Opinion
2013-04-26
Creighton, Johnsen & Giroux, Buffalo (Jonathan G. Johnsen of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant. Harris Beach Pllc, Pittsford (A. Vincent Buzard of Counsel), for Respondent–Respondent Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority.
Creighton, Johnsen & Giroux, Buffalo (Jonathan G. Johnsen of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant. Harris Beach Pllc, Pittsford (A. Vincent Buzard of Counsel), for Respondent–Respondent Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority.
Goldberg Segalla LLP, Buffalo (Matthew C. Van Vessem of Counsel), for Respondents–Respondents City of Buffalo and Byron Brown, Mayor, City of Buffalo.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, AND CARNI, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging the authority of respondent Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority (BFSA) to prohibit respondents City of Buffalo (City) and Byron Brown, Mayor, City of Buffalo, from complying with an arbitration award (Rinaldo II award) that established a wage increase for the collective bargaining agreement i effect from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2004 ( Matter of Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn., Inc., IAFF Local 282 [ masieLlo], ––– a.d.3D ––––, ––– n.y.S.2D –––– [apr. 26, 2013] ). it is undisputed that, in 2004, the BFSA issued a resolution to freeze the wages of City employees and that by Resolution 11–05, the BFSA determined that the wage freeze applied to the wages awarded in Rinaldo II. A prior arbitration award governing the same CBA (Rinaldo I award) was vacated in its entirety by the Court Of Appeals (Matter of Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 282, IAFF, AFL–CIO–CLC [Masiello], 13 N.Y.3d 803, 890 N.Y.S.2d 375, 918 N.E.2d 887). Petitioner previously had commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the authority of the BFSA to determine that the wage freeze applied to the Rinaldo I award, but that proceeding was dismissed as time–barred (Matter of Foley v. Masiello, 38 A.D.3d 1201, 1202, 833 N.Y.S.2d 342).
We agree with petitioner that the instant proceeding is not barred by the statute of limitations ( cf. Gress v. Brown, 20 N.Y.3d 957, 959–960, 958 N.Y.S.2d 675, 982 N.E.2d 595). Contrary to petitioner's contention, however, Supreme Court properly determined that the instant proceeding is barred by res judicata. It is well established that a dismissal of a proceeding as time–barred “ ‘is equivalent to a determination on the merits for res judicata purposes' ” ( Landau, P.C. v. LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 11 N.Y.3d 8, 13, 862 N.Y.S.2d 316, 892 N.E.2d 380 n.3). Although petitioner in the instant proceeding is challenging a resolution of the BFSA that applied to Rinaldo II rather than Rinaldo I, which was at issue in Foley, both proceedings are between the same parties in interest and concern the same cause of action, i.e., the application of the wage freeze to wage rates for the same CBA, and the instant action therefore is barred by res judicata based on “ ‘claim preclusion’ ” ( Landau, P.C., 11 N.Y.3d at 12–13, 862 N.Y.S.2d 316, 892 N.E.2d 380;see generally O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158).
We reject petitioner's contention that the court should have dismissed this proceeding as moot based upon its order in the proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 vacating the Rinaldo II award inasmuch as a reversal of that order on appeal would result in the reinstatement of the award ( see Matter Of Utica Mut. Ins. Co. [Selective Ins. Co. Of Am.], 27 A.D.3d 990, 991–992, 813 N.Y.S.2d 547).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.