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concluding trial court did not err in refusing to reform the MSA to reflect a lower payment from husband to wife or in rendering the divorce decree based on the binding MSA, which met the procedural requisites of section 6.602, because even if the parties overestimated the value of their property during mediation, nothing in the MSA indicated that the agreed payment to wife was based on a sixty–forty division of their community property, as alleged by husband on appeal
Summary of this case from In re TorresOpinion
No. 05-02-01631-CV
Opinion Filed August 21, 2003.
On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 01-18793-Y
AFFIRMED
Before Justices JAMES, FRANCIS, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
George David Butler seeks to set aside or reform the mediated settlement agreement (MSA) upon which his divorce decree was based. He generally contends (1) there was a mutual mistake of fact with respect to the value of the couple's house and motor home at the time the MSA was executed, and (2) the trial court improperly awarded attorney's fees. Concluding appellant's arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
During divorce proceedings, appellant and appellee executed an MSA and about one month later, appellant filed a motion to reform, clarify, or strike the MSA. The matter was submitted to arbitration as required by the MSA and the arbitrator entered an award resolving all property issues between the parties. Notably, appellant did not raise the issue of mutual mistake of fact in the arbitration. About four months after the mediation, the trial court held a hearing on appellee's motion to enforce the MSA and appellant's supplemental motion to reform, clarify or strike the MSA. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court approved the MSA, confirmed the arbitration award, awarded attorney fees of $6,200 to appellee and signed the final decree of divorce incorporating the MSA. Appellant appeals.
In nineteen issues, appellant urges he should be permitted to rescind the MSA because he and appellee mistakenly overvalued their house and motor home at the time the MSA was executed. He also maintains that section 6.602 of the family code outlining mediation procedures "should be applied only when children are involved and made a part of the agreement."
Section 6.602(b) of the family code provides that an MSA is binding on the parties if it prominently states in boldfaced type, capital letters, or underlining that the agreement is not subject to revocation and is signed by each party and attorney. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.602(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). If the above requirements are met, a party is entitled to judgment on the MSA "notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.602(c). Section 6.602 provides a procedural shortcut for the enforcement of MSAs in divorce cases, eliminating the need for a separate suit to enforce the agreement even when one party withdraws his consent from the MSA. See Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). MSAs are binding in those suits involving only marital property as well as those affecting the separate parent-child relationship. Id.
Appellant does not contend the MSA fails to meet the statutory requirements listed above but argues the MSA should be set aside because he and appellee mistakenly overvalued their house and motor home. In particular, appellant alleges he intended to pay appellee $130,000 representing sixty percent of the total value of the couple's community property and contends the MSA should be rescinded or reformed to reflect a lower payment to appellee considering the corrected values of the house and motor home.
The trial court heard evidence that on the inventories and appraisements filed three months before the mediation, appellee valued the house at $370,000 and the motor home at $46,060, while appellant estimated the value of these items at $350,000 and $24,940. Appellant testified that at the time of the mediation, he and appellee thought the net value of the house was $331,000 but he since learned the house was worth only $250,000. Appellee, on the other hand, testified the $331,000 value given to the house was scratched out on Exhibit A to the MSA because the parties could not agree on a value for the house. The house was currently listed for sale at $349,000 and an offer of $290,000 had been rejected. Appellant also testified $46,060 was listed as the value of the motor home during the mediation, but he told the trial court he had sold the motor home, contrary to an injunction, and received only $18,119.
After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing on appellee's motion to enforce and appellant's supplemental motion to reform, we conclude the trial court did not err in rendering the divorce decree based on the MSA. The procedural requisites of section 6.602 were met and are binding on appellant. Even assuming the parties overestimated the value of the house and motor home, nothing in the MSA indicates the $130,000 payment to appellee was based on a sixty-forty division of the community property. The trial court did not err in enforcing the MSA, confirming the arbitration award and signing the divorce decree incorporating the MSA.
In his fifteenth and sixteenth issues, appellant challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees to appellee. Appellant's brief includes only two sentences addressing the attorney fee award ("The record further reflects that the Court had no agreement for awarding attorney's fees against one party or the other. In fact, the Agreement states just the opposite."). Appellant has waived these issues by failing to provide any discussion, argument, or authority to support his contentions. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Even absent waiver, we find no merit to appellant's contention. The MSA provided that each party was responsible for their outstanding attorney's fees at the time the MSA was executed. The attorney's fees awarded by the trial court were based on testimony of fees appellee incurred after the signing of the MSA.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.