ORDER AND REASONS

LANCE AFRICK, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, Carol Fox Bright, individually and on behalf of her minor children, moves this Court to remand this action to the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa on the ground that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Defendant, Purdue Frederick Company ("Purdue"), filed a notice of removal on March 5, 2003, contending that plaintiffs products liability claim against it is fraudulently misjoined with plaintiffs negligence claims against non-diverse defendants and, therefore, diversity jurisdiction exists. Defendant seeks severance of the products liability claim asserted against it from the negligence claims filed against non-diverse defendants. For the following reasons, plaintiffs motion to remand this action is GRANTED. BACKGROUND

On November 11, 1999, William Bright III filed this action in the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa alleging state law negligence claims against No Cuts, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and Eugene McDonald, a Louisiana citizen. The state court petition alleged that Bright was electrocuted and suffered serious personal injuries when he struck an unmarked electric service line while in the process of digging a cable television line trench on property under the care, custody and control of Eugene McDonald. Plaintiff alleged that No Cuts, Inc. was the company that failed to mark the location of the electric power service line.

The original petition has been amended four times. On July 26, 2000, the first amending petition added defendant, Johnny McDonald, a Louisiana citizen, who allegedly negligently installed the electric power lines on the property. Thereafter, Bright filed a second amending petition, adding Cleco Corporation as a defendant based on plaintiffs belief that Cleco provided the electric service to the McDonald dwelling. On January 18, 2001, plaintiff filed a third amending petition dismissing Cleco Corp. and adding as a defendant, Entergy Corporation (later amended to be Entergy Louisiana, Inc.), a "foreign" corporation.

On April 22, 2002, Bright died. On January 27, 2003, a fourth amending petition was filed substituting Carol Fox Bright, individually and on behalf of her minor children, as the named plaintiff and adding Purdue as a defendant. Purdue is a pharmaceutical manufacturing corporation that manufactures and distributes the prescription pain killer, Oxycontin.

The fourth amending petition alleges that as a consequence of the injuries he sustained due to the negligence of Eugene McDonald, Jr., Johnny McDonald, and Entergy Louisiana, Inc.(the "Louisiana defendants"), Blight's physician prescribed Oxycontin and that Bright died from the toxic effects of Oxycontin on his body, including his heart and lungs. Plaintiff alleges that Oxycontin is an unreasonably dangerous product and that the Louisiana defendants' fault, together with Purdue's fault, is the legal cause of Blight's death. Plaintiff also alleges that Purdue is liable jointly, severally, and in solido with the Louisiana defendants for Blight's death.

Purdue maintains that, pursuant to Louisiana procedure, the claim against it is fraudulently misjoined with the negligence claims against the Louisiana defendants. Purdue asserts that, for the purpose of removal, the citizenship of the Louisiana defendants should be disregarded and that the joined products liability claim, which standing alone satisfies the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, should be severed from the negligence claims against the Louisiana defendants.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a), an action filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the action is one over which the federal court would have original jurisdiction. The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal. Jernigan v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992)); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988). However, removal jurisdiction is to be strictly construed as its application "deprives a state court of a case properly before it and thereby implicates important federalism concerns." Frank v. Bear Stearns Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, any doubts about removal must be construed against removal and in favor of remanding the case back to state court. See Vasquez v. Alto Bonito Gravel Plant Corp., 56 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1995).

Original federal diversity jurisdiction exists "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In the present case, plaintiff does not dispute that the amount in controversy requirement is met. Nor is there any dispute that because there are Louisiana citizens on both sides of the litigation, complete diversity does not exist on the face of the pleadings. The latter fact, however, will not defeat diversity jurisdiction if the Louisiana defendants are fraudulently joined. See e.g., Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 120 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1997).

A. Fraudulent Joinder

In 5., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit described the burden placed upon parties who remove based upon a fraudulent joinder theory:

The burden of persuasion placed upon those who cry `fraudulent joinder1 is indeed a heavy one. In order to establish that an in-state defendant has been fraudulently joined, the removing party must show either that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court; or that there as been outright fraud in the plaintiffs pleadings of jurisdictional facts.

663 F.3d at 549 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

In determining the validity of a fraudulent joinder claim, "the district court `must evaluate all of the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff" Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549). The court must also resolve all ambiguities in the controlling state law in the plaintiffs favor. Id. The court need not decide whether the plaintiff will actually, or even probably, prevail on the merits; it must only determine whether there is a possibility that the plaintiff may do so. Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992) (other citations omitted). "[I]f there is even a possibility that a state court would find a cause of action stated against any one of the named in-state defendants on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, then the federal court must find that the in-state defendant(s) have been properly joined, that there is incomplete diversity, and that the case must be remanded to the state courts," B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 550 (citations omitted).

Purdue does not argue that plaintiff has not stated a viable products liability claim against it. Nor does Purdue maintain that plaintiff has not stated viable negligence claims against the Louisiana defendants. Therefore, this Court need not pursue the traditional fraudulent joinder analysis. Rather, Purdue maintains that plaintiffs product liability claim has been improperly cumulated with the negligence claims filed prior to Bright's death against the Louisiana defendants. It argues that plaintiffs petition pleads two separate and unrelated actions, i.e., a "products liability action" that is removable on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and an "electrocution action" that is not removable. Consequently, the focus is on Purdue's argument that the combination of these two actions in the same lawsuit is a fraudulent misjoinder of claims that justifies disregarding the citizenship of the Louisiana defendants.

B. Misjoinder as Fraudulent Joinder

The genesis of the "fraudulent misjoinder" theory is Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds, Cohen v. Office Depot, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). In Tapscott, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant's right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant as to whom there is no allegation of joint, several or alternative liability and where claims against non-diverse defendants have "no real connection with the controversy." Id. at 1360 (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 37, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921)); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). The facts and holding of Tapscott were succinctly set forth in Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1319 (S.D.Miss. 2003):

In Tapscott, the plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class, filed suit in state court against four (4) defendants, stating claims of fraud and conspiracy arising from the sale of automotive service contracts sold and financed in Alabama. Two amended complaints followed, the second adding additional plaintiffs and naming three (3) new defendants, including Lowe's Home Centers, a North Carolina corporation.

Unlike the initial and first amended complaints, which centered on automobile service contracts, the second amended complaint alleged violations arising from the sale of extended service contracts for retail products. These new "retail class" plaintiffs, all residents of Alabama, were indisputably diverse from Lowe's, but not from the original automotive class defendants, which included several Alabama residents. Additionally, none of the "retail class" plaintiffs stated claims against the original automotive contract defendants. Lowe's removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, claiming "fraudulent joinder," and filed a motion to sever the claims against Lowe's from the claims against the other defendants. The district court granted the motion to sever and remanded the action to state court as to all defendants except Lowe's.

The plaintiffs appealed the district court's order severing the claims. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order, agreeing with the district court that a mere allegation of a common business practice was insufficient to permit joinder. The court characterized the joinder of the Tapscott defendants as "improper and fraudulent joinder, bordering on a sham."

Significantly, the plaintiffs in Tapscott did not argue that the joinder of defendants was proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). Rather, they contended that "while a court may disregard the citizenship of fraudulently joined parties, a misjoinder, no matter how egregious, is not fraudulent joinder." Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360. The Eleventh Circuit responded to plaintiffs' contention by first ruling that because the alleged transactions involved in the automotive class were "wholly distinct" from the alleged transactions involved in the retail class, the joinder of claims against these two distinct classes of defendants did not satisfy the permissive joinder standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). See id. Second, the Court concluded that if plaintiffs join resident defendants who have "no real connection with the controversy," such a "[m]isjoinder may be just as fraudulent as the joinder of a resident defendant against whom a plaintiff has no possibility of a cause of action." Id. The court cautioned, however, "[w]e do not hold that mere misjoinder is fraudulent joinder, but we do agree with the district court that [the plaintiffs'] attempt to join these parties is so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder." Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that, in some circumstances, the misjoinder of plaintiffs "should not be allowed to defeat diversity jurisdiction." In re Benjamin Moore Co., 309 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

Courts analyzing fraudulent misjoinder claims under Tapscott have consistently noted that mere misjoinder does not constitute fraudulent misjoinder. See e.g., Jamison, 251 F. Supp. 2nd at 1320; Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., 238 F. Supp.2d 804, 814 (S.D.Miss 2002); Johnson v. Glaxo SmithKline, 214 F.R.D. 416, 420 (S.D.Miss. 2002); Conk v. Richards O'Neill, 77 F. Supp.2d 956, 970 (S.D.Ind. 1999); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999 WL 554584, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 16, 1999); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Texaco, Inc., 1998 WL 160919, at *2 (E.D.La. April 3, 1998); Ren-Dan Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 952 F. Supp. 370, 375 (W.D.La. 1997). These courts have emphasized that the joinder at issue in Tapscott was particularly egregious, i.e. fraudulent, because it involved an attempt to join claims brought by one class of plaintiffs against one set of defendants with another group of factually unrelated claims brought by a second class of plaintiffs against a second group of defendants with no connection between the two groups. See e.g., Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1289 (distinguishing Tapscott because "the instant case does not involve two distinct classes that have "no real connection' to each other"); Glenn v. Purdue Pharma Co., 2003 WL 22243939, at *5 (N.D.Miss. Sept. 25, 2003) (declining to apply Tapscott because Tapscott involved two separate groups of plaintiffs and defendants with "no real connection existing between the two groups"); Jamison, 251 F. Supp.2d at 1323 (noting that because "no plaintiff in the first group stated a claim against a defendant in the second group and no plaintiff in the second group stated a claim against a defendant in the first group, there was no series of transactions or occurrences that connected these two groups11); Johnson, 214 F.R.D. at 420 (noting that "[i]n effect, two entirely distinct lawsuits had been merged into one . . .); In re Diet Drugs, 1999 WL 554584, at *3(stating that the joinder in Tapscott was "so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder because the transactions between certain plaintiffs and defendants had `no real connection' to the transactions involving the other party); Conk, 77 F. Supp.2d at 970 (noting that the joinder in Tapscott bordered on a "sham" because "plaintiffs' non-removable claims arising from automobile purchases were `wholly distinct' from their claims against the diverse defendant based on other retail products"); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 1998 WL 160919, at *2 (noting the Tapscott court found that "joining claims by two sets of plaintiffs against two sets of defendants involved in different transaction coupled with plaintiffs failure to allege joint liability or conspiracy was so egregious as to render the joinder fraudulent"); see also Hewitt v. AAA Ins. Co., 1999 WL 243642, at *3 (E.D.La. April 23, 1999); Ren-Dan Farms, 952 F. Supp. at375.

Because the focus of the fraudulent joinder analysis is on the connection between the joined claims and parties, the relevant inquiry is whether the connection between the joined claims and parties is so tenuous so as to justify disregarding the citizenship of the joined parties upon removal. See, e.g., Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1290 (reversing district court's finding of fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs because "unlike Tapscott, there is a real connection between the claims of the named plaintiff and the claims which defendants seek to bifurcate and sever"); Jamison, 25 1 F. Supp.2d at 1322-23 (rejecting defendant's fraudulent joinder claim and granting remand because claims had a sufficient "logical relationship" to satisfy permissive joinder under both the federal and Mississippi joinder rules); Coleman, 238 F. Supp.2d at 817-19 (finding "collusive" misjoinder of plaintiffs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 and dismissing 45 out-of-state plaintiffs because their claims arose in "complete factual, temporal and geographic isolation"); In re Diet Drugs, 1999 554584, at *3 (finding fraudulent misjoinder because "[p]laintiffs' attempt to join persons from seven different states into one civil action who have absolutely no connection to each other" went "well beyond misjoinder").

Such "procedural misjoinder" [is] a plaintiffs purposeful attempt to defeat removal by joining together claims against two or more defendants where the presence of one would defeat removal and where in reality there is no sufficient factual nexus among the claims to satisfy the permissive joinder standard.

District courts in this circuit have declined to find that claims and parties have been fraudulently misjoined if there is a "palpable connection" between the claims and parties joined. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Ed., 1998 WL 160919, at *3; see also Johnson, 214 F.R.D. at42Q; Ren-Dan Farms, 952 F. Supp. at 375-76. For instance, in Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., the plaintiff alleged a series-of transactions that could have resulted in overlapping liability among defendants though there was no single transaction joining the defendants. See id. The court held the plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to withstand the defendant's claim of fraudulent misjoinder because if defendant's conduct could have jointly or severally caused plaintiffs1 alleged damage, there was a "palpable connection" between the claims and parties joined. Id. at *2-3. Accordingly, this Court's jurisdictional inquiry is broader than simply whether the joined claims and parties comply with the technical rules of joinder. See Marble v. Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 571, 574-75 (N.D.Miss. 1998) (holding that "the joinder of the defendants, . . . whether proper or improper under [Fed.R.Civ.P. 20] was not so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder").

Purdue argues that the plaintiffs products liability claim has been improperly cumulated with the negligence action, in violation of Louisiana procedure, and that such improper cumulation of actions constitutes fraudulent misjoinder. Whether the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides the applicable analytical framework within which to analyze Purdue's fraudulent misjoinder claim appears to be an issue of first impression in the federal courts sitting in Louisiana. Purdue cites no authority for this proposition. This Court's research reveals that among the federal district courts sitting in other jurisdictions, the question of whether a claim of fraudulent joinder should be analyzed under state joinder rules or Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 is unsettled. Compare Coleman, 238 F. Supp.2d at 814-817 (examining choice of law at length and determining that "the joinder provisions of Rule 20 are procedural in nature" and, therefore, "Federal Rule 20, rather than Mississippi Rule 20, applies to the subject fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs issue") with In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 260 F. Supp.2d 722, 729 (holding that "the relevant question in this case is whether the Mississippi Supreme Court would find that the plaintiffs in these cases were misjoined under Mississippi Rule 20") and Conk, 77 F. Supp.2d at 971 (holding that a claim of fraudulent misjoinder should be analyzed under Indiana Trial Rule 20(A)(2) rather than Fed.R.Civ.P. 20); see also Jamison, 251 F. Supp.2d at 1321 n. 6 (discussing the Conk rationale approvingly).

This Court finds it unnecessary to reach the issue because this case, unlike Tapscott, does not present an example of "egregious" misjoinder. In Tapscott, there were multiple plaintiffs whose claims were "matched with particular defendants against whom they alleged individual claims" Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1359. In this case, unlike Tapscott, there is one plaintiff alleging claims against all of the joined defendants. Additionally, there is a "palpable connection" between plaintiffs claims against all joined defendants. It is undisputed that plaintiff has alleged a viable negligence claim against the Louisiana defendants for damages arising from certain injuries suffered by Bright. Moreover, plaintiff has stated a products liability claim against Purdue based on Blight's ingestion of Oxycontin, a drug used to treat those injuries. In these circumstances, "it cannot be said that there is `no real connection' between the defendants." Marble, 996 F. Supp. at 574-75 (distinguishing Tapscott and holding that the joinder of the defendants does not rise to the level of fraudulent joinder where one plaintiff alleges claims against all joined defendants). Here, plaintiff alleges one series of events leading to Blight's ultimate death. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is "no real connection" between the claims or that the claim against Purdue is "wholly distinct" from the claims against the non-diverse defendants.

The cases upon which Purdue relies are unpersuasive. All three cases, In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig.9 168 F. Supp.2d 136, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y 2001), Simmons v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. 1996 WL 617492, at *1 (E.D.Pa.), and In re Diet Drugs 1999 WL 554584, at *3, involved courts severing factually unrelated claims by multiple plaintiffs against various drug manufacturer defendants. Notably, Purdue has not cited any case where claims alleged by a single plaintiff against multiple defendants have been severed from a lawsuit on the basis of fraudulent misjoinder.

Nonetheless, Purdue argues that plaintiffs improper cumulation of actions in this case constitutes fraudulent joinder because 1) the facts relevant to the electrocution accident have nothing to do with the facts of the products liability action; 2) there is no common question of law between the two claims; and 3) there is no joint liability between the defendants because Purdue cannot be assigned fault for Blight's initial injuries and the non-diverse defendants, as a matter of legal cause under Louisiana law, cannot be assigned any fault for Bright's ultimate death. The Court finds that there are common questions of fact present in plaintiffs allegations. Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Bright was electrocuted due to the negligence of the non-diverse defendants and, as a result, he suffered severe injuries "including injuries to his spine, nervous system, and mind." Having been prescribed Oxycontin to treat these injuries by his treating physician, Bright died due to the toxic effects of Oxycontin on his body. Plaintiff further alleges that Oxycontin is an unreasonably dangerous product because, inter alia, Oxycontin may cause death and injury as a result of foreseeable use, Purdue failed to warn consumers and physicians about the dangers of Oxycontin, and Purdue overpromoted the use of Oxycontin without regard to the risks and hazards that the drug posed to patients.

Plaintiffs ability to establish that Oxycontin is unreasonably dangerous and that, in fact, Oxycontin caused Bright's death could possibly depend on Bright's physical condition at the time he ingested Oxycontin. See In re Rezulin, 168 F. Supp.2d at 146 (severing plaintiffs `pharmaceutical products liability claims because each individual claim could depend "on such variables as exposure to the drug, the patient's physical state at the time of taking the drug, and a host of other known and unknown factors that must be considered at trial with respect to each individual plaintiff). Therefore, facts regarding the nature, extent, and degree of injury caused by electrocution are common to both the negligence claims and the products liability claim.

The Court also finds that there exists a possibility of overlapping issues of law with respect to causation and damages. In 1996, the Louisiana legislature placed Louisiana in a "pure comparative fault" system. Dumas v. Dept. of Culture, Recreation Tourism, 828 So.2d 530, 535 (La. 2002). The Louisiana Civil Code "clearly requires that the fault of every person responsible for a plaintiffs injuries be compared, whether or not they are parties, regardless of the legal theory of liability asserted against each person." Id. at 537. In addition, La. Civ. Code 2324(B) clearly provides that "in non-intentional cases, liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation." Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges that Purdue is "liable jointly, severally, and in solido with the other tortfeasors in this matter for the death of William Bright, III." Therefore, the issue of the apportionment of legal fault with respect to Blight's death is a common question of law as to all joined defendants, even though the claims against the non-diverse defendants are based in negligence and the claim against Purdue is grounded in products liability.

Purdue maintains, however, that plaintiffs claims are fraudulently misjoined because Louisiana tort law precludes the possibility that Purdue and the non-diverse defendants are joint tortfeasors. It argues that joint tortfeasor status among the joined defendants is precluded because, as a matter of legal causation, the Louisiana defendants cannot be held liable for Bright's death and that Purdue cannot be held liable for Bright's initial injuries. Purdue argues that legal causation for Bright's death is lacking with respect to the claims against the non-diverse defendants because "[n]o one . . . could reasonably expect that a person striking a power line might later use a defective product to treat pain caused by the electrocution injury, and suffer harm because of the alleged product defect."

First, neither state nor federal rules of joinder require that the plaintiff establish joint liability as to all joined defendants, on every theory of liability, as a necessary prerequisite to joining parties and claims. See Jamison, 251 F. Supp.2d at 1323 ("[T]he defendants' argument that the allegations of the Complaint provide no basis for holding [a non-diverse] defendant jointly liable with the other defendants overlooks Rule 20's language permitting joinder of persons whose liability is allegedly joint, several, or in the alternative.") (internal quotes ommitted); Pierce v. Reily-Benton Co., Inc., 846 So.2d 143, 144 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that a plaintiff need allege solidary liability as to all defendants as a prerequisite for cumulating actions under La. Code Civ. P. 463).

Second, although it is unlikely that a product defect in Oxycontin could be found to be the legal cause of Blight's initial injuries, plaintiff may be able to establish that the alleged negligence of the Louisiana defendants is a legal cause of Blight's death. Unlike common law jurisdictions, Louisiana tort law does not evaluate legal causation in terms of proximate cause, foreseeability, and intervening acts. Younger v. Mar shall Indus., Inc. M/V Mr. Jeffery, 618 So.2d 866, 872 (La. 1993). Rather, in evaluating legal causation, the Louisiana courts employ a duty-risk analysis. Id.

Under this approach, there must be a finding of causation-in-fact arid a determination of whether the law imposes a duty under the circumstances and, if so, whether the particular risk which occurred is within the scope of the protection extended by the imposition of the duty.

In Weber v. Charity Hospital, 475 So.2d 1047 (La. 1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the duty not to injure another person encompassed the risk that a tort victim's injuries might be worsened by the subsequent negligent medical treatment for those injuries because there was an "ease of association" between the injury and the rule of law which gave rise to the initial duty. Id. at 1050. Purdue argues that the Weber principle is inapplicable in this case because plaintiff has not alleged that Bright's injuries were worsened by subsequent medical malpractice. It insists that although courts may consider an initial tortfeasor and doctors who negligently treat the tortfeasor's victim as joint tortfeasors, the same cannot be said for tortfeasors and manufacturers of allegedly defective products.

However, in Younger, 618 So.2d at 873, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the "weakened condition theory" of tort liability, holding that "the duty of a tortfeasor not to injure a victim includes the risk that due to his weakened physical condition, the victim would require the assistance of a medical device or appliance to accomplish his daily tasks, and that such device might be defective, further injuring the victim." Under the "weakened condition" theory, the Court concluded that an initial tortfeasor may be held liable for a subsequent injury because there was an "ease of association" between a defendant's duty not to injure a plaintiff and the risk that a plaintiffs weakened condition would necessitate the use of a medical device and that the device would be defective thereby causing further injury. See id. at 873. Although Younger involved a tort victim's use of an allegedly defective medical device rather than an allegedly defective drug, subsequent decisions of Louisiana courts have established that Younger established a "broad basis for recovery" that extends the "weakened condition" theory beyond the use of a medical device. See Butcher v. Mount Airy Ins. Co., 741 So.2d 745, 749 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1999) (Amy, J. concurring). Applied in this case, if plaintiff proves that Blight's death was attributable to his "weakened condition" as well as the toxic effects of Oxycontin, a factfinder may find that the conduct of the Louisiana defendants was a legal cause of Bright's death.

C. Conclusion

Because a sufficient factual and legal nexus between plaintiffs claims and the joined defendants exists, there is no fraudulent misjoinder in this case. The Court emphasizes, however, that in so holding this Court does not hold that the cumulation of actions under Louisiana procedure was proper or that plaintiff will actually, or even probably, prevail on the merits with respect to the claims stated against any of the defendants either jointly or severally. Even if Purdue is correct that plaintiffs claims are improperly cumulated under Louisiana procedure, such "mere misjoinder" is more properly addressed to the state district court. See Johns on, 2147.R.D. at 421 ("Since the Court has found that . . . the joinder of the plaintiffs' claims against the [defendants], even if not proper, does not rise to the level of fraudulent joinder, the Court shall let the state court decide the issues of improper joinder and severance."); Alman v. GlaxoSmithKline Corp., 2002 WL 465202, at *4 (E.D.La.) ("Whereas `fraudulent joinder' is properly addressed by the federal District Court, the issue of'misjoinder1 is more properly addressed to the state District Court.").

Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of plaintiff, Carol Fox Bright, to remand is GRANTED and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this action is REMANDED to the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa.