Opinion
C. A. 23-4364-SAL-PJG
04-12-2024
Jovan Bradshaw, Plaintiff, v. Tabitha Carson; Oakdale Elementary School Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jovan Bradshaw, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. By order dated September 25, 2023, the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct deficiencies identified by the court that would warrant summary dismissal of the Complaint. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 34.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance of service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the original complaint on a standard complaint form for civil rights violations. Plaintiff claimed he was falsely arrested and “tortured” by police officers in front of his children. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, Plaintiff provided no other facts in the section of the form Complaint asking for Plaintiff to provide the facts underlying his claim. Plaintiff indicated that he brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages. Plaintiff listed three Rock Hill, South Carolina police officers as defendants-Officer Malicki, Eric Olson, and an unnamed detective. Plaintiff also listed a solicitor, Jessica Russo, as a defendant.
In documents attached to the Complaint, an arrest warrant indicates that Plaintiff was charged with custodial interference for transporting a minor across state lines without the minor's custodial parent's permission in violation of S.C. Code § 16-17-495. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1.)
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names completely new defendants: his ex-wife, Tabitha Carson, and his child's former school, Oakdale Elementary School. Plaintiff indicates he brings this action pursuant to several federal criminal statutes relating to conspiracy to deprive civil rights-18 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that the new defendants falsely accused him of kidnapping when he picked his child up from school in December 2022, which is apparently the event that led to his arrest as explained in the original complaint. Plaintiff lists three causes of action against the new defendants-civil conspiracy, harassment, and custodial interference. Plaintiff seeks damages against them and to restrain them from interfering with Plaintiff's custodial rights.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court finds that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the court, this case should nonetheless be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff indicates he brings this case pursuant to criminal statutes related to the deprivation of civil rights, but in light of the court's duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings and Plaintiff's claim for damages and injunctive relief, the court construes the Amended Complaint as raising claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. Section 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Meanwhile, § 1985 allows a plaintiff to recover for damages arising out of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law. A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). However, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 or § 1985 claim upon which relief can be granted for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that his ex-wife, Carson, is a state actor who is amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 49 (“To constitute state action, ‘the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible,' and ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982)); see also Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that whether the defendants are state actors depends on, among other factors, whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, the extent and nature of public assistance and public benefits accorded the private actor, the extent and nature of governmental regulation over the actor, and whether the state itself regards the actor as a state actor). Plaintiff provides no allegations that Carson exercised any right or privilege created by the State when she accused Plaintiff of a crime. See, e.g, Dillberg v. Cty. of Kitsap, 76 Fed.Appx. 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating a complaining witness is not a state actor amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983); Dement v. Summers Cty. Courthouse, Civil Action No. 5:13-cv-08899, 2015 WL 461560, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 3, 2015) (stating that private citizens that testify in a judicial proceeding are not state actors amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983); Hall v. Watson, Civil Action No. 6:06-cv-3110-RBH, 2007 WL 1447755, at *3 (D.S.C. May 11, 2007) (“[A] witness in a state court proceeding cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a witness does not act under color of state law.”), affd, 259 Fed.Appx. 599 (4th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Carson is not a state actor amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983.
Second, Oakdale Elementary School is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”). Courts have held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and do not act under color of state law. See, e.g., Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the Lexington County Detention Center, “as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”); see also Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). Because an elementary school is not a corporate or political body itself, Oakdale Elementary School is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.
Third, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy to violate his rights. Plaintiff claims the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights, but his claim is conclusory and lacks any specific factual support. See A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 346 (“We have specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.”) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 361 (4th Cir. 2022) (stating that to demonstrate a conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a “single plan, the essential nature and scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences). Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly show that there existed a plan to deprive him of his rights. Consequently, Plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1985 claims are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the court recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without the issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).