MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Rodney S. Webb, Chief United States District Judge.

Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Local Rule 54.1(A) (doc. #133). Defendant acknowledges responsibility for some costs, but objects to certain items which plaintiffs propose to tax. (See doc. # 137). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for costs is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.

As the prevailing party, plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to an award of costs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 54(d). See Greaser v. State of Missouri, Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 1998); Bathke v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 347 (8th Cir. 1995). The amount of the costs award, however, is within the discretion of the district court. Greaser, 145 F.3d at 982. The term "costs" as used within Rule 54(d) is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 which outlines the expenses that may be taxed pursuant to Rule 54(d). Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987).

The Court examines each cost plaintiffs seek to tax below.

1. Tax Transcript

Defendant requested that a tax transcript be prepared and does not object now to this cost. As the tax transcript was necessarily obtained for use in the case, see 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), and the cost is reasonable, the sum of $23.00 is taxed.

2. Expert Witness Fees

Plaintiffs request a total sum of $9,314.60 in fees for their three expert witnesses. Defendant's objections are taken up below.

Witness fees are recoverable as a cost under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3). Absent other explicit statutory authority, non-court appointed expert witnesses are compensated like any other witness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821. The taxable costs for such experts are limited to their testimonial services and subject to the statutory fees and allowances found in 28 U.S.C. § 1821. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc., v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87 (1991); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996). Section 1821 provides that a witness is only entitled to fees and allowances when s/he is "in attendance at any court of the United States, or before a United States Magistrate, or before any person authorized to take his [her] deposition." 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (bracketed language added). When the witness is entitled to a fee, that fee is limited by section 1821(b) which provides:

A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance or at any time during such attendance.

a. Dr. Paul Estenson, Economist

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of $6,090.50 for their economist's time and expense relating to trial and necessary preparation. Upon the Court's request, plaintiffs have clarified that this amount covers four invoices submitted by Dr. Paul Estenson. The first invoice covers his expenses for travel, research, and a preliminary report. These expenses are for non-testimonial services which are not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 absent other explicit statutory authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a); West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 499 U.S. at 87. Similarly, the third invoice is for analysis, consulting, and preparing the revised estimates. Again, these expenses are not allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 as they were non-testimonial services.

The remaining two invoices, however, are on different footing. The second invoice is for a deposition taken in October. Plaintiffs assert and defendant acknowledges that it agreed beforehand to cover this cost. The supplemental information provided by plaintiffs indicates that the expense of this deposition was $1283.00. Since defendant agreed to pay the cost of this deposition, the amount of $1283.00 is taxed.

The fourth and last invoice is for $1941.50 covering trial testimony, consulting, court time and travel expenses. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821, plaintiffs are entitled to tax part of this invoice. Estenson is from St. Peter, Minnesota. He traveled to Fargo, North Dakota for trial. By the Court's calculation, this is roughly a distance of 290 miles. The estimated time to travel by car between the two locations is four (4) hours and fifty (50) minutes. Estenson was in Fargo for three days and on the stand for two. Under the circumstances, he is entitled to three days of witness fees at $40.00 per day. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (witness entitled to fee for days in attendance and time necessarily occupied in going to and from place of attendance). Thus, $120.00 for Estenson's witness fees is taxed.

Along with witness fees, plaintiffs are also entitled to recover travel and subsistence allowances for Estenson. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (c), (d). A witness who travels by privately owned vehicle is entitled to receive the mileage allowance federal government employees receive on official travel, see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2); this amount is currently $.325 per mile. A round trip between Fargo and St. Peter is 580 miles. Accordingly, mileage is taxed at $188.50 (580 x $.325 = $188.50). Estenson also is entitled to a subsistence allowance for an overnight stay since his home is too far from Fargo to require daily commuting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(1). Similar to the mileage allowance, the subsistence allowance is the equivalent of what a federal government employee on official travel in the area would receive. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(2). This is currently an eighty ($85.00) dollar per diem in the District of North Dakota. Accordingly, subsistence is taxed at $255.00 (3 x $85 = $255). In sum, $563.50 for fees and allowances in connection with Estenson's trial testimony is approved. Thus, in total, plaintiffs are awarded $1846.50 for Estenson.

b. Paul Cook

Next, plaintiffs request $2,454.50 for an airline ticket purchased by expert witness Paul Cook. A witness is entitled to recoup the expense of traveling by common carrier. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c). The Court's review of the supplemental invoice indicates that Cook flew from his home in Dallas-Forth Worth (DFW), Texas to Fargo, North Dakota. From Fargo, Cook traveled to Indianapolis, Indiana and from there he traveled home to DFW. Apparently, he had a previous commitment to attend in Indianapolis. While the Court understands why plaintiffs were willing to pay for Cook to go on from Fargo to Indianapolis, this added expense is not properly chargeable to defendant. See Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. CIV.A.93-6948, 1997 WL 537406, at *5 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 1, 1997) (disallowing cost of side trip to Dayton for witness coming from Chicago to Philadelphia to testify).

Section 1821(c)(1) of Title 28, United States Code, provides that witness travel expenses related to a common carrier shall be based upon "the distance necessarily traveled to and from such witness's residence by the shortest practical route in going to and returning from the place of attendance." Cook's return journey from Fargo to Indianapolis and then to DFW does not qualify as the "shortest practical route" home. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Moreover, the side trip to Indianapolis also does not constitute "going to and returning from the place of attendance." See id. Consequently, the Court considers awarding only the cost of a ticket from DFW to Fargo and directly back. The submitted invoice indicates that the ticket from DFW to Fargo cost $737.00. Assuming that a return ticket also would cost $737.00, the most the Court would consider awarding is $1474.00.

The Court is mindful, however, that defendant objects to the cost of the tickets as excessive. Defendant points out that the tickets were purchased just a few days before traveling. Plaintiffs, while admitting that this likely accounts for the high cost, do not explain why the tickets could not have been purchased further in advance. Also adding to the excessive cost, it appears that the tickets were one-way tickets which are generally more expensive.See Farley, 1997 WL 537406, at *4 (noting that one-way tickets are generally more costly than round-trip tickets and do not constitute the most economical rate reasonably available).

Section 1821(c)(1) requires a witness to use "a common carrier at the most economical rate reasonably available." See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (c)(1). It is hard to believe that these one-way tickets purchased within just a few days of traveling at an estimated cost of $1474.00 were the most economical tickets reasonably available. The Court is especially troubled by such an amount in light of the fact that plaintiffs' attorney apparently traveled by air from Fargo to Dallas and back at cost of $646.00. (See doc. #133) (requesting $323.00 for half the amount of airfare to Dallas).

Plaintiffs offer no support, beyond mere assertion, that these tickets were purchased at the "most economical rate reasonably available." It is, however, their obligation to do so. See Gregory v. Weigler, 873 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (C.D.Ill. 1995) (prevailing plaintiff must provide evidence that the rate charged for airfare was "the most economical rate available"). Under these circumstances, the request may be denied or reduced. See id. (denying request since not properly supported). In this case, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the request and concludes that a reasonable round-trip ticket for airfare between DFW and Fargo is $800.00. This amount is taxed, along with a $40.00 witness fee, for a total sum of $840.00 for Cook's fees and allowances.

c. Lonnie Hoover

Last, plaintiffs request $779.60 for expert witness Lonnie Hoover. This request includes five days of witness fees plus mileage. Defendant objects that there is no basis for awarding Hoover five days of witness fees when he only testified for one day. Upon supplement, the plaintiffs explain that Hoover was forced to travel by car from Oklahoma to Fargo due to back problems. Plaintiffs assert that this is a round trip distance of 1,790 miles. Because of his back problems, Hoover had to stop every hour to rest or walk around. Plaintiffs explain that because of the distance between Oklahoma and Fargo, and his need for rest, Hoover was traveling and in Fargo for a total of five days, although he only testified for one day.

Admittedly, this is a tougher decision for the Court. A witness is entitled to receive a $40 fee not only for the days in attendance but also for "the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance." 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). This means that plaintiffs may be compensated for Hoover's necessary travel time. Upon review of plaintiffs' supplement, the Court does not believe that they are overreaching by requesting five days of witness fees for Hoover. The necessity of four travel days is adequately explained by Hoover's back problems and the great distance he traveled. Accordingly, the Court awards $200.00 for Hoover's witness fees (5 days x $40 = $200). As for a mileage allowance, $581.75 is awarded (1790 x $.325 = $581.75). Last, Hoover is also entitled to a subsistence allowance for an overnight stay since his home is so far from Fargo that daily commuting is impossible. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1). This allowance is limited to one night ($85.00 per diem), however, since Hoover only stayed in Fargo for one day. See id. (subsistence allowance paid when an overnight stay is required at the place of attendance). In sum, $866.75 is awarded for Hoover's fees and allowances.

Based on the above, the total amount awarded for all expert witnesses' fees and expenses is $3553.25.

3. Deposition Transcript Copy Costs

Plaintiffs seek to recover $2,316.44 in costs for deposition transcripts. Defendant resists taxing the costs related to the deposition transcripts of Gail and Ernie Brookins, David Lingebeck, John Overgaard, Jeff Olson, Paul Estenson, Jerry Tibiatowski, Lonnie Hoover, and Paul Cook.

As a general matter, fees for transcripts and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case may be recovered under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The costs of taking a deposition and transcribing it may be taxed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) which allows for "fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case."See Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 558, 561 (D.Kan. 1995). Additionally, the costs of copying a deposition transcript reasonably necessary for trial also may be recovered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Id. The Eighth Circuit has explained that the costs of a deposition and transcript may be taxed where the deposition was "necessarily obtained for use in the case" and was not "purely investigative." See Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 363 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 63 F.3d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1995)). The cost of a deposition transcript copy may be obtained if it was reasonably necessary for trial preparation. Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 63 F.3d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1995).

Although it is not clear, the Court discerns that plaintiffs actually request costs for copies of deposition transcripts. The controverted costs are for depositions that defendant noticed and therefore presumably had transcribed. Plaintiffs apparently incurred the costs of obtaining copies of those transcripts. It may be, in the final analysis, that this distinction is of little moment, however, the Court prefers to be precise and encourages the parties to be precise as well.

A copy of a deposition transcript may be taxed when the copy was reasonably necessary for trial preparation and was not merely obtained for the convenience of counsel. Slagenweit, 63 F.3d at 721 (citing Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1991)). Neither party explains satisfactorily why these controverted copy costs were either "merely for convenience" (defendant) or "necessary for trial preparation" (plaintiffs). See Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1991). Defendant simply claims that "the depositions were for discovery only." (doc. #137, pg. 4). Plaintiffs merely assert that the depositions were taken by defendant and the costs were expended by the plaintiffs in obtaining the transcripts for use at trial. (doc. #136, pg. 3). Upon being urged by the Court to be more specific, plaintiffs add that the transcripts were necessary to properly object to defendant's cross-examination when such deposition testimony was used to impeach a witness. (doc. #139). This explanation may support taxing the deposition copy costs of Gail and Ernie Brookins, Overgaard, Estenson, Hoover, and Cook as they testified at trial. See EEOC v. WO, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 621 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that deposition costs for witnesses that testified at trial may be taxable in the discretion of the district court).

Lingbeck, Olson, and Tibiatowski, however, did not testify. Nevertheless, these deposition transcript copy costs may still be recovered if they appeared reasonably necessary for trial preparation at the time the depositions were taken. See Zotos, 121 F.3d at 363 (noting that "the determination of necessity must be made in light of the facts known at the time of the deposition, without regard to intervening developments that later render the deposition unneeded for further use"). In this regard, and upon its own review, the Court notes that each of these deponents was named as a potential witness on plaintiffs' pared down witness list. Therefore, it is logical that each deponent offered testimony that, at the time, was believed to be relevant for trial.

Other courts have allowed recovery of such costs when the deponent appeared on a witness list for trial or actually testified. See, e.g., Karsian v. Inter-Reg'l Fin. Group, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1088 (D. Col. 1998) (adopting test for taxable deposition costs that includes costs of transcripts of individuals who did not testify at trial but whose names appeared on pretrial order as well as one of parties' final witness lists); Ortega, 883 F. Supp. at 561 (denying defendant's objection to taxing cost of deposition of deponent who appeared on plaintiff's witness list). The Court is persuaded that when a deponent either testifies at trial or is listed on a witness list, the cost of a deposition transcript, or copy thereof, is reasonably necessary for trial preparation. See Karsian, 13 F. Supp.2d at 1088. Counsel routinely use such transcripts or copies to prepare cross-examination as well as using them as tools for impeachment. Therefore, opposing counsel also must have deposition transcripts or copies to properly guide a witness's testimony, and object to improper cross-examination or impeachment. See Board of Dir., Water's Edge v. Anden Group, et. al., 135 F.R.D. 129, 135 (E.D. Vir. 1991) (transcripts of parties' own witnesses are reasonably necessary for trial preparation as they are used in choosing direction of testimony and limiting exposure to impeachment). See also Scallet v. Rosenblum, 176 F.R.D. 522, 526-27 (W.D. Vir. 1997).

Consequently, the Court concludes that the controverted deposition copy costs are properly taxable as since each deponent either testified at trial or was named on a witness list. Accordingly, the total sum of $2,316.44 is taxed. This includes the amount defendant did not object to noted in footnote 2, supra.

4. Attorney Travel Costs

Plaintiffs request $809.95 for the expenses their attorney incurred in traveling to depose witnesses. Defendant objects to taxing these costs arguing that attorney travel, hotel, meal, parking, and car rental expenses are not appropriate costs within the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The Court agrees. Section 1920 makes no provision for awarding the expenses of attorney travel as costs. See Calderon v. Witvoet, 112 F.3d 275, 276 (7th Cir. 1997) (outlays for travel and related expenses are not listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and, therefore, may not be reimbursed as costs). Accordingly, the request for these expenses is denied .

In accordance with the above, plaintiffs' motion for costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (doc. # 133). To recapitulate, the following costs are approved:

1. Tax Transcript: $ 23.00

2. Expert Fees Allowances: $3553.25

3. Deposition Copy Costs: $2316.44

Therefore, the total sum of $5892.69 is taxed to the judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.