Cameron W., No. M08-CP05-009919-A

Full title: IN THE INTEREST OF CAMERON W. A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Mar 13, 2007

2006 Ct. Sup. 2805 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)

Opinion

Nos. M08-CP05-009919-A

March 13, 2007

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILSON .J.

I. STATEMENT OF CASE

This case involves consolidated coterminous petitions. On August 25, 2005, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed a neglect petition for ] Cameron W. (D.O.B., February 5, 1999) and an application for an ex parte order of temporary custody. The order of temporary custody was sustained by agreement on November 21,2005. The 1 neglect petition alleges that respondents mother and father denied Cameron proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally; and that they permitted him to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being. On September 2, 2005 both mother and father entered denials to the allegations in the neglect petitions.

Prior to the adjudication on the neglect petition, DCF, on November 16, 2005, also filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112, et seq. to terminate the parental rights of JoAnn W. and Gary S. to their child, Cameron W. Respondents mother and father entered denials to the grounds alleged in the petition to terminate their parental rights to Cameron W. On July 26,2006, respondent mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Cameron W. Father contests the allegations in the neglect petition and the grounds alleged in the petition to terminate his parental rights. Trial of this matter began on October 11, 2006 and concluded on October 13, 2006. The record remained opened until November 27, 2006 for the submission of proposed findings of facts. The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the child.

CT Page 2806

II. ISSUES

The grounds alleged in the neglect petition as to both mother and father are that Cameron was denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally; and that Cameron was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well being. The ground for termination alleged against both mother and father is that Cameron has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and both mother and father have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. General Statutes § 17a-l 12(3)(B)(i). An additional ground alleged as to father is that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral, or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(3)(D).

Respondent father denies the allegations in the neglect petition and contests the termination of his parental rights to Cameron W. Father contests termination because he "wants to get to know his son . . ." and he "wants to be in the kid's life . . ." Respondent mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Cameron W.

A) WAS CAMERON W. NEGLECTED IN THAT HE WAS DENIED PROPER CARE AND ATTENTION, PHYSICALLY, EDUCATIONALLY, EMOTIONALLY OR MORALLY, AND PERMITTED TO LIVE UNDER CONDITIONS, CHICUMSTANCES OR ASSOCIATIONS INJURIOUS TO HIS WELL BEING?

B) SHOULD RESPONDENT FATHER'S RIGHTS BE TERMINATED PURSUANT TO GENERAL STATUTES §§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) AND 17a-112(j)(3)(D)?

C) SHOULD RESPONDENT MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS BE TERMINATED BASED ON HER CONSENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(a)?

D) SHOULD PETITIONER'S PERMANENCY PLAN FILED MAY 19, 2006 BE APPROVED?

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. MOTHER-JO ANN W.

1) Respondent mother, JoAnn W., was born on October 19, 1959 in Middletown, Connecticut.

2) Respondent mother is the youngest of two children having one older brother.

3) Respondent mother has a "normally good relationship with her parents and maintains regular contact with them."

4) Respondent mother's relationship with her older brother remains strained due to her substance abuse issues.

5) Respondent mother graduated from Middletown High School in 1977.

6) In 1978, respondent mother attended and graduated from the Creative School of Beauty with a certificate in hairdressing.

7) Respondent mother held her first job at the age of sixteen, as a grocery cashier.

8) Since the age of sixteen, respondent mother has worked as a secretary or a waitress.

9) Respondent mother was employed five years from age 30-35.

10) Respondent mother has been unemployed since October 2004.

11) Respondent mother has applied for social security disability benefits but has been rejected.

12) Respondent mother has been married three times.

13) Respondent mother was married to her first husband, Matt R. for approximately eight years, from 1981 to 1989 and with whom she has two children who reside with Mr. R. due to respondent mother's alcohol abuse.

14) Respondent mother married her second husband, Bob S. in 1989 and was married to him for only three months.

15) In February 1994, respondent mother married Greg W. with whom she has two children, T. W. and A. W.

16) Respondent mother's marriage to Greg W. ended in divorce due to her alcohol abuse. Both T. W. and A. W. reside with their father Greg W., due to respondent mother's alcohol abuse.

17) During the separation from her third husband, respondent mother had a relationship with respondent father Gary S. with whom she had one child, Cameron W., who is the subject of the neglect and termination petitions presently before this court.

18) Respondent mother's relationship with respondent father was good when he was not abusing substances.

19) When respondent father abused substances, he became abusive, both physically and emotionally toward respondent mother.

20) Respondent mother began drinking at age twenty-one and has subsequently had a long history of alcohol, drug and prescription medication addiction.

21) Mother has been hospitalized on a number of occasions for detoxication from alcohol and prescription medication. All of these hospitalizations have been at the Rushford Center and Connecticut Valley Hospital, Merritt Hall.

22) Respondent mother has a history with the department relative to Cameron W. dating back to March 1999.

23) In March 1999, physical neglect was substantiated due to respondent mother using substances.

24) In September 1999, Cameron W. who was seven months old was removed from his mother and placed in the care and custody of DCF under an order of temporary custody as a result of mother's alcohol abuse. A neglect petition was also filed at this time.

25) In September 1999, physical neglect was substantiated against mother.

26) Cameron W. was placed in foster care from September 1999 until March 2000.

27) Cameron W. was returned to his mother in March 2000.

28) In December 2001, respondent father and mother were involved in a serious domestic dispute which resulted in mother being assaulted and father being arrested for Sexual Assault, Risk of Injury and Assault 3.

29) Cameron W. witnessed the December 2001 incident.

30) Respondent mother during the time of the domestic incident continued to abuse drugs and alcohol.

31) Respondent mother in December 2001 and early 2002 continued to engage in alcohol and substance abuse.

32) In December 2001 and early January 2002, mother was suffering from depression.

33) As of December 2001 and into January 2002, mother had not addressed her alcohol and substance abuse, mental health or domestic violence issues. Mother refused to enter into a residential substance abuse treatment program at this time.

34) In December 2001, physical neglect was substantiated against father Gary S. as result of ongoing domestic violence.

35) In June 2002, physical neglect was substantiated against mother due to her substance abuse issues and her inability to provide a safe environment for Cameron W.

36) In May 2002, Cameron W. was for the second time removed from his mother's care and placed in the care and custody of DCF from May 2002 until September 2002. Cameron was placed in foster care at this time.

37) In January 2002, mother submitted to a substance evaluation at Rushford Center. Mother's urinalysis was positive for barbiturates, opiates, codeine and morphine. The recommendation from the Rushford Center was for a residential program at the Women and Children's Center.

38) In June 2002, mother entered a residential treatment facility for substance abuse at Women's and Children's Center.

39) Mother was in the treatment facility from June 2002 until May 2003.

40) After leaving the treatment facility in May 2003, mother obtained an apartment through the Section 8 Housing Program, Supportive Housing for Recovering Families. Mother cooperated with the case management services and was successfully discharged in November 2003.

41) In 2003, DCF Social Worker Liza Frank referred mother for parent-aide services since mother expressed a desire to learn skills to gain more control over Cameron's behaviors.

42) Mother began to work with the parent-aide but was non-compliant with home visits and scheduling appointments. Mother was discharged from the parent-aide program.

43) Mother waited almost two months following her discharge from Women and Children's Center in May 2003 before she participated in aftercare services.

44) Approximately two months after her May 2003 discharge from the Women and Children's Center, in July 2003, mother did begin to attend substance abuse groups at Rushford.

45) Mother's attendance at these groups was sporadic.

46) Mother did have negative urines at this time.

47) Mother preferred to attend only AA/NA groups.

48) On October 15, 2003, mother was unsuccessfully discharged from Rushford due to non-compliance since mother eventually stopped attending the groups at Rushford.

49) Mother reported that she was attending three AA/NA meetings every week and felt that those meetings were more beneficial.

50) In October and November 2003, DCF recommended mother submit to a hair test and urine screen.

51) Mother agreed to submit to hair test and urine test and contacted Rushford to set up the appointment, however, mother did not follow through with the appointment.

52) Mother relapsed on heroin in November 2003.

53) On January 10, 2004, mother went into Merritt Hall detox for five days.

54) At the time mother went in for detox, she voluntarily placed Cameron into the care of his former foster parent.

55) Cameron's former foster parent continued to provide babysitting services even after Cameron was no longer in her care.

56) After mother's discharge from Merritt Hall on January 12, 2004, mother was again referred to Rushford for out-patient services.

57) After her release from Merritt Hall, mother also began treatment at Hartford Dispensary for methadone maintenance.

58) On January 20, 2004, mother was not engaging in the parent-aide services despite several attempts by the parent-aide to do so.

59) In January and February 2004, DCF received reports that mother was still engaged in substance abuse activity.

60) On June 25, 2004, the DCF child protection case was closed. The case remained active with DCF Probate Social Worker, since mother at that time was pursuing a termination of father's parental rights.

61) Between September 2002 and August 22, 2005, Cameron remained in the legal custody of mother.

62) On August 19, 2005, DCF received a report that mother had left Cameron in the care of his former foster parent for several weeks while mother was in and out of rehab and detox.

63) Cameron's former foster parent had Cameron in her care for 3 to 4 weeks during the summer of 2005 because mother was in and out of detox.

64) Foster parent had a standing arrangement with mother that if mother felt the urge to drink then foster parent would care for Cameron.

65) Mother reported that she was assaulted by a friend in the early morning of August 18, 2005. Mother later reported that she may not have been assaulted but had a seizure.

66) Cameron was in the home on the evening of August 18, 2005.

67) Cameron went to his former foster mother's home on the morning of August 19, 2005.

68) Cameron knew that mother had been assaulted because mother told him.

69) As of August 2005, mother was attending the methadone clinic daily.

70) Mother was arrested for driving under the influence in May 2005.

71) Mother was in detox from July 19, 2005 until July 26, 2005 and from August 10, 2005 until August 15, 2005.

72) In August 2005 DCF discussed with mother a safety plan for Cameron. Mother refused all suggestions.

73) On August 22, 2005 DCF invoked a ninety-six hour hold and Cameron was placed in foster care.

74) This was the third time Cameron had been removed from his mother's care and placed into foster care with his former foster parent, Janet J.

75) On August 25, 2005, DCF filed an ex parte order of temporary custody ("OTC") and neglect petition.

76) On August 25, 2005, the ex parte order of temporary custody was sustained (Scarpellino, J.)

77) On November 21, 2005, all parties agreed to sustain the order of temporary custody.

B. SPECIFIC STEPS — MOTHER

78) On August 25 2005, the court (Scarpellino, J.), ordered specific steps for mother.

79) In accordance with the specific steps, mother was ordered to keep all appointments set by DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits announced or unannounced and visits by the child's court appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

80) Mother was ordered to participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: No substance abuse; gain insight into choice of partners and how this negatively affects her child; no domestic violence relationships; develop skills to cope with anxiety and depression.

81) Mother was ordered to accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

82) Mother was ordered to submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including in-patient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.

83) Mother was ordered to submit to random drug testing; time and method of the testing was at the discretion of DCF.

84) Mother was ordered to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing.

85) Mother was ordered to sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for future proceedings before the court.

86) Mother was ordered not to engage in substance abuse.

87) Mother was ordered to have no further involvement with the criminal justice system.

88) Mother has been generally compliant with the visitation requirement. Mother did miss some supervised visits with Cameron with no explanation.

89) As of April 25, 2006, mother had been complying with the step requiring her to participate in counseling. Mother was participating in the Hartford Dispensary Dual Diagnosis Program. Mother was attending 1-3 groups per day and was receiving methadone maintenance.

90) On September 13, 2005, mother attended a substance abuse evaluation and was referred for intensive outpatient treatment at Middlesex Behavioral. Mother attended.

91) Mother refused to participate in parent-aide services.

92) Mother has submitted to substance abuse assessments. However, mother did not fully comply with treatment recommendations in light of her continued substance abuse.

93) Mother appeared intoxicated when she arrived for her supervised visit with Cameron on September 28, 2005.

94) Foster parent observed mother stumble several times, speak baby talk to Cameron and had slurred speech.

95) In August, September and October, 2005, mother was still testing positive for alcohol and benzodiazepines.

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96) As of September 13, 2006, mother was continuing to receive methadone maintenance at the Hartford Dispensary.

97) As of September 13, 2006, mother admitted to relapsing on alcohol but did not report a relapse of any other substances.

98) Mother has been in compliance with the specific steps that she submit to random drag testing in that she receives drag testing in accordance with the methadone maintenance program at Hartford Dispensary.

99) Mother has cooperated with court-ordered evaluations and testing.

100) Mother has complied with the specific step that she sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with providers.

101) Mother failed to comply with the specific step that she not engage in substance abuse.

102) In August, September and October 2005, mother had positive urines for benzodiazepines and positive breathalyzers for alcohol.

103) Mother also attended visits in September and October 2005 with Cameron under the influence.

104) In September 2006, mother admitted to relapsing on alcohol.

105) Mother has not complied with the step that she have no further involvement in criminal activity.

106) On September 15, 2005, mother was arrested for second degree threatening and harassment.

107) On October 9, 2005, mother was arrested for disorderly conduct following a domestic dispute with a man residing in her home.

108) On July 26, 2006, mother consented to the termination of her parental rights.

C. FATHER-GARYS.

109) Father, Gary S. was born on January 20, 1958 in New Britain, Connecticut.

110) Father is the youngest of five children having one older sister and three older brothers. One of father's older brothers is deceased as is father's mother.

111) Father completed tenth grade.

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112) Father attended GED classes at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, however, father did not complete the classes to obtain his GED.

113) Father is presently incarcerated.

114) Father was employed as a steeplejack restorator prior to his incarceration.

115) Father has been incarcerated since February 2, 2002.

116) Father has a long criminal history.

117) Father's criminal history involves domestic violence against mother.

118) The incident for which father is presently incarcerated involves domestic violence against mother.

119) The incident occurred on the night of December 7, 2001.

120) On December 7, 2001, father beat mother about the face and body.

121) Mother alleged father sexually assaulted her.

122) Cameron, age two at the time, walked in the room during the incident.

123) Mother was treated for her injuries at New Britain General Hospital on December 8, 2001.

124) Father was charged with two counts of Sexual Assault in a spousal/cohabitating relationship; two counts of Risk of Injury and Assault in the Third Degree.

125) As a result of the December 7, 2001 incident a criminal protective order was issued prohibiting father "from having any contact in any manner" with mother and Cameron.

126) Father sent a Christmas card postmarked December 30, 2002 to Cameron at the shelter where mother and Cameron were residing. The text of the note in the card read "I know where you are."

127) On January 6, 2003 mother filed a complaint with Middletown Police Department.

128) On February 6, 2003 father was arrested while incarcerated and charged with criminal violation of a protective order.

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129) On October 6, 2004 father entered guilty pleas to Assault in the Second Degree for the December 7, 2001 incident and Criminal Violation of a Protective Order for the Christmas card sent to Cameron in December 2002.

130) Father was sentenced to five years jail on each charge to run concurrent, for a total effective sentence of five years.

131) Father's maximum release date is November 19, 2007 and his earliest release date is February 19, 2007.

132) Father admitted that he had been addicted to cocaine since 1987. Father reported that he was hospitalized for detoxification from cocaine in 1989 at Bristol Hospital.

133) Father received substance abuse treatment at Rushford Center in 1998, where he met mother.

134) Father acknowledges that he has not had a relationship with Cameron.

135) Father admitted in a letter to Cameron's therapist that he "left out of Cameron's life when [Cameron] was two years old." (Petitioner's Exhibit 12)

136) Father also admitted that he never had a chance to form a relationship with Cameron or get to know him.

137) Father wants to be a positive influence in Cameron's life.

138) While incarcerated, father has successfully completed several programs, which include Domestic Violence in December 2005; HIV Prevention in February 2005 and November 2004; From Prison to Paycheck, The Great Escape in September 2004, 7. 5 hours of substance abuse programming in July 2004 and Anger and Aggression Program in November 1999.

139) Father has not completed any parenting classes.

140) During the periods December 2004 and July 2005 thru August 2005, father received a rating of "Excellent" on his Inmate Performance Evaluation.

141) Father acknowledges that upon release from prison, he is unable to take Cameron into his care. Father acknowledges he "needs to get himself together."

142) Father acknowledges that he needs counseling and tools necessary to parent.

143) Father appeared at court, wheelchair bound due to an injury to his back.

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144) Although father has experience in steeple ack and restoration work, he acknowledges that he can not presently perform this work.

145) Father has not had any vocational training for employment other than steeplejack and restoration work.

146) Father will live with his niece if he makes parole and is released early, if not, father will have to find a place of his own.

147) Father admits that after release from prison, he would need another six months to a year before he could take care of Cameron.

148) Father has been incarcerated all but fifteen months of Cameron's life.

149) Father acknowledged thai il would nol be in Cameron's best interest to remove him from his pre-adoptive home.

150) Father acknowledged that it would not be in Cameron's best interest to have to wait until father is released from jail and gets himself together.

151) On September 30, 2005, father filed a pro se Motion for Visitation to gain prison visitation with Cameron.

152) On September 30, 2005, father's Motion for Visitation was denied by the Middletown Superior Court for Juvenile Matters (Dyer, J.) based on Cameron's therapist opining that visits with father were not in Cameron's best interests.

153) Father was allowed to write one letter to Cameron's therapist stating how he feels about Cameron and his reason for visitation.

154) In November 2005, father did write a letter to Cameron's therapist.

155) Asha Patlikh, Cameron's therapist, discussed in general terms the content of the letter with Cameron. (Testimony of the therapist Asha Patlikh, 10/10/06).

156) Ms. Patlikh offered to review the letter with Cameron, however Cameron did not want to read the letter.

D. SPECIFIC STEPS — FATHER

157) On August 25, 2005, the court (Scarpellino, J.) ordered that father comply with the sole specific step of cooperating with court-ordered evaluations and testing.

158) On December 15, 2005, DCF requested father to participate in a court-ordered psychological evaluation.

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159) Father did not agree to participate in psychological evaluation.

160) On December 15, 2005, DCF's request was denied.

E. CHILD-CAMERON W.

161) Cameron W. was born on February 5, 1999 to Jo Ann W. and Gary S. at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford, Connecticut.

162) Cameron is seven years and ten months old.

163) Cameron does not have a history of serious illness and is medically up-to-date.

164) Cameron was first removed from his mother's care and placed in DCF foster care from September 16, 1999 through March 15, 1999 due to mother's ongoing substance abuse.

165) Cameron was again removed from his mother's care and placed in DCF foster care from May 9, 2002 through September 2, 2002, again due to mother's ongoing substance abuse and due to father's domestic violence against mother.

166) Cameron was most recently removed from his mother's care and placed in DCF foster care on August 22, 2005, again due to mother's ongoing substance abuse and due to father's domestic violence against mother.

167) Cameron is a bright child and is in the first grade.

168) Cameron has been in therapy since September 2005.

169) Cameron's therapist is Asha Patlikh, LTMT.

170) Cameron attends therapy sessions once a week.

171) Ms. Patlikh has diagnosed Cameron with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), neglect of child, rule out ADHD and recently added, impulse control disorder.

172) Cameron's presenting issues to Ms. Patlikh were: placement in foster care; issues with mom; tempter tantrums; aggressive with animals and hitting his head against the wall.

173) Cameron's witnessing of severe domestic violence between mother and father relates to his PTSD and ADHD diagnoses.

174) On January 26, 2006 and February 2, 2006, Dr. Logan Green, a forensic psychologist evaluated Cameron and mother at the court's request.

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175) Dr. Green's diagnoses of Cameron were: "Axis I: Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct, Neglect of Child — Victim, Physical Abuse of Child — Victim, Relational Problem NOS (not otherwise specified) with issues of aggression and dysfunctional attachment, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Predominantly Hyperactive/Impulsive Type, Observe for Symptomatology: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); Axis II: None; Axis III: None relevant to mental disorder; Axis IV: Abusive and neglectful family situation, separation from mother; Axis V: GAF (Global Assessment of Function): 62 (current)." (Petitioner's Exhibit #10).

176) Dr. Green opined that Cameron is uncomfortable with his thoughts and has many feelings and emotions he wants to keep out of his conscious awareness. This causes difficulty in his thinking, hence resulting in the ADHD diagnosis.

177) Cameron feels he has no friends.

178) Cameron is discouraged, lonely and feels he has no stability in his life.

179) Dr. Green opined that the root of Cameron's problems occurred in early development from birth to 4.

180) Cameron's problems stem from his exposure to a significant amount of domestic violence between mother and father.

181) Cameron relates to the world in a suspicious way.

182) Cameron does have a relational disorder in that he does not relate well to people and does not think people will relate well to him.

183) Cameron has no sense of stability or permanency, partly due to the domestic violence he witnessed and abuse.

184) Cameron described his father to Dr. Green as a horrible person.

185) Cameron has negative feelings and memories of his father.

186) The only memories Cameron has of his father which he has verbalized are those involving the domestic violence father visited upon Cameron and mother.

187) Cameron is fearful of his father.

188) Cameron does not wish to see his father.

189) It would be detrimental for Cameron to have contact with his father.

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190) Cameron's behavior would regress if he has contact with his father.

191) Cameron needs to develop a sense of self.

192) If Cameron does not develop a sense of self he will probably develop a narcissistic personality disorder.

193) Cameron attends weekly therapy to address his emotional and behavioral issues.

194) Cameron struggles with behaviors such as lying, stealing, violent and aggressive actions and severe tantrums.

195) Cameron has expressed a desire to harm himself and has spoken of hurting animals.

196) Cameron's behaviors are attributable to his upbringing with his biological parents.

197) It is extremely important for Cameron to have a sense of grounding and permanency.

198) Cameron is very bonded to his foster mother.

199) Mother voluntarily placed Cameron with his current foster mother when Cameron was a baby.

200) Cameron's foster parents are his psychological parents.

201) Cameron wants to be adopted by his foster parents.

202) Cameron's foster parents provide him with regular contact with his siblings.

203) Cameron has a sense of emotional safety with his foster family that allows him to express his emotions and hurt feelings.

204) Cameron's foster parents are committed to maintaining Cameron in their home and adopting him.

205) Cameron wants to visit with mother and the foster parents do allow mother to have supervised visits with Cameron.

206) Dr. Green opined that mother is incapable on a consistent basis of meeting the criteria necessary to parent Cameron. Mother's ability to develop appropriate relationships is limited and her understanding of child care responsibilities could not be determined due to her impaired level of consciousness.

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E. RELATIVE RESOURCES

207) Although mother has a good relationship with her parents and had asked that they be considered as a placement option for Cameron, mother's parents would not be able to care for Cameron without mother's assistance.

208) Mother does not have a relationship with her brother and does not want him to be considered as a placement resource for Cameron.

209) Father did not offer any relative resources who would be considered as placement options for Cameron.

IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. COTERMINOUS PETITIONS

Because there are coterminous petitions for neglect and termination in this case, the court must first determine, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, if the child had been neglected or uncared for as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 263 (1984); In re Clark K., 70 Conn. App. 665, 669-70 (2002); In re Daniel C, 63 Conn. App. 339, 350 (2001). If the petitioner's evidence does not support such a finding, then both petitions must be dismissed. If the court finds the child to have been neglected or uncared for, disposition is deferred until a decision is made on the termination petition. The court must next determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that any pleaded ground exists to terminate the parent's rights as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. If no ground for termination is found, the court must proceed on the neglect petition and consider an appropriate disposition. If at least one alleged ground to terminate is found, however, the court must move on to the third stage.

If grounds have been found to adjudicate the children neglected or uncared for and to terminate parental rights, applying the respective standards of proof, the court must then consider8 whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest, after considering the seven factors set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-l 12(k). If the court does not find that the child's best interests would be served by termination, it must return to and dispose of the neglect petition. If the court does find that termination serves the child's best interests, an order shall enter terminating parental rights.

B. THE NEGLECT PETITIONS

The court finds that the petitioner has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence the elements of neglect in this case. A "child or youth may be found `neglected' who (A) has been abandoned, or (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth, or (D) who has been abused . . ." General Statutes § 46b-120(9). A "child or youth may be found `uncared for' who is homeless . . ." General Statutes § 46b-120(10). |

`"Neglect . . . is the failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces willful as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixed and measured meaning. It takes its context always from specific circumstances and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding circumstances changes. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Honorable Thomas D. Gill, `The Legal Nature of Neglect' . . . ," Randall v. Dunbar, No. CV 04 0525159 S, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain (Murray, J.; December 29, 2004); See also In re Aaron B., Superior Court Child Protection Session at Middletown (Bear, J., July 21, 2006).

Neglect also has been generally defined as "the failure, whether intentional or not, of the person responsible for the child's care to provide and maintain adequate food, clothing, medical care, supervision and/or education." State of Connecticut DCF website, operational definitions. The9 following are set forth as "examples of physical neglect: 1. the failure to provide, adequate food, shelter, and clothing appropriate to the climatic and environmental conditions[;] 2. the failure to provide, whether intentional or not, supervision or a reliable person(s) to provide child care[;] 3. leaving a child alone for an excessive period of time given the child's age and cognitive abilities[;]

4. holding the child responsible for the care of siblings or others where beyond the child's ability [;]

5. The person responsible for the child's care display's erratic or impaired behavior [;] 6. The person responsible for the child's care is unable to consistently perform the minimum of child-caring tasks [; and] 7. death." There are additional examples set forth in the DCF operational definitions of educational, emotional and moral neglect.

The standard of proof is by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Here, the petition alleges two grounds for neglect by respondents. First, that Cameron was neglected in that he was denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally. General Statues § § 46b-120(9)(B), 46b-129(a). Second, that Cameron was neglected in that he was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well being. General Statutes §§ 46b-120(9)(c), 46b-129(a).

The respondents have failed to fulfill their parental responsibilities. Cameron was permitted to live under violent conditions when he was in the care of his mother and father. Mother and father had significant domestic disputes which were witnessed by Cameron. Mother could not tackle her substance abuse sufficiently to be able to parent Cameron. Cameron was often voluntarily placed with his foster parent Janet J. while mother was off in detox. This episode was repeated by mother frequently while Cameron was in mother's care. Father, likewise had a significant substance abuse problem prior to his incarceration. In addition, father simply was not in Cameron's life for any significant period of time to provide Cameron with the proper care and attention he needed. Father0 has been incarcerated all but fifteen months of Cameron's life, and, during the time father was in Cameron's life he was engaged in violent domestic disputes with mother witnessed by Cameron. Cameron has suffered and continues to suffer emotionally as a result of his parents' inability to care for him. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, the court finds, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that Cameron W. was neglected by the respondents in that he was denied proper emotional care and attention. In addition, the court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Cameron was neglected in that he was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being.

Accordingly, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and therefore enters a neglect adjudication on both grounds as to Cameron W.

C. THE TERMINATION PETITIONS

The court has determined that Cameron W. has been neglected. The court must now consider, as a disposition of the matter, whether the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence, that the parental rights of the respondents should be terminated.

"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent. . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001 ); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194,200(1995). The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. General Statutes § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z, 26 Conn. App. 58, 63 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 901 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18 (1985); Practice Book 33-1, et seq. Only one1 ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn. Sup. 101, 106 (1994), aff d, 40 Conn. App. 73 (1996).

Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented established by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal, (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights." In re Daniel C, 63 Conn. App. 339, 357 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).

If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-173, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re QuanitraM., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert, denied, 255 Conn. 903 (2000); In re EmmanuelM., 43 Conn. Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, aff d, 35 Conn. App. 276, 278,2 648 A.2d 881, cert, denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn. App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert, denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).

The court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn. App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert, denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986). The court may consider direct and circumstantial evidence. In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn. App. 151, 158-59, 756 A.2d 303, cert, denied, 354 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 759 (2000); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), 3 Conn. App. 184, 193, 485 A.2d 1362 (1985). "The same evidence certainly can establish more than one ground for termination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M, 33 Conn. App. 12, 16, 632 A.2d 1122, cert, denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993). The standard of proof in a termination action is clear and convincing evidence. Practice Book § 32a-3. "The burden of persuasion . . . in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing evidence proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist. Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n., 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976).

"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M. 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . the trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caressa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "Although expert testimony may be accorded great weight3 when it is offered, there is no requirement for expert testimony in termination of parental rights cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400, 852 A.2d 643 (2004).

The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter, notice of the proceeding was provided, and no action is pending in any other court affecting the custody of the children. After due consideration, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent parents.

(i) ADJUDICATION

The ground alleged in the termination petitions against both mother and father is that Cameron has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and both mother and father have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Cameron they could assume a responsible position in his life. General Statutes § 17a-112(3)(B)(i). An additional ground alleged as to father is that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to father that would ordinarily develop as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral, or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112 (3).

On July 26, 2006, the petitioner moved to amend the petition to change the ground for termination as to mother from failure to rehabilitate to consent. Mother, on that same date, knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights to Cameron W. Father denies the allegations in the neglect petition and contests the termination of his parental rights to Cameron W.4

"In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a-l 12, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)( 1 ); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-l 12(j)(2); and (3) there exists anyone of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-l 12(j)(3)." In re Samantha C, 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).

(a) Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(l)

In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not require if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." General Statutes § 17a-l 12(j)(l). In accordance with § 17a-l 12(j)(l), "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony, 68 Conn. App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).

"Although [njeither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). "[RJeasonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 349. The department has "a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." In re VincentB.,5 73 Conn. App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert, denied, 262 Conn., 934, 815 A.2d 136(2003). But "[t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Anthony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn. App. 645.

"Reunification efforts generally consists of visitation and, where appropriate, other rehabilitative services such as evaluations, testing, counseling, therapy, education, medical care, parenting classes and housing assistance." In re Destiny Q., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (November 19, 2001, Levin, J.). In evaluating the department's reunification efforts, the court may consider whether the department engaged the respondent, apprised him or her of the steps that had to be taken to achieve rehabilitation, and gave the respondent feedback on his or her progress in reaching that goal." In re Vincent, supra, 73 Conn. App. 645. The court may take into consideration whether the department met "its burden of making reasonable efforts to achieve [ reunification by engaging the respondent and making available services aimed at instilling in him [or her] healthy parental skills. Id., 647. The court may also assess whether "steps taken by the respondent presented the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have been made." Id., 644. The court may find that the efforts were reasonable even though the department made mistakes. In re Charles A., 33 Conn. App. 293, 297-98, 738 A.2d 222 (1999). ("The court is aware that [the department] has made mistakes in this case failing to treat [the respondent] as a victim of domestic violence. . . . These mistakes, however, do not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In the first instance, counseling services were provided. Other in home services were offered, but refused.") (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.6

In finding that DCF made reasonable efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g. In re Destiny D., 86 Conn. App. 77, 83-84, 859 A.2d 793, cert, denied, 272 Conn. 911 (2004) (department provided regular visitation, rehabilitative services, counseling and therapy for children, respondent's performance in rehabilitative programs was disappointing, including erratic attendance, resistance to treatment recommendations, and positive drag tests; respondent also failed to sign releases for a period of time, so department unable to make additional referrals); In re Jonathan C., 86 Conn. App. 169, 180, 860 A.2d 305 (2004) (department provided numerous referrals for services, facilitated visitation, and provided therapy for both respondent and children); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 479, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (department offered respondent services over several years, including substance abuse evaluation and treatment, parenting skills classes, domestic violence counseling, a family reunification program, a psychological evaluation, and visitation; but she failed to avail herself of or participate meaningfully { in those services by failing to attend many visits, and denying the fact that she needed to participate in counseling); In re Daniel C, supra, 63 Conn. App. 362-63 (respondents participated in services but continually relapsed and resumed abusing substances and alcohol, so department declined to pursue goal of reunification after children were removed; "[t]he dissolution of this family resulted from the failure of the department to provide services and assistance."); In re Ebony K, supra, 68 Conn. App. 350 (respondent's inability to overcome drag addiction and failure to comply with services "thwarted the department's efforts to reunify her and the child.")

In the alternative, the court may also determine that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. As previously noted, "the department is required only to make `reasonable efforts' . . . [i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Anthony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 476. The court may therefore find by clear and7 convincing evidence that "the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the child, [and] [t]he respondent's subsequent failure to take advantage of those efforts establish her [or his] inability or unwillingness to benefit from those reasonable efforts." In re Alexander T., 81 Conn. App. 668, 676, 841 A.2. 274, cert, denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).

In finding that a respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department's reunification efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. In re Jonathan C, supra, 86 Conn. App. 178 ("[throughout the duration of the department's involvement with the family, the respondent demonstrated a lack of cooperation and progress, and revealed an apathetic attitude toward the repeated and extensive reunification efforts that were made.") In making this determination, the court may consider whether "the respondent's positive step in participating in a treatment program demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation in itself." In re Vincent, supra, 73 Conn. App. 645 (trial court reversed because department did not make reasonable efforts when it decided not to engage in further efforts based on its prior experiences with respondent, although respondent took steps and was in a position to benefit from services; respondent had successfully completed long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling for anger ! management and depression, and no evidence of relapse in those areas). In addition, the court may consider whether the respondent "was unwilling or unable to formulate an appropriate plan for [child] . . ." Id., 647. "Expert testimony is not required to examine the respondent's history with the department and the trouble she has experienced in achieving rehabilitation to determine that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the efforts of the department." In re Alexander 71, supra, 81 Conn. App. 676.

The department's ability to provide services and visitation is limited when a respondent is incarcerated. "Because the respondent had at all times been in prison and in the custody of the8 commissioner of corrections, DCF was excused from providing her with reunification services other than visitation." In re Destiny Q., supra, Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown; see also In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn. App. 44 57,720 A.2d. 1112 (1998) (together with other factors, the respondent's "frequent periods of incarceration prevented the petitioner from offering him services.") A respondent's imprisonment, however does not, in and of itself, excuse DCF from providing him with visitation with his child. In re Hector L., 53 Conn. App. 359,372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999); see also In re Roshawn R., supra, 51 Conn. App. 58-59. However, the department is unable to provide visitation if there is an outstanding protective order. The petitioner alleges in its petition that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Cameron with mother and father and, that mother and father are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

Although mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made substantial efforts to reunify Cameron with his mother in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who I could help mother address substance abuse, housing, mental health and parenting concerns. Mother I failed to participate in most of the services offered. Although mother did participate in some services, she did not benefit from the services provided and failed to follow the recommendations of providers, particularly substance abuse treatment providers. Mother continued to relapse and failed to remain substance free so that she could sufficiently provide Cameron with the day-to-day care he required. DCF also provided visitation for mother. Mother on several of the visits appeared under the influence. The department's ability to provide services and visitation to father was limited because father has been incarcerated all but fifteen months of Cameron's life. Because father had at all times been in prison and in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections, DCF was not able to provide father with reunification services. In re Destiny Q., supra; see also In re Roshawn R.,0 supra, (respondent's frequent periods of incarceration prevented DCF from offering services). In addition, the department was unable to provide father with visitation due to a criminal order prohibiting father from having any contact with mother and Cameron W. In addition, father's motion for visitation was denied (Dyer, J.). The basis for the denial was Cameron's therapist's recommendation that Cameron not have visits with his father as it would be therapeutically detrimental to Cameron.

Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both mother and father with Cameron and that as of the filing of the petition, the parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

(b) Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(l)

The petitioner alleges that respondents parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).¹ As this court has adjudicated Cameron neglected, the critical issue now for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for him. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

1 Section § 17a-l 12(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as o the "parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for n a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the:ommissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate he return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and îeeds of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. . . ."

"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [Section 17a-l 12] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . Rehabilitate means to restore

0

[a handicapped or delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through special rehabilitation. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date, she can assume a responsible position in her child's life. . . ."

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 ( 1999), 741 A.2d 873.

"[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Citations omitted.) In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000); See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert, denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 63 (2001). In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor father has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Cameron, they could assume a responsible position in the life of Cameron. See In re Daniel C, 63 Conn. App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. at 448.

Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that she failed to fulfill them. As described above, mother failed to participate in most of the services offered. Although mother did participate in some services, she did not benefit from the services provided and failed to follow the recommendations regarding her substance abuse and mental health treatment. Mother has been in and out of detox facilities and has been offered1 mental health and substance abuse treatment on numerous occasions, however, mother has not been able to maintain her sobriety.

"The psychological testimony [and evidence] from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation marks omitted). In re John G., 56 Conn. App. 12, 24, 740, A.2d 496 (1999). As Dr. Logan Green found, "Ms. [W.'s] parenting capacity does not meet [the] criteria [for parenting] on a consistent basis. Furthermore, her ability to develop appropriate relationships is limited. Her understanding of child care responsibilities could not be determined due to her impaired level of consciousness." (Petitioner's Exhibit #10). Dr. Green also found that "mother is not capable of rehabilitating in a reasonable amount of time given Cameron's age and comorbid problems." (Testimony of Dr. Logan Green, 10/10/06).

Pursuant to specific steps issued on August 25, 2005, father was ordered to submit to a psychological examination. Father refused to do so. Furthermore, father has been incarcerated since I February 2002. Due to father's incarceration, DCF has been unable to provide services to him. Although father has engaged in some rehabilitative services through the Department of Corrections, he has not achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation to adequately care for Cameron. Father's maximum release date is November 2007. Father acknowledged that upon release he would need an additional six months to one year before he could take care of Cameron. The court therefore concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of November 16, 2005, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for Cameron.

The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's2 life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); In re Latifa K, 67 Conn. App. 742, 749-50; 789 A.2d 1024 (2002); (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was no change in father's circumstances after the adjudicatory date. Father remained incarcerated and presently remains incarcerated. Father's request for visitation was denied because Cameron's therapist determined it would be emotionally detrimental for Cameron to have contact with his father. Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date did not improve much. Although mother continues to receive methadone maintenance at the Hartford dispensary, she has relapsed on alcohol. |

Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470. 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn. App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Mother's lack of sufficient engagement in mental health and substance abuse treatment to maintain her sobriety has limited her ability to rehabilitate. Additionally, mother lacks the minimum parenting skills to care for Cameron and, as testified to by Dr. Green, is not capable of rehabilitating within a reasonable period of time. Father remains incarcerated with a maximum release date of November 2007. Father acknowledges that upon his release from prison he will not be in a position to immediately care for Cameron.

Cameron is in great need of permanency. Cameron has significant emotional issues which demand permanency and stability in his life. If Cameron does not experience this permanency his psychological status will not improve. Given mother's and father`s current inability to have Cameron placed with either one of them, additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to Cameron.3

Cameron has been out of his mother's care since August 2005 and father has been incarcerated all but fifteen months of Cameron's life. Cameron is now placed in a foster home where the foster mother wishes to adopt him and is committed to his needs and development, any additional time for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable.

The court finds that the parents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for Cameron or to assume a useful role in his life and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of Cameron.

In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 261, 763] A.2d 71 (2000); accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn. App. 286, 292, 784 A.2d 412 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). The issue is not whether respondent mother and father have improved their ability to manage their life, but rather whether they have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 180, 743 A. Id 165 (1999); In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). Cameron has 9 specialized needs. He has significant emotional issues which require intensive therapy and at times, medication to stabilize his behavior. As Dr. Green testified, it is extremely important for Cameron to have a sense of grounding and permanency.

Cameron desperately needs and deserves a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn. Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff d.,4 51 Conn. App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998). "[terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and, remain unable to provide the day-to-day care Cameron needs within a reasonable time. Cameron now has a foster mother with whom he has thoroughly bonded. The foster mother is committed to Cameron and would like to adopt him. Although Cameron has significant emotional issues and behavioral problems that require specialized care, the B foster mother has committed herself to providing him with the necessary care to address his issues,

Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondents remain unable to successfully parent Cameron and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in his life within a reasonable foreseeable time. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-l 12 (j)(3)(B).

(c) No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.

No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been5 completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G, 56 Conn. App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn. App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert, denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn. App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).

In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondent (1 ) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the child Cameron and respondent father. Cameron considers his foster parents to be his psychological parents. Father has not provided day-to-day care for Cameron for any significant length of time in his life. Cameron has negative feelings and memories of his father and does not wish to have contact with his father. Father's visitation request was denied because of the detrimental effect the visits would have on Cameron. Thus, the evidence established to a clear and convincing standard that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between father and Cameron.

The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondent father additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship with the child who is in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. Cameron is now seven years and ten months old. He has been in DCF care in his pre-adoptive home since August 2005.6

It would be detrimental to Cameron's well-being to allow father additional time for the establishment of a relationship with Cameron. This court recognizes and acknowledges that father loves his son and wants to get to know his son and have a relationship with his son, unfortunately for father, it is simply too late. Cameron needs stability and permanency now. Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground as to respondent Gary S. by clear and convincing evidence.

(ii) DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including October 11, 2006, the date on which the evidence in this matter was completed. `"If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child. [In re Eden F., 250 Conn. At 689].'" In re Quanitra M, 60 Conn. App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 853 (2000). "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn. App. 528 (quoting In re DenzelA., 53 Conn. App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M, supra, 60 Conn. App. 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services to mother including substance abuse evaluation, testing, and treatment; mental health evaluation, counseling and treatment; and visitation. Respondent mother7 engaged in some services, but failed to engage in others. Respondent mother as of September 2006, was still receiving methadone maintenance through the Hartford Dispensary. Mother as of September 2006 admitted to relapsing on alcohol. As of October 11, 2006 the last trial date in this matter, father was still incarcerated with a maximum release date of November 19, 2007. Father has been incarcerated since February 2002 and therefore DCF has been unable to provide father with services. Father attempted to gain prison visitation with his son but this was denied by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters because Cameron's therapist did not feel visits were therapeutically in Cameron's best interests.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent mother and father. As set forth above in detail, respondent mother failed to comply with many of the specific steps. Due to father's years of incarceration, DCF was unable to provide father with services. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does have an emotional bond with his mother. Mother has entered into an open adoption agreement with Cameron's foster parents which includes liberal supervised visitation. Cameron does not have a bond with his father. Cameron has negative feelings and8 memories of his father and does not wish to see his father. Cameron has a significant emotional bond with his foster parents. Cameron's foster parents are psychological parents and are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support that Cameron needs. What is most important for Cameron at this time is stability and permanency in light of the respondents' inability to provide him with a stable and permanent environment. The foster mother is committed to Cameron and would like to adopt him. Cameron wishes to be adopted by his foster parents.

(5) As to the age of the child, the court finds that Cameron, born February 5, 1999, is seven years and ten months old. The court further finds that Cameron requires stability of placement and continuity of care and that the child's attorney recommends termination.²

2 Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused md neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings MI young children, time is of the essence.. . In re Alexander V., 25 Conn App. 741,748,596 A.2d 930 (1992), iff d., 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent mother has maintained only a visiting relationship with the child and father has maintained no significant relationship with the child. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child9 to be reunited. In re Luis C, 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by either parent, the child protection agency, foster parent or third parties. Further, while mother's financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the child.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of JoAnne W. and Gary S. as to Cameron W. is in the best interest of Cameron. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Cameron. Cameron has been out of his mother's care and in DCF foster care for approximately sixteen months. Cameron is in a foster home where he is very well cared for by his foster parents who are fully committed to him. Mother and father are unable to assume a responsible parental role for Cameron. Although father loves Cameron and would like to care for him, father is presently unable to do so. Mother, having recognized her inability to care for Cameron has consented to the termination of her parental rights.

In view of the fact that respondent father has been incarcerated for a substantial period of Cameron's life, has not been involved in Cameron's life in any significant way and is not a resource for Cameron, termination of his parental rights is in Cameron's best interest. In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature0 of his relationship with the foster mother and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents; and his genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C, 60 Conn. App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 159,167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M, 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 ( 1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in Cameron's best interest.

With regard to permanency, the court considers the evidence and testimony introduced that the foster parents are committed to adopting Cameron. The court also considers the testimony of Asha Patlikh, Cameron's therapist and Dr. Logan Green, the court appointed psychologist who examined Cameron. Cameron is entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as his parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the child supports termination.

After considering Cameron's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondents mother and father is in the child's best interest.

With regard to the permanency plan filed by petitioner on May 19, 2006 and any objection thereto, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds by clear and convincing evidence that such plan is in the best interest of Cameron. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.1

V. CONCLUSION

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of JoAnne W. and Gary S. as to the child Cameron W. are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent of the child. The permanency plan filed by petitioner on May 19, 2006 is approved.

A permanency plan shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

It is so ordered this March 13, 2007.