Summary
overruling defendant's issue that the trial court should have conducted an informal competency hearing based, in part, on his statements that "he had been diagnosed with PTSD as a result of military service in Iraq," suffered flashbacks, was discharged from the military as a disabled veteran, and was on medication
Summary of this case from Joseph v. State No. 05-08-01678-CR
Opinion Filed June 23, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-33269-Y.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice MURPHY.
Paul Edison Charley appeals his jury conviction for the sexual assault of his daughter. The issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an informal inquiry into Charley's competency to stand trial. We affirm.
Background
Charley was arrested following his daughter's disclosure that he had sexually assaulted her. Charley confessed to repeated assaults over the course of several years and was charged with three offenses. The State tried Charley for an aggravated sexual assault first. After the jury returned a guilty verdict and assessed a fifteen-year sentence, the State offered fifteen-year sentences in the instant case and the third case to run concurrently with the existing sentence. The State notified Charley that it would seek consecutive sentences in the two remaining cases if he rejected the offer. At a pre-trial hearing, the trial judge explained to Charley that he "could get out of jail as soon as seven-and-a-half years" if Charley accepted the offer. The judge told Charley that concurrent sentences were "the very best [he] could do" because he had already been convicted of one offense. The judge warned Charley that if he went to trial, he would "run a very significant risk of going to jail for the rest of [his] life." The judge asked Charley if he understood and Charley responded, "Yes, Your Honor." The judge then explained to Charley his right to a jury trial and warned again that his position could not "possibly be improved by going to trial on these cases, it [could] only get worse." Charley repeated that he understood and that he wanted to go to trial. Thereafter, the State opted to try the two cases separately and proceeded to trial on the sexual assault charge. At trial, the State called seven witnesses. In addition to the testimony of Charley's daughter detailing the abuse, the jury heard the arresting officer's testimony that Charley had voluntarily confessed. The jury also saw Charley's video-taped confession, which included the details of how he assaulted his daughter. The video also included Charley's statements that he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of military service in Iraq, suffered from flashbacks, and only wanted to stay home and drink. After the State rested, the judge admonished Charley of his right against self-incrimination. The judge explained to Charley that if he testified, the State could impeach him with his prior testimony and video-taped confession. Charley twice acknowledged he understood and stated he wished to testify. The trial judge then confirmed with Charley's counsel that she had discussed "all of this" with Charley and that nothing further needed to be discussed with respect to his right to testify. Charley then testified. He informed the jury he was a disabled veteran and denied he assaulted his daughter. He said his confession was not truthful but the result of not understanding the officer and being nervous, confused, surprised, under pressure, misled, and unaware of his rights and the consequences of confessing. Charley testified again at the punishment phase of the trial. He stated he was receiving treatment at the VA Hospital for PTSD and was on medication that was changed "every once in a while" because it was not effective. Charley expressed concern for his family and asked for probation. The jury assessed a fourteen-year sentence, which the trial court ordered to run consecutively to the fifteen-year sentence, and a $10,000 fine. Discussion
Subjecting a legally incompetent person to trial violates his Texas and federal due process rights. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2006). To protect a defendant's constitutional and statutory rights, a trial court must inquire into a defendant's mental competence once the issue is sufficiently raised. McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 709. The initial inquiry is informal and is required when evidence suggesting incompetency comes to the trial court's attention and creates a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind as to whether a defendant is incompetent. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b), (c); Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows truly bizarre behavior by the defendant, recent severe mental illness, or at least moderate mental retardation. Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425. A bona fide doubt about a defendant's competency may arise from the trial court's observations, known facts, evidence presented, motions, affidavits, or any other claim or credible source. Brown v. State, 960 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd) (citing Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Thompson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g)). In evaluating a defendant's competency to stand trial, the trial court considers the defendant's level of understanding of the proceeding and ability to consult with counsel in preparation for the proceeding. Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425-26. We review a trial court's decision not to conduct an informal competency inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 426. In applying this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we determine whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. Charley argues the trial court erred in not making an informal inquiry into his competency due to his (1) rejection of the State's plea offer; (2) statements that he had been diagnosed with PTSD as a result of military service in Iraq, suffered from flashbacks, and only wanted to stay home and drink; and (3) trial testimony that he was discharged from the military as a disabled veteran and was on medication. Charley also relies on statements made in a pre-trial hearing in which the trial court addressed Charley's request for new counsel. Specifically, he told the trial court that he was "sick," he was a "patient here at this jail," and he asked for an "MHMR attorney to help [him] on the case." He also relies on his counsel's statement that Charley had failed to follow her suggestions on how to handle his cases. We conclude the evidence does not sufficiently raise an issue of Charley's incompetency under the applicable standards. To begin, no evidence exists of moderate retardation, and no evidence from any source suggests any present or recent clinical proof that Charley's mental health issues were severe. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426; Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 765, 766 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). None of the actions Charley cites were "truly" bizarre or showed an inability to communicate with counsel or understand the proceedings. See, e.g., Criswell v. State, 278 S.W.3d 455, 458-59 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (appellant's refusing plea offer, standing by a presumption of innocence, and requiring the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt did not suggest incompetency); Baldwin v. State, 227 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (same — rejecting plea offer and refusing to apply for probation, both against advice of counsel); Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (same — requesting removal of court-appointed counsel based on ineffective assistance). To the contrary, many of Charley's actions suggest he was competent. His theory at trial that he was pressured and misled into confessing, for example, shows that his rejection of the plea offer was a result of a plan of action established to discredit his confession. This shows he understood the significance of his confession and the proceedings against him. Similarly, his request to discharge counsel based on a claim she had failed to share trial strategy with him, and his request for an MHMR attorney, shows he had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. See Reed, 122 S.W.3d at 711. That he failed to follow counsel's suggestions and sought new counsel also shows that he consciously was trying to pursue his own strategy. His emphasis to the judge that he was sick and taking medicine was offered at the time he was seeking new counsel, and he used the same information as part of his strategy in his testifying before the jury. At no time did counsel, the prosecutor, or the court, all of whom observed Charley, question his ability to understand the proceedings. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426 (those observing appellant's behavior in better position to determine competency). Nor does the record reflect that Charley's behavior or comprehension during the proceedings was abnormal. His testimony was lucid and showed he was cognizant of and understood the charges against him. He also understood the risks and danger associated with trying the cases and testifying in his defense. See McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 712 (quoting Johnson v. State, 564 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (op. on reh'g), rev'd on other grounds by, Williams v. State, 663 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) for proposition that, in reviewing whether evidence raised bona fide doubt requiring competency inquiry, lucid testimony by appellant has often been viewed as important in determining competency to stand trial). Conclusion
Having considered the record, we conclude the evidence did not raise a bona fide doubt as to whether Charley was incompetent and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an informal inquiry. We resolve Charley's sole issue against him and affirm the trial court's judgment.