Opinion
02-23-00150-CR
08-30-2024
Peter Cardona, Appellant v. The State of Texas
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1758622
Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Elizabeth Kerr Justice
A jury found Appellant Peter Cardona guilty of murdering Alfredo Olivares, and the trial court assessed his punishment at 15 years' incarceration. Cardona appeals from his conviction, arguing in two issues that the trial court erred by overruling his improper-jury-argument objections and by committing jury-charge error. We will affirm.
I. Background
In September 2020, Olivares lived in a house on Valentine Street in Fort Worth with several of his extended family members. At the time, Olivares was on house arrest for a 2019 aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon charge arising from a shooting incident at the Valentine Street home. Because of this incident, Olivares was subject to GPS monitoring and wore an ankle monitor.
On the evening of September 18, 2020, one of Olivares's family members who lived in the Valentine Street home invited some friends over for drinks. The group gathered in the home's combined back-porch and carport area, drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. One of the attendees invited Cardona. Cardona-who was already intoxicated from a night of drinking-arrived sometime in the early morning hours of September 19, 2020.
Cardona had been to the Valentine Street home before. He had known Olivares for as long as he could remember because their families knew each other. A few years before the gathering, the two men had a disagreement during which Olivares suddenly "flipped a switch," became aggressive, and had some of his friends "jump" Cardona. Because of that incident, Cardona was scared of Olivares.
Despite his fear of Olivares, Cardona went to the gathering at the Valentine Street home. Cardona claimed that he was surprised to see Olivares there because he had been told that Olivares had moved out. But Cardona also said that he went there that night knowing that Olivares would be there. Although Olivares was there, Cardona chose to stay because he "didn't want to seem like [he] was scared of [Olivares] or . . . like a chicken."
Cardona and Olivares cordially greeted and engaged with each other that night. They sat next to one another for most of the evening and were seen hugging, talking, and drinking together. Surveillance video footage from that evening also showed the two men sitting next to each other and getting along. Cardona admitted that drinking was not the only thing the two men did that night; according to him, "[t]here was marijuana involved."
The Valentine Street home had a motion-activated video surveillance system directed at the back-porch, carport, and front-yard areas.
Cardona testified that he and Olivares talked about their respective families and "talk[ed] about the past, reminiscing." Sensing that Olivares wanted to discuss the earlier incident between them, Cardona asked him, "[D]o you remember when you sic[c]ed your dogs on me?" Olivares laughed and responded, "[Y]eah, we beat your ass." Cardona replied, "I don't remember it like that, but if that's what happened, I guess so." Although they talked about the past, Cardona denied that he was "trying to start any crap" with Olivares. He insisted that he wanted to "[l]et bygones be bygones."
The two men also discussed Olivares's ankle monitor: Cardona knew about the 2019 shooting incident and knew that Olivares could not leave his home. Cardona noticed Olivares's ankle monitor, and Olivares told him that "they got me on this hard-ass monitor[;] I fucking shot this fool."
The night of the gathering, however, Olivares was unarmed. Although Cardona was intoxicated, he brought a gun with him to the party that night because, according to him, he always carried a gun with him when he left his home. He conceded, however, that it was unreasonable for him to carry a weapon while intoxicated. At one point that evening, he lifted his shirt to show another party attendee the gun tucked into his waistband. Cardona admitted that he knew that Olivares was unarmed.
Eventually, the crowd thinned to just Olivares and Cardona. At this point, both men were intoxicated. According to Cardona, Olivares's demeanor changed once everyone else left-Olivares started "talking shit" and insisted that Cardona owed him money.
Olivares later told detectives that he was so intoxicated that he urinated on himself after he got home that morning.
Surveillance video footage showed the two men walking through the Valentine Street home's backdoor and then into the home's front yard a few minutes before 6:00 a.m. Olivares closely followed Cardona, and Cardona told Olivares that he was making him nervous. As Olivares turned away to urinate in the yard, Cardona tried to leave but had trouble opening the gate.
Olivares then asked Cardona where he was going, and Cardona responded that he was going home. Olivares continued to insist that Cardona owed him money. Cardona eventually opened the gate and walked toward his truck, which was parked down the street.
There was no surveillance footage of what happened next because the men walked outside of the camera's frame. Cardona testified that as he began walking toward his truck, Olivares followed him. According to Cardona, Olivares yelled, "Where you going, bitch. If you don't pay me my money, I'm going to kill you right here. And after I'm done with you, I'm going to kill your family. I know where your mom lives." Olivares's threats "pissed" Cardona off and scared him.
Cardona reached into his left pocket to get his keys; his gun was also on his left side. Cardona then looked over his shoulder and saw Olivares reaching for something. According to Cardona, Olivares was "not far behind" him and was "coming at" him. At that point, Cardona took out his gun and started shooting. He continued to shoot even after Olivares took cover behind another vehicle between the first and second shots.
Cardona does not have use of his right hand due to a congenital anomaly.
Video surveillance footage from other homes on Valentine Street recorded the sound of six gunshots, and law enforcement later found six casings at the scene. Two bullets hit Olivares, one in his abdomen and one in his back. Olivares died from the gunshot wound to his back.
After the shooting, Cardona left the scene. On his way home, he disassembled the gun, went to Z. Boaz Park, and threw the parts into a river there. Cardona later told law enforcement where he had dumped the gun's parts and went with officers to the spot, but the parts were never recovered.
Cardona was charged with Olivares's murder. He pleaded not guilty, and guilt- innocence was tried to a jury. At trial, the jury heard testimony from, among others, several party attendees, the two detectives who had interviewed Cardona after the shooting, and Cardona. Surveillance footage from the party and from the neighboring homes was played for the jury, as was a video of Cardona's interview with the detectives in which he admitted shooting Olivares.
The trial court included deadly force self-defense and defense-of-property instructions in the jury charge. Within these instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that it could presume that an actor's belief that force was immediately necessary to protect himself against another's use or attempted use of unlawful force was reasonable, provided that, among other things, the actor "was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of [a] law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used." The trial court additionally instructed the jury that under certain circumstances, a person has no duty to retreat before using deadly force, provided again that the person "is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used."
In its closing argument, the State pointed out that Cardona had testified that he carried a weapon with him every day. The State argued that Cardona "was committing a crime every day of his life" by carrying a weapon. Cardona's attorneys argued that Cardona was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity at the time of the shooting because he was not illegally carrying a weapon at the time: "You are allowed in the state of Texas to carry a firearm from a private residence to your vehicle for purpose of travel."
During its rebuttal argument, the State countered that Cardona was not entitled to the reasonable-belief presumption because he was committing the crime of unlawful carrying of a weapon, a Class A misdemeanor:
[The State]: . . . . This defendant every day was breaking [minor laws]. And he's committing the offense at the time of unlawful carry of a weapon.
We talked to him on the stand. I asked him, I said, you were piss drunk, weren't you? Yeah, I was. Carrying a weapon and being piss drunk is not reasonable, is it? No, it's not. You weren't acting reasonable that night, were you? No, I was not.
Defense counsel says we've got to guess. Guess what, we don't have to guess. Because what we're going to walk through is the Defendant telling you he didn't have to kill him. It wasn't proportional. It wasn't immediately necessary. And we know, because he took the stand, that he's not acting reasonable. So let's walk through that.
Unlawful carry (sic) of a weapon is a Class A misdemeanor in the state of Texas. We know that [Cardona] was intoxicated. And we know he was carrying a weapon on his person because he told us.
[The Defense]: Objection, Your Honor. That was not against the law in 2020. That law was changed by the legislature in 2021. It was not against the law to carry a weapon while intoxicated in 2020. I move that that be struck.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[The State]: What -- what he did is he carried a weapon on his person away from his premises. That is a violation of the law.
[The Defense]: Objection, Your Honor. The law provides you can carry a weapon ingress and egress to your vehicle from a private residence. I object.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[The State]: It's not good for them. And that's why it's important. Because what the law says is that if he's violating an offense, if he's committing a Class A misdemeanor, which he is, he's not presumed to be reasonable. You can't presume it. He told you he's not being reasonable, so you have that. It also means that he has no duty to -- he has no right to stand his ground.
You may consider the fact that he said he could leave and didn't as was -- as to the reasonableness of his belief. So let's walk through. Let's play the game. Let's see what the Defendant says.
We know he was engaged in conduct because he told us.
(Video playing)
[The State]: Unlawful carrying a weapon at the time of the offense, at the time of the murder of what happened.
[The Defense]: I renew my objection, Your Honor. I renew my objection.
THE COURT: It's overruled. You may have a running objection.
The jury found Cardona guilty of murder. Cardona elected to have the trial court assess his punishment, and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years' confinement.
Cardona timely appealed and has raised two issues: (1) improper jury argument and (2) jury-charge error. We will address these issues in turn.
II. Improper Jury Argument
Cardona contends in his first issue that the prosecutor misstated the law in his jury argument when he argued that Cardona's "intoxicated status triggered liability for unlawful carrying of a weapon." Cardona argues that this statement was harmful because it had the effect of leading jurors to conclude (1) that they could not presume that Cardona reasonably believed that force was necessary to defend himself against Olivares and (2) that Cardona had a duty to retreat before using deadly force. The State admits that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding carrying a weapon while intoxicated but contends that the prosecutor's general argument did not otherwise misstate the unlawful-carrying-of-a-weapon statute. The State alternatively argues that error, if any, did not violate Cardona's substantial rights because, even if the prosecutor had stated the correct applicable law, any rational juror would have rejected Cardona's self-defense claim.
Although the jury charge also included a defense-of-property instruction, Cardona's first issue focuses on his claim of self-defense and does not mention or argue any relevant law or facts as to a person's justification in using deadly force to protect his property. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.41, 9.42.
A. The law on self-defense "[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a). Relevant here, an actor's belief is presumed to be reasonable if he (1) "knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used . . . was committing or attempting to commit . . . murder, . . . robbery, or aggravated robbery"; (2) "did not provoke the person against whom the force was used"; and (3) "was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used." Id. § 9.31(a)(1)(C), (2)-(3). Otherwise, the Texas Penal Code defines "reasonable belief" as "a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor." Id. § 1.07(a)(42).
To justify the use of deadly force, the actor not only must be justified in using nondeadly force against another under Section 9.31 but also must reasonably believe that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor from another's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force or to prevent the other's imminent commission of, among other crimes, murder, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Id. § 9.32(a). As with the use of nondeadly force, the actor's belief of immediate necessity is presumed to be reasonable if the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used was committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, or aggravated robbery, did not provoke the person against whom the force was used, and was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity other than a Class C traffic offense. Id. § 9.32(b)(1)(C), (2)-(3).
"Deadly force" is "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 9.01(3). A person has no duty to retreat before using deadly force under certain circumstances:
A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.Id. § 9.32(c).
B. Analysis
Here, the prosecutor argued, "Unlawful carry[ing] of a weapon is a Class A misdemeanor in the state of Texas. We know that [Cardona] was intoxicated. And we know he was carrying a weapon on his person because he told us." The State agrees with Cardona that this argument misstated the law because the statute in effect at the time of the offense-September 2020-did not prohibit carrying a firearm while intoxicated. See Act of May 24, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 809, § 22, sec. 46.02(a-6), §§ 28-29, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 1960, 1967, 1972 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02(a-6)) (amending Penal Code Section 46.02 effective September 1, 2021, to prohibit carrying a handgun under certain circumstances while intoxicated). At the time, the statute provided that a person committed an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carried a handgun on or about his person and the person was not "on the person's own premises or premises under the person's control" or "inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle . . . that is owned by the person or under the person's control." Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 1, sec. 46.02(a), 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 383, 383 (amended 2021) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02(a)). So, the State counters, Cardona still "unlawfully carried his weapon into Mr. Olivares's backyard and back toward his truck because he was not on his own premises or en[ ]route to his truck from his premises." The State contends that it thus generally did not misstate the law in its closing argument by arguing that Cardona violated the law by carrying a weapon away from his premises.
To be permissible, the State's jury argument generally must fall within one of the following four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to opposing counsel's argument; or (4) plea for law enforcement. Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). It is error for a prosecutor to misstate the law. See Whitting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Slater v. State, No. 02-11-00368-CR, 2013 WL 2631194, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 13, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). But even if a jury argument exceeds the permissible bounds, generally we will not reverse a trial court's erroneously overruling a defense objection unless the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b); Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 728; see Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that precedent "suggests that most comments that fall outside the areas of permissible argument" will be nonconstitutional error). In determining whether substantial rights were affected, we consider (1) the severity of the misconduct (that is, the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks), (2) curative measures, and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 728.
Here, the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect Cardona's substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Although the prosecutor misstated the law on unlawful carrying of a weapon while intoxicated and there were no curative measures, the prosecutor's misstatement was not unduly prejudicial given the evidence. Furthermore, the prosecutor's misstatement did not affect the certainty of conviction because any rational jury would have found against Cardona on his self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
We express no opinion about whether the State otherwise correctly stated the law on unlawful carrying of a weapon.
After a defendant has introduced some evidence of self-defense, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove it. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The State's burden does not require it to introduce evidence disproving the defense; rather, it requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. To determine evidentiary sufficiency to disprove a self-defense theory, we ask whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against the defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 609; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
When, as here, a jury finds the defendant guilty, there is an implicit finding against the defensive theory. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594. The jury resolves any conflicts in the testimony and determines witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Gaona v. State, 498 S.W.3d 706, 709-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2016, pet. ref'd) (explaining that even if the court assumed that the appellant's version of events would suffice to justify his use of deadly force, other evidence disputed that version and supported the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim). We may not act as a thirteenth juror and must not disregard, realign, or reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence. Fountain v. State, 604 S.W.3d 578, 583-84 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (discussing evidence to support jury's rejection of self-defense claim). The jury, as factfinder, is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony-even if that testimony is uncontroverted-because the jury can observe the witness's demeanor and appearance. See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 612 ("The jury was free to evaluate [a witness's] testimony and disregard mistakes or inconsistencies while crediting other portions of her testimony.").
Here, the jurors were entitled to believe some, all, or none of Cardona's testimony. As noted, the reasonable-belief presumption regarding force and deadly force arises when three criteria are satisfied. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(b). One of these criteria is that the actor was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used. Id. §§ 9.31(a)(3), 9.32(b)(3). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona was publicly intoxicated-a Class C misdemeanor that is not a violation of a traffic law or ordinance-when he shot Olivares. See id. § 49.02(a) ("A person commits an offense if the person appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another."), (c) (stating that a public-intoxication offense is a Class C misdemeanor); see also id. § 1.07(a)(40) (defining "public place" to mean "any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets"), § 49.01(2)(A) (stating that "intoxication" means "not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body"); Gonzalez v. State, No. 13-23-00025-CR, 2024 WL 2349321, at *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that Penal Code Section 9.32's reasonable-belief presumption did not apply because "there was plenty of evidence to suggest" that appellant was "engaging in other criminal activity at the time of the shooting," including among other offenses, public intoxication).
Cardona's defense attorney addressed public intoxication in his closing argument:
Now, [the State is] going to come and say, well, he was otherwise engaged in criminal activity. First of all, he was drunk in public, which is a [C]lass C misdemeanor. And even then they would have to prove to you that he was a danger to himself in the moments before he got run up on. He was walking to his dang truck, folks.
Another criterion for the reasonable-belief presumption is that the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom force was used was committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, or aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31(a)(1)(C), 9.32(b)(1)(C). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona neither knew nor had reason to believe that Olivares was committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, or aggravated robbery when Cardona shot him. Cardona knew that Olivares was unarmed that evening. Cardona claimed to fear Olivares, yet he remained at the party. Throughout the evening, the men cordially interacted with one another-hugging, shaking hands, talking, and drinking. And although Olivares can be heard on the surveillance video claiming that Cardona owed him money, the jury could have disbelieved Cardona's testimony regarding Olivares's threatening him and his family as Olivares followed Cardona to his truck. And even if the jury believed that Olivares had threatened Cardona, use of force is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone. Id. § 9.31(b)(1). Furthermore, Cardona testified that Olivares's threats had angered him. Finally, although Olivares was unarmed, Cardona fired six bullets at him and kept firing as Olivares took cover between the first and second shots.
For these reasons, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardona was not entitled to the reasonable-belief presumption and that Cardona unreasonably believed that using deadly force against Olivares was immediately necessary. Because the prosecutor's misstatement of the law was not unduly prejudicial and did not affect the certainty of Cardona's conviction, that misstatement did not affect his substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We thus overrule Cardona's first issue.
III. Jury-Charge Error
In his second issue, Cardona complains that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the applicable law for unlawful carrying of a weapon in conjunction with the self-defense and defense-of-property instructions. Cardona argues that without an instruction on the law of unlawful carrying of a weapon, he received no benefit from "two extremely favorable instructions"-the reasonable-belief presumption and the no-duty-to-retreat instruction-"on use of force and self[-]defense" because the applicability of those instructions hinged on whether Cardona was engaged in criminal activity at the time he shot Olivares.
Unless a particular statute places a sua sponte duty on a trial court to give an instruction, the trial court generally need not instruct the jury sua sponte on unrequested traditional defenses and defensive issues because they are not "law applicable to the case." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14; Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A defendant who fails to ask for an instruction on such issues, or to object to their exclusion, forfeits the alleged error on appeal; thus we do not engage in an Almanza egregious-harm review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Vega, 394 S.W.3d at 519; see Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g). But when, as here, "the trial judge does charge on a defensive issue (regardless of whether he does so sua sponte or upon a party's request), but fails to do so correctly, this is charge error subject to review under Almanza." Vega, 394 S.W.3d at 519.
Cardona contends that to charge the jury correctly and completely on the self-defense and defense-of-property issues, the trial court was required to include in the larger instructions an additional instruction on unlawful carrying of a weapon. But Cardona did not ask the trial court to include an instruction on unlawful carrying of a weapon, nor did he object to its exclusion. Because Cardona did not properly object, reversal is required only if the error-if any-caused "egregious harm." Id. (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
But in reviewing a jury charge, we first determine whether error occurred; if not, our analysis ends. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows on the reasonable-belief presumption and the duty to retreat:
Upon the law of self-defense, you are instructed that a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree that the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself
against the other person's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable if the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person against [whom] the force was used was committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, or aggravated robbery, and did not provoke the person against whom the force was used, and was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used, is not required to retreat before using deadly force. [Emphases added.]
These instructions track the Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(c). The phrase "criminal activity," as it is used in Chapter 9 of the Penal Code, is undefined. See Barrios v. State, 389 S.W.3d 382, 393 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2012, pet. ref'd); see also Hoff v. State, No. 14-23-00145-CR, 2024 WL 3948201, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 27, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op. on reh'g, not designated for publication); Johnson v. State, No. 01-15-00101-CR, 2016 WL 4536954, at *13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2016, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). "The court of criminal appeals has held that a trial court will not be held to have erred in its jury charge by tracking the law as set out by the legislature." Whitney v. State, 396 S.W.3d 696, 703 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (first citing Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); and then citing Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
Cardona does not cite, nor have we found, any authority supporting his contention that a trial court must instruct a jury about what constitutes criminal activity in conjunction with self-defense and defense-of-property instructions. Cf. Hoff, 2024 WL 3948201, at *7 (concluding that "trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury as to the specific definitions of 'criminal trespass,' 'harassment,' or 'stalking' when those terms were mentioned in the State's closing argument" in conjunction with the reasonable-belief presumption). We thus conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the law of unlawful carrying of a weapon. We overrule Cardona's second issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Cardona's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.