OPINION AND ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, United States District Judge

Pro se petitioner Antwane Carlisle seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Petitioner challenges his 1998 sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment on the ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons set forth below, Carlisle's petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In late June 1997, petitioner broke into the St. Dennis School in Yonkers, New York. See Transcript of July 27, 1998 Trial ("Tr.") at 12. Once inside, petitioner used a fire extinguisher to shatter a computer lab window, entered the lab, and stole a Gateway computer. See id. at 13. The Yonkers Police found fingerprints on the fire extinguisher which they later determined belonged to petitioner. See id. at 14. Petitioner gave the stolen computer to Ulysses Stevenson, from whom it was recovered by the police. See id. Against the advice of counsel, petitioner testified at trial that a man named "Cat" had stolen the computer while petitioner waited outside. See id. at 216-219. Petitioner claimed that his fingerprints were on the fire extinguisher because he fell on it when it was used to prop the school's outside door open, but that he had never entered the school. See id. at 221.

B. Procedural Background

Petitioner was indicted on six different counts. See Indictment, No. 97-1629, Ex. A to Respondent's Memorandum of Law ("Resp. Mem.") (original exhibit unnumbered). The first three counts were based on a July 1997 incident in which petitioner was accused of stealing from his grandmother: (1) burglary in the second degree; (2) attempted petit larceny; and (3) criminal mischief in the fourth degree. See id. Counts four, five, and six were based on the burglary at the St. Dennis School: (4) burglary in the third degree; (5) criminal mischief in the fourth degree; and (6) petit larceny. See id.

On August 3, 1998, petitioner was convicted of counts four, five, and six, but acquitted on counts one, two and three. See Tr. at 239-240. The People sought persistent felony offender status for petitioner, and filed a statement on August 3, 1998 listing petitioner's previous felony, youthful offender and misdemeanor convictions. See Persistent Felony Offender Statement, Ex. D to Resp. Mem. (original exhibit unnumbered). At a hearing on September 30, 1998, petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment as a persistent felony offender, a sentence he is currently serving in the Attica Correctional Facility. See 9/30/98 Sentencing Hearing Transcript ("Sent. Tr.") at 2, 4.

On December 7, 1998, the Westchester County Court denied petitioner's motion to vacate the sentence. See 12/7/1998 Decision and Order on N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 Motion, Ex. G to Resp. Mem. (original exhibit unnumbered). On March 17, 1999, the Appellate Division, Second Department, denied leave to appeal. See Appellate Division Decision and Order on Motion, Ex. I to Resp. Mem. (original exhibit unnumbered). On May 15, 2000, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed petitioner's conviction. See People v. Carlisle, 716 N.Y.S.2d 645 (2d Dep't 2000). On October 26, 2000, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. See People v. Carlisle, 708 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2000). On October 31, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). The AEDPA, which modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254, created a new standard of review for federal courts to apply when reviewing habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-14 (2000); Whittman v. Sabourin, No. 00 Civ. 2867, 2001 WL 687369, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2001)

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in a State court proceeding.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner seeking federal habeas review of a state conviction must first exhaust available state remedies by "`present[ing] his federal constitutional claims to the highest court of the state before a federal court may consider the merits of the petition.'" Cook v. Pearlman, No. 01 Civ. 7168, 2002 WL 1751305, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002) (quoting Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1991)). A petitioner must "fairly present" his constitutional claims to state court, and must apprise the state court of "both the factual and the legal premises of the claim the petitioner asserts in federal court." Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1997). When a petitioner raises a colorable federal claim in state court solely as a violation of a state statute and "`not on the basis of an invasion of his federal constitutional rights, dismissal by the federal court is mandated as the claim is unexhausted.'" Orraca v. Walker, 53 F. Supp.2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. Fogg, 571 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir. 1978)).

Respondent claims that petitioner's section 440 motion to vacate his sentence did not allege a violation of federal law or discuss the alleged failures of counsel in sufficient detail. However, a petitioner need not inform the state court of all of the details of his federal claim. "The standards for presenting federal constitutional claims to state courts are not so stringent as to require the citation of `book and verse on the federal constitution.'" Love v. Khulman, No. 99 Civ. 11063, 2001 WL 1606759, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2001) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971)). Here, petitioner alleged a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Petitioner explained that he had ineffective counsel because counsel failed to present sufficient mitigating factors and witnesses at the sentencing hearing. See 12/10/98 Affidavit of Antwane Carlisle in Support of Motion to Set Aside Sentence ("Carlisle Aff."), Ex. E to Resp. Mem., ¶¶ 3-5, 9 (original exhibit unnumbered). This was enough to "fairly present" his federal claims to the state court and afforded the state court the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. Therefore, petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies concerning the claim presented in the instant petition.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing because his trial counsel failed to raise mitigating factors and call witnesses which might have prevented petitioner from being sentenced as a persistent felony offender. See Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition ("Petition") at 10. Petitioner claims that his counsel should have called two psychologists, Dr. Weiss and Dr. Halpern, to testify that petitioner committed the crimes because of drug addiction, and not because of a propensity toward violent conduct. See id. at 9, 21. Petitioner claims that his counsel should have called family members to testify that petitioner would be better served by drug treatment rather than prolonged incarceration as a persistent felony offender. See id. at 15. Petitioner also argues that if counsel had been properly prepared, he would have uncovered other mitigating factors. See id. at 11.

Under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), petitioner must satisfy a two-part test. First, petitioner must show that in light of all the circumstances, counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional standards. See id. at 687. Petitioner's burden is onerous. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. . . . [Counsel is] strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 689-90. Second, even if counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, a petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the legal representation. See id. at 687. To prove prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective. Petitioner argues that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable because he failed to call witnesses at his sentencing hearing. This argument is incorrect. "Failure to call a witness at trial does not necessarily imply ineffective assistance." Demosthene v. Miller, No. 97 Civ. 495, 1998 WL 338087, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998). See also United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1990) (counsel's decision not to call allegedly exculpatory witnesses was not a lapse in representation) Counsel's decision to proceed with the sentencing hearing even though additional witnesses had not been located can be seen as a strategic decision to benefit petitioner. Petitioner's grandmother and aunt testified against him as prosecution witnesses at trial, and petitioner had been living outside his parent's home since the age of sixteen. Regardless of the effect petitioner now claims their testimony would have had on the sentencing court, counsel's decision not to call these witnesses was reasonable. A sentencing proceeding allows the court to consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, in all matters "pertaining to the defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct." N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 400.20 (McKinney 2002). Accordingly, counsel's decision to describe the family's request for drug treatment and petitioner's drug use reaped the benefit of the proposed testimony without the risk of detrimental cross-examination. Thus, counsel's decision was not unreasonable.

Petitioner claims that counsel should have uncovered the following mitigating factors: he was scheduled to enter college, he had signed up as homeless at the Department of Social Services, he was attempting to enter a residential drug treatment and work program, and he had enrolled in a training program as a counseling aide. See Petition at 11. Petitioner does not claim that he provided any of this information to counsel. Petitioner himself did not raise any specific mitigating factors in any of his state court proceedings. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for counsel to rely on petitioner's drug use as the sole mitigating factor. Because there is no support in the record to indicate that counsel's decision rises to the level of a Strickland violation, the first prong of the Strickland test has not been satisfied.

Nor does petitioner meet the second prong of the Strickland test. Even if counsel had offered the testimony of family members and presented the mitigating factors, it is unlikely that the court would not have found petitioner to be a persistent felony offender. The court found that petitioner had likely committed similar burglaries. See Sent. Tr. at 19. The court also concluded that petitioner's explanation of the events of the day of the burglary was "perjurious." Petitioner's prior misdemeanor and felony convictions were also considered. See id. at 20. The court detailed prior sentences of leniency and rehabilitation and said that petitioner's "entire adult life has been involved in [a] series of thefts and crimes of violence . . . it would appear that a sentence as a persistent felony offender may be the only appropriate way to protect the public." Id. at 21. The court concluded that petitioner gave the court no assurance that he would not "go out tomorrow or as soon as you were released from custody and victimize someone else, maybe your own family." Id. at 24-25. Based on the court's strong conviction that a persistent felony offender sentence was warranted, it seems unlikely that evidence supporting the theory that petitioner's drug problem was solely to blame for his actions would have swayed the court. Therefore, even if counsel's performance was ineffective, petitioner was not prejudiced by such ineffective assistance.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's motion for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Because petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Lucidore v. New York State Div of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.