OPINION BY BROSKY, J.

¶ 1 This is an appeal from an order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Appellant raises one question for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of assumption of the risk where there existed a material issue of fact as to whether [Bullman], a visitor to a residential construction site, subjectively knew that a plank providing access would move, causing her to lose her balance, step onto and fall through boards, which appeared to be weight-bearing and a covered porch, into the basement and become a paraplegic?

We vacate and remand.

¶ 2 On February 1, 1996, Appellant (hereafter Bullman), along with her parents, visited the construction site of a new home which was being built for Appellees, James and Barbara Giuntoli (Giuntolis), who were friends of Bullman's parents, with the intention of viewing the unfinished home. As of that date the basic structure was in place, the house had been framed and a roof was in place. Around the perimeter of the house was an open excavation "ditch" approximately six to eight feet wide and eight to nine feet deep. The only apparent access to the interior of the unfinished home was provided by a wooden board or plank approximately twenty feet long and one foot wide. This board crossed the excavation ditch onto an unfinished porch area and into the main portion of the home. Underneath the house was a basement, which extended out to the porch. The porch was covered with insulation boards which had been placed there to retain heat and allow for the pouring of the basement floor.

¶ 3 Since Bullman had desired to see the interior of the unfinished home, she stepped onto the board and began crossing the board toward the entrance of the house. According to her deposition testimony, Bullman safely traversed the excavation ditch and was over the unfinished porch area when the board moved causing her to lose her balance. As Bullman was losing her balance she stepped onto the flooring of the porch in an effort to regain stability, but, as the porch was covered only with insulation board, which could not sustain her weight, she fell through the insulation board into the basement. As a result of the fall, Bullman sustained severe injury and is now a quadriplegic.

¶ 4 On August 12, 1997, Bullman filed a complaint against both the Giuntolis and Heinz C. Augustine, individually, and H.C.A. Construction (Augustine), alleging causes in negligence and seeking damages for her personal injury. On September 11, 1998, Giuntolis filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that as Augustine Construction was an independent contractor the Giuntolis were not "in possession" of the property on the date the accident occurred and also asserting that Bullman had voluntarily assumed the risk of the injury sustained. The court granted the Giuntolis' motion on the basis of assumption of the risk and did not consider Giuntolis other basis for summary judgment relief. In order to facilitate an immediate appeal Bullman asked the court to amend its order to indicate that the ruling on assumption of the risk would preclude an action against Augustine. The court modified its order as requested and the present appeal followed.

¶ 5 When reviewing an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we consider the following principles:

[We] will only reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment where the [trial court committed] an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In determining whether to grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Sebelin v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 705 A.2d 904, 906 (Pa.Super. 1998) (citations omitted).

¶ 6 This appeal asks us to once again revisit the matter of assumption of the risk, that is, a situation where a party voluntarily proceeds in the face of a known risk. As can be readily seen from even a cursory research of this area of law, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been very problematic and has fallen from the favor of some of the judiciary and legal commentators. In fact, the doctrine as a separate affirmative defense has only narrowly survived abolishment by our Supreme Court. As this case attests, the doctrine is frequently misapplied. At times, trial courts, in reliance upon the doctrine, have incorrectly precluded cases from going to a jury, thus, precipitating reversals and remands. Moreover, in the day of comparative negligence, many believe the doctrine is outdated and serves little purpose. Nevertheless, as the doctrine has not been formally abolished by our Supreme Court, we are obligated to apply the doctrine despite its less than wholehearted support.

¶ 7 Before attempting to define what assumption of the risk is, perhaps more might be accomplished by clarifying what assumption of the risk is not. If one thing is clear from a thorough review of assumption of the risk law it is that a failure to apprehend a danger that then occasions injury is negligence, not assumption of the risk. An apprehension of a danger, followed by a conscious decision to tempt fate and accept what fate may bring, which then occasions injury, while indeed constituting contributory negligence, is additionally assumption of the risk, and a complete bar to recovery. Hopefully the discussion that follows will demonstrate the above with convincing clarity.

¶ 8 In Handschuh v. Albert Development, 574 A.2d 693 (Pa.Super. 1990), we stated:

The essence of assumption of the risk defense is not an evaluation of fault or negligence in encountering a danger but an acknowledgement that the plaintiff changed his position. Before suffering injury "he intelligently acquiesced in a known danger and abandoned his right to complain, but afterwards, seeks to assert the claim he had waived." Id., 463 A.2d at 1049.

Quoting Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d 1042 (Pa.Super. 1983). (Emphasis added). This same sentiment was echoed in Struble v. Valley Forge Military Academy, 665 A.2d 4 (Pa.Super. 1995), where we stated:

a plaintiff will not be precluded from recovering except where it is beyond question that he voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition and thereby must be viewed as relieving the defendant of responsibility for his injuries.

(Emphasis added). In Long v. Norriton Hydraulics, Inc., 662 A.2d 1089, 1090 (Pa.Super. 1995), we termed the concept as one where the plaintiff, by his actions, "absolved the defendant from responsibility for the injuries sustained." (Emphasis added). The recent case of Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522, 529 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), incorporates both terms and states, "a plaintiff has assumed the risk where he has gone so far as to abandon his right to complain and has absolved the defendant from taking any responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries."

¶ 9 To borrow from another well-known legal concept, "assumption of the risk" is essentially a form of "estoppel" in a tort context. It might be assumed, for purposes of an assumption of the risk analysis, that the defendant(s) was negligent, and at least partly responsible for the injury sustained, nevertheless, given the circumstances in which the injury was sustained, the plaintiff is essentially "estopped" from pursuing an action against the defendant because it is fundamentally unfair to allow the plaintiff to shift the responsibility for the injury to the defendant when the risk was known, appreciated and voluntarily assumed by the plaintiff.

¶ 10 The above principle, whether couched as abandoning a right to complain, or absolving/relieving a defendant of responsibility, or even estopping a plaintiff from recovering, cannot follow, however, unless the danger was known and fully appreciated. As related in the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 496 D:

b. The basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiff's consent to accept the risk and look out for himself. Therefore he will not be found, in the absence of an express agreement which is clearly so to be construed, to assume any risk unless he has knowledge of its existence. This means that he must not only be aware of the facts which create the danger, but must also appreciate the danger itself and the nature, character, and extent which make it unreasonable.

c. The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In this it differs from the objective standard which is applied to contributory negligence. (See §§ 464, 289 and 290.) If by reason of age, or lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a known situation; he will not be taken to assume the risk, although it may still be found that his conduct is contributory negligence because it does not conform to the community standard of the reasonable man.

¶ 11 Given the above, it is not surprising then that the assumption of the risk doctrine has been applied in rather narrow fashion, particularly in more recent years, as it is quite a drastic measure to state that despite the very possible presence of negligence that at least contributed to a party's injuries, nonetheless, the plaintiff should be "estopped" or prevented from holding that party liable in court because the plaintiff's actions are such that they should be viewed as having abandoned any right to complain. Thus, in particular, the recent decisions reflect a reluctance to find assumption of the risk applicable unless it is quite clear that the specific risk that occasioned injury was both fully appreciated and voluntarily accepted.

¶ 12 In Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A.2d 839 (Pa.Super. 1994):

Appellant brought suit to recover damages for an injury sustained at a 7-Eleven store owned by appellees. According to appellant's testimony she entered appellees' store on a day it had been raining, stepped onto a floor mat located just inside the doorway and, on her first step off the mat, fell on the linoleum floor. Appellant admitted that she had glanced at the floor immediately prior to stepping onto it and noticed that it appeared wet. Based upon this admission the trial court concluded that appellant had "assumed the risk" of the injury she sustained and, therefore, was precluded from recovery.

In reviewing this decision we concluded that the court had erred in finding assumption of the risk under the facts presented there. We stated:

we do not believe appellant assumed a known risk under circumstances that indicates an abandonment of a right to complain. The "preliminary conduct" of walking into the store is not such that should be regarded as accompanied with assuming the risk of a fall on a slippery floor. Appellant did not become aware of the "known danger" until just before she took the step which caused her injury. Indeed, in order to avoid the danger it might have been necessary for her to stop herself in mid-stride. In our opinion these are not circumstances to which the doctrine should apply as an affirmative defense. Rather, these circumstances invite comparison of negligence under applicable law.

¶ 13 We reached a similar conclusion in the aforementioned case of Struble v. Valley Forge Military Academy, 665 A.2d 4 (Pa.Super. 1995). There, a student of the Academy was injured when a ceremonial/"toy" cannon, which was loaded with "blanks only," discharged while the student was located in front of, and slightly to the side of, the cannon's mouth causing injury to the student's leg. The cannon discharged when the student attempted to loosen the lanyard after it became stuck between the wheel and body of the cannon. The trial court refused to charge the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the risk prompting the Academy's appeal when the jury found for the student in a negligence action.

¶ 14 Although the student indicated that he was aware that he should not stand in front of the cannon while it was being discharged, and even though the student caused the cannon to discharge when he pulled on the lanyard while attempting to dislodge it, we concluded that the case did not support an assumption of the risk defense. In reaching this conclusion, we focused upon the fact that the student had indicated that he was unaware that the cannon, being loaded with blanks, could cause the type of injury sustained and also that the cannon had always required considerably more pressure upon the lanyard to discharge it than the student had applied that day. Thus, given the above-quoted standard, it is clear that the panel did not believe that the student's actions amounted to a voluntary assumption of risk under circumstances that "relieved the defendant of responsibility for the injuries sustained."

¶ 15 Similarly, in Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129 (Pa.Super. 1996), we reversed the finding of assumption of the risk where an insulation installer, working on two foot stilts, slipped and fell on a discarded piece of siding. Central to our decision was the fact that the plaintiff did not see the specific piece of vinyl siding which he stepped on and caused him to fall. Indeed, Barrett provides a useful lesson. The mere fact one engages in activity that has some inherent danger does not mean that one cannot recover from a negligent party when injury is subsequently sustained. Mr. Barrett clearly had an appreciation of a certain amount of risk in the venture. Working on stilts certainly is more dangerous than working while standing on firm ground. Additionally, he had taken time to clear a path where he would be working from debris in order to prevent an accident. However, the appreciation of a general risk was not sufficient to prevent the case from going to the jury. Instead, that appreciation required a weighing of fault under comparative negligence principles. Had Barrett glanced down and seen the vinyl siding and then chose to proceed despite its presence then experienced the fall, the case may very well have implicated assumption of the risk.

¶ 16 Similarly, in Long v. Norriton Hydraulics, Inc., 662 A.2d 1089 (Pa.Super. 1995), we reversed an order granting summary judgment in favor of several defendants on the basis of assumption of the risk. There a worker was injured when he slipped on hydraulic fluid and fell while trying to avoid being struck by a hydraulic lift that suddenly shifted downward toward him. The evidence cited to support the granting of summary judgment included the fact that the hydraulic lifts had "shifted" "quite a few times" and also that the lifts had been leaking hydraulic fluid for some time and that the appellant was aware of both of these facts. The panel's decision reflects a belief that this evidence did not establish the essential elements of the assumption of the risk doctrine, namely that the risk of injury from the transaction that actually took place was so immediately apparent as to be equivalent to an appreciation and acceptance of that risk and a relinquishment of the right to complain.

¶ 17 A similar result was reached in the aforementioned Handschuh v. Albert Development, 574 A.2d 693 (Pa.Super. 1990). In Handschuh we found that the court had properly denied a request to instruct the jury on the theory of assumption of the risk in an action involving the death of a plumbing contractor who sustained injuries when a trench in which he was laying pipe collapsed. Mr. Handschuh was aware of the general risk of ditch collapses and it had even been believed that this particular job would be "delicate." As a safety precaution Mr. Handschuh had a lookout on duty to shout a warning if any evidence of a collapse was presented. The fatal injury resulted when a seam developed in the trench. The lookout shouted a warning and Mr. Handschuh responded by retreating up the trench but he did not exit the trench. After hesitating a moment, Mr. Handschuh turned again when the bulk of the dirt hit him, causing him to sustain fatal injuries. We stated that although the job contained a definite element of risk that was appreciated, the risk was not so imminent as to constitute a waiver of the right to complain. Thus, application of assumption of the risk was not implicated.

¶ 18 After reviewing the above decisions it should be clear that to grant summary judgment on the basis of assumption of the risk it must first be concluded, as a matter of law, that the party consciously appreciated the risk that attended a certain endeavor, assumed the risk of injury by engaging in the endeavor despite the appreciation of the risk involved, and that the injury sustained was, in fact, the same risk of injury that was appreciated and assumed. This last factor, although certainly a logical component of the assumption of the risk doctrine, also appears to be a stumbling block in assumption of the risk analysis. Even if it is assumed that there is an assumption of the risk component to one's actions, it does not necessarily follow that any type of injury suffered in that endeavor becomes immune from suit. Logically speaking, the injury sustained must be the result of the same risk appreciated and assumed.

¶ 19 To illustrate this point, consider a frequently cited example of assumption of the risk: when one attends a baseball or hockey game one is presumed to assume the risk that he might be hit by a baseball or a puck. Nevertheless, if one is struck by a baseball intentionally thrown into the stands, or a puck intentionally shot into the seats, one cannot be deemed to have assumed that risk. Similarly, one who engages in skiing might be thought of as assuming the risk of falling or colliding with something. Yet, if a ski trail suddenly, and without warning, falls off causing one to fall and injure oneself, or if one collides with heavy machinery left in a skiing area, one cannot be thought of as having assumed that risk and the ski area operator should not be insulated from liability for the injury merely because the skier engaged in an activity that has inherent or attendant risks.

¶ 20 With the above as prologue, we undertake an analysis of the facts of the present case. As related above, here Bullman desired to observe firsthand the progress of the construction of an acquaintance's home. Upon arrival at the work site, the only apparent method of ingress was over a plank approximately one foot wide. The plank crossed over an open ditch of six to eight feet and continued crossing over a porch area that appeared to Bullman to be roughly finished and covered with wood. Bullman successfully crossed the excavation ditch but began to lose her balance as the plank moved while she was over the porch area. In an effort to regain her balance she placed her foot on the material covering the porch but fell through the insulation board and sustained injury.

¶ 21 In the case at bar, it could certainly be argued that Bullman indeed assumed the risk that she might naturally lose her balance while traversing the plank and fall into the excavation ditch. The excavation ditch was open and obvious and the peril of crossing a one-foot wide plank is well understood by virtually all individuals of adult age. Nevertheless, since Bullman did not fall into the excavation ditch, we do not find the above premise controlling.

¶ 22 As just stated, from Bullman's perspective the obvious hazard was the excavation ditch that lie before her and which required her traversal to gain entry into the home. However, her testimony indicated that she had no appreciation of a risk of falling through what proved to be insulation board covering the porch. Her testimony indicated that she observed the porch area to be covered with what she thought was wood. Thus, considering the knowledge in her possession, Bullman could only be found to have assumed the risk of falling into the excavation ditch. Once she safely traversed that section, the risk she had assumed had ended. Despite the fact that obviously there were other perils still around her, they were not fully appreciated, thus, they could not be voluntarily assumed.

¶ 23 In short, under the uncontradicted facts of record, it cannot be said that Bullman "assumed the risk" of sustaining the injury she actually sustained. The mere fact that she assumed a certain risk in crossing the board into the house cannot be used to immunize the Appellees from liability for any injury that she may have had the misfortune of sustaining and to which their negligence may have, in fact, contributed. Since assumption of the risk requires a subjective appreciation of risk, Bullman could not have assumed the risk that she did not ascertain, even if the injury actually sustained is similar to the risk assumed. Thus, the granting of summary judgment on the basis of the assumption of the risk doctrine was in error.

¶ 24 Perhaps anticipating the possibility of the above result, Appellees-Giuntolis argue that the grant of summary judgment should be affirmed nevertheless on the other ground they had raised in the motion for summary judgment, namely, that they were "out of possession" of the property during the construction of the home. Although, in light of its conclusion on assumption of the risk, the trial court did not address this issue, Appellees correctly assert that we are empowered to affirm the trial court on any basis if the decision is correct. Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 96 n. 5 (Pa. 1974). Thus, we feel compelled to review and assess the Giuntolis' argument.

¶ 25 Our Concurring and Dissenting colleague disagrees with this position and sets forth a spirited multi-part argument to support his belief that we should not address Appellee's assertion. The Dissent first argues that the Giuntolis are precluded from "raising" this argument because they did not file a cross-appeal. However, the Dissent fails to acknowledge that since the Giuntolis were granted summary judgment below, they were not "aggrieved" by the order under consideration and, thus, were not entitled to cross-appeal. See Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894 (Pa.Super. 1997) (quashing cross-appeal as cross-appellant not aggrieved by the order appealed from). In accord, In Re Miller Son Paving Inc., 636 A.2d 274 (Pa. Comwlth. 1993). Thus, had they attempted to cross-appeal, as the Dissent suggests they were obligated to do, their cross-appeal would have been subject to quashal. Moreover, a review of the many authorities cited in defense of the Dissent's proposition reveals that, unlike the Giuntolis here, the parties in those cases were aggrieved, at least in part, if not wholly, by the order under consideration. Thus, their failure to file a cross-appeal prevented them from seeking relief from this court. In contrast, Giuntolis are not seeking relief from this court. Rather, they argue for affirmance of the order granting summary judgment, even if it requires reliance upon a theory different from that relied upon by the trial court.

¶ 26 Next the Dissent acknowledges that there exist cases where the grant of summary judgment was affirmed on grounds not relied upon by the trial court but asserts, "I am unaware of any cases where this Court or our Supreme Court undertook to consider an issue not addressed by the trial court in reversing the trial court order." Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, at p. 7. By this passage the Dissent evidences a failure to recognize that, from a logical standpoint, the process is essentially the same regardless of whether the eventual result is affirmance or reversal, or alternatively, proposes an approach that ignores the important interests of judicial economy.

¶ 27 Logically speaking, an appellate Court cannot "affirm on other grounds" unless those grounds are first considered, are found to independently support the decision below and are then set forth in the court's opinion as a basis for affirmance. Thus, in every case where an appellate court "affirmed on other grounds," a decision was made not to affirm on the grounds set forth by the trial court, followed by a consideration of "other grounds" and a conclusion that "other grounds" existed to support affirmance of the decision in question. This process is precisely what we are undertaking in the present case. Having found the grounds relied upon by the trial court to be erroneous, we now undertake to see if there are other grounds that require the affirmance of the grant of summary judgment. The significant difference being that, in contrast to the previously referenced cases, where the appellate court found other grounds upon which to affirm, we have not.

¶ 28 The Dissent seems to suggest that we are empowered to consider grounds other than those considered by the trial court, but only in affirmance. However, unless the court is predisposed to affirmance, we cannot conclude whether or not affirmance is proper until review of the "other grounds" takes place. Only after a review of "other grounds" takes place will the appellate court be in a position to determine whether the proper course of action is affirmance or reversal. If no other grounds are found to support affirmance, reversal is the only, and proper, action.

¶ 29 Moreover, adherence to both the above principle and the posture of the Dissent would require the odd circumstance where, if we conclude that there are other grounds upon which to affirm, we proceed to do so and set forth that analysis in our opinion. However, if, on the other hand, the "other grounds" argued are found not to support affirmance, we remain silent as to those theories, even though a full review of the merits may have occurred in chambers. The irony in this scenario is that, as hinted at by the Dissent, the party who prevailed below, only to face reversal, may subsequently seek summary judgment upon the alternate grounds not previously relied upon and which went unaddressed by the appellate court. This could then invite another appeal and, possibly, a second reversal, thereby occasioning an unnecessary delay and a wasting of judicial resources, all after a full review of the "other grounds" had been undertaken by the appellate court in the first appeal.

¶ 30 Moreover, and despite the Dissent's argument to the contrary, in Gutman v. Giordano, 557 A.2d 782 (Pa.Super. 1989), the panel indeed addressed "other grounds" yet found reversal to be proper. In Gutman, the trial court granted summary judgment in reliance upon res judicata. Id., 557 A.2d at 783. After recognizing this, the panel, in the next paragraph, states "[c]uriously, neither party on appeal had addressed the application of this doctrine to the present case. Our view, nevertheless is that res judicata does not apply. . . ." Id. After concluding that the granting of summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata was error, the court states, "[a]ccordingly, we examine the arguments on appeal." Id. The court then points out that it is empowered to affirm on other grounds, as if to utilize this principle as the reason for addressing the arguments on appeal. Ultimately, after considering the arguments pursued by the parties, and after concluding that the argument advanced by appellee in support of the granting of summary judgment lacked merit, the panel reversed, as we do today.

¶ 31 Because the panel recited the principle in question, we can safely assume that had the panel found the appellee's position meritorious, it would have affirmed on that ground. Also, given the context in which the panel recites the principle of affirmance upon "other grounds," it can be assumed they believed this principle required them to address the arguments raised by the parties despite the fact that they did not address the grounds relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment. Thus, despite the insistence of our Concurring and Dissenting colleague to the contrary, we feel that we are obligated to review the additional matter raised by the Giuntolis.

¶ 32 Turning to the alternative argument advanced by the Giuntiolis, they assert that they were entitled to summary judgment because, as employers of an independent contractor, they were not in possession of the land and could not be held liable for injuries resulting from work performed thereon. Relying on Brletich v. United States Steel Corporation, 285 A.2d 133, 135 (Pa. 1971), and Motter v. Meadows Limited Partnership, 680 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super. 1996), the Giuntolis correctly state, "when a [landowner] turns the work over to an independent contractor with experience and know-how, who selects his own equipment and employees, the possessor of land has no further liability in connection with the work to be done." Appellant's Brief at 18.

¶ 33 In response, both Bullman and Augustine assert in the briefs in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that the question of whether the Giuntolis were in possession and control of the property where the house was being constructed on February 1, 1996 is a matter for the jury's determination. Of course, given our conclusion above, we can affirm the order granting summary judgment only if Giuntolis were entitled to summary judgment on the possession issue. This would require a conclusion that there are no material facts for resolution and that the Giuntolis are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The above, in turn, would require an assessment that all facts relevant to the determination have been developed and that no reasonable jury could conclude to the contrary. See Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998). Reviewing the record in light of this standard, we do not think we can reach this conclusion. Thus, we conclude that Giuntolis were not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

¶ 34 Although Giuntolis correctly assert that a landowner who turns over work on his/her property to an independent contractor has no further liability in connection with the work, § 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), further provides:

One who entrusts the work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414.

¶ 35 A review of the record reveals that Mr. Giuntoli was taking a far more than passive role in overseeing the construction of the house. Mr. Giuntoli visited the construction site on a daily basis and frequently stopped by in the morning and evening. Additionally, Mr. Giuintoli, during construction of the home, made various changes to the plans and/or specifications either by telephone or by directly communicating with Augustine. Mr. Giuntoli testified at his deposition that he made these visits "to see the quality of the work, the progress that had been made, if there was a deviation from something you thought shouldn't have occurred." Dep. of J. Giuntoli, p. 10.

¶ 36 Mr. Giuntoli also reserved certain aspects of the home construction to other subcontractors, in particular, areas relating to the kitchen, bathroom, and the lighting to be installed in the home. As to these matters, Mr. Giuntoli was overseeing the work of the subcontractors and Augustine was not involved. Thus, from one perspective it could be argued that the Giuntolis were operating as "general" contractors and contracting the work out to a variety of "subcontractors." Additionally, there was an absence of any language in the construction contract that would have acknowledged that the Giuntolis were relinquishing possession of the property to Augustine during construction. Perhaps most relevant to the action before us, Mr. Giuntoli indicated at deposition that he had expressed concerns to Augustine about the use of the gangplank for persons accessing the home after his wife, and certain subcontractors and/or visitors had voiced such concerns directly to him.

¶ 37 Viewed as a whole, the record does not paint a picture of a situation where an agreement was reached and Augustine was extended unfettered discretion to deliver a completed structure. Mr. Giuntoli maintained an active oversight of the project to ensure compliance with the contract and quality of work. Moreover, he reserved responsibility for completion of certain parts of the project for himself. Lastly, the fact that he registered a complaint or concern regarding the very means of egress used by Bullman reflects at least a consciousness of some authority to influence decisions regarding the safety of the worksite, if not absolute authority to dictate such matters. Thus, when the whole of the record is considered we believe that there exists at least a jury question as to the applicability of the defense raised by the Giuntolis. Consequently, we cannot affirm the granting of summary judgment on the basis of this theory.

¶ 38 For the above reasons we vacate the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and remand for a continuation of proceedings.

¶ 39 Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

¶ 40 JOHNSON, J., files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.