Summary
holding that only cabinet-level agencies are proper defendants in FOIA actions
Summary of this case from Prison Legal News v. LappinOpinion
Civil Action No. 04-0055 (EGS).
March 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment [Dkt. #31]. Having considered defendants' motion, and plaintiff's opposition, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff also brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The Court will not rule on defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's FOIA claims [Dkt. #42] at this time. However, for the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the individual defendants and all claims against them because they are not proper parties to civil actions under the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner who currently is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado. He brings this action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
Plaintiff's complaint might be read to include constitutional claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against a BOP employee, the officer who conducted a disciplinary hearing, in his individual capacity. The Court notes that it likely lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he is not alleged to reside or work in the District of Columbia, and that venue appears to be improper. At any rate, another Court has considered the merits of this claim, and has found them meritless. See Brooks v. Gallegos, 76 Fed. Appx. 236, 237 (10th Cir. 2003).
On or about September 19, 2000, while incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Marion, Illinois ("FPC Marion"), plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary violation, possession of a hazardous weapon (Offense Code 108). Compl. at 1; Boyd Decl., Attach. 2 (Incident Report No. 817133). A Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO") found him guilty of a lesser offense, possessing an unauthorized item (Offense Code 305). Compl. at 1 Ex. B. Plaintiff appealed the DHO's decision, and BOP's Regional Director ordered a rehearing due to a procedural error in the disciplinary proceedings. Id. Ex. C (Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal dated November 27, 2000). The Regional Director's response, however, incorrectly stated that plaintiff was "found to have committed the prohibited act of Possession of a Hazardous Tool, Code #108." Id.
On January 25, 2001, upon rehearing, the DHO concluded that plaintiff possessed a tool with a sharpened end, and thus found that he had committed the more serious offense, possession of a hazardous tool (Offense Code 108). Boyd Decl., Attach. 5 (Discipline Hearing Officer Report on Incident Report No. 817133). As a consequence, plaintiff was to spend 15 days in administrative segregation (suspended pending 180 days clear conduct), and forfeited seven days good conduct time. Id.
Plaintiff was charged with another disciplinary violation, assault (Offense Code 101), by kicking another prisoner in the face on September 19, 2000. Compl. at 3 Ex. B1; Boyd Decl., ¶ 13 Attach. 3 (Discipline Hearing Officer Report on Incident Report No. 819471). Because the disciplinary hearing occurred after plaintiff's transfer to the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado ("FCI Florence"), witnesses could not appear. Compl., Ex. B1. Relying on written witness statements, the DHO found that plaintiff committed a less serious assault (Offense Code 224) . Id. This matter, too, was subject to rehearing on January 25, 2001. Boyd Decl., Attach. 7 ((Discipline Hearing Officer Report on Rehearing, Incident Report No. 819471). On rehearing, plaintiff again was found guilty of a less serious assault (Offense Code 224). Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the BOP fails to maintain its records pertaining to him and the disciplinary proceedings against him with the requisite level of accuracy, and that its reliance on these records has resulted in adverse determinations. Compl. at 4-5. Specifically, plaintiff contends that his custody classification score changed, presumably to require a more secure placement. Id. at 5. In addition, plaintiff contends that BOP wrongfully denied him access to records pertaining to him, that is, those witness statements supporting plaintiff's defense at the second disciplinary hearing. Id. at 3, 5 Ex. A1. He demands the removal of all inaccurate information from the agency's records, the recalculation of his custody classification score based on the finding on the lesser disciplinary violation (Offense Code 305 for possessing an unauthorized item), and the dismissal of Incident Report No. 819471 for defendant's alleged failure to produce plaintiff's witness statements. For defendant's alleged willful violation of his rights under the Privacy Act, plaintiff also demands monetary damages.
II. DISCUSSION A. The individual defendants are not proper parties to this action.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as against the individual defendants on the ground that they are not proper parties to an action brought under FOIA or the Privacy Act. The Court agrees.
The proper defendant in a FOIA or Privacy Act case is the agency, in this case, the Department of Justice of which BOP is a component. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (jurisdiction only to enjoin an "agency"). The Department of Justice is listed in FOIA among the cabinetlevel agencies that fall within the definition of "Executive department." 5 U.S.C. § 101. Individual employees of the federal government are not subject to suit under FOIA. See Stone v. Defense Investigative Serv., 816 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D.D.C. 1993); Whittle v. Moscella, 756 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.D.C. 1991); Sherwood Van Lines v. Dep't of Navy, 732 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D.D.C. 1990). Nor does the Privacy Act allow suits against subordinate agency officials. Armstrong v. Bureau of Prisons, 976 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd, No. 97-5208, 1998 WL 65543 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 1998).
To the extent that plaintiff's complaint is an attempt to obtain relief from the individual defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), it fails. FOIA established a comprehensive statutory scheme to resolve all issues associated with the release of government documents. Johnson v. Exec. Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002). With this extensive and detailed process available to requesters, courts have concluded that a Bivens remedy is not appropriate. Id; Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ( en banc) (no Bivens remedy available if a statute provides a "comprehensive system to administer public rights"). Similarly, there is no remedy under the Privacy Act for plaintiff's constitutional claims because these claims "are encompassed within the remedial scheme of the Privacy Act." Griffin v. Ashcroft, No. 02-5399, 2003 WL 22097940, *1-2 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2003).
For these same reasons, the Court will deny plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Add Unknown Defendant [Dkt. #37].
B. Plaintiff failed to file a civil action under the Privacy Act within the two-year statute of limitations.
Under the Privacy Act, an individual must file a civil action "within two years from the date on which the cause arises." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). An action arises when "the plaintiff knows or should know of the alleged violation." Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see Szymanski v. United States Parole Comm'n, 870 F.Supp. 377, 378 (D.D.C. 1994) (Privacy Act cause of action arises when "(1) an error was made in maintaining plaintiff's records; (2) plaintiff was harmed by the error; and (3) the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the error."). Under this standard, it is evident that plaintiff's Privacy Act claims are barred.
Plaintiff has known of incorrect information in BOP records pertaining to him since he received the Regional Director's November 27, 2000 response to his first appeal of the DHO's decision. It was in this document that the Regional Director incorrectly stated that plaintiff had been found to have committed the more serious offense, possession of a hazardous weapon (Offense Code 108). Plaintiff did not file his complaint, however, until December 18, 2004. Plaintiff failed to bring a civil action under the Privacy Act within two years from the date on which the cause of action arose. As plaintiff concedes, the Privacy Act claims are time barred.
The Clerk of Court received plaintiff's pro se complaint, application to proceed in forma pauperis and a copy of his prison trust fund account statement on December 18, 2004. The case did not appear on the Court's docket, however, until January 14, 2004.
Plaintiff "has to admit that he is time barred by the statute limitation to claim for money damags [sic]." Plaintiff's Response in Objection to the Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment at 7.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the individual defendants must be dismissed as parties, and that plaintiff failed to file his Privacy Act complaint within the two-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss [Dkt. #31] is GRANTED, and defendant's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #31] is DENIED, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the individual defendants are DISMISSED as parties to this action, and that all Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act claims against them are DISMISSED, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Add Unknown Defendant [Dkt. #37] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.