STEWART, Justice:

Plaintiff, Rosa Bustamante, a nonimmigrant alien, brought this divorce action which was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not a resident of the State of Utah as required by Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 30-3-1. On appeal we must decide whether an alien, present in this jurisdiction under a temporary nonimmigrant visa, is precluded as a matter of law from fulfilling the residency requirements of our divorce statute, § 30-3-1.

Plaintiff married defendant in 1947 in El Salvador, the country of their citizenship. The plaintiff arrived in Utah August 19, 1979, on a visitor's visa valid through July, 1980. On June 21, 1980 she submitted an application to federal authorities to extend her stay until December 31, 1980. Because Mrs. Bustamante neither speaks nor writes English, her son prepared the extension application which stated that plaintiff desired to spend Christmas with her family and that the political situation in El Salvador was too unstable to assure her safety upon return. She received the requested extension. On January 13, 1981, plaintiff applied to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a change in her status to that of political asylum.

On July 14, 1980 plaintiff filed this action in the trial court, and the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A hearing on the issue was held July 25, 1980, and evidence as to the jurisdiction was adduced. Plaintiff presented the following testimony: She came to the United States intending to live in Utah for the rest of her life. She and her husband had been estranged for several years. He abandoned her, refused to account for his whereabouts for long periods of time, and established a marital relationship with another woman in Tennessee. She came to the United States on a visitor's visa because it was the easiest manner of entry available to her. Her move to the United States intentionally coincided with her daughter's pending application for citizenship and ability to sponsor her as an immigrant. The daughter lives in Utah, is 29 years old, married to an American, and has four children. Plaintiff also has a son and minor daughter living in Utah. She owns real property in both Provo and Cedar City and has bank accounts in Utah County.

After hearing plaintiff's testimony regarding her intention in coming to this country and in remaining for the necessary three months for filing her divorce complaint, the court found that "the best and most believable evidence as to the intent of plaintiff to make Utah County her permanent residence is found in her application to extend time of temporary stay which was executed by plaintiff on June 21, 1980." The court held that since she did not "seek to change her tourist status" to permanent residency, but merely to extend her stay until December 31, 1980, the application showed that as of June 21, 1980 she intended to remain temporarily and not permanently in Utah. On this and other evidence, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had not met the three month actual and bona fide residency on July 14, 1980, the date she filed her divorce action.

Section 30-3-1 confers jurisdiction on the district court to dissolve a marriage when plaintiff or defendant is an "actual and bona fide resident" of this state and of the county where the action is brought for three months immediately preceding the commencement of the action. The term "bona fide" resident connotes a good faith intention to reside in a particular place, a "home feeling" for that place, see Munsee v. Munsee, 12 Utah 2d 83, 85, 363 P.2d 71, 72 (1961), and the absence of an intention to live elsewhere permanently, see Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d 1055 (1950). "Actual" residence requires physical presence. 12 Utah 2d at 85, 363 P.2d at 71. To establish an actual and bona fide residence, ". . . one must have some abode in the county to which he intends to return and where, in doing so, he would be no trespasser." Id. Factors that may reflect the requisite intent to return or remain in a jurisdiction include voting, owning property, paying taxes, having family in the area, maintaining a mailing address, being born or raised in the area, working or operating a business, and having children attend school in the forum.

Defendant argues that an intent to remain permanently in the United States is in direct conflict with plaintiff's visitor's status and that an intent to establish permanent residency in the United States would be inconsistent with the requirements which must be met to obtain a temporary visa. Entry under those circumstances would be fraudulent, so the argument goes, and one who so enters under those circumstances would preclude one from becoming a bona fide domiciliary as a matter of law. Plaintiff concedes that one who resides in the country without permanent status may as a factual matter lack the intent to remain but is not precluded as a matter of law from establishing that intent. As a general proposition that is a correct statement of the law.

We emphasize that a visa application or renewal form indicating a date certain for return to one's home country is not necessarily inconsistent with an actual conditional intent to establish permanent residency in the United States, if possible, by means of renewals and extensions of one's nonimmigrant status or attainment of immigrant status. Indeed, plaintiff's visa extension until December 31, 1980 is just one example of a legal means to fulfill her intention to stay beyond an expressed return date. Moreover, it is instructive to note that nonimmigrant aliens need no longer leave the country to apply for an immigrant visa. In 1952 Congress created an "adjustment of status" mechanism by which an alien already in the United States may apply for permanent resident status. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Ch. 477, § 245, 66 Stat. 217 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).

Even if the plaintiff's professed intention to establish an actual and bona fide residency is inconsistent with the terms of her right of entry into the United States, she is not thereby disqualified from becoming a domiciliary for divorce purposes. As stated in Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D.C.V.I., 1971):

Even assuming the least favorable situation, where an alien has misrepresented his true intent at the time he was granted entry to the country, the fact that he may be illegally in the country and deportable would not preclude him from forming an actual intent to make his home here. I see no reason to erect from the immigration laws an insuperable barrier of "constructive" intent in divorce litigation that cannot be overcome even by proof of a person's actual intent. The enforcement of immigration laws properly remains with those to whom it is entrusted by law and does not need in aid of enforcement the judicially created civil disability of exclusion from our divorce courts. There is no rational ground for intermingling these two distinct areas of law — immigration and divorce.

"A visa is a document of entry required of aliens by the United States Government and is a matter under the control of the government. It has little relevance to the question of domicile." Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 115 (D.C.App. 1970). A state must determine who qualifies as a resident under its own laws, and need not assist the Federal Government in enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws. Numerous cases have held that nonimmigrating aliens may form the requisite intent to establish a permanent residence necessary for divorce jurisdiction. Torlonia v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 142 A. 843 (1928); Abou-issa v. Abou-issa, 229 Ga. 77, 189 S.E.2d 443 (1971); Gosschalk v. Gosschalk, 48 N.J. Super. 566, 138 A.2d 774 (1958); Cocron v. Cocron, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797, 84 Misc.2d 335 (1975). See also Brownell v. Gutnayer, 212 F.2d 462 (D.C.App. 1954). Given the uncertainty confronting an alien in knowing whether he may be accorded the right to remain indefinitely or permanently under certain situations, we hold that an alien may have a "dual intent" — an intent to remain if that may be accomplished and at the same time an intent to leave if the law so commands.

In equity cases our scope of review is broad, and this Court may weigh the evidence and determine the facts. Ovard v. Cannon, Utah, 600 P.2d 1246 (1979). Generally, we defer to the findings of fact of the trial judge unless the findings are based on an erroneous standard, although this Court may under some circumstances reassess the facts itself. Under similar facts, numerous courts have treated the issue of residency as a matter of law and simply reversed a trial court's ruling. E.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Borg, 396 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1968); Peninsula Insurance Co. v. Knight, 254 Md. 461, 255 A.2d 55 (1969); Buddin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 250 S.C. 352, 157 S.E.2d 633 (1967); Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 55 Wis.2d 27, 197 N.W.2d 783 (1972).

Generally, however, the determination of residency for divorce purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. Williams v. Williams, 226 Ga. 734, 177 S.E.2d 481 (1970). Cf. Munsee v. Munsee, 12 Utah 2d 83, 383 P.2d 71 (1961). Of course, when credibility is an issue a trial judge is in an advantaged position in evaluating the evidence. Searle v. Searle, Utah, 522 P.2d 697 (1974); Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975).

This Court has not heretofore addressed the issue of the definition of "residency" under Utah law as it relates to aliens who are in this country on a nonpermanent type visa. How the trial court might have ruled on the basis of the standards set forth herein, we cannot predict. Furthermore, there may be issues of credibility which must yet be resolved. Therefore, the most appropriate procedure in our view is to remand this case to the trial court to determine again whether on the facts and the law, including the law set forth in this opinion, a different conclusion as to residency should be made. On that, we express no opinion.

Reversed and remanded. No costs.

OAKS and HOWE, JJ., concur.