking charge. The last incoming call on November 22 was at 5:10 p.m., and the last outgoing call was at 11:37 p.m. None of the calls indicated a " Maria" as the identified contact. [Petitioner] specifically asked Officer Craig if any of the incoming or outgoing calls for that phone referenced the phone number ending in 9182.FN1 Officer Craig said no.
FN1 The record does not reflect to whom this number belongs, but presumably it is a number [Petitioner] believed was pertinent to his defense.
Ms. Gale testified at trial and identified [Petitioner] as the man she saw getting out of the truck, who then walked past her talking on a cell phone. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, [Petitioner] exercised his right not to testify in his own defense and did not call any defense witnesses.
(Lodged Doc. No. 2 at 2-8 (some footnotes omitted).)
IV. PETITIONER'S CLAIM
Trial counsel deprived Petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain phone records that would have shown that Petitioner did not carjack the victim, but rather attempted to purchase drugs from him.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review applicable to Petitioner's claims herein is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (" AEDPA") (Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on its merits in state court unless that adjudication " resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, " or " resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by a state court " shall be presumed to be correct" unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption " by clear and convincing evidence."
The phrase " clearly established Federal law" means " the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). However, a state court need not cite the controlling Supreme Court cases in its own decision, " so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts" relevant Supreme Court precedent which may pertain to a particular claim for relief. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) ( per curiam ).
Under AEDPA, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law is set forth in a holding (as opposed to dicta) of the Supreme Court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). Thus, while circuit law may be " persuasive authority" in analyzing whether a state court decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, " only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).
A state court decision is " contrary to" clearly established federal law if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing Supreme Court law or reaches a result that differs from a result the Supreme Court reached on " materially indistinguishable" facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. A decision involves an " unreasonable application" of federal law if " the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. A federal habeas court may not overrule a state court decision based on the federal court's independent determination that the state court's application of governing law was incorrect, erroneous, or even " clear error." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, a decision may be rejected only if the state court's application of Supreme Court law was " objectively unreasonable." Id.
The standard of unreasonableness that applies in determining the " unreasonable application" of federal law under Section 2254(d)(1) also applies in determining the " unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence" under Section 2254(d)(2). Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, " a federal court may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Id.
Where more than one state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claims, the federal habeas court analyzes the last reasoned decision. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) for presumption that later unexplained orders, upholding judgment or rejecting same claim, rest upon same ground as the prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or unexplained state court decisions to the last reasoned decision in order to determine whether that decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003).
VI. DISCUSSION
In his sole claim for relief, Petitioner contends that trial counsel deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain phone records showing that no carjacking occurred. Petitioner believes that, had counsel obtained those records, he could have convinced the jury that the incident underlying Petitioner's conviction was not carjacking, but rather the result of a drug deal gone wrong.
Petitioner's allegations underlying this argument are as follows. On the night of the incident underlying his conviction, Petitioner was attempting to buy crack cocaine from a drug dealer named Maria. Petitioner asserts that Reyes, the victim, worked for, or with, Maria and that, on the night of the incident, Reyes was delivering drugs to Petitioner on Maria's orders. Thus, when Reyes arrived at Petitioner's location, he invited Petitioner into his car to conduct the contemplated drug deal. According to Petitioner, the drug transaction went awry when Reyes realized that Petitioner had attempted to purchase the crack cocaine with counterfeit money. At that point, according to Petitioner, Reyes shut the car door with Petitioner inside and then the sped off. Thereafter, Reyes and Petitioner fought for control of the car until it crashed.
What follows is merely a summary of the facts according to Petitioner. Other than Petitioner's assertions, there is no evidence in the record to support the following allegations.
Petitioner maintains that, thereafter, he grabbed two cell phones that he noticed in Reyes's car and ran off. However, Petitioner saw that Reyes had a third cell phone. According to Petitioner, Reyes used the third cell phone to call the police and report the accident. But when Reyes did so, according to Petitioner, he pretended to be someone named Miguel.
Citing these allegations, Petitioner maintains that his counsel committed prejudicial error in failing to obtain the phone records that would have supported the foregoing allegations. The court of appeal rejected this claim on the merits. In doing so, the court of appeal applied the proper legal standard for analyzing federal law challenges based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. ( See Lodged Doc. No. 2 at 10 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).) Accordingly, the court of appeal's resolution of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly established precedents. As such, Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless he can show that the court of appeal unreasonably applied the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent -- that is, he must show that the court of appeal unreasonably applied the governing legal standard to the facts of his case. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). As explained below, Petitioner cannot make that showing.
As noted by the court of appeal, Petitioner's challenge to his counsel's performance is governed by the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the first prong of that test, the petitioner must prove that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show his counsel " made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In reviewing trial counsel's performance, however, courts " strongly presume[] [that counsel] rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). Only if counsel's acts and omissions, examined within the context of all the surrounding circumstances, were outside the " wide range" of professionally competent assistance, will petitioner meet this initial burden. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
Under the second part of Strickland 's two-prong test, the petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The errors must not merely undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, but must result in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair. Williams, 529 U.S. at 393 n.17; Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369. The petitioner must prove both deficient performance and prejudice. A court need not, however, determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before determining whether the petitioner suffered prejudice as the result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Here, Petitioner can show neither deficient performance nor prejudice with respect to his allegation of attorney error. First, no evidence supports Petitioner's assertions that Reyes was a drug dealer or that he knew, or worked for, a drug dealer named Maria. Such unsupported claims do not warrant habeas relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (" Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief."); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (habeas relief not warranted where claims for relief are unsupported by facts).
Second, the record belies Petitioner's claim that his counsel performed deficiently in failing to obtain Reyes's phone records. In fact, counsel obtained the records for the two phones of which Reyes claimed ownership. Those records showed no contact between Reyes and Maria. Indeed, Reyes's phones did not even list anyone named Maria as a contact. Although counsel did not obtain phone records for a third phone that, according to Petitioner (and Petitioner only), belonged to Reyes, there is no reason to believe that doing so would have yielded any beneficial evidence to Petitioner. Counsel obtained the phone records of the person identified as Maria, and those records showed no contact between Reyes and Maria, or between Reyes and anyone else involved in drug dealing. And, other than Petitioner's self-serving allegations, no evidence was offered to show that the third phone even belonged to Reyes. Although Petitioner now insists that it did, he elected not to testify at trial. As for Reyes, he testified that he had only two cell phones, one of which did not work. Counsel obtained the records for both of those phones.
Third, assuming deficient performance, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. Petitioner's entire argument is based on the belief that Reyes worked with, or for, a drug dealer named Maria. But as set forth above, nothing in the record supports that belief. Nor is there any evidence to show that the phone records from the third phone would have provided the missing evidence on this point.
Given this record, there is no reason to conclude that counsel erred or that, but for counsel's purported error, the jury likely would have reached an outcome more favorable to Petitioner than the one it actually reached. Accordingly, the court of appeal's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Because the court of appeal also applied the correct law, habeas relief is unwarranted on this claim.
VII. ORDER
The Magistrate Judge therefore orders that judgment be entered denying the Petition on the merits with prejudice. DATED: April 29, 2015
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, IT IS ADJUDGED that the Petition is dismissed with prejudice.