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refusing to find that "public humiliation and mental anguish" as well as harm to "reputation" constitute irreparable harm
Summary of this case from Mungia v. Judson Independent School DistrictOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0468-L
December 17, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the District Court's Standing Order of Reference, filed April 23, 2003, this matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management and for recommendation on dispositive motions. The following pleadings are presently before this Court:
1. Plaintiff's Plaintiff's Brief [sic] for Preliminary Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(a), filed July 25, 2003;
2. Plaintiff's Brief [sic] for Preliminary Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2 (a) the Appendix/Exhibits, filed July 25, 2003;
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, filed August 19, 2003;
4. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, filed September 9, 2003; and
5. Appendix to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, filed September 9, 2003.
Having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence submitted therewith, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers"), proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint ("Compl.") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Andrew Marks ("Marks"), who is the Executive Director of the Texas State Board of Social Workers Examiners ("Board") in Austin, Texas. Chalmers is studying to become a licensed social worker, and the Board is a state agency set up to regulate the profession of social work in Texas. The Board is administratively attached to the Texas Department of Health, has rule-making authority, is governed by a nine member board appointed by the Governor, and regulated by the Social Work Practice Act, TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 505.001, et seq. (Vernon 1999). Chalmers alleges that Marks violated his constitutional rights by not approving his application to take the social worker licensing examination and refusing to provide him with an administrative hearing. (Compl. at 1-2.) Chalmers requests monetary damages, declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and a trial. See id. at 3.On May 9, 2003, Marks filed a motion to dismiss Chalmers' Complaint or to order Chalmers to file a more definite statement of his claims pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). On recommendation from this Court, the District Court dismissed Chalmers' monetary claims, but denied dismissal of Chalmers' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief on August 1, 2003. The District Court also ordered Chalmers to file an amended Complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) to replead his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Chalmers filed the instant motion ("Mot.") for preliminary injunctive relief on August 19, 2003, and filed an Amended Complaint on August 22, 2003.
Chalmers' motion for a preliminary injunction was referred to this Court, which entered an Order on August 26, 2003, stating that it would consider Chalmers' July 25, 2003 brief for preliminary injunctive relief ("Br.") and supporting appendix ("Chalmers App.") in support of his current motion. Also in that Order, the Court ordered Marks to file a response with supporting evidence by September 9, 2003, and it allowed Chalmers to file a reply. Marks filed a response ("Resp.") with a supporting appendix ("Marks App.") on September 9, 2003; but Chalmers failed to file a reply. Chalmers' motion for preliminary injunctive relief is now ripe for determination.
The Court notes that Marks spends a third of his response arguing for the dismissal of Chalmers' Amended Complaint. (Resp. at 2-4.) The Court has before it only Chalmers' motion for preliminary injunction. To the extent that Marks requests dismissal of Chalmers' Amended Complaint, which requests a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment, he should file a motion to dismiss in accordance with the local rules. See N.D. TEX. L. CIV. R. 5.1(c) (requiring that any document with more than one motion must clearly identify each in its title); followed in Ortloff v. Fleming, 2003 WL 21246098, at *1 n. 1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2003) (finding that "buried" motions "without reference in the title and without separately complying with the local rules of court applicable to motions" were not properly before the Court). Marks' request for dismissal in his response is not properly before the Court and will not be considered.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for a Preliminary Injunction
Chalmers moves for a preliminary injunction under FED. R. CIV. P. 65 to force Marks to provide him an administrative hearing on his social worker licensing application, to take the social worker licensing examination, and obtain a temporary social worker license. (Mot. at 1-2.) Rule 65 authorizes federal injunctions, and the requirements that must be satisfied to obtain a preliminary injunction are set out in the case law: "To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff's outweighs the injury to the defendant; and (4) granting the injunction does not disserve the public interest." Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas v. Sanchez, 280 F. Supp.2d 590, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Cherokee Pump Equipment, Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1994)). "A preliminary injunction is an `extraordinary remedy' that should not be granted unless a party demonstrates the above four factors by a `clear showing.'" Malone Mortgage Company America, Ltd. v. Martinez, 2002 WL 31114160, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2002) (quoting Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1997)). "Strict proof of each element is required before a court may issue a preliminary injunction." Chalmers v. Gavin, 2003 WL 22290535, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n of Lubbock, Texas v. Goodpasture Computer Servs., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1987)). "Because preliminary injunctive relief should be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four factors, it is unnecessary for the court to consider the remaining factors when the movant fails to carry its burden on any one of the factors." Consolidated Restaurant Operations, Inc. v. National Processing Co., LLC, 2002 WL 1432469, at *4 n. 5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2002) (citation omitted); see also Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The failure of a movant to establish one of the above four elements will result in the denial of a motion for a temporary injunction.").
The "[t]hreat of irreparable injury is `[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.'" Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls Intern., Inc., 2001 WL 34109376, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2001) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR B. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.1 (1995)). Indeed, the Supreme Court "has stated that `[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies[.]" Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)). After a thorough review of Chalmers' motion, the Court finds that Chalmers fails to establish a "substantial threat of irreparable harm;" thus, the Court need not address the remaining three elements. See Chalmers, 2003 WL 22290535, at * 1 (denying preliminary injunction where no substantial likelihood of success or irreparable injury and not considering other two factors); see also Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Esh, 2002 WL 31757640, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2002) (considering only irreparable harm and refusing to grant preliminary injunction where movant failed to show irreparable harm).
B. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Harm
Chalmers' July 25, 2003 brief proclaims that he "will suffer irreparable injury if defendants are not enjoined during this lawsuit because plaintiff has met all [of] the requirements to sit for the state social worker exam." (Br. at 3.) Chalmers alleges that he will suffer harm to his "reputation, . . . public hatred, contempt and ridicule," injury to his "business and profession," "personal humiliation and mental anguish." Id. Chalmers fails to provide any supporting evidence of irreparable harm in his motion, brief, or appendix. Assertions of injuries not supported by evidence fail to clearly establish irreparable harm. See American Telnet, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 1999 WL242686, at *2 (N.D. Tex. April 16, 1999). "The irreparable harm element must be satisfied by independent proof, or no injunction may issue. Speculative injury is not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant. Clearly demonstrating irreparable harm is a heavy burden to overcome." Id.
In addition to the lack of evidence, Chalmers also fails to clearly establish how such alleged harm would be irreparable. "The word irreparable connotes that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again [or] atoned for." Consolidated Restaurant Operations, Inc. v. National Processing Co., LLC, 2002 WL 1432469, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2002). "[O]nly those injuries that cannot be redressed by the application of a judicial remedy after a hearing on the merits can properly justify a preliminary injunction." Id. "The mere existence of an `adverse effect' is insufficient to establish the `irreparable harm' element of a preliminary injunction." Esh, 2002 WL 31757640, at *2. Chalmers' bare allegations, even when taken as true, allege only adverse effects; they fail to clearly show harm that would be uncorrectable by legal remedies.
Furthermore, Chalmers cites no authority, and the Court has found none, which has found irreparable harm based on "public hatred, contempt and ridicule," or "personal humiliation and mental anguish." While Chalmers alleges injury to his "business and profession," he offers no supporting evidence of such injury or how it is irreparable. Courts have found irreparable injury to a business usually only in situations where a business was ongoing and monetary damages would be insufficient to repair the continuing damage to the business. See, e.g., Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991) ("This Court has recognized that when economic rights are especially difficult to calculate, a finding of irreparable harm maybe appropriate."); Martinez, 2002 WL 31114160, at *25 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2002) (noting that "[m]ere loss of income" is not irreparable, but evidence that movant may "very well may lose its business" was evidence of irreparable harm). Contrary to these cases, Chalmers does not present evidence that he has an ongoing business that is suffering continuing damage at the hands of Marks. Because Chalmers' motion is entirely lacking in evidence of irreparable harm, the Court finds no basis to conclude that Chalmers would suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief.
Consequently, because Chalmers fails to establish a "substantial threat of irreparable harm," the Court need not address the remaining three elements, and the motion for preliminary injunction should be denied. See Esh, 2002 WL 31757640, at *2; see also Consolidated Restaurant Operations, Inc., 2002 WL 1432469, at *4 n. 5; Medlin, 874 F.2d at 1091; Anderson, 835 F.2d at 133.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief be DENIED. SO RECOMMENDED, on this
The denial of Chalmers' motion for preliminary injunction is not to be construed as a final determination on the merits. In a preliminary injunction context, the movant need not prove his case, but must establish each of the four elements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. See Taylor, 932 F.2d at 1109 n. 11; see also Amerispec, Inc. v. Metro Inspection Services, Inc., 2001 WL 770999, at *6 n. 8 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2001) (noting that a preliminary injunction "is not a final decision — which can only be reached after full consideration of the merits (by pretrial motion or trial)).