OPINION & ORDER

          SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

          Michael Brown brings this putative class action against, inter alia, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly and the City of New York, alleging that they have unlawfully continued to arrest, summons and prosecute individuals such as himself for violating a, statute that was declared unconstitutional by the Second Circuit in 1993. This statute, New York Penal Law § 240.35(1), provides that a person is guilty of " loitering when he ... [l]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging ...." It is undisputed that for over a decade, notwithstanding the Second Circuit's ruling, defendants continued to enforce section 240.35(1) at a largely unabated rate. Although to this day, a handful of officers of the New York City Police Department (" NYPD" ) persist in issuing unconstitutional summonses for violations of section 240.35(1), in an Opinion dated May 31, 2007, familiarity with which is assumed, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for an Order adjudging municipal defendants in civil contempt.

         Plaintiff now requests leave to amend his First Amended Class Action Complaint and moves for class certification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. By his proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint (" Complaint" ), plaintiff seeks to add the following six individuals as plaintiff class representatives: Xavier J. Grant, Bobby Wells, Michael Louis Brown, Edgar Turner, Keith Anderson and Llewellyn Rudy (" named plaintiffs" ). Additionally, the Complaint adds nine individual police officers as defendants, supplements plaintiff's allegations against the proposed defendant class, adds a cause of action for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and updates allegations to reflect data adduced in discovery and remedial relief to date.

         Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes: (1) a plaintiff class consisting of all persons who have been or will be arrested, charged or prosecuted for a violation of section 240.35(1) in the State of New York from October 7, 1992 onward; (2) a plaintiff subclass of all persons arrested, charged or prosecuted for a violation of section 240.35(1) by employees, agents or representatives of New York City (" City" ) from October 7, 1992 onward; and (3) a defendant class of " all political sub-divisions and all law enforcement/prosecutorial policy-making officials in the State of New York with authority to arrest, charge or prosecute a person with a violation under New York Penal Law." For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion is granted in its entirety.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Continued Enforcement of Section 240.35(1)

          The background facts of this case are thoroughly set forth in Brown I and therefore I summarize them only briefly. In 1992, Judge Robert W. Sweet of this Court issued a permanent injunction barring the NYPD from enforcing section 240.35(1), which the Second Circuit affirmed in Loper v. New York City Police Department. Nevertheless, on multiple occasions from 2002 to June 2005, uniformed police officers wrongfully arrested former plaintiff Eddie Wise for peacefully begging on the streets of the Bronx. Wise was charged with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1) and prosecuted for this offense by the Bronx District Attorney's Office. On June 9, 2005, Wise commenced the instant action by filing an Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order seeking relief against City and state defendants for unlawfully enforcing section 240.35(1). Soon thereafter, the municipal defendants entered into a stipulation in which they agreed to take steps aimed at preventing future enforcement of the statute. This Court " so ordered" that stipulation on June 23, 2005 (hereafter " June 23, 2005 Order" ). Pursuant to that Order, defendants notified various City law enforcement officials and employees that section 240.35(1) had been declared unconstitutional. That Order further stated that the City and its employees " shall cease enforcement of [section 240.35(1) ]."

         Notwithstanding the clear command of the June 23, 2005 Order, defendants continued to arrest, prosecute, issue bench warrants and issue an alarming number of summonses for violations of section 240.35(1). Beginning in December 2006, however, City law enforcement officials began taking affirmative steps to quash enforcement, including vacating all outstanding bench warrants based solely on violations of section 240.35(1) and sending notices to officers reminding them that the statute is unenforceable. As a result, prosecutions and arrests for section 240.35(1) have dwindled, although summonses for violations of section 240.35(1) were still being issued regularly as recently as March of this year.

         B. Proposed Plaintiff Class Representatives

         Michael Brown is a forty-six year-old African-American man. On June 14, 2003, he was peacefully begging on the streets of the Bronx when he was arrested and charged with violating section 240.35(1). The police took Brown to the precinct, where he was held pending arraignment. At arraignment, Brown pled guilty and was sentenced to a term of conditional discharge of one year.

         Xavier J. Grant is a twenty-three year-old African-American man. On July 17, 2003, he was standing at an intersection in the Bronx, peacefully talking with his friends, when police officers approached and told him to " move along" because " you can't be here." The officers then issued Grant a summons charging him with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1) and directing him to appear in court on August 25, 2003, to answer to the charge. When Grant failed to appear on the summons, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Grant did not learn of this until November 2006, when he applied for a job at TOYS " R" US, which conducted a background check that revealed the active warrant. Soon thereafter, in an effort to resolve this outstanding warrant, Grant went to the Bronx Criminal Court, where the judge sentenced him to an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal on the still extant charge.

         Bobby Wells is a forty-nine year-old African-American man who was peacefully walking around his neighborhood in the Bronx on April 21, 2004, when he was stopped by a police officer, arrested and charged with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1) and disorderly conduct. At arraignment, Wells pleaded guilty and received conditional discharges of one year for each charge, to be served concurrently. Thereafter, on or about March 30, 2005, Wells was again arrested and charged with violating section 240.35(1) and disorderly conduct, to which he again pleaded guilty.

         Michael Louis Brown is a forty-eight year-old African-American man. On March 1, 2004, Michael Louis Brown was peacefully asking passers-by for money in the Bronx when he was stopped by police officers, arrested and charged with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1) and with disorderly conduct. The officers took Michael Louis Brown to the police station, where he was held pending arraignment. Later that day, Michael Louis Brown pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of time served.           Keith Anderson is a forty-two year-old African-American man who was peacefully standing on a street in the Bronx on August 20, 2002, when he was arrested and charged with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1). He was taken to the precinct and held pending arraignment. The Bronx prosecutor charged Anderson with loitering and aggressive solicitation. At arraignment, Anderson pleaded guilty to violating section 240.35(1) and received a sentence of a conditional discharge of one year. On September 8, 2004, Anderson was again arrested and charged with violating section 240.35(1) and with disorderly conduct; he pleaded guilty to those charges and was sentenced to one day in jail, ninety-five dollars in fees and surcharges, and civil judgments for these amounts.

         Edgar Turner is a forty-eight year-old African-American man. In October 2006, Turner was standing at an intersection in Manhattan, waiting for an office in a nearby building to open, when he was approached by police, questioned and ordered to produce identification. He was then issued a summons charging him with loitering in violation of section 240.35(1). On December 8, 2006, Turner appeared in Manhattan Criminal Court to answer the charge, and the summons was dismissed.

         II. APPLICABLE LAW

         A. Leave to Amend a Complaint

         Leave to amend a complaint " will be freely given when justice so requires." The liberality in granting leave to amend applies to requests to amend a complaint to add new parties. " The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad faith."

         B. Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements

         1. Rule 23(a)

         Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class certification. To be certified, a putative class must first meet all four prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that the class meets these requirements-commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The numerosity requirement mandates that the class be " so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Commonality requires a showing that common issues of fact or law affect all class members. Typicality exists where the named plaintiffs' claims and the absent class members' claims arise from " the same course of events," and where each class member makes " similar legal arguments" to prove defendant's liability. The adequacy requirement demands that " the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Finally, although " ‘ Rule 23(a) does not expressly require that a class be definite in order to be certified[,] a requirement that there be an identifiable class has been implied by the courts.’ "          2. Rule 23(b)

         In addition to showing that the proposed class satisfies the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), plaintiffs must also show that the class is " maintainable" under Rule 23(b). A class satisfies this requirement if it in fits into one of the three alternative categories delineated by Rule 23(b), subdivisions (1), (2) and (3). A class may be certified under more than one category, and in the case at bar plaintiff moves for class certification pursuant to subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3).

         Under Rule 23(b)(2), class litigation is appropriate where " the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." The Advisory Committee Note suggests that in this context, " [d]eclaratory relief ‘ corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief."

         Although subdivision (b)(2) was designed with an eye towards equitable relief, certification of a class seeking both equitable and monetary relief may be appropriate " in light of the relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and circumstances of the case." The Second Circuit has instructed that in assessing whether subdivision (b)(2) applies, a district court's first inquiry is whether " ‘ even in the absence of possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.’ " The court's next inquiry is whether " ‘ the injunctive or declaratory relief would be both reasonably necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits.’ "

         Under Rule 23(b)(3), certification is appropriate where " questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and the court finds that class litigation " is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Generally, the " ‘ predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ " The Second Circuit has observed that this subdivision

encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.

         " Regardless of whether [an action] as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement," courts may employ Rule 23(c) (4)(A) to certify a class on a particular issue.

         In determining whether the class action mechanism is the most " fair and efficient" method of resolving a case, courts must consider the following four nonexclusive factors: (1) class members' interest in maintaining individual actions; (2) " the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; " (3) " the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; " and (4) " the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."          3. Standard of Proof

         Prior to certifying a class, a court must assess " all the relevant evidence admitted at the class certification stage" and find that " each of the Rule requirements has been met." Furthermore,

such determinations can be made only if the [court] resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular Rule 23 requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant facts and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met.

         A court's " obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue" -even where the two are " identical." In making this determination, courts should refrain from considering " aspect[s] of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement."

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Leave to Amend

         Defendants have failed to show that plaintiff's request to amend the First Amended Class Action Complaint should be denied on grounds of prejudice, bad faith or futility. Accordingly, leave to amend is granted.

         B. Proposed Plaintiff Class and Subclass

         1. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

         a. Numerosity

          The named plaintiffs seek to represent a(b)(2) injunctive class " consisting of all persons who have been or will be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of [section 240.35(1) ] in the State of New York from Oct. 7, 1992 onward." They also seek to represent a(b)(3) damages subclass " consisting of all persons arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of [section 240.35(1) ], by employees, agents, or representatives of the City of New York" during that same time period. By conservative assessments of available data, both proposed classes consist of thousands of people and therefore easily satisfy the numerosity requirement.

         b. Commonality and Typicality

          Although commonality and typicality are two separate criteria, in this action they " tend to merge into one another, so that similar considerations animate analysis of Rules 23(a)(2) and (3)." They are also well-suited for joint discussion here because defendants present an umbrella theory addressing both requirements.

          The thrust of defendants' opposition is that " the substantive law underlying plaintiff's claims requires individualized, highly fact-specific analysis to establish liability for each individual claim." Defendants assert that each plaintiff's claims must be analyzed individually in order to determine distinct legal issues such as each defendant's liability and/or unique defenses vis-à-vis each claimant. These arguments, however, all derive from defendants' erroneous assumption that merely because " all class members were charged with [section 240.35(1) ] does not make their claims common or typical." While it is true that a handful of " individual" issues exist, these issues do not undermine the commonality and typicality of plaintiff's core claims.

         Defendants start with the conclusion that their liability (if any) cannot be established solely on the basis that the enforcement of section 240.35(1) is per se unlawful in light of Loper. As a result, defendants insist that the fact that a person is charged with violating section 240.35(1) should not automatically identify him as a class member. Defendants theorize as to how each claim alleged in the Complaint could turn on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each arrest, summons, and prosecution predicated on section 240.35(1). For example, the Complaint includes a class claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment that defendants' practice of arresting and prosecuting individuals for section 240.35(1) violations-referred to as defendants' " Arrest & Prosecution Policy" -resulted in individuals being falsely arrested, imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted without probable cause. Seizing on the term " probable cause," defendants argue that since the existence of probable cause is a fact-specific inquiry, if class certification is granted the fact-finder will be forced to engage in mini-trials in order to determine the extent of defendants' liability as to each putative class member. Defendants contend the same is true of plaintiff's substantive due process claims-burdensome mini-trials will be required in order to determine whether defendants' conduct during each episode of enforcement was so deliberate and unjustifiable so as to " shock the conscience."

         Defendants also argue that plaintiff's proposed classes fail to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements because they improperly amalgamate individuals who received summonses with those who were arrested and prosecuted. In support, defendants point out that a summons cannot be the basis for a malicious prosecution claim, and that in order to prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, each plaintiff will have to show that the underlying action resulted in a favorable disposition indicative of innocence.

          But if such factual distinctions could preclude findings of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), they would be the death knell for class actions challenging the systemic enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. This is an unacceptable result. As the Supreme Court has instructed, " class relief is consistent with the need for case-by-case adjudication," especially where " [i]t is unlikely that differences in the factual background of each claim will affect the outcome of the legal issue." With respect to commonality, Rule 23(a)(2) does not require all questions of law or fact be common to the class.

         Although not all prospective class members experienced the same constitutional violation, their central claim is " ‘ that their injuries derive from a unitary course of conduct by a single system.’ " Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants' blanket Arrest & Prosecution Policy chilled free speech and facilitated the unlawful enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It follows from this premise that this class action involves numerous common questions of both law and fact.

         As plaintiff observes, many of the distinctions defendants draw between putative class members' claims actually support certification. For instance, defendants argue that because named plaintiffs Rudy and Grant were issued summonses but never charged at arraignment, they cannot establish Fourth Amendment violations. But this is a legal question-whether a summons charging an unconstitutional statute violates the Fourth Amendment-that is common to thousands of proposed class members. Quite clearly, the named plaintiffs' complained-of injuries arose from the same practice/policy which now gives rise to the claims of absent class members, and thus proves the existence of common factual and legal issues. Common questions of fact include:

(i) whether defendants enforced or failed to prevent the enforcement of [section] 240.35(1), after the statute was declared unconstitutional; (ii) the existence of a widespread pattern, policy or practice of enforcement ... (iii) whether defendant Kelly had knowledge of the unlawful acts of his subordinates; (iv) whether [the City] failed to train supervise, and discipline the personnel in the NYPD and district attorneys' offices such that they are liable to members of the subclass for damages; ... and [ (v) ] what protocols existed in the NYPD regarding enforcement of [section 240.35(1) ].

         Common questions of law include:

(i) whether defendants' enforcement of the statute during the class period violated class members' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights;

(ii) whether liability against the City is appropriate pursuant to controlling precedent on the basis of either (a) defendants' custom, pattern and practice or (b) supervisory policy-maker liability;

(iii) whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity or liable for punitive damages; (iv) whether the City is collaterally estopped from contesting liability in light of its admissions as to instances of wrongful enforcement of section 240.35(1);

(v) whether defendants' conduct was discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and

(vi) whether plaintiffs are entitled to various forms of equitable relief, such as a disgorgement of fines paid or the expunging of unlawful arrests from the public record.

         Whether certain common issues are legal or factual or a mixture of both is irrelevant for present purposes; the critical point is that they are common.

         Nor do the legal and factual distinctions drawn by defendants vitiate the typicality of putative class members' claims. Typicality is determined by the nature of the claims brought by the class representatives, not by the particular fact patterns from which they arose. This is particularly true with respect to plaintiff's request for (b)(2) certification, for " where plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief against a defendant engaging in a common course of conduct toward them ... [there is] no need for individualized determinations of the propriety of injunctive relief."

         The named plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the absent class members because they arise from the same course of unconstitutional conduct-the post- Loper enforcement of section 240.35(1)-that affected all class members. If absent class members were to assert their claims individually, they would presumably rely on the same legal theories plaintiff espouses here. And if plaintiff succeeds on his claims, all members of the putative class will benefit. Moreover, the fact that some absent class members may have suffered greater injuries than their proposed representatives or fellow class members ( i.e., by virtue of being jailed or prosecuted for violating section 240.35(1), as opposed to merely receiving a summons), and are thus able to bring additional claims or seek greater damages, does not make the proposed representatives' claims atypical. As a result, plaintiff's proposed class and subclass satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement.

         c. Adequacy

          Defendants have attacked both the adequacy of class counsel and the proposed class representatives. As to the former, defendants assert that The Bronx Defenders is inadequate because it has a conflict of interest with putative class members who it represented in criminal actions, including prosecutions occurring after 1992 where the class member pled guilty to violating section 240.35(1). Defendants assert that they (as defendants) are entitled to discover whether The Bronx Defenders was on notice of Loper at the time it represented these individuals because this information is potentially relevant to the City's defense against plaintiffs' claims of deliberate indifference. If such relevance is adduced, defendants may call The Bronx Defenders as a fact witness, who would then be in violation of ethical rules forbidding lawyers from acting as witnesses. Additionally, information adduced at discovery may suggest that The Bronx Defenders are contributorily liable for damages, giving rise to an additional conflict of interest proscribed by the disciplinary rules.

         Defendants' sudden concern for the best interests of the class is as ironic as it is unconvincing. First, it must be remembered that The Bronx Defenders are appearing as co-counsel. The class is also represented by Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP, a preeminent civil rights firm that defendants do not challenge. Second, The Bronx Defenders represented forty clients who were charged with section 240.35(1) at arraignments in forty-nine cases; only seventeen of these resulted in convictions under the statute. Out of a putative class numbering in the thousands, this number is de minimis. And even assuming, arguendo, that the defense attorneys appearing in those seventeen actions were or should have been on notice of Loper, the circumstances surrounding their representation have no bearing on the illegality of the summonses and arrests underlying those prosecutions. Furthermore, disqualification on these ethical grounds requires " a high standard of proof" that the court's usurpation of a party's right to choose his counsel freely is necessary in order to maintain the highest standards of the profession. Defendants do not meet this burden.

         As to the adequacy of the proposed class representatives, defendants provide a litany of purported reasons why the named plaintiffs are too unreliable or incompetent to represent absent class members. These reasons boil down to two primary concerns-missed court appearances and/or past substance abuse. Neither of these concerns disqualify any of the named plaintiffs from adequately representing the proposed classes. Indeed, if this Court were to rule out proposed class representatives on these grounds there would likely be nobody left to bring suit on behalf of persons charged with " loitering for the purpose of begging." Such rigidity would undermine " a principal objective of the class action mechanism-to facilitate recovery for those least able to pursue an individual action."

          Moreover, in the course of a discovery dispute, defendants had already raised the issue of named plaintiffs' prior use of illegal drugs. At that time, the Court held that " given the makeup of this putative class-primarily homeless people panhandling for subsistence-the fact that individuals have suffered from ... drug addiction is not relevant to their adequacy to act as class representatives." Neither the facts nor law have changed since that explicit and unambiguous ruling.

         Defendants further argue, without explanation, that because the named plaintiffs' claims arose in New York City, an impermissible conflict of interest exists between them and absent class members whose claims arose outside of the City. This argument is without merit. The critical purpose of the adequacy inquiry is to determine whether a class representative's interests are antagonistic to those of absent class members. That some absent class members were charged with violating section 240.35(1) elsewhere in New York may lead to a geographically dispersed class, but suggests no antagonism whatsoever. To the contrary, it is obvious that the named plaintiffs' motives for pursuing this litigation are commensurate with those of all proposed class members, and satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).

         2. Rule 23(b)(2)

          Certification of a state-wide plaintiff class falls squarely within the purview of Rule 23(b)(2), for even in the absence of possible monetary recovery, reasonable individuals charged with violating an unconstitutional and unenforceable criminal statute would bring suit to obtain the extensive injunctive relief plaintiff seeks. They would seek to have their wrongful criminal convictions and bench warrants expunged, and to have their fines repaid. Civic-minded citizens would also, quite reasonably, seek ongoing monitoring of police officer training and any continuing enforcement of section 240.35(1).

          Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that all post- Loper instances of enforcement of section 240.35(1) violated class members' federal, state and constitutional rights. Although it may be true that plaintiff seeks this judgment as a prelude to a request for damages, such declaratory relief is nevertheless " ‘ reasonably necessary and appropriate were plaintiff to succeed on the merits.’ " This is par for the course in civil rights cases where a plaintiff class seeks systematic reform through injunctive relief in addition to monetary relief.

         Defendants oppose (b)(2) certification on the ground that plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under Galvan v. Levine, a seminal case in which the Second Circuit found class certification unnecessary because the state defendant, prior to judgment, withdrew the challenged rule and represented that it had no intention of reinstating it. The court explained that

insofar as the relief sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials on the ground of unconstitutionality of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class action designation is largely a formality, at least for the plaintiffs. As we have recently noted in Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 399 ( [2d Cir.] 1973), what is important in such a case for the plaintiffs or, more accurately, for their counsel, is that the judgment run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs but of all others similarly situated ... as the judgment did here. The State has made clear that it understands the judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the court ultimately directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy.

          A number of lower courts have applied Galvan in denying class certification. On the other hand, many lower courts have distinguished Galvan and granted class certification. Judge Charles S. Haight of this Court addressed this issue in Blecher v. Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York :

Courts have focused on four factors in determining whether class certification is necessary under Galvan . First, notwithstanding the presumption that government officials will abide by a court's decision as to similarly situated individuals, an affirmative statement from the government defendant that it will apply any relief across the board militates against the need for class certification.

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Second, withdrawal of the challenged action or nonenforcement of the challenged statute militates against the need for class certification.

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Third, the type of relief sought can affect whether class certification is necessary. Courts have found that where the relief sought is merely a declaration that a statute or policy is unconstitutional, denial of class certification is more appropriate than where plaintiffs seek complex, affirmative relief.

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Fourth, courts also consider whether the claims raised by plaintiffs are likely to become moot, making class certification necessary to prevent the action from becoming moot.

         Focusing on the third factor, numerous courts have distinguished Galvan on the basis of the type of relief sought, namely whether it is prohibitionary or affirmative. Although this distinction is often " somewhat illusory," it is useful and illuminating as applied here. Defendants argue that in light of their recent efforts to cease the continuing enforcement of section 240.35(1), plaintiff " cannot hope to achieve more [equitable relief] via a (b)(2) class." Yet clearly he does, for the Complaint expressly seeks complex affirmative relief which neither state nor municipal law enforcement has ever agreed to provide-either to him or to all persons similarly situated. The NYPD's recent actions aimed at ceasing enforcement do not moot, for example, plaintiff's prayer for the disgorgement of fines that were levied under section 240.35(1), or for the expungement of wrongful convictions from public records.

         Another way to frame the Galvan test is by looking at " the level of commitment expressed by the defendants." With respect to the City defendants, the record in this case establishes their patterned unwillingness to voluntarily modify internal procedures in order to ensure compliance with court orders. In view of this past resistance to redressing constitutional wrongs, I harbor serious doubts that all potential plaintiffs whose claims arose in New York City will automatically benefit ( i.e., have their criminal records expunged) absent additional action on their part.

          With respect to the proposed absent defendants who are scattered around the State, although they have never been ordered to cease enforcing section 240.35(1), the record suggests that absent a court-issued mandate, they will not take affirmative action to remedy past incidents of illegal enforcement of the statute. According to available OCA data, notwithstanding Loper, over six hundred individuals have been prosecuted for violating section 240.35(1) in Rockland, Suffolk, Erie and Nassau Counties. Quite simply, the class action device is the most efficient and appropriate method for vindicating the rights of individuals throughout New York who were subject to an unlawful section 240.35(1) charge. Additionally, as a consequence of being poor and homeless, most absent plaintiffs are uninformed, disenfranchised and without the means to bring individual actions in the hope of having their convictions overturned or their extant warrants vacated. Bringing non-City parties into this litigation via bilateral (b)(2) class certification is the only way to achieve uniformity of equitable relief for past enforcement, and to effectively prevent any future enforcement across the state.

         In sum, certification of a state-wide (b)(2) plaintiff class is appropriate because law enforcement agencies throughout New York State, including New York City, continued charging individuals with violating section 240.35(1) after it was declared unconstitutional. Given the import and necessity of plaintiff's prayers for affirmative injunctive relief, Galvan does not preclude certification here.

         3. Rule 23(b)(3)

         a. Predominance

          Certification of a damages subclass consisting of all persons arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of section 240.35(1) by employees, agents or representatives of the City of New York, from October 7, 1992 onward, is appropriate because core common issues predominate over individual issues. Two predominating issues at the heart of this litigation are: (1) whether defendants maintained an unconstitutional policy of enforcing a void statute that criminalized " loitering for the purpose of begging," and (2) whether defendants violated individuals' constitutional rights by arresting, summoning, or prosecuting them under this same statute. These central questions predominate, require no individualized analysis, and are common to the entire subclass, making them ideally suited for resolution in a(b)(3) class action.

         Defendants oppose (b)(3) certification with the same arguments they employed in attempting to defeat commonality and typicality under (a)(4), to wit, that common issues fail to predominate because each incident of enforcement requires an individualized analysis. As set forth above, this argument is a red herring in light of the core constitutional issues underlying the claims of each putative plaintiff. That some claimants may prevail on more constitutional claims than others " does nothing to alter the fundamental cohesion of the proposed class, which is the central concern of the predominance requirement."

          With respect to predominance, defendants reargue their earlier point that established law requires a case-by-case determination of whether probable cause to arrest existed based on any criminal activity regardless of whether or not it was charged. In presenting this argument, defendants ignore leading Circuit law on 23(b)(3) Fourth Amendment class actions. This case is remarkably similar to In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, where the Second Circuit rejected defendants' argument that predominance was defeated by the individualized liability issue of whether each plaintiff had been strip-searched based on reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that " [i]n light of the pervasive character of the common liability issues and the admittedly de minimis nature of individualized liability issues," the district court erred in finding that individual issues predominated. Defendants are correct that probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim, but the fact that this defense " may arise and affect different class members differently does not compel a finding that individual issues predominate over common ones." Here, the common liability issues (Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, Due Process) are so pronounced and pervasive they overwhelmingly outweigh the more narrow inquiries that may be required to resolve a subset of certain Fourth Amendment claims.

         In arguing that predominance is lacking, defendants also reassert their earlier contention that plaintiff's First Amendment claims will require mini-hearings to determine whether each claimant was actually panhandling at the time he was charged with violating section 240.35(1). But regardless of whether or not each putative class member was engaging in protected speech or expression at the time he was charged, by virtue of the charge itself, he was accused of engaging in such activity and penalized based on that accusation. Under Rule 23, plaintiff may allege on behalf of himself and others similarly situated that these charges sent a message to all New Yorkers that peaceful begging was a criminal offense and thereby had the effect of chilling future protected speech and expression. This First Amendment claim is sufficient for class certification.

         In sum, the gravamen of plaintiff's claims attacks the systemic enforcement of a single unconstitutional statute by police officers and district attorneys in New York City. All members of the damages subclass " will presumably rely on the same proof to establish the existence and legality, or lack of legality of this practice," and thus their claims are ideally suited for (b)(3) certification.

         b. Superior Method of Adjudication

          Plaintiff is also correct in his contention that given the demographics of the proposed subclass, the class action device is not just a superior method of adjudication, it is the " only method of adjudication." As noted above, most members of the damages subclass lack the resources necessary to bring individual lawsuits and therefore, absent class certification, their rights will go unvindicated. However, even assuming that some subclass members possess the means and initiative to file individual actions, certification will allow them to enforce their rights in unison, thereby avoiding the expense and burden of duplicative lawsuits.

         C. Proposed Bilateral 23(b)(2) Defendant Class

         Plaintiff's proposed defendant class encompasses " all political sub-divisions and all law enforcement/prosecutorial policy-making officials in the State of New York with authority to arrest, charge or prosecute a person with a violation under New York Penal Law." This includes all sixty-two counties throughout New York State as well as an estimated 553 law enforcement agencies.

         1. Named Plaintiffs' Standing to Sue Non-City (Absent) Defendants

          As a threshold issue, defendants argue that because all named plaintiffs were charged by the NYPD with violating section 240.35(1), they do not have a live case or controversy with any non-City agency or official, and thus lack standing to prosecute class claims against the absent members of the proposed defendant class. This is a specious argument. Although prior to seeking class certification putative class representatives must first demonstrate individual standing to sue, it is well-established that traditional standing requirements do not apply to absent parties when a representative party brings suit on behalf of-or against-similarly situated absent class members. " In a class action context, adequate representation and typicality of claims or defenses, as required by procedural due process and Rule 23 standards, serve as a substitute for application of normal standing requirements with respect to the relationship between absent class members and the party representing or opposing the class." Because I find that the proposed defendant class satisfies each Rule 23(a) criterion, the fact that under a traditional standing analysis no representative plaintiff has suffered personal injuries with respect to each absent defendant does not preclude bilateral certification.

         2. Rule 23(a)

          The requirements of Rule 23 apply " equally to plaintiff and defendant classes." The proposed defendant class satisfies the four criteria of Rule 23(a).

          Because the proposed defendant class encompasses hundreds of law enforcement agencies which are scattered throughout New York State, the numerosity prerequisite is satisfied. The commonality prong is also easily satisfied, as the central issues of this litigation- i.e., whether the continued enforcement of section 240.35(1) violates individuals' constitutional rights-are common to all class members. Accordingly, the simple fact that section 240.35(1) remains on the books and subject to state-wide enforcement provides the requisite commonality. In light of the common legal issues, I need not find that there are also questions of fact common to the class. Nonetheless, I note that because plaintiff seeks to have all members of the proposed defendant class enjoined from enforcing section 240.35(1), to the extent that they ultimately refrain from doing so, their practices and procedures will mirror each other in respects pertinent to plaintiff's claims.

          As to Rule 23(a)'s typicality and adequacy requirements, both are satisfied here under the juridical link doctrine. A juridical link is " some independent legal relationship which relates all defendants in such a way that a single resolution of the dispute is preferred to a multiplicity of similar actions." A particularly strong juridical relationship exists in cases " ‘ [w]here all members of the defendant class are officials of a single state and are charged with enforcing or uniformly acting in accordance with a state statute, or common rule or practice of state-wide application, which is alleged to be unconstitutional.’ " That section 240.35(1) has already been found unconstitutional does not sever this link.

          The City defendants assert that they are inadequate class representatives because they are unable to raise a defense that is unique to absent members of the defendant class. Specifically, because the City defendants were parties to Loper and are currently enjoined from enforcing section 240.35(1), they are precluded from arguing what non-City defendants could argue, namely that Loper is merely persuasive rather than binding authority on state courts. Regardless of the viability of this defense, the fact that an absent defendant possibly could or would raise it does not destroy the City defendants' adequacy as class representatives. State law enforcement agencies will be put on notice of this litigation, and if any wish to oppose a permanent injunction on the ground that they are not bound by Loper, they may do so.

         Rule 23(a)(4) " does not require a willing representative but merely an adequate one." The City defendants, including Commissioner Kelly, will adequately represent the interests of the absent defendants. The City has been a named party in this lawsuit since the day it was filed, and its thorough familiarity with the factual background and legal issues of this litigation will enable it to effectively represent the defendant class. It is not surprising that defendants object to representing a class, for " named defendants almost never choose their role as class champion [as] it is a potentially onerous one thrust upon them by their opponents." But acceding to the wishes of defendants and allowing them to abdicate this responsibility so easily would gut the effectiveness of Rule 23(b)(2) as an instrument for preventing the recurrence of unconstitutional conduct. Because the overwhelming number of incidents of unlawful enforcement of section 240.35(1) were carried out by the NYPD, the City defendants have the greatest stake in this litigation. Quite naturally then, they have the greatest incentive to litigate vigorously, which makes them and their counsel more than adequate representatives of the defendant class.

         Defendants also argue, against no Rule 23(a) criterion in particular, that the proposed defendant class is so overly broad it raises due process concerns which caution against certification. While a heightened sensitivity to due process is warranted in the class action context, it does not dictate a denial of certification here. First, defendants' assertion that procedural due process is lacking because absent defendants were not on notice of Loper is at best a frivolous argument. At worst, this argument pushes the envelope of hypocrisy, for defendants elsewhere argue that absent plaintiffs should be deemed on notice of Loper as of October 1992 because the story received " significant coverage in the local New York City newspapers." Second, defendants argue that the defined defendant class is " so over-broad and unfair that it amounts to a deprivation of due process," but offer no examples or reasoning in support of this conclusion. If there are counties in New York State that have never unlawfully enforced section 240.35(1), any remedies imposed on these defendants will do them no harm. Third, what constitutes procedural fairness to absent defendants varies with respect to different types of defendant class suits. In a civil rights class action such as this-where certification of a defendant class will achieve uniform injunctive relief and avoid enforcement problems; where exposing absent defendants to liability will not impose upon them a significant out-of-pocket financial risk; and where adequate representation is ensured-due process is satisfied and the defendant class can be maintained.

         3. Rule 23(b)(2)

          There is currently a split in the circuits as to whether defendant classes are permissible in class actions governed by Rule 23(b)(2). Courts ascribing to a literal reading of the Rule have held that it only permits plaintiff classes to seek injunctive and declaratory relief from individual defendants, as opposed to defendant classes. However, the Second Circuit-the only appellate court that binds this Court-has expressly rejected such a narrow interpretation of the Rule. In Marcera v. Chinlund, the court affirmed certification of a defendant class of county sheriffs and stated " it is now settled that 23(b)(2) is an appropriate vehicle for injunctive relief against a class of local public officials." Although it is employed rarely for this purpose, both before and after Marcera, Rule 23(b)(2) has been the cornerstone of bilateral civil rights class actions.

          Defendants also balk at the size of plaintiff's proposed defendant class, but a large class is not an uncommon feature of (b) (2) civil rights classes. Nor is the size of this defendant class surprising given the particular circumstances Nor is the size of this defendant class surprising given the particular circumstances of this case, namely that the criminal statute at issue was declared unconstitutional over a decade ago but still remains on the books. While the City has taken positive steps toward vacating all outstanding bench warrants issued under section 240.35(1) and by removing it as a chargeable offense from the NYPD's computer program (thereby precluding any future arrests and prosecutions), as noted above, this does not vitiate plaintiff's request for further affirmative relief.

         Furthermore, certification of a state-wide defendant class is appropriate because incidents of unlawful enforcement of section 240.35(1) are not limited to the NYPD. According to available OCA data, since 1992 there have been at least 673 criminal prosecutions by District Attorneys' Offices charging violations of section 240.35(1) in Rockland, Suffolk, Erie and Nassau Counties. Repealing section 240.35(1) is the province of the New York State Legislature, not the federal courts. Nonetheless, this Court may issue a permanent injunction barring all state law enforcement officials from enforcing 240.35(1) so as to foster state-wide uniformity of protection and respect for free expression. Rule 23(b)(2) allows plaintiff to seek state-wide injunctive relief that will not only vacate outstanding warrants, dismiss pending prosecutions and overturn unlawful convictions, but also prevent further illegal actions before they occur.

         IV. CONCLUSION

         For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's request to amend the complaint is granted. Plaintiff's motion for certification of bilateral state-wide classes under Rule 23(b)(2) and for certification of a City-wide plaintiff subclass under Rule 23(b)(3) is also granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this motion [Docket No. 63]. A conference in this action is scheduled for July 30, 2007, at 4:30 p.m.

         SO ORDERED.