MINUTE ENTRY

BARBIER, J.

Before the Court is plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Defendant Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. ("Chevron") opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on Wednesday, May 10, 2001, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument.

Finding that plaintiff's claim under the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 et seq., was fraudulently pled to defeat removal, and that federal jurisdiction is present pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., the Court holds that plaintiff's motion to remand must be denied as more fully explained below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his motion to remand, plaintiff alleges that defendant is barred from removing this action because it was brought in state court under the Jones Act. Plaintiff alleges that he qualifies for the protections of the Jones Act by virtue of his permanent connection to a vessel in navigation, the Genesis Spar. Petition, ¶¶ 3-6. In support of its counter-argument that the Genesis Spar is not a vessel in navigation, defendant has supplied the Court with the affidavit of Arthur L. Herman, II, Facilities Engineering Advisor for Chevron. Opp., Exh. A. Herman's affidavit establishes that the Genesis Spar, which is located offshore in Green Canyon Block 205, was designed solely as a work platform. Id., ¶ 10. It is anchored above the wellheads by 14 steel chain/wire rope anchor lines, which in turn are connected to massive pilings driven 250 into the ocean floor. Id., ¶ 7. The Genesis Spar has no organic means of propulsion, and its movement is limited to a 50 to 140-foot range to allow for positioning near a wellhead. Id., ¶ 8. It has never been located in any other spot than its current location, where it is intended to stay until the oil reserves beneath it are exhausted, which is not predicted to occur for twenty years. Id., ¶ 9. Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence that would countervail Herman's affidavit.

DISCUSSION

Jones Act claims ordinarily not subject to removal

It is well-settled that Jones Act cases are not removable unless a plaintiff has fraudulently pled his Jones Act claim. Burchett v. Cargill, 48 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1995). In determining if a Jones Act claim has been fraudulently pled, district courts may use a summary judgment-like procedure to pierce the plaintiff's pleadings and dispose of the claims.Id. at 176. "The court may deny remand where, but only where, it determines, after resolving `all disputed questions of fact and any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law in plaintiff's favor,' that there is `no reasonable basis for predicting that the plaintiff might establish liability' under the Jones Act." Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 F.3d 353, 356-57 (5th Cir. 1999), quoting Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176.

Requirements for Jones Act status

The Jones Act applies to [a]ny seaman who . . . suffer[ed] personal injury in the course of his employment." 46 App. U.S.C. § 688. Seaman status requires, inter alia, "a connection to a vessel in navigation . . . that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 (1997) (emphasis added).

A spar designed primarily as a work platform is not a vessel

As part of the ongoing endeavor by the courts to define the contours of the term "vessel in navigation" for Jones Act purposes, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that a spar designed primarily as a work platform is not a vessel. Fields, 182 F.3d at 358-59. In reaching this holding, the Fifth Circuit applied a three-part test to determine whether a structure is a work platform rather than a Jones Act vessel. Id. at 357-58. In brief, courts must ask (1) whether the structure was built to serve primarily as a work platform; (2) whether the structure is moored or otherwise secured; and (3) whether the structure has a transportation function "beyond theoretical mobility and occasional incidental movement." Id. at 358.

Applying these factors to a structure known as the Neptune Spar, the Fifth Circuit found that it was not a vessel because all three of the above factors were present. First, its owners had no plan to move the Neptune Spar until the oilfield in which it was located was exhausted, an event not expected to occur for fifteen years. Id. at 358. Moreover, the Neptune Spar was designed to exploit the field, not solely to discover and open it, requiring a long-term commitment to a particular location.Id. The Fifth Circuit found that these facts mandated the conclusion that the Neptune Spar was designed to serve as a work platform in a fixed location for the foreseeable future, and therefore, the first factor for classification as a work platform was satisfied. Id.

Second, the Neptune Spar was secured by an elaborate system involving 180-foot pilings run into the ocean floor, to which the spar was attached by massive chain lines. It was additionally secured by the infrastructure required for the extraction of the petroleum. Id. at 358-59. These facts led the Fields court to conclude that the second factor required for classification as a work platform was also met. Id. With respect to the third factor, the court found it was satisfied because the Neptune Spar was extremely limited in its mobility, which was purely incidental to its function. Id. at 359. While the spar could shift in order to situate itself over one of the seven wellheads, this movement was limited to 250 feet in any direction. Id. Thus, under the three-prong test for work platform status, the Fifth Circuit found the Neptune Spar was clearly a work platform and not a vessel.

Application of law to facts

The facts of the instant case are so similar to those in Fields that the exercise of applying the three factors to our case is almost redundant. The affidavit of Arthur L. Herman, II establishes the first requirement for work platform status is present because the Genesis Spar was built to serve primarily as a work platform, and it has never been located in any other spot than its current location, where it is intended to stay until the oil reserves beneath it are exhausted, which is not predicted to occur for twenty years. Opp., Exh. A, ¶¶ 9-10. The second factor for work platform status is met because the structure is secured by 14 steel chain/wire rope anchor lines, which in turn are connected to massive pilings driven 250 into the ocean floor. Id., ¶ 7. The third factor is present because the Genesis Spar has no transportation function beyond theoretical mobility and occasional incidental movement, since it has no organic means of propulsion, and its movement is limited to a 50 to 140-foot range to allow for positioning near a wellhead. Id. at ¶ 8. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Fields requires the conclusion that the Genesis Spar is a work platform, not a vessel. This being the case, plaintiff cannot be considered a Jones Act seaman since he was not permanently assigned to a vessel in navigation. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535. Since plaintiff's Jones Act claim was fraudulently pled, it does not provide a bar to removal.

OCSLA jurisdiction

The OCSLA provides federal subject matter jurisdiction for cases involving injuries which occur on platforms on the outer continental shelf. Plaintiff claims that his injuries involved the negligence of Chevron employees and unsafe conditions on the Genesis Spar, which is located in Green Canyon Block 205 on the outer continental shelf. Therefore, his claims are governed by OCSLA and federal subject matter jurisdiction is present regardless of the citizenship of the parties.

Accordingly;

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 8) should be and is hereby DENIED.