Opinion
No. 08-05-00089-CR
June 22, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 34th Impact District Court of El Paso County, Texas, Tc# 20040D00994.
Before BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.
OPINION
Enrique Camacho appeals his conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine in the amount of four grams or more, but less than two hundred grams. A jury found Appellant guilty and the trial court assessed punishment at 5 years imprisonment. In his sole issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his oral statements and erred in refusing to suppress the evidence derived from these statements, specifically the cocaine seized from his person and his subsequent written statement. We affirm. On January 28, 2004, Officers Raul Jacquez and Claude Collins, assisting in a narcotics investigation, conducted a traffic stop of a gray 1998 GMC Yukon after observing the driver fail to signal a lane change about four times. Officer Collins approached the driver, later identified as Appellant, and Officer Jacquez approached the front passenger, Gesenia Gomez. When the officers were unable to obtain positive identification from either occupant or proof of insurance on the vehicle, the officers then switched roles and re-approached the vehicle. Officer Jacquez asked Appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant was frisked, but not searched. Officer Jacquez also asked Appellant if he had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle and Appellant said "no." Officer Jacquez asked Appellant who was the owner of the vehicle and Appellant told him that Ms. Gomez was the owner. Officer Jacquez instructed Officer Collins to stand by Appellant, while he spoke to Ms. Gomez. Ms. Gomez gave the officer both verbal and written consent to search her vehicle. Ms. Gomez's children, two little girls, were also in the vehicle, so Officer Jacquez directed everyone to exit the vehicle and he placed Ms. Gomez and the girls in the back of the patrol unit. Officer Jacquez did recall that before he asked them to exit the vehicle, he observed that the girls were crying and Ms. Gomez explained that they were crying because they were very hungry. Officer Jacquez denied that there was any conversation with Ms. Gomez about the government taking her children away in obtaining her consent to the search. About that time, a K-9 narcotics unit arrived. No one was in the vehicle when it was searched. The dog handler quickly notified Officer Jacquez that the dog had detected an illegal substance. Officer Jacquez went back to the SUV and saw apparent narcotics, possibly cocaine, in a zip-lock bag in a compartment on the driver's side door. Officer Jacquez also observed a golf ball size bag of narcotics in the center armrest. After the narcotics were discovered, Officer Jacquez returned to Appellant and asked him if he had any other narcotics on his person. Appellant stated, "Yes, I do" and said he had it in his underwear. According to Officer Jacquez, by that point in time, Appellant was under arrest for the narcotics found in the SUV, but was not yet handcuffed. Officer Jacquez testified that he did not personally give Appellant his Miranda warnings. Rather, Detective Boyce Hooper read Appellant his Miranda rights after he arrived and had been advised by Officer Jacquez and Officer Fairbanks, the dog handler, that narcotics had been found in the SUV and that Appellant had some narcotics in his undergarments. Detective Hooper testified that he observed two baggies of what he believed to be cocaine inside the SUV. Detective Hooper then made contact with Appellant. He read Appellant his Miranda rights and then asked Appellant if he had any other cocaine on him and Appellant said he did and explained that it was concealed in his undergarments. Detective Hooper and another officer searched Appellant and found a clear plastic baggy of a white powder believed to be cocaine inside Appellant's undergarments. Detective Hooper agreed that once the cocaine was discovered in the SUV, Appellant was technically under arrest. Appellant gave a written statement to Sergeant Carrillo at the police station. Sergeant Carrillo testified that he presented Appellant with a card advising him of his Miranda rights. Appellant read the card and it was also read to him by Sergeant Carrillo. Appellant signed and initialed the card, indicating that he understood his rights. Appellant was allowed to read the completed statement and to make any additions, alterations, changes, or deletions. Appellant chose to make an addition to his statement. Appellant signed the confession in the presence of Sergeant Carrillo, Detective Hooper, and another officer. Sergeant Carrillo denied ever having any conversation with Appellant about whether Ms. Gomez would be arrested or not or whether Ms. Gomez' children would be left alone or would be taken away from her by Child Protective Services. Detective Hooper also testified that no deal was made in exchange for Appellant's statement and that no promises were made to him. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing. According to Appellant, during the traffic stop, he and Ms. Gomez were pulled out of the SUV after he failed to produce a driver's license. Ms. Gomez was immediately placed in the squad car and the children were left in the SUV. An officer patted down Appellant. Appellant was then pulled to the side and the officer patted him down again before placing him in handcuffs. The officer found nothing on him in each pat down. The officers then sat Appellant down on the parking curb in the parking lot, away from the vehicles. Later, detectives approached him and put him up against the wall. A detective asked him if he knew what was going on. Appellant was then left there with another officer while they searched the SUV. The officers then returned and asked Appellant to cooperate if he did not want his girlfriend to go to jail or CPS to take her children away. Appellant told the officers that he would cooperate with them. They then asked him, "Okay. Where is it?" Appellant told them that he had it on him. A detective asked Appellant if he had been patted down and Appellant explained that he was patted down twice, but they had not found anything. The detective then asked Appellant, "Okay. So, where is it?" Appellant told the detective that he "had it in [his] privates." According to Appellant, all of the narcotics were on him, and there was absolutely nothing in the SUV. Appellant testified that he was given the Miranda warnings after he had told the officers where the drugs were located. Gesenia Gomez Camacho testified she was pulled out of the SUV after she failed to produce a driver's license. She was put into the back of the patrol car while here daughters remained in her SUV. The girls started crying. Appellant had already been pulled out of the car, handcuffed, and put to the side. Ms. Gomez observed the officers pat Appellant down and handcuff him right away. Ms. Gomez observed Appellant move a little closer to the SUV where the girls could see him in the side window. She did not hear any conversations between Appellant and the police officers. Officer Jacquez asked her to sign a consent form to search her SUV. At first, she did not want to give consent, but was threatened with arrest and having her children removed by CPS. According to Ms. Gomez, the officers searched her SUV and found nothing. At the suppression hearing, Appellant's counsel argued that all of Appellant's oral and written statements and the cocaine found on his person were inadmissible because his initial oral statement was the result of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. At trial, Appellant's counsel re-urged his objections, cross-examined the officers extensively on the suppression issues, and throughout the trial raised the same objections to the officers' testimony and the admissibility of the State's evidence. In addition, Appellant's counsel raised the objection that all the evidence Appellant sought to suppress was inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. The trial court found that Appellant's objection on federal grounds was timely, but overruled this objection as well. In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his oral statements to Officer Jacquez because the statements were made without first administering the Miranda warnings and were the product of coercive interrogation procedures and illegal inducements and promises. Further, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence derived from these statements, specifically, the cocaine seized from his person and his subsequent written statement to the police, pursuant to exclusionary rule in the Fifth Amendment.
At trial, Officer Jacquez testified that before conducting the search incident to the arrest, for safety purposes, he asked Appellant if he had any type of weapons, needles, or narcotics on his person. In response, Appellant told him that he had some cocaine in his underwear and showed it to the officer. According to Officer Jacquez, when he asked Appellant the question, he did not have Appellant at gun point, did not have him in handcuffs, and did not threaten him in any way. Officer Jacquez denied that he interrogated Appellant in order to obtain an incriminating response. Officer Jacquez explained that every time he arrests someone, for his safety, he searches the person before that person is handcuffed and placed in the patrol unit because that person could have a weapon or a needle that could poke him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Under this standard, we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. at 89. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.; Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In determining whether a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is supported by the record, an appellant court generally considers only the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. See Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 614, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). However, where the suppression issue is consensually re-litigated by the parties at trial, as in this case, we consider the evidence presented at the hearing as well as the relevant evidence presented at trial. Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 809. The trial court's ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Under Miranda, the prosecution may not use statements, exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Morris v. State, 897 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. In this case, the State does not dispute that Appellant was in custody at the time he made his oral statement to Officer Jacquez; rather, it contends that the statement did not stem from an interrogation. The term "interrogation" under Miranda "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The term "incriminating response" refers to any response that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. Id. at 301 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 5. According to Officer Jacquez, before conducting such a search incident to an arrest, he asked Appellant if he had any type of weapons, needles, or narcotics on his person. In response, Appellant told the officer that he had cocaine in his undergarments. Officer Jacquez explained that every time he arrests someone, for his safety, he searches the person before that person is handcuffed and placed in the patrol unit because that person could have a weapon or a needle that could poke him. Officer Jacquez denied that he interrogated Appellant in order to obtain an incriminating response. Not all post-arrest police questioning constitutes an interrogation. Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). "For example, routine inquiries, questions incident to booking, broad general questions such as `what happened' upon arrival at the scene of a crime, and questions mandated by public safety concerns, e.g., `where did you hide the weapon' when the weapon has just been hidden in the immediate vicinity" are not interrogation. See id. at 174 n. 3. Officer Jacquez's inquiry, however, does not fall within the sort of questioning that is normally attendant to arrest and custody. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90; McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). While the police officer was justified in conducting a search incident to arrest, we can find no justification for directly questioning Appellant about the presence of narcotics on his person, which under the circumstances, was certain to elicit an incriminating response. We conclude that Officer Jacquez's inquiry was not the type of questioning normally attendant to arrest and custody, but rather constituted an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, and therefore, Appellant's oral statement should have been suppressed. Having reached this conclusion, we next determine whether the cocaine seized from Appellant's person or his subsequent written statement were also inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in the Fifth Amendment. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) does not apply to mere violations of the prophylactic requirements in Miranda: while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of the statement, i.e., the "fruits" of the statement, need not be suppressed. Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2368, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the warnings required by Miranda are designed to protect against a defendant's compelled testimony in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2626, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion in the making of a custodial statement, which implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and requires the suppression of the statement. Patane, 542 U.S. at 639, 124 S.Ct. at 2627; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. However, this presumption extends no further than necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination and does not require suppression of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation when the "fruit" is a subsequent, properly warned and voluntary statement or is physical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned, but voluntary statement. See Patane, 542 U.S. at 642-44, 124 S.Ct. at 2629-30; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307-09, 105 S.Ct. at 1292-93. Here, Appellant argues that his oral statement was the product of coercive interrogation techniques employed by Officer Jacquez, that is, threatening to arrest Appellant's girlfriend and to have her children taken away and placed in child protective services if Appellant did not cooperate with the narcotics investigation. Further, Appellant asserts that he was induced to make the statement only because of Officer Jacquez's unlawful promise that he would release Appellant's girlfriend and her children and allow them to go home if Appellant cooperated and told the officer where the cocaine was hidden. The rule in Wong Sun requires suppression of the fruits of a defendant's statement only when the statement was obtained through actual coercion. Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22, citing Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448-49, 94 S.Ct. at 2365-67; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296; see also Patane, 542 U.S. at 644, 124 S.Ct. at 2630 (the court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2002, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003) (those subjected to coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection from the use of their involuntary statements [or evidence derived from their statements] in any subsequent criminal trial). A statement is involuntary if the record reflects "official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Before a promise will render a confession inadmissible, the promise must be positive, made or sanctioned by a person in authority, and be of such character as would be likely to influence the defendant to speak untruthfully. Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The voluntariness of the statement is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was obtained. See Creager, 952 S.W.2d at 855. The ultimate question is whether Appellant's will was overborne. See id. at 856. According to Appellant's testimony, after he was patted down twice, was handcuffed, and the SUV searched, the police officers came over to him and "they asked me that if I didn't want my girlfriend or her kids — or the CPS to take the kids away and her go to jail, for me to cooperate with them." Specifically, the following exchange occurred:So, he had told me to work with them and she would get — she'd be able — they wouldn't arrest her and they wouldn't take her kids away. So, I told them that I'd cooperate with them. So, they asked me, `Okay. Where is it?' And I told them that I had it on me.In contrast, Officer Jacquez testified at trial that he asked Appellant if he had any type of weapons, needles, or narcotics on his person. Officer Jacquez stated that he did not have Appellant at gunpoint or in handcuffs and did not threaten him in any way. Although Officer Jacquez did not specifically rebut Appellant's claim that he made promises in exchange for Appellant's oral statement, Appellant's testimony indicates only a general, non-specific request for Appellant to cooperate with the police. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence does not suggest that Appellant's will was overborne or that he was coerced such that his statement was given involuntarily. With regard to Appellant's subsequent written statement, the relevant inquiry is whether this later, properly warned statement was also voluntarily made. See Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 773 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293 (Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.). "As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298. Officer Jacquez testified that the initial traffic stop occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m., and within moments of the encounter, the SUV was searched and Appellant had make his oral statement. According to Detective Hooper, he read Appellant his Miranda rights after being advised that narcotics had been found in the SUV and that Appellant had narcotics on his person. After Appellant was transported to the police station, he agreed to give a written statement to Sergeant Carrillo. The detective testified that he advised Appellant of his Miranda rights from a printed card, Appellant read them and they were also read to him by Sergeant Carrillo. Appellant initialed each of his rights, indicating that he acknowledged and understood his rights. By his signature, Appellant acknowledged that he freely and voluntarily waived those rights. Appellant's written statement also states that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. The written statement indicates that Sergeant Carrillo warned Appellant at 3:45 p.m. and that the statement was given between 4 to 4:45 p.m. Both Sergeant Carrillo and Detective Hooper testified that no threats or promises were made in exchange for Appellant's written statement. Further, Appellant's written statement recites that he was not threatened or made any promises. After examining the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct, it is clear that Appellant's subsequent written statement was voluntarily given. Therefore, we conclude that even if the trial court erred in refusing to suppress Appellant's oral statement to Officer Jacquez, the alleged "fruits" of that statement, the cocaine seized from his person and his subsequent written statement were nevertheless admissible at trial. As discussed above, we have determined that it was error for the trial court not to suppress Appellant's oral statement to Officer Jacquez. While we believe this error is of constitutional dimension because it affected Appellant's Fifth Amendment rights, we nevertheless conclude that this error was harmless. An appellate court must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. See TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(a). Under this harm analysis, we calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the existence of other evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). While the most significant concern must be the error and its effects, the presence of overwhelming evidence supporting the finding in question can be a factor in the evaluation of harmless error. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 119; see also Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587-88 (outlining factors to consider). In establishing it's case-in-chief, the State did not rely upon nor did it place any emphasis on Appellant's oral statement to Officer Jacquez. Rather, the State argued that Appellant had committed the charged offense based on the following evidence: the quantity of the cocaine found on Appellant's person and inside the SUV; Appellant's written statement in which he admitted ownership of the cocaine; evidence related to the location and accessibility of the cocaine to Appellant; the amount of money found in the center console of the SUV, in particular the denomination of the bills; and witness testimony to show an intent to deliver rather than possession of the cocaine for personal use. Therefore, even though the trial court erred in not suppressing Appellant's oral statement, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Appellant's conviction or punishment. Accordingly, we find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to suppress the complained-of evidence. Appellant's sole issue for review is overruled. We affirm the trial court's judgment.