Opinion
1:24-cv-58 DAK-DBP
11-05-2024
Kelly Christian Brown, Plaintiff, v. Matthew B. Jantzen, et al., Defendants.
Dale A. Kimball Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Dustin B. Pead United States Magistrate Judge
Pro se Plaintiff Kelly Christian Brown filed this suit against Defendants originally in state court. Defendants removed this matter to Federal Court based on the causes of action brought by Plaintiff. Defendants then moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff failed to respond, prompting an order to show cause from the court. In response, Plaintiff filed a document titled Notice and Motion to Strike. In that motion Plaintiff “appears and moves this court to strike all pleadings of defendants that failed to prove subject matter jurisdiction on the record.”For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the matter be dismissed, and Plaintiff's motion be denied.
ECF No. 21 (emphasis omitted).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kelly Christian Brown, a “Living flesh and blood Man standing on the ground”, “transient foreigner without legal domicile”and “Real Person in Interest”, brings this suit against a judge, three prosecutors, and a probation agent who were involved in his criminal case in the Utah Second District Court. Plaintiff avers violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and causes of action under quite a few federal statutes.In his Complaint, Plaintiff denies the existence of the United States, Davis County Utah, the State of Utah, Kelly Christian Brown©, and “any other Corporations Members who are Alien(s) or may be associated with Any Complaint(s).” Mr. Brown further contests jurisdiction citing to a variety of cases and questions the ability of a court to render any judgment or conviction against him.
Complaint p. 6, ECF No. 2-2 (the court cites to the page number found on the bottom of Plaintiff's Complaint).
These include inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 471, 873, and 1503; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; 26 U.S.C. §§ 6325 and 7214; and 28 U.S.C. § 2041.
Complaint p. 8.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Utah Second District Court on April 8, 2024, and it was removed by Defendants that same day to this court. Defendants then moved to dismiss this case and there are presently two motions to dismiss pending before the court.Plaintiff failed to file any opposition to Defendants' respective motions and the court entered an Order to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed. In response, Plaintiff filed a “Notice and Motion to Strike” that copied portions of his Complaint.
ECF No. 12, ECF No. 17.
LEGAL STANDARD
i. Pro Se Filings
The court construes a pro se litigant's pleadings “liberally” and holds them “'to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” A liberal reading of Plaintiff's complaint, however, “'does not relieve the Plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim [can] be based.'”Accordingly, it is not the proper function of a court to “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf,”and the court may not assume “the role of advocate for Plaintiff or any other pro se litigant.”
Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 955 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. (quoting Hall, 955 F.3d at 1110)).
Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
ii. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) can take one of two forms. Either a facial attack “challeng[ing] the sufficiency of the complaint, requiring the district court to accept the allegations in the complaint as true,” or a factual attack, “challeng[ing] the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends.”The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the complaint bringing a facial attack. With facial attacks, the court applies “the same standards under Rule 12(b)(1) that are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.”
Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Cont'l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2005).
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974) (“The party invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the duty to establish that federal jurisdiction does exist, but, since the courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against its existence.”) (internal citation omitted).
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”The court's function when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that may be presented at trial, rather it is to “'assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.'”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b0(6).
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action”, however, are insufficient.“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court uses a relaxed pleading standard in comparison to a trained attorney.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); see also Johnson v. Blendtec, Inc., 500 F.Supp.3d 1271, 1278 (D. Utah 2020) (applying the applicable standard).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Id. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the court notes that even under the liberal pleading standard given to Plaintiff's pleadings, Plaintiff's Complaint is largely incoherent, illogical, and fails to comply with Federal Rule 8's requirement that it contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff's Complaint also fails for the reasons set forth in Defendants' respective motions.
Defendants Judge David Williams and Adult Probation and Parole Agent CJ Evans seek to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. They argue Plaintiff has failed to make a facially plausible claim, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine and barred by Heck v. Humphrey, Judge Williams is protected by judicial immunity and Mr. Evans is entitled to qualified immunity, and Defendants are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if sued in their official capacities. Plaintiff fails to address these arguments. Instead, Mr. Brown makes fanciful assertions and contests subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants Matthew Janzen, Benjamin Willoughby, and Troy Rawlings, the Davis County prosecutors, make similar arguments for dismissal. These include state criminal proceedings against Plaintiff remain ongoing, thus, the Younger abstention doctrine applies. Defendant Prosecutors are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and Mr. Brown's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by Heck v. Humprey because success on his claims would invalidate Plaintiff's state court conviction. Finally, Defendants argue the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Once again, Plaintiff fails to specifically address these arguments.
As set forth by the Supreme Court and followed in this Circuit, federal courts must abstain pursuant to Younger when: “(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.”All of these factors are met here and Plaintiff offers nothing to refute the applicability of Younger. In sum, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, a federal court is not permitted to intervene in ongoing state criminal proceedings.”Thus, this court may not intervene in Plaintiff's state matter.
Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir.2003)); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971).
Walck, 472 F.3d at 1233.
Under Heck v. Humphrey, “a plaintiff cannot assert a § 1983 claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of the prior conviction or sentence.”There has been no successful post-trial motion, appeal, or other proceeding showing a favorable termination or invalidity of Plaintiff's conviction. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against all Defendants are therefore barred.
Johnson v. Pottawotomie Tribal Police Dep't, 411 Fed.Appx. 195, 198, 2011 WL 441772 (10th Cir. 2011).
Next, the court finds Defendants' arguments regarding immunity are well taken. Judge Williams is protected by judicial immunity. The other Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity or qualified immunity “'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'”Plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption of qualified immunity in this case.
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (“A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.”); Sanchez v. Lyman, Case No. 2:18-CV-69-DAK, 2019 WL 2240651, * 3 (D. Utah May 24, 2019) (unpublished) (“It is well settled that judges ‘are absolutely immune from suit unless they act in clear absence of all jurisdiction, meaning that even erroneous or malicious acts are not proper bases for § 1983 claims.'”) (quoting Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, 324 Fed.Appx. 742, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)).
Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
See Est. of Smart by Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020) (“When a § 1983 defendant asserts qualified immunity, this affirmative defense “creates a presumption that [the defendant is] immune from suit. To overcome this presumption, the plaintiffs bear the burden of show[ing] that (1) the officers' alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) [that right] was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that ‘every reasonable official would have understood,' that such conduct constituted a violation of that right.”). (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Finally, there is no reason to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint because “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”Thus, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motions be granted.
Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109 (citation and quotations omitted).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff's Notice and Motion to Strike be DENIED.
Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties who are hereby notified of their right to object. Within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to object may constitute a waiver of objections upon subsequent review.